Anson Bartrand v. Public Utility District No. 2 of Grant County

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: December 10, 2024
• Docket: 40011-5
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED DECEMBER 10, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

ANSON BARTRAND, ) No. 40011-5-III ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 2 OF ) GRANT COUNTY, ) ) Respondent. )

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Anson Bartrand appeals the superior court’s

summary dismissal of his complaint based on the doctrine of res judicata. We reverse

and remand.

FACTS

In December 2021, Sentinel Shores, LLC, filed a claim against Public Utility

District (PUD) No. 2 of Grant County in small claims court for breach of a 1962 written

agreement. Sentinel claimed it was an assignee of the agreement, and that the PUD owed

it $120 for six years back rent for the presence of its transmission and distribution lines

on its property. No. 40011-5-III Bartrand v. PUD No. 2

In January 2022, a small claims judgment was entered wherein the court

explained: “Grant County PUD [has] a prescriptive easement in terms of the lines on

property of Sentinel Shores, LLC. Rent is not due and owing per license agreement from

1962.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 51. Because the amount Sentinel sought was $120, i.e.,

not in excess of $250, Sentinel was statutorily precluded from appealing the judgment.

See RCW 12.36.010; RCW 12.40.120.

In July 2023, Anson Bartrand filed a complaint against Grant County PUD in

superior court. Bartrand is Sentinel’s chief financial officer and an owner-member.

Bartrand alleged that Sentinel had quitclaimed the property to him so that he now was the

assignee of the 1962 agreement. In his claim for relief, Bartrand asked for a declaration

of the parties’ rights, for the PUD to acknowledge the agreement and rescind its claim to

a prescriptive easement, and for payment of back rent. In response, the PUD filed a

CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and a declaration with attachments in support of its

motion.

In its motion, the PUD argued that Bartrand’s complaint was barred because res

judicata prevented the issues raised in the complaint from being litigated. Bartrand

responded that res judicata did not apply because the small claims court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction once the PUD raised its prescriptive easement defense. Bartrand

additionally argued:

2 No. 40011-5-III Bartrand v. PUD No. 2

Res judicata is a common law doctrine rooted in the spirit of fairness and justice. [It] is not to be applied rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice, or to work an injustice. Allowing the small claims court to unilaterally make decisions regarding real estate without [an] opportunity for appeal would violate the common law principles of fair play and justice. Small claims actions in which the matter sought by the claimant is under $250 may not be appealed.

CP at 109 (footnote omitted).

The superior court disagreed with Bartrand’s arguments and dismissed his

complaint.

Bartrand appeals.

ANALYSIS

Bartrand argues the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint based on res

judicata. As he argued below, he again argues the small claims court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction once the PUD raised its prescriptive easement defense, and that

applying res judicata to a judgment he was precluded by statute from appealing, works an

injustice. We agree with his second argument and decline to address his first.

Whether res judicata applies to preclude litigation of claims is a question of law

that an appellate court reviews de novo. Weaver v. City of Everett, 194 Wn.2d 464, 473,

450 P.3d 177 (2019). Res judicata precludes litigation of an entire claim when a prior

proceeding involving the same parties and issues culminated in a judgment on the merits

and the claim either was litigated or could have been litigated in the prior proceeding. Id.

3 No. 40011-5-III Bartrand v. PUD No. 2

at 480. For the doctrine to apply, a prior judgment must have a concurrence of identity

with a subsequent action in (1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties,

and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Id. “Under the

principles of res judicata, a judgment is binding upon parties to the litigation and persons

in privity with those parties.” Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 764, 887

P.2d 898 (1995). Here, Bartrand does not dispute any of the doctrine’s four

requirements. Rather, his argument focuses on equity.

“[R]es judicata remains an equitable, common law doctrine. Like its sister

doctrine, collateral estoppel, ‘res judicata . . . is not to be applied so rigidly as to defeat

the ends of justice, or to work an injustice.’” Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 482 (quoting

Henderson v. Bardahl Int’l Corp., 72 Wn.2d 109, 119, 431 P.2d 961 (1967)).

On a prior occasion, we had the opportunity to decide whether res judicata’s sister

doctrine, collateral estoppel, should be applied to bar relitigation of a claim decided in

small claims court where the losing party was barred by statute from appealing.

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Avery, 114 Wn. App. 299, 305,

57 P.3d 300 (2002), we noted that collateral estoppel would not be applied when it would

work an injustice. Under the injustice rubric of our analysis, we wrote:

4 No. 40011-5-III Bartrand v. PUD No. 2

No appeal of a small claims court judgment is allowed unless the amount in controversy, exclusive of costs, exceeds $250. RCW 12.40.120. The amount here was $158.07. State Farm had, therefore, no right to appeal. And for this reason alone, we deny preclusive effect to Mr. Avery's small claims judgment here. Even though [the three requirements for collateral estoppel are present], we will not deny a party the chance to [re]litigate the issue if it was statutorily denied an opportunity to appeal.

Id. at 309 (citation omitted).

Similarly, here, even though the four requirements for res judicata are present, we

will not apply res judicata if a party was statutorily denied the right to appeal. Bartrand's

claim in small claims court was for $120, exclusive of costs, so RCW 12.40.120 denied

him the right to appeal. Application of res judicata under this circumstance would work

an injustice.

We reverse the superior court's summary dismissal of Bartrand's complaint and

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. WE CONCUR:

Staab, J. Cooney, J.