NUMBER 13-19-00183-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
ANISETO ALEJANDRO JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 156th District Court of Live Oak County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Aniseto Alejandro Jr. was convicted of capital murder, a capital felony.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(A). Alejandro was sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole. By three issues, Alejandro argues that: (1) the evidence is
legally insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated; and (3) the trial court reversibly erred by admitting hearsay
text messages into evidence. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2017, Alejandro was indicted by a Live Oak County grand jury for
capital murder. The indictment alleged that on December 22, 2015, Alejandro shot and
killed Bill Hammit and Sandra Garcia during the same criminal transaction and then
subsequently burned their corpses. A jury trial began on March 28, 2019.
The evidence at trial established that Hammit and Garcia operated a store named
Camco Saltwater Transport (Camco) in Clegg, Texas. Several members of the
community testified that they saw the decedents’ vehicles, including a large white truck,
at Camco on the night of December 22, 2015. Several community members also recalled
seeing another vehicle, with its lights on, at Camco late that same night.
Jammie Kirby, Hammit’s son-in-law, worked as a truck driver for Camco. Kirby
testified that on December 22, 2015, he and his wife borrowed a credit card from Hammit
to make purchases to improve their home. According to Kirby, they returned the credit
card to Hammit by 2:30 in the afternoon of the same day. Kirby returned to Camco at 8:00
a.m. the following morning to find that the store was unlocked, but Hammit and Garcia
were not at the store. Garcia’s pickup truck was also missing, which Kirby thought was
unusual. Kirby asked Cory Priddy, Garcia’s son-in-law, to help locate Hammit and Garcia.
Priddy eventually returned to Camco to inform Kirby that he had found Garcia’s burnt
truck and that Hammit and Garcia were both dead. When they returned to the store, they
noticed a shell casing from a gun.
2 Deputy Danny Caddell of the Live Oak County Sheriff’s Office testified that his first
lead in this case came when he realized that Hammit’s and Garcia’s credit cards were
being used in the San Antonio area. Camera footage revealed that Alejandro made
purchases with Hammit’s and Garcia’s credit cards at various locations, including a
convenience store, Wal-Mart, Dairy Queen, HEB, Pizza Hut, McDonald’s, CD Tire
Service, Target, and Sephora.
Caddell testified that he obtained an arrest warrant for Alejandro and arrested him
on March 25, 2016. Following the arrest, Caddell searched Alejandro’s residence in
D’Hanis pursuant to a search warrant. The following items, among other things, were
located and seized: a pair of Nike shoes; new pair of boots; a list containing categories of
“things to pay first,” “Christmas,” and “trips” that totaled over $100,000; two knives that
had been missing from Camco; and a blue shirt with what appeared to be bleach stains.
Caddell testified that shoe imprints recovered from Camco were consistent with the Nike
shoes.
In a video-taped statement, Alejandro told Caddell that Hammit had simply given
him the credit cards; however, Caddell noted that Alejandro’s version of events conflicted
with what Kirby had told Caddell concerning the credit cards. Alejandro further told
Caddell that another individual, Steven Deleon, could verify that Alejandro was in Poteet
during the murders. However, Deleon, a former employee of J.C. McLelland, testified that
he only became acquainted with Alejandro in January 2016. He claimed that he was never
in the company of Alejandro at any point in December of 2015. Caddell reaffirmed this
testimony after examining Alejandro’s cell phone records.
3 Glenn Bard, a cell phone analysis expert, testified that the cell phone belonging to
Desiree Trevino 1 was located within the vicinity of Camco at 8:00 p.m. on December 22,
2015. According to Bard, the cell phone remained near Camco until shortly before
midnight. The cell phone was next located at a Holiday Inn Express in San Antonio at
approximately 8:30 a.m. the following day. The general manager of the Holiday Inn
Express in San Antonio confirmed that, according to their records, Alejandro registered
as a guest at that location at approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 23, 2015.
Caleb Bunch, a patrol officer with the Atascosa County Sheriff’s Office testified that
he stopped Alejandro for speeding on December 23, 2015, at 1:38 a.m. in Poteet. Bunch
gave Alejandro a verbal warning before letting him go.
Ray Fernandez, the Nueces County Medical Examiner, testified that he examined
the bodies recovered from the burnt pickup truck. The bodies were burned severely
enough that identification was impossible using fingerprints or visual recognition. Instead,
the respective identities of the burnt bodies were determined through comparing the DNA
extraction from the bodies with DNA extractions from Hammit’s and Garcia’s children.
Fernandez testified that an analysis of Hammit’s organs revealed a low level of carbon
monoxide, indicating that Hammit was already dead by the time his body was consumed
by fire. Fernandez offered the same opinion in regard to Garcia.
The State also called Trevino as an accomplice witness. While Alejandro was
married to Adelina Flores, Trevino was in an intimate relationship with Alejandro. Trevino
and Alejandro had their first child together in January 2013; their second child was born
1 Trevino was arrested and charged with the same offense as Alejandro. However, she testified
that she entered into an agreement with the State in which she would testify in the trial against Alejandro and plead true to credit card abuse, tampering with evidence, and burglary of a habitation in exchange for the State seeking a lesser punishment against her.
4 in August 2015. Trevino and Alejandro began living together in D’Hanis in December
2015. Trevino testified that she was first contacted by law enforcement in March 2016
concerning the Camco incident. She had given an alibi for Alejandro, claiming that he had
a job in Austin, Texas. However, Trevino admitted at trial that she was not truthful during
this initial contact. It was simply a fabricated story.
According to Trevino, on December 22, 2015, she and Alejandro left their children
with Trevino’s mother in San Antonio so that she could accompany him to a “job.” Upon
arriving at Camco, Alejandro parked his car across the street, exited the vehicle, and told
her that he would be back. After being gone for approximately one hour, Alejandro
returned to his car and told Trevino that there were people at Camco and that he was
going to wait until they left so that he could “retrieve money that was owed.” After waiting
ten minutes, Alejandro left the car and was gone for about another hour. Trevino claimed
that when Alejandro returned, he placed two trash bags in the back seat then immediately
left for about another hour. When Alejandro returned the third time, he was driving a white
pickup truck. He told Trevino to remain where she was as he removed items from the
truck and placed them in his vehicle. Alejandro drove away in the truck for approximately
thirty minutes. Trevino testified that around that time she heard a loud pop and saw an
orange glow behind some trees as she saw Alejandro walking back towards his car.
Trevino asked Alejandro what was going on, to which he responded: “Nothing. Don’t
worry about it.”
As Trevino and Alejandro began driving back to San Antonio, Alejandro showed
her a phone and told her that he got it from “that place.” However, he threw the phone out
the window once he realized that he could not use the phone because it was protected
5 with a passcode. Trevino testified that they were pulled over in Poteet, given a verbal
warning, and then checked into the Holiday Inn hotel using cash taken from Camco. The
following morning, she and Trevino went to Ingram Park Mall to make various purchases.
McLelland testified that he was a contractor working on a number of projects
erecting fences and building roads for landowners in December of 2015. He testified that
he became acquainted with Hammit in early 2015 by visiting his store. McLelland testified
that, within months, he was spending a decent amount of time together with Hammit,
either for business purposes or just hanging out. McLelland testified that he also became
acquainted with Alejandro in early 2015. Alejandro began working for McLelland as a
welder. While working for McLelland, Alejandro cashed his checks at Camco on multiple
occasions. However, in July 2015, Alejandro was arrested for seeking to sell materials
stolen from a job site at which McLelland was performing contract work. According to
McLelland, he visited Camco at the end of the workday on December 22, 2015, and
stayed until approximately 10:00 p.m. After receiving a call from Priddy, he returned the
following morning only to discover that Hammit and Garcia were missing. Priddy showed
him a shell casing that had been discovered at Camco. McLelland claims that he became
suspicious because it seemed as if it was fired from his gun. McLelland checked his
vehicle and discovered that his Glock .357 Sig was missing. McLelland called 911. When
police arrived, McLelland informed them that his gun was missing.
Lonald Frazier testified that he was a former employee of McLelland. According to
Frazier, in the spring of 2015, Alejandro attempted to sell him fencing material that was
stolen from McLelland. Frazier reported this to McLelland. In August 2015, Frazier sold a
6 .357 Glock to McLelland because McLelland’s old gun, a Ruger .9mm pistol, had been
stolen.
Vicente Cisneros testified that Alejandro is his cousin’s ex-boyfriend. Cisneros
testified that he purchased a Ruger pistol from Alejandro. Alejandro told Cisneros that the
gun had belonged to his boss, but he represented to Cisneros that he had the paperwork
for the gun to show that he was the legal owner. Alejandro never presented Cisneros with
the paperwork. In January 2016, Alejandro contacted Cisneros to inform him that he was
interested in selling a Glock.
The jury found Alejandro guilty of capital murder of Hammit and Garcia. Alejandro
was sentenced to life without parole in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice. This appeal followed.
II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
In his first issue, Alejandro argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain
his conviction.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
In order to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a criminal case, an
appellate court reviews all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 509 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018); Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“Due
process requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the
crime charged.”); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality
op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard tasks the
7 factfinder with resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing
reasonable inferences from basic facts. See Ingerson, 559 S.W.3d at 509. On appeal,
reviewing courts “determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based
upon on the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Appellate courts must avoid “divide and conquer” strategies in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence; instead, appellate courts must consider the evidence
cumulatively. See Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 262.
We give great deference to the trier of fact and assume the factfinder resolved all
conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict. See Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “An
appellate court cannot act as a thirteenth juror and make its own assessment of the
evidence. A court’s role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence
when the factfinder does not act rationally.” Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 262. “Circumstantial
evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and
circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 262; Orr v. State, 306
S.W.3d 380, 395 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). We will uphold the verdict unless
the factfinder “must have had reasonable doubt as to any essential element.” Laster, 275
S.W.3d at 517.
Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge in this case would state that a person commits the
8 offense of capital murder if he murders more than one person during the same criminal
transaction. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(A). A person commits murder if he
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. Id. § 19.02(b)(1).
B. Analysis
Alejandro argues that “the evidence at trial provides only a suspicion of guilt at best
for capital murder.” According to Alejandro, no “forensic, DNA, or other trace evidence, if
any, implicated [him] in this offense at all.” And Alejandro claims that a viable alternate
suspect—McLelland—was not properly investigated.
We first note that the State had no obligation to show whether McLelland was
properly investigated as a viable alternate suspect. The State simply needed to establish
the essential elements of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt as to Alejandro. See
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We also note that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient
to establish guilt. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Priddy testified that he saw Alejandro
in the vicinity of the offense on the evening of December 22, 2015. Shoe prints at Camco
were consistent with the Nike shoes found in Alejandro’s residence. Trevino testified
extensively concerning the night of December 22, 2015, and how Alejandro went to
Camco that night to “retrieve money that was owed.” After several hours, Alejandro came
back driving a large white truck that matched the description of the vehicle owned by
Garcia, and then disappeared again. Trevino next testified that she heard a loud “pop”
and saw an orange glow through the trees as Alejandro returned to the car without the
white truck. Trevino further confirmed that Alejandro made a number of purchases over
the next day and months using money and credit cards belonging to the victims. The
evidence further indicated that Alejandro attempted to sell a Glock, the type of gun
9 connected to the murders and similar to the gun that McLelland reported as missing.
Lastly, Alejandro attempted to provide Deleon as an alibi witness; however, Deleon
testified that he was never with Alejandro in December 2015. See King v. State, 29
S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that making false statements to cover
up crime is evidence indicating consciousness of guilt and is admissible to prove
commission of the offense); Torres v. State, 794 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.—Austin
1990, no pet.) (“A ‘consciousness of guilt’ is perhaps one of the strongest kinds of
evidence of guilt.”).
Based on all of the evidence presented, we conclude that a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Ingerson, 559 S.W.3d at. 509. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, we conclude there was legally sufficient evidence to support Alejandro’s
conviction. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 905. We overrule Alejandro’s first issue.
III. CORROBORATING EVIDENCE
In his second issue, Alejandro argues that there was insufficient evidence to
corroborate Trevino’s testimony.
In Texas, a conviction cannot be secured by the testimony of an accomplice unless
that testimony is corroborated by other evidence “tending to connect the defendant with
the offense committed.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14; see Cocke v. State, 201
S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Thus, when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to corroborate accomplice testimony, “the reviewing court eliminates the
accomplice testimony and examines the remaining portions of the record to determine if
10 there is any evidence that tends to connect the accused with the commission of the
crime.” Castillo v. State, 221 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The corroborating
evidence does not need to be independently sufficient to establish guilt; “there simply
needs to be ‘other’ evidence ‘tending to connect’ the defendant to the offense.” Id.; see
Casanova v. State, 383 S.W.3d 530, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Alejandro argues that “[t]he mere presence of the accused in the company of the
accomplice shortly before or after the time of the offense is not, in itself, sufficient
corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice.” Etheredge v. State, 542 S.W.2d 148,
150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
“repeatedly held that evidence that an accused was in the company of the accomplice
close to the time of the offense, coupled with other suspicious circumstances, may tend
to connect the accused to the offense.” Gill v. State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (emphasis added).
In the present case, within hours of the commission of the offense, Alejandro was
in the company of Trevino when their vehicle was pulled over by patrol officer Bunch. The
non-accomplice evidence in the present case also established the following: (1) Alejandro
was in the vicinity of Camco on the evening of December 22, 2015; (2) over the course
of the next day after the commission of the offense, Alejandro used credit cards that
belonged to the deceased victims; (3) sometime after the offense, Alejandro attempted to
sell a weapon similar to the one linked to the murders, which was also similar to the gun
that McLelland reported as missing; (4) Alejandro was found to be in possession of items
taken from the scene of the offense; and (5) Deleon could not verify Alejandro’s
11 whereabouts on December 22, 2015. The non-accomplice evidence, when viewed as a
whole, tended to connect Alejandro to the offense committed. See Castillo, 221 S.W.3d
at 691. Therefore, we conclude that the non-accomplice evidence adduced at trial was
sufficient to satisfy the accomplice witness rule. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.14; Gill, 873 S.W.2d at 49. We overrule Alejandro’s second issue.
IV. HEARSAY EVIDENCE
In his third issue, Alejandro argues that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay
evidence from Trevino.
A trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Cameron v. State, 241 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As long as
the trial court’s decision was within the zone of reasonable disagreement and was correct
under any theory of law applicable to the case, it will be upheld. Winegarner v. State, 235
S.W.3d 787, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Upon finding a non-constitutional error, the
reviewing court will reverse only upon a finding that the error affected the substantial
rights of the accused. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); see Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 94
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Substantial rights are not affected if, based on the record as a
whole, this Court has a fair assurance that the erroneous admission of evidence had
either no influence or only a slight influence on the verdict. Whitaker v. State, 286 S.W.3d
355, 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). In making this assessment, this Court considers everything in the record, the
nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error, and how
it relates to other evidence in the record. See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355. The presence of
12 overwhelming evidence supporting the conviction can be a factor in the evaluation of
harmless error. See id. at 356.
During Trevino’s testimony, the State introduced a number of conversations
Trevino had with Alejandro via text messaging. Alejandro specifically complains of the
following messages sent by Trevino to Alejandro as being hearsay:
I’ve put up with so much from you for 5 years and [I] even stood by your side with what you did to those people and you STILL to this day treat me like im [sic] nothing.
....
You’ve done things to the extent of killing people and [I] stood by you through that but you cant [sic] even change for us. I hope this night and all of your lies are worth it.
Assuming without deciding that it was error to admit these text conversations,
Alejandro has not demonstrated that his substantial rights were affected. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 44.2(b); Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 94. Considering everything in the record—including
Trevino’s testimony concerning Alejandro’s activities on the night of December 22, 2015;
the evidence concerning Alejandro’s use of credit cards belonging to the deceased shortly
after the murders; Alejandro’s attempt to sell a gun similar to the one linked to the
murders; Alejandro’s possession of items stolen from Camco; and the fact that
Alejandro’s alibi witness could not verify his whereabouts—we have a fair assurance that
the admission of the text messages had either no influence or only a slight influence on
the verdict. See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355. We overrule Alejandro’s third issue.
13 V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NORA L. LONGORIA Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 19th day of November, 2020.