Antaeus Enterprises et a l . v . Davidson CV-10-126-JL 3/29/11 P
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Antaeus Enterprises, Inc. and James H . Rand
v. Civil N o . 10-cv-126-JL Opinion N o . 2011 DNH 050 L . John Davidson
MEMORANDUM ORDER
The question in this case is whether judgment creditors of a
limited liability company can hold the company’s owner personally
liable for the judgment by “piercing the corporate veil.”
Plaintiffs Antaeus Enterprises, Inc. and James H . Rand recently
obtained a default judgment against SD-Barn Real Estate, LLC for
damages allegedly caused by its failure to timely pay them money
due under certain promissory notes. See Antaeus Enters., Inc. v .
SD-Barn Real Estate, LLC, N o . 05-6396 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1 1 , 2007).
Unable to collect the judgment from SD-Barn, an admitted “shell
corporation” with no assets or business activities, they brought
this suit against SD-Barn’s sole member, defendant L . John
Davidson, seeking to pierce the corporate veil and recover the
judgment from him personally. This court has subject-matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (diversity).
Plaintiffs have now moved for summary judgment, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 5 6 , arguing that they can pierce the corporate veil as a
matter of law because the record shows that Davidson used SD-Barn to perpetrate a fraud and injustice, diverting to himself money
that SD-Barn owed to them. See, e.g., LaMontagne Builders, Inc.
v . Bowman Brook Purchase Group, 150 N.H. 2 7 0 , 275 (2003) (courts
“will pierce the corporate veil and assess individual liability
. . . where the corporate identity has been used to promote an
injustice or fraud”). 1 After hearing oral argument, this court
denies the motion. Davidson has offered a competing explanation
for his conduct that, while not fully compliant with SD-Barn’s
obligations under the promissory notes, could be construed as
neither fraudulent nor unjust. Because material facts thus
remain in dispute, plaintiffs’ veil-piercing claim cannot be
resolved on summary judgment.
I. Applicable legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). An issue is “genuine” if it could
1 Both parties agree that the veil-piercing claim is governed by New Hampshire law, since that is the state where SD-Barn is registered. See, e.g., Archdiocese of San Salvador v . FM Int’l, LLC, 2006 DNH 1 0 2 , 18 n.13 (DiClerico, D.J.) (citing Goya Foods, Inc. v . Unanue, 233 F.3d 3 8 , 43 n . 4 (1st Cir. 2000), and 1 William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corporations § 41.90, at 696-97 (rev. ed. 1999)).
2 reasonably be resolved in either party’s favor at trial, and
“material” if it could sway the outcome under applicable law.
Estrada v . Rhode Island, 594 F.3d 5 6 , 62 (1st Cir. 2010). Where,
as here, plaintiffs seek “summary judgment on claims for which
they, as plaintiffs, would bear the burden of proof at trial,”
they “cannot attain summary judgment unless the evidence that
they provide is conclusive.” Zimmerman v . Puccio, 613 F.3d 6 0 ,
70 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Village Press, Inc. v . Stephen
Edward Co., 120 N.H. 469, 471 (1980) (stating that plaintiffs
bear the burden of proof on veil-piercing claims under New
Hampshire l a w ) .
In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court must
“view[] all facts and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Estrada, 594 F.3d
at 6 2 . Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that this court must
accept their version of the facts because Davidson, who is
appearing pro s e , did not submit any affidavits or other properly
authenticated evidence with his objection. See L.R. 7.2(b)(2).
But in the earlier case that resulted in the default judgment
against SD-Barn, where Davidson had counsel, he submitted an
affidavit and deposition testimony that set forth his own version
of the facts. This court will consider those materials in
evaluating plaintiffs’ motion. See, e.g., Dutil v . Murphy, 550
F.3d 1 5 4 , 158 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that courts “endeavor,
3 within reasonable limits, to guard against the loss of pro se
claims due to technical defects”); Gilroy v . Kasper, 654 F. Supp.
2d 4 4 , 46 n.2 (D.N.H. 2009) (accepting late-filed affidavit
because of party’s pro se status). 2
II. Background
In the early 1990s, having enjoyed a successful career in
real estate development, Davidson embarked on a new business
venture seeking to develop and market a technique for
pasteurizing chicken eggs. He initially conducted the venture as
a limited partnership, Pasteurized Eggs L P . In 2001, hoping to
raise additional funds, he formed a new corporation, Pasteurized
Eggs Corporation (“PEC”), of which he became the president, chief
executive officer, and chairman of the board of directors, as
well as the largest shareholder. PEC struggled financially,
however, and Davidson lasted only nine months in his management
role before the board (on which plaintiffs Antaeus and Rand each
had a seat) removed him. Nevertheless, Davidson remained the
company’s largest shareholder.
By fall of 2002, PEC was exploring the possibility of filing
a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United
2 This court need not rule on plaintiffs’ objections to the other materials that Davidson submitted with his summary judgment briefs, because the court did not rely on those materials in ruling on the motion.
4 States Bankruptcy Code, which it eventually did. See In re
Pasteurized Eggs Corp., N o . 02-13086 (Bankr. D.N.H. Oct. 5 ,
2002). Davidson met with PEC’s board to discuss financing
options. They agreed that PEC would take out a $700,000 debtor-
in-possession (“DIP”) loan, with half of the money coming from
Davidson3 and the other half coming from Antaeus, Rand, and two
other investors (one of whom is now deceased, and the other
incapacitated). SD-Barn, a limited liability company that
Davidson had formed several years earlier but had never used,
served as a conduit for the loan. The investors loaned the money
to SD-Barn (in exchange for promissory notes), which in turn
loaned the money to PEC (in exchange for a separate note).
By Davidson’s own admission, SD-Barn was merely a “shell
corporation,” with no assets, no employees, no regular meetings,
and no business activities other than serving as a conduit for
the DIP loan. Davidson was its sole member and the only person
responsible for its activities. If he needed assistance in
carrying out those activities (e.g., accounting), he relied on
the employees of his other businesses. Davidson claims that the
other DIP lenders were “fully aware of the status and
3 In his affidavit, Davidson acknowledges that the contribution made to the DIP loan by another investor, Frederick Flather, “is considered to be part of my contribution,” so this court will treat it as such and will not discuss Flather separately.
5 characteristics of SD-Barn” and, indeed, sought assurances from
him that the company would serve no other purpose during the term
of the loan.
Even with the DIP loan, PEC could not raise the funds
necessary to reorganize under Chapter 1 1 . Instead, PEC agreed in
2003 to sell substantially all of its assets to National
Pasteurized Eggs, LLC (“NPE”), which was then the sole licensee
of its pasteurization technology. See In re Pasteurized Eggs
Corp., N o . 02-13086 (Bankr. D.N.H. July 2 5 , 2003) (approving the
sale). As part of that transaction, NPE assumed PEC’s obligation
to repay the DIP loan. NPE made an up-front payment to SD-Barn
of $200,000 and issued a promissory note for the remaining
balance (about $590,000, which included accrued interest). The
note required that NPE make interest payments to SD-Barn on a
monthly basis for the term of the loan, pay half of the
outstanding principal in July 2004, and finally pay the other
half in July 2005.
After deducting expenses, SD-Barn distributed NPE’s initial
$200,000 payment to the DIP lenders on a pro rata basis and then
issued amended and restated promissory notes for the remaining
balances owed to each of them (including approximately $85,000
each for Anteaus and Rand). The amended notes required SD-Barn,
upon receiving any further payments by NPE, to distribute those
payments to the lenders on a pro rata basis within five days. In
6 the event that SD-Barn failed to distribute those payments within
ten days of the due date, the notes provided that SD-Barn would
be deemed in default and that the lenders would have a “right of
acceleration,” meaning that “all sums payable under [the note
would] become immediately due and payable [by SD-Barn] without
further notice or demand.”
NPE made monthly principal payments to SD-Barn throughout
the term of the loan, totaling about $44,000. SD-Barn failed,
however, to distribute those payments to the other DIP lenders on
a pro rata basis. Instead, SD-Barn transferred them into
Davidson’s personal bank accounts. The same thing happened with
NPE’s first principal payment in July 2004. Shortly after that
payment, Davidson brought suit against Rand, Antaeus, and various
other parties in New Hampshire Superior Court, alleging that they
misappropriated his intellectual property and committed various
other torts in connection with PEC’s demise. See Davidson v .
Rand, N o . 04-C-805 (N.H. Super. C t . Sept. 1 7 , 2004). Rand and
Antaeus claim that Davidson withheld the NPE payments from them
in retaliation for that alleged mistreatment and also to give
himself greater leverage in the New Hampshire Superior Court litigation.4
4 Davidson has since become involved in several more cases relating to PEC’s demise, including at least one currently pending before this court. See Nat’l Pasteurized Eggs, LLC v . Davidson, 2011 DNH 009.
7 Davidson, however, claims that he was simply preoccupied
with a personal tragedy: one of his daughters was dying of
cancer. He temporarily relocated from New Hampshire to Texas in
early 2004 to be with her. To make matters worse, in August
2004, shortly before his daughter died (and just after NPE’s
first principal payment), Davidson himself suffered a stroke and
was hospitalized. He suffered another stroke, which left him
blind, in September 2004, just after his daughter died. Under
the circumstances, he “decided that it would be better--with my
inability geographically, physically, and in every other way--to
attend to the issues of the DIP [loan] at a later time and
authorize my bookkeeper . . . to pay me off [with NPE’s first
principal payment] and to earmark the next payment for” the other
DIP lenders, knowing that he and they were each entitled to half
of the principal and thus would all be paid in full, albeit not
at the same time (and not in accordance with the terms of the
promissory notes).
As for the monthly interest payments, Davidson believed it
was proper for SD-Barn to distribute them to him as “partial
payment” for the expenses that he incurred in connection with the
DIP loan (including, most notably, legal fees in excess of
$10,000). The notes provided that SD-Barn “shall deduct from the
outstanding amount due under this note a pro rata proportion of
expenses incurred . . . in relation to [each lender’s] share of
8 the obligations.” Davidson believed that those expenses would
exceed the other lenders’ share of the interest payments (about
$22,000). He planned a final accounting of the loan after NPE’s
second principal payment, and after his health improved, at which
time any amounts owed by or to the other lenders could be
calculated.
Davidson never communicated these plans to the other DIP
lenders. He admits that he was, and still i s , upset with them
for failing to contact him to see how he was doing after his two
strokes. Fearing that Davidson planned to keep all of NPE’s
payments for himself, the other lenders sent him letters in 2005
demanding that SD-Barn immediately distribute their pro rata
shares of NPE’s past payments, and that it instruct NPE to make
all future payments directly to them, not to SD-Barn. But SD-
Barn did not respond to the letters, or take either of the
requested actions.5 Davidson recalls that he “just didn’t pay
any attention” to the issue, “knowing full well that a [second
principal] payment of equal amount would be forthcoming” in July
5 There is a factual dispute over exactly what Davidson told NPE with regard to the future payments. Both parties agree that he did not expressly instruct NPE to make the payments directly to the other DIP lenders (though Davidson seemed to suggest otherwise at oral argument). Davidson claims, however, that he had “no ability” to give that instruction and that, in discussing the issue with NPE, he “never voiced any objection” to direct payment.
9 2005 and would be distributed to the other lenders, making
everyone “even-steven in [his] mind.”
About two weeks before the deadline for NPE’s second
principal payment, the other DIP lenders sued SD-Barn and
Davidson in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, seeking a declaration of their rights under
the promissory notes and asserting claims for breach of contract
against SD-Barn, tortious interference with contract against
Davidson, and conversion against both defendants. See Antaeus
Enters., Inc. v . SD-Barn Real Estate, LLC, N o . 05-06396 (S.D.N.Y.
July 1 3 , 2005). They also named NPE as a nominal defendant.
With the district court’s approval, NPE deposited the second
principal payment into the court’s registry in September 2005,
and was voluntarily dismissed from the case by stipulation of the
parties.
SD-Barn and Davidson initially moved to dismiss the case for
lack of personal jurisdiction or to transfer it to New Hampshire,
their home state, but the district court denied both requests.
See Antaeus Enters., Inc. v . SD-Barn Real Estate, LLC, 396 F.
Supp. 2d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). They then answered the complaint,
denying liability and asserting various defenses and
counterclaims. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the
counterclaims, prompting SD-Barn and Davidson to voluntarily
dismiss them. The plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment on
10 their own claims. In August 2006, before that motion was fully
briefed, the parties stipulated that the full amount that NPE had
deposited in the court’s registry could be released to the
plaintiffs (consistent with Davidson’s assertion at his June 2006
deposition in that case that “they can have it all”).
Following that stipulation, counsel for both SD-Barn and
Davidson withdrew from the case. Davidson continued, on a pro se
basis, to defend the claims against him personally. SD-Barn,
however, did not retain new counsel or appear at any subsequent
hearings, so the district court entered a default judgment
against SD-Barn for $665,284.30 in damages, consisting mostly of
the plaintiffs’ alleged legal fees incurred in the litigation up
to that point. See Antaeus Enters., Inc. v . SD-Barn Real Estate,
LLC, N o . 05-6396 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1 1 , 2007). In the promissory
notes, SD-Barn had “agree[d] to pay all costs of collection when
incurred [by the DIP lenders], including reasonable attorney’s
fees.”
Notwithstanding the default judgment against SD-Barn, the
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment against Davidson remained
pending. The district court granted i t , finding Davidson
personally liable for tortious interference with contract, in
that he intentionally caused SD-Barn not to distribute NPE’s
payments pro rata to the other DIP lenders within the time
specified in the promissory notes. See Antaeus Enters., Inc. v .
11 SD-Barn Real Estate, LLC, 480 F. Supp. 2d 734 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Since the plaintiffs had already received their half of NPE’s
principal payments from the court’s registry, they were awarded
damages on that claim for only their half of the interest
payments (about $22,000). The court refused to incorporate
plaintiffs’ legal fees into the damages award, finding that
Davidson’s arguments against liability, though “weak,” were not
“vexatious or intended to prolong the litigation,” nor “so
lacking in merit that Davidson should be punished for making
them.” Id. at 745-46.
In an unusual procedural move, the plaintiffs appealed that
favorable judgment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. They
were worried that, because they had amended their complaint
(while the summary judgment motion was pending) to add a veil-
piercing claim against Davidson, the judgment might be construed
to have res judicata effect on that claim, thus preventing them
from seeking to enforce the SD-Barn default judgment against
Davidson in a future action (and thereby preventing them from
recovering their legal fees). The court of appeals, agreeing
that the veil-piercing claim had never been adjudicated, remanded
for consideration of that claim only, affirming the judgment in
all other respects. See Antaeus Enters., Inc. v . SD-Barn Real
12 Estate, LLC, 305 Fed. Appx. 675, 677 (2d Cir. 2008). 6 Then, on
remand, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the claim without
prejudice.
Two of them, Antaeus and Rand, re-filed the veil-piercing
claim against Davidson in this court in 2010, having been unable
to collect the default judgment from SD-Barn (or even to collect
the personal judgment from Davidson, as to which they filed an
enforcement action in New Hampshire Superior Court 7 ). Without
conducting any discovery, beyond that already conducted in the
New York action, they moved for summary judgment, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 5 6 , arguing that they are entitled to pierce SD-Barn’s
corporate veil as a matter of law. This court will now turn to
that issue.
6 The court of appeals advised the district court, on remand, to “consider whether fairness to Davidson requires that the default judgment against SD-Barn should be reopened to permit Davidson to contest the amount for which he would be personally liable in the event that the veil-piercing claim is upheld.” Antaeus, 305 Fed. Appx. at 677. Antaeus and Rand have no objection to this court’s conducting that inquiry, see document n o . 17-1, at 1 7 , and fairness does indeed require i t , particularly in light of the fact that plaintiffs’ claimed legal fees exceed the amount of their recovery. Thus, the parties should be prepared to address the damages issue at trial, rather than assuming that the amount of the default judgment will control. 7 Plaintiffs informed the court at oral argument that they recently received a payment from Davidson in satisfaction of that personal judgment.
13 III. Analysis
“Ordinarily, corporate owners are not liable for a
corporation’s debts” under New Hampshire law, barring an
agreement to the contrary. Norwood Group, Inc. v . Phillips, 149
N.H. 7 2 2 , 724 (2003). That limitation on personal liability is
considered “one of the desirable and legitimate attributes of the
corporate form of doing business.” LaMontagne, 150 N.H. at 275.
Courts “will pierce the corporate veil and assess individual
liability, however, where the corporate identity has been used to
promote an injustice or fraud.” Id. It is the plaintiff’s
burden to prove that the corporate identity has been used in that
manner. See Village Press, 120 N.H. at 471. “The doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy and,
therefore, is particularly within the province of the trial
court.” LaMontagne, 150 N.H. at 274.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has not yet considered a
veil-piercing claim involving a limited liability company. But
another federal court in this district recently held, and this
court agrees, that “it is likely that New Hampshire courts would
permit piercing of the veil of an LLC under the same
circumstances as permitted for corporations.” In re Gilbert, N o .
06-10119, 2007 WL 397018, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.H. Feb. 1 , 2007).
Neither party has argued for a different rule here.
14 Plaintiffs argue that it is appropriate to pierce the
corporate veil because the summary judgment record shows that
Davidson used SD-Barn to perpetrate a fraud and injustice, first
by diverting to himself money that SD-Barn owed to them and then
by mounting an aggressive and frivolous defense when they sued
him and SD-Barn to recover the money. They allege that his
motives, in doing s o , were to retaliate for the way they treated
him in connection with PEC’s demise and to give himself greater
leverage in his separate suit against them in New Hampshire
Superior Court. It is true that the record could reasonably be
construed to support such an inference. And it is true that such
conduct would warrant piercing the corporate veil. See id. at
275 (affirming trial court’s decision to pierce veil where owner
“breached his promise to pay [plaintiff] without good cause,”
gave “disingenuous” and “bad faith” reasons for doing s o , and
most of the money went instead to the owner).
But that is not the only inference that one could reasonably
draw from the summary judgment record. As discussed in Part I I ,
supra, Davidson has offered another, less sinister explanation:
that he was distracted from SD-Barn’s affairs by his daughter’s
death and his own severe health problems; that, rather than
distributing NEP’s two principal payments pro rata, he simply
allocated the first payment to himself and the second payment to
the other DIP lenders, knowing that they would all be fully paid
15 within a year; that he kept NPE’s interest payments as
reimbursement for legitimate expenses that SD-Barn had incurred
in connection with the loan; that any minor adjustments necessary
were to be made after a final accounting of the loan; and that
his defense to the plaintiffs’ suit was neither frivolous nor
overly aggressive, according to the court that presided over i t .
See Antaeus, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 745-46.
Plaintiffs protest that Davidson’s explanation for his
conduct is not “credible.” Document n o . 17-1, at 1 0 . But this
court is not permitted to make credibility determinations at the
summary judgment stage. Rather, as discussed in Part I , supra,
it must “view the record in the light most favorable to
[Davidson] and resolve all reasonable inferences in [his] favor,
without weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of
the witnesses.” Sheehan v . N . Am. Mktg. Corp., 610 F.3d 144, 149
(1st Cir. 2010). Under that approach, it is clear that material
facts remain in dispute, particularly regarding Davidson’s
intent. Plaintiffs have not presented “conclusive” proof that
Davidson used SD-Barn to promote a fraud or injustice, as would
be required to pierce the corporate veil at the summary judgment
stage. See Zimmerman, 613 F.3d at 7 0 .
Plaintiffs also point to a number of undisputed facts that,
they say, support piercing the corporate veil, including that (1)
Davidson had sole and exclusive control over SD-Barn; (2) SD-Barn
16 failed to observe corporate formalities, other than keeping
accounting records for the DIP loan; (3) SD-Barn was an admitted
“shell corporation” with no assets; and ( 4 ) SD-Barn intermingled
its affairs with those of Davidson’s other businesses by using
their employees. Those are indeed some of the relevant factors
that may be considered in determining whether to pierce the
corporate veil. See, e.g., Border Brook Terrance Condo. Ass’n v .
Gladstone, 137 N.H. 1 1 , 15 (1993); Walter L. Murphy & Daniel C .
Pope, New Hampshire Civil Jury Instructions § 36.1, at 36-2
(2007).
Again, however, those factors are not necessarily
“conclusive,” as would be required to pierce the corporate veil
on summary judgment. Zimmerman, 613 F.3d at 7 0 . The New
Hampshire Supreme Court has made clear, for example, that
“piercing the corporate veil is not permitted solely because a
corporation is a one-man operation,” unless there is “proof that
the [owner] conveyed property fraudulently . . . or that he
misled [creditors] as to the corporate assets.” Village Press,
120 N.H. at 471-72 (quotation omitted). Similarly, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the corporate veil should not be pierced
based on a lack of corporate formality, unless the informality
was “intended to promote injustice or fraud.” Druding v . Allen,
122 N.H. 8 2 3 , 828 (1982). Since whether Davidson used SD-Barn to
promote fraud or injustice is a matter of genuine dispute on this
17 record, so too is the weight to be accorded each of these other
factors. Such disputes must be resolved at trial, not on summary
judgment.
Finally, it is worth noting that, even if summary judgment
were granted, trial would still be necessary to determine the
amount of plaintiffs’ damages, if any. See note 6, supra. That
strengthens this court’s conclusion that, under the circumstances
of this case, with a pro se defendant, the best course is to deny
summary judgment and proceed to trial on both liability and
damages.
IV. Expedited discovery
Given that the parties have already conducted significant
discovery (and each expended substantial resources) on this
matter in the earlier action in New York, this court has
determined that it is in the interest of justice to expedite
discovery here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). Discovery shall
proceed as follows:
• The parties shall have 90 days from the date of this order to conduct and complete discovery.
• Each side shall be confined to a maximum of 15 written interrogatories, 5 document requests, and 3 depositions (not including any expert depositions). The interrogatories and document requests, if any, shall be propounded within 20 days of this order and answered within 20 days of receipt.
18 • Expert disclosures, if any, shall be made by the plaintiffs within 30 days of this order, and by the defendant within 30 days of receiving plaintiffs’ disclosures, allowing time for the experts to be deposed before the close of discovery.
• The deadline for joinder of additional parties, amendment of pleadings, and disclosure by the defendant of claims that unnamed parties are at fault for the plaintiffs’ claim, see DeBenedetto v . CLD Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 153 N.H. 793 (2006), shall be 30 days from the date of this order.
• If necessary, the parties may seek leave of court to extend these deadlines or exceed these limitations, stating specifically the grounds for any such request. This court is mindful of the defendant’s pro se status and physical limitations and is prepared to make reasonable accommodations to allow him full and fair discovery.
Discovery disputes will be handled by the undersigned judge,
as opposed to the Magistrate Judge, in the normal course. No
motion to compel is necessary. The party or counsel seeking
discovery-related relief should confer with adverse counsel to
choose mutually available dates, and then contact the Deputy
Clerk to schedule a conference call with the court. The court
will inform counsel and parties what written materials, if any,
should be submitted in advance of the conference call.
Customary motions to compel discovery, while disfavored by
the undersigned judge, are nonetheless permissible. If party or
counsel prefer traditional discovery litigation to the conference
call procedure set forth above, any such motion to compel should
expressly request, in the title of the motion, a referral to the
Magistrate Judge. Such referral requests will normally be
19 granted. If the Magistrate Judge is recused, alternate
arrangements will be made.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment8 is DENIED. Discovery shall proceed on an
expedited basis, consistent with Part IV of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph N . Laplante United States District Judge
Dated: March 2 9 , 2011
cc: David Himelfarb, Esq. Russell F. Hilliard, Esq. L . John Davidson, pro se
8 Document n o . 1 7 .