Ansley Realty Co. v. Pope & Smith

151 S.W. 525, 105 Tex. 440, 1912 Tex. LEXIS 174
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 4, 1912
DocketNo. 2260.
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 151 S.W. 525 (Ansley Realty Co. v. Pope & Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ansley Realty Co. v. Pope & Smith, 151 S.W. 525, 105 Tex. 440, 1912 Tex. LEXIS 174 (Tex. 1912).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Brown

delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in Error, hereafter called the Realty Company, sued J. B. Pope and A. M. Smith, hereinafter called defendants, in the District Court of Donley County seeking to recover commissions upon certain lands sold by defendants to the Monarch-Land and Loan Company who were procured as purchasers by plaintiff under a contract with defendants for the sale of the land. The facts were not stated by Judge Dunklin, as provided for by Article 1639 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1911; but we will be able to decide the case upon the record.

*441 At a date prior to the 14th day of August, 1907, by oral contract defendants employed the realty company to sell eight sections of land situated in Moore County, four sections of patented land and four sections of school land, in the aggregate 5,120 acres, at the price of $8.00 per acre for the patented land and $7.50 per acre for the school land; the compensation to be 5% on the gross sales.

The Monarch Land and Loan Company were engaged in the town of Amarillo in buying and selling land and had an agent in Moore County who learned of the fact that the Ansley Realty Company had the agency to sell the land in question and through its agent, McFarland, the Monarch Company and the Realty Company were brought into contact and the sale of the land and the terms thereof were discussed, and the agent of the Monarch Company concluded to buy the land, but did not close the trade but went to Pope and Smith to try for better terms. The price was satisfactory. The purchasing agent of the Monarch Company told Pope and Smith of their having applied to plaintiff to purchase and what had occurred. After their consultation this contract was entered into:

“The State of Texas, County of Donley.
1 ‘ This contract made and entered into by and between A. M. Smith and J. B. Pope, of Donley County, Texas, as parties of the first part, and the Monarch Land & Loan Co., of Amarillo, Texas, as parties of the second part. Witnesseth, that the parties of the first part herein give to the parties of the second part, the exclusive sale of the following described land to-wit: Sections 302, 303, 304, 327, 328, 329, 330, 345, block 44, Moore County, Texas, for ninety days from the twenty-first day of August, providing a sale now pending is not closed on or before that date. The price agreed upon and for which the parties of the first part agree to sell, is $8.00 per acre, straight through, school and patented, and parties of the first part further agree to deed any or all of the above described land, not less than 160 acres in one deed, to the Monarch Land & Loan Co. or any person or persons they may sell to for whatever price the said Monarch Land & Loan Co. may sell for, and all excess above the aforesaid price shall be retained by the party of the second part as their commission. The terms shall be forty per cent cash payment, the balance one and two and three years at 8 per cent interest. The deferred payments shall be evidenced by vendor lien notes on the above described land. The party of the first part further agrees to furnish each purchaser with a warrantee deed and abstract showing good and perfect title. The parties of the second part agree to sell all of the eight sections as per contract, but should there be any remaining after the expiration of the time specified, then the parties of the second part further agree to buy the same themselves. Signed in duplicate this 14th day of August, 1907.
(Seal) A. M. Smith.
(Seal) J. B. Pope.
(Seal) Monarch Land & Loan Co.
(Seal) S. F. Hiatt, Pres.”

*442 Upon the back of the contract was endorsed the following:

“The terms of the contract on the reverse side hereof are hereby extended as to time to and including January 21, 1908, and it is expressly agreed that all supposed claims or claims of either party hereto growing out of any supposed breach or breach of said contract by either party up to this date are hereby waived. Witness our hands at Clarendon, Texas, this 18th day of November, 1907.
“Monarch Land & Loan Co.,
“By S. F. Hiatt, President.
“A. M. Smith.
“J. B. Pope.”

The Monarch Company sold all of the land except one tract which was deeded to it by Smith and Pope. Plaintiff alleged that Smith and Pope had employed it to sell the same land at $8.00 per acre and that it secured the Monarch Company as purchaser for all of the said land at the price named and that the said Monarch Company did purchase from defendants all of the land at $8.00 per acre. The defendants claimed that the transaction between them and the Monarch Company was not a sale but an employment of the Monarch Company as agent to sell the same land.

These propositions are essential to the right of plaintiff to recover: (1) That Smith & Pope sold the land to the Monarch Company. (2) That the Monarch Company was procured by the Realty Company as purchaser of the land.

Counsel for defendants in error state the issues correctly thus: “Everybody conceded that there was a .trade consummated between Pope and Smith and the Monarch Land & Loan Company on the 14th of August, 1907, just as Dan Ansley stated. The controverted question was as to whether this trade was one for the sale of the land or for the exclusive agency for its sale. If the former, the plaintiffs were entitled to win; if the latter, the defendants were entitled to win.” Whether the transaction was a sale or the creation of an agency must, in this case, be determined by the terms of the contract itself. The character of the instrument can best be determined by ascertaining the remedy to which each party would be entitled in case of refusal of the other to comply. If it was an executory contract of sale of the land by Pope and Smith to- the Monarch Company, either party could enforce specific performance of it. If it were an employment of the Monarch Company as agent to sell the land, then specific performance could not be had. Chinnock v. Sainsbury, 30 L. J. (N. S.) 409. To apply this test we will assume that the Monarch Company declined to sell any of the land as agent, electing to receive a deed for the whole at eight dollars per acre, but Pope and Smith refused to convey. The contract contains this language: “And parties of the first part further agree to deed any or all of the above described land, not less than 160 acres in one deed to the Monarch Land & Loan Company, or any person or persons they may sell to for whatever price the said Monarch Land & Loan Co. may sell for.” Upon compliance with the terms of *443 the agreement, that is, payment of forty per cent cash and executing notes for the remainder as prescribed, the Monarch Company could have maintained an action for specific performance of the contract. But to give the instrument the character of a sale, the right to specific performance must be mutual. Waterman on Specific Performance, pp.

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Bluebook (online)
151 S.W. 525, 105 Tex. 440, 1912 Tex. LEXIS 174, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ansley-realty-co-v-pope-smith-tex-1912.