MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2021 ME 59 Docket: Ken-21-83 Submitted On Briefs: October 20, 2021 Decided: November 23, 2021
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.
ANNALEE R. BLOOM
v.
LAWRENCE P. BLOOM
GORMAN, J.
[¶1] Lawrence P. Bloom appeals from a divorce judgment issued in the
District Court (Waterville, Montgomery, J.) on Annalee R. Bloom’s complaint.
Lawrence challenges the court’s decision as to child support, spousal support,
and the distribution of marital property. We vacate the judgment as to child
support and affirm in all other respects.
[¶2] Annalee and Lawrence were married in 1996 and have two children.
Annalee instituted this divorce action on January 22, 2019. At the time, their
older child was seventeen years old and their younger child was fifteen years
old.
[¶3] After a three-day testimonial hearing, by a judgment dated
September 21, 2020, the court awarded the parties shared parental rights and 2
responsibilities of the younger child with primary residence of the child to
Lawrence. By then, the older child was eighteen years old and had graduated
from high school, and the younger child was seventeen years old.
[¶4] As to child support, the court initially calculated the parties’ basic
weekly support obligation only as to the younger child, given that the older
child was eighteen years old and had graduated from high school, and therefore
was no longer a proper subject of child support. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(11)
(2021) (providing that the child support guidelines may only be used for “a
child between 18 and 19 years of age” when that child “is attending a secondary
school”); 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(8)(A), (12)(A) (2021). The court used the basic
weekly support obligation of $264 as set out in the child support table for
parents of one child earning a combined annual gross income of $120,000 per
year.1 See 10-144 C.M.R. ch. 351, ch. 6, § 2 (effective July 29, 2016); 19-A M.R.S.
§ 2006(1); Foley v. Ziegler, 2007 ME 127, ¶ 9, 931 A.2d 498. To that, the court
added the cost of the younger child’s health insurance; divided that amount in
half based on the parents’ equal incomes; and then deducted the health
insurance cost paid by Annalee, arriving at the total weekly support due of $118
1Contrary to Lawrence’s contentions, the court’s calculation of both parties’ incomes was supported by competent record evidence. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(A), (D) (2021); Ehret v. Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 14, 135 A.3d 101. 3
to be paid to Lawrence as the parent providing primary residential care.
See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(3)-(4); Foley, 2007 ME 127, ¶ 9, 931 A.2d 498. The
court then reduced that amount by $18 (a 15% downward deviation) based on
Annalee’s payment of “a considerable portion of the child’s regular expenses
(i.e., for clothing, test fees, haircuts, shoes, and extracurricular expenses),”
ultimately ordering Annalee to pay child support of $100 per week to Lawrence
as primary caregiver for the younger child.2 See 19-A M.R.S. § 2007 (2021);
Sullivan v. George, 2018 ME 115, ¶ 14, 191 A.3d 1168. Both parties filed timely
post-judgment motions.
[¶5] Five months later, on March 1, 2021, the court issued an amended
divorce judgment and additional findings in response to Annalee’s motion. The
older child was nineteen by then, and the younger child was still seventeen
years old. Notwithstanding that the parties’ older child was not a proper
subject of prospective child support, in the amended child support worksheet,
the court listed both children and used the basic support obligation from the
child support table that applies for parents of two children rather than one—a
weekly support obligation of $188 per child rather than the $264 that applies
2 No “plain and unmistakable injustice” is suggested by the court’s award of a downward deviation to Annalee based on her payment of a greater portion of the expenses of the younger child, for whom Lawrence is the primary caretaker. Sullivan v. George, 2018 ME 115, ¶ 12, 191 A.3d 1168. 4
when only one child is at issue. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(1), (11); 10-144 C.M.R.
ch. 351, ch. 6, § 2. Then, despite using the amount from the child support table
for two children—a lower number because support will be awarded to more
than one child—the court applied that amount only as to the younger child. To
that incorrect number, the court added the cost of health insurance for both
children, yielding a total weekly support obligation of $241. The court divided
that amount in half to reflect each parent’s equal share of the obligation and
then deducted Annalee’s payment of both children’s health insurance costs,
yielding a child support amount of $68 due to Lawrence. The court then
factored in the same 15% downward deviation, reducing Annalee’s weekly
child support obligation to $58, and it imposed that obligation retroactive to
January 25, 2019.3 Using that start date, the court calculated that Lawrence had
been overpaid by $6,797 in child support; granted Annalee a “[j]udgment” in
that amount; and then ordered that that amount would be paid by Lawrence—
first through a weekly $40 offset against Annalee’s child support obligation and
3 The significance of the January 25, 2019, date is unclear from the court’s findings or the record. It is close to—but not the same as—the date on which Annalee instituted the divorce proceedings (the complaint was filed on January 22, 2019). 5
then, when her obligation to pay child support ended, through $100-per-week
payments. Lawrence appeals.
[¶6] We address only Lawrence’s argument regarding child support.4
We review the factual findings underlying a child support award for clear error;
the award itself, including a decision to award a downward deviation, for an
abuse of discretion; and questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
Lawrence v. Webber, 2006 ME 36, ¶ 6, 894 A.2d 480; Sullivan, 2018 ME 115,
¶ 12, 191 A.3d 1168; Akers v. Akers, 2012 ME 75, ¶ 2, 44 A.3d 311.
[¶7] We agree with Lawrence that the court’s child support
determination in the amended judgment must be corrected. The child support
worksheets and orders contain multiple errors:
• The court failed to distinguish between the periods of time when the parents were obliged to support two children and when they were obliged to support only one child;
• When creating an order that reflected Annalee’s child support obligation for one child, the court used the two-child basic support obligation from the child support table and included the cost of health insurance for the older child’s health insurance in its calculations; and
• The court applied its erroneous support obligation as to one child retroactively to a time when both children were properly the subject of child support.
4 Lawrence’s other arguments are not persuasive, and we do not address them further. 6
[¶8] Because there were different numbers of children to be supported
at different times during the pendency of this case, the court should have
calculated child support separately for the different periods of time. In
addition, because the court made no findings as to whether one parent
provided primary residential care for the older child before she “aged out” of
the child support equation, or whether the parties provided substantially equal
care, we cannot fix this arithmetic error.
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2021 ME 59 Docket: Ken-21-83 Submitted On Briefs: October 20, 2021 Decided: November 23, 2021
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.
ANNALEE R. BLOOM
v.
LAWRENCE P. BLOOM
GORMAN, J.
[¶1] Lawrence P. Bloom appeals from a divorce judgment issued in the
District Court (Waterville, Montgomery, J.) on Annalee R. Bloom’s complaint.
Lawrence challenges the court’s decision as to child support, spousal support,
and the distribution of marital property. We vacate the judgment as to child
support and affirm in all other respects.
[¶2] Annalee and Lawrence were married in 1996 and have two children.
Annalee instituted this divorce action on January 22, 2019. At the time, their
older child was seventeen years old and their younger child was fifteen years
old.
[¶3] After a three-day testimonial hearing, by a judgment dated
September 21, 2020, the court awarded the parties shared parental rights and 2
responsibilities of the younger child with primary residence of the child to
Lawrence. By then, the older child was eighteen years old and had graduated
from high school, and the younger child was seventeen years old.
[¶4] As to child support, the court initially calculated the parties’ basic
weekly support obligation only as to the younger child, given that the older
child was eighteen years old and had graduated from high school, and therefore
was no longer a proper subject of child support. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(11)
(2021) (providing that the child support guidelines may only be used for “a
child between 18 and 19 years of age” when that child “is attending a secondary
school”); 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(8)(A), (12)(A) (2021). The court used the basic
weekly support obligation of $264 as set out in the child support table for
parents of one child earning a combined annual gross income of $120,000 per
year.1 See 10-144 C.M.R. ch. 351, ch. 6, § 2 (effective July 29, 2016); 19-A M.R.S.
§ 2006(1); Foley v. Ziegler, 2007 ME 127, ¶ 9, 931 A.2d 498. To that, the court
added the cost of the younger child’s health insurance; divided that amount in
half based on the parents’ equal incomes; and then deducted the health
insurance cost paid by Annalee, arriving at the total weekly support due of $118
1Contrary to Lawrence’s contentions, the court’s calculation of both parties’ incomes was supported by competent record evidence. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(A), (D) (2021); Ehret v. Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 14, 135 A.3d 101. 3
to be paid to Lawrence as the parent providing primary residential care.
See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(3)-(4); Foley, 2007 ME 127, ¶ 9, 931 A.2d 498. The
court then reduced that amount by $18 (a 15% downward deviation) based on
Annalee’s payment of “a considerable portion of the child’s regular expenses
(i.e., for clothing, test fees, haircuts, shoes, and extracurricular expenses),”
ultimately ordering Annalee to pay child support of $100 per week to Lawrence
as primary caregiver for the younger child.2 See 19-A M.R.S. § 2007 (2021);
Sullivan v. George, 2018 ME 115, ¶ 14, 191 A.3d 1168. Both parties filed timely
post-judgment motions.
[¶5] Five months later, on March 1, 2021, the court issued an amended
divorce judgment and additional findings in response to Annalee’s motion. The
older child was nineteen by then, and the younger child was still seventeen
years old. Notwithstanding that the parties’ older child was not a proper
subject of prospective child support, in the amended child support worksheet,
the court listed both children and used the basic support obligation from the
child support table that applies for parents of two children rather than one—a
weekly support obligation of $188 per child rather than the $264 that applies
2 No “plain and unmistakable injustice” is suggested by the court’s award of a downward deviation to Annalee based on her payment of a greater portion of the expenses of the younger child, for whom Lawrence is the primary caretaker. Sullivan v. George, 2018 ME 115, ¶ 12, 191 A.3d 1168. 4
when only one child is at issue. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(1), (11); 10-144 C.M.R.
ch. 351, ch. 6, § 2. Then, despite using the amount from the child support table
for two children—a lower number because support will be awarded to more
than one child—the court applied that amount only as to the younger child. To
that incorrect number, the court added the cost of health insurance for both
children, yielding a total weekly support obligation of $241. The court divided
that amount in half to reflect each parent’s equal share of the obligation and
then deducted Annalee’s payment of both children’s health insurance costs,
yielding a child support amount of $68 due to Lawrence. The court then
factored in the same 15% downward deviation, reducing Annalee’s weekly
child support obligation to $58, and it imposed that obligation retroactive to
January 25, 2019.3 Using that start date, the court calculated that Lawrence had
been overpaid by $6,797 in child support; granted Annalee a “[j]udgment” in
that amount; and then ordered that that amount would be paid by Lawrence—
first through a weekly $40 offset against Annalee’s child support obligation and
3 The significance of the January 25, 2019, date is unclear from the court’s findings or the record. It is close to—but not the same as—the date on which Annalee instituted the divorce proceedings (the complaint was filed on January 22, 2019). 5
then, when her obligation to pay child support ended, through $100-per-week
payments. Lawrence appeals.
[¶6] We address only Lawrence’s argument regarding child support.4
We review the factual findings underlying a child support award for clear error;
the award itself, including a decision to award a downward deviation, for an
abuse of discretion; and questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
Lawrence v. Webber, 2006 ME 36, ¶ 6, 894 A.2d 480; Sullivan, 2018 ME 115,
¶ 12, 191 A.3d 1168; Akers v. Akers, 2012 ME 75, ¶ 2, 44 A.3d 311.
[¶7] We agree with Lawrence that the court’s child support
determination in the amended judgment must be corrected. The child support
worksheets and orders contain multiple errors:
• The court failed to distinguish between the periods of time when the parents were obliged to support two children and when they were obliged to support only one child;
• When creating an order that reflected Annalee’s child support obligation for one child, the court used the two-child basic support obligation from the child support table and included the cost of health insurance for the older child’s health insurance in its calculations; and
• The court applied its erroneous support obligation as to one child retroactively to a time when both children were properly the subject of child support.
4 Lawrence’s other arguments are not persuasive, and we do not address them further. 6
[¶8] Because there were different numbers of children to be supported
at different times during the pendency of this case, the court should have
calculated child support separately for the different periods of time. In
addition, because the court made no findings as to whether one parent
provided primary residential care for the older child before she “aged out” of
the child support equation, or whether the parties provided substantially equal
care, we cannot fix this arithmetic error. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2001(7), (8-A),
2006(4), (5)(E), (11) (2021).
[¶9] Given these errors, we must vacate the amended child support order
and remand the matter to the District Court so that the court can make findings
regarding the parents’ obligations for the older child in order to properly
calculate child support retroactively as to her. Then, for the period during
which the parents were obliged to support both children, the court will have to
create a child support worksheet—or worksheets, depending on its findings—
to reflect the parties’ respective obligations. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(4), (5)(E).
[¶10] For the period after the earlier of the older child’s high school
graduation or nineteenth birthday, the court must calculate child support based
on the younger child alone using the one-child basic support obligation in the
child support table and the cost of health insurance for that one child, as it did 7
in the initial divorce judgment. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(1)-(4), (11). Annalee
will be obliged to make those payments until the earlier of the younger child’s
high school graduation or his nineteenth birthday. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(11).
[¶11] After the court has made the necessary findings and created
accurate child support worksheets, it must address any corresponding
overpayment and setoff provisions that are necessary. We note that this
divorce has had an extremely protracted history in the District Court and direct
that the findings and recalculations be made as quickly as possible.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated as to child support and affirmed in all other respects. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Lawrence P. Bloom, appellant pro se
Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq., Lewiston, for appellee Annalee R. Bloom
Waterville District Court docket number FM-2019-14 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY