Annett v. United States

205 F.2d 689
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedJuly 21, 1953
Docket4632_1
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 205 F.2d 689 (Annett v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Annett v. United States, 205 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1953).

Opinions

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Gene Tony Annett, was charged with knowingly failing and refusing to submit to induction into the United States Army with intent to evade service therein, in violation of 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 451 et seq. He has appealed from a judgment finding him guilty and sentence imposed thereon.

The scope of review of a court of law of the actions of a local board fixing and determining a classification is a limited one. We may not weigh evidence. The decisions of the local board made in conformity with the regulations are final and binding , on us, even though they may be erroneous. We may interfere only where the local board lacks jurisdiction to make the order, and it lacks jurisdiction and the order is void if there is no substantial evidence to support it. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423, 427, 90 L.Ed. 567, is a landmark case in this field of law. The court therein states, “We cannot read[690]*690ily infer that Congress departed so far from the traditional concepts of a fair trial when it made the actions of the local boards ‘final’ as to provide that a citizen of this country should go to jail for not obeying an unlawful order of an administrative agency.” It is stated that the Congressional expression that the decision of the board was final merely meant that it chose not to give administrative action under this act the customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. The court states the rule as follows: “It means that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations are final even though they may be erroneous.” The court states that the question of jurisdiction of the local board to issue the classification and induction order was “reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant.” This rule was followed by the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky (Louisville) in United States v. Graham, 109 F.Supp. 377, where the court held void a classification of 1-A of a conscientious objector and a minister because it was without factual support.

It is in this light that we examine the record. The record and the briefs recite in great detail the steps taken by the authorities in seeking to induct Annett into the military service. These include his original 1-A classification, a hearing and rehearing before the board and an appeal to the Appeal 'Board of Oklahoma. That board found that Annett should not be granted a classification either as a minister or as a conscientious objector and forwarded his file to the Justice Department for an advisory recommendation as to Annett’s conscientious objector’s claim. Annett was given notice to appear before Hearing Officer, R. A. Belisle. Belisle recommended against the allowing of the classification claim by Annett. His recommendations were reviewed by the Justice Department and the State Appeal Board was notified that the Justice Department concurred in the conclusions of the hearing officer.

After receiving the advisory opinion from the Justice Department, the Appeal Board upheld the local board’s classification of 1-A and Annett was ordered to report for induction, but failed to appear. Thereafter he was notified that he would be given another personal appearance before the board. This time he appeared and presented further oral information to the board. His file was then reopened and he was again classified 1-A. When notified of this classification, he filed a notice of appeal. The Appeal Board again concluded that he was not entitled to the classification claimed by him and again forwarded the file to the Department of Justice for an advisory opinion. He was given a second hearing before Hearing Officer Belisle, who again recommended that his claimed classification be denied and that he be classified 1-A. The entire file and record was then reviewed by the Justice Department which again concluded that Annett had failed to establish his alleged conscientious objections were based upon deep-seated convictions arising out of religious training and belief and recommended that he be not classified as a conscientious objector. He was again so classified, refused to be inducted, and was then prosecuted with the results indicated above.

Annett produced an abundance of evidence, evidencing his membership in the Jehovah Witness religious organization and his sincerity in his religious belief that it was wrong to participate in war in any manner. He established by uncontrovert-ed evidence that he was reared as a youth in the Jehovah Witness faith and had been a member in good standing in the Jehovah’s Witnesses for a number of years. The hearing officer found that Annett became a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1942 and that he testified publicly in the theocratic school which he attended and at other meetings of his sect. Annett testified that he was baptized and consecrated in 1941. He also offered evidence of good moral character and evidence tending to support his minister status as that exists in his religious organization.

The Government’s case, aside from the exhibits of the official actions of the [691]*691various boards, rests upon the two reports and recommendations of Hearing Officer Belisle. In his report of December 4, 1950, he set out a number of statements made to him by persons he interviewed. The witnesses adverse to Annett merely stated that they did not believe him to be sincere and did not consider him entitled to a conscientious objector status. They all referred to the fact that in their opinion he had a poor family background. But all they stated was their opinion or conclusion. They gave no basic facts, no evidence whatever on which such belief was predicated. Thus the chief of police and long time former sheriff of Woods County, Oklahoma, stated that Annett came from a poor family background and he did not consider him entitled to a conscientious objector’s rating. Assuming that this appraisal of his background was correct, it is in nowise material or indicative of An-nett’s status as a conscientious objector. To merely state that he does not consider him sincere without giving a single fact upon which such belief is predicated does not rise to the dignity of evidence. It states the mere belief and conclusion of the witness. Whether he is entitled to the status he sought was for the determination of the board to be made from positive evidence adduced before it. All the remaining adverse witnesses set out in Belisle’s report merely stated that they did not believe he was entitled to what he sought without the statement of a single fact on which they based their belief. To illustrate, an undersheriff stated that he was not sufficiently acquainted with Annett to comment on his sincerity of this conscientious objector claim; yet he stated that he did not believe that he was entitled to it.

During the investigation, Annett was asked if he believed in self defense and he frankly stated that he did and that he would kill if necessary to defend and preserve his life. Belisle believed that this was inconsistent with the claim of religious scruples and beliefs against participation in war. In his report he stated, “Your hearing officer was not impressed with the manner in which the registrant answered questions propounded to him. There is an abundant amount of evidence furnished in his behalf, principally by members of his own faith.

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Bluebook (online)
205 F.2d 689, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/annett-v-united-states-ca10-1953.