Ann Lunsford v. Martin O'Malley

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 6, 2024
• Docket: 23-15910
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 6 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANN CATHERINE LUNSFORD, No. 23-15910

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:21-cv-07654-SVK

v. MEMORANDUM* MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Susan G. Van Keulen, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 4, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: MILLER and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,*** District Judge.

Ann Lunsford appeals the district court’s order affirming the final decision of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States Senior District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation. the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for disability benefits

pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1382.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s order

upholding the Commissioner’s denial of benefits de novo, and reverse only if the

decision was not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Ford

v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). We affirm.

1. Lunsford contends that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by

failing to credit the medical opinions of Telford Moore, Ph.D., Kelvin Vu, M.D., and

Wendy Brandon, PM-HNP. The ALJ explained that these providers’ opinions were

unpersuasive because they were unsupported by and inconsistent with their own

treatment records, Lunsford’s treatment records more generally, and Lunsford’s

representations about her activities during the relevant period. While Lunsford

contends that the ALJ erred by not explicitly addressing factors other than

supportability and consistency, the applicable regulations do not require as much.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c; see also Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of

Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017); Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th

785, 789 (9th Cir. 2022).

2. Lunsford contends that the ALJ’s determination that Lunsford had the

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work was not supported by

substantial evidence. Lunsford primarily faults the ALJ for “rel[ying] on the

2 opinions [of] non-examining, non-treating, state agency medical consultants” H.

Pham, M.D., and A. Pan, M.D., in determining that she could perform light work.

She points to her own testimony and medical records noting that she cannot lift more

than five to ten pounds comfortably, and the fact that she is prescribed multiple

assistive devices for ambulation. She further claims that the ALJ did not articulate

how her spinal impairments and neuropathy were considered in his determination.

However, the record refutes Lunsford’s contention that there was “no support”

for the ALJ’s RFC determination. The ALJ explained that “[b]oth [Dr. Pham and

Dr. Pan] supported their assessments with a review of the available records[,]” and

that “[t]heir conclusions also appear consistent with the longitudinal evidence

showing the claimant’s generally stable gait with and without an assistive device,

good use of both hands, and maintained strength despite pain and decreased

sensation.” While Lunsford’s primary physician indicated that Lunsford’s ability to

lift weight was limited, the ALJ explained why he did not find this opinion

persuasive, noting that “the extreme limitations . . . provided do not appear

consistent with the claimant’s reported activities during the relevant period, which

include[d] cleaning out closets, doing household chores, accompanying her husband

to the forest [] for firewood, and running errands with family members.” Lastly,

while Lunsford asserts that the ALJ did not consider her spinal impairments and

neuropathy in his determination, a review of the ALJ’s findings does not support this

3 assertion. We find that the ALJ’s RFC determination was a rational interpretation

of the record and was supported by substantial evidence.

3. Lunsford argues that the ALJ erred by failing to “impose any specific

restrictions or limitations on [her] ability to lift weights and . . . sit and stand” during

the hypothetical questioning of the vocational expert. As this court explained in

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1988), “[h]ypothetical questions posed to

the vocational expert must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular

claimant.” Id. at 422. And in Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2021), this court

considered a hypothetical that used the term “medium work” and held that a

vocational expert is “presumptively aware of the agency’s well-established

definition of this term of art.” Id. at 1011. Here, the ALJ used the term “light,”

“work at the light level,” and “light jobs” at the administrative hearing. Moreover,

the ALJ provided the vocational expert with the limitations ultimately specified in

the RFC. Thus, the ALJ’s reference to light work and Lunsford’s specific limitations

in his questioning of the expert sufficiently conveyed her limitations. Terry, 998

F.3d at 1013.

4. Lunsford further argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that her mental

conditions did not meet the requirements of Listings 12.04 (Depressive, bipolar, and

related disorders), 12.06 (Anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders), and 12.15

(Trauma- and stressor-related disorders). “For a claimant to show that his

4 impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An

impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does

not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).

Lunsford contends that “[t]hree separate and independent medical opinions

effectively found that Ms. Lunsford met Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15,” pointing

to the opinions of Dr. Moore, Dr. Vu, and PM-HNP Brandon. As the district court

explained, the record “does not support Plaintiff’s assertion that these medical

providers found that she met the Listings.” Moreover, both state agency

psychological consultants, John Thibodeau, Ph.D., and Pheadra Caruso-Radin,

Psy.D.—the only medical providers that addressed the Listings—found, at most,

moderate limitations in the Paragraph B criteria. The ALJ’s determination that

Plaintiff was not under a disability was a rational interpretation of the record and

supported by substantial evidence.

AFFIRMED.