Anheuser-Busch v. Caught-on-Blue

2003 DNH 173

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: October 9, 2003
• Docket: CV-02-196-JD
• Status: Published

Opinion

Anheuser-Busch v. Caught-on-Blue CV-02-196-JD 10/09/03 P UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

v. Civil No. 02-196-JD Opinion No. 2003 DNH 173 Caught-on-Bleu, Inc.

O R D E R

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. ("A-B") has sued Caught-on-Bleu, Inc.

("C-O-B") for trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and

unfair competition under the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§

1051-1127 ("the Lanham Act"), for trademark dilution under New

Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated ("RSA") 350-A:12, and for

trademark infringement and unfair competition under common law.

A-B moves for summary judgment on its claims for trademark

infringement under Section 32 of the Lanham Act,1 15 U.S.C. §

1114(1) (count one), unfair competition under Section 43(a) of

the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (count two), and for dilution

under RSA 350-A:12 (count four) (document no. 44).2 C-O-B

objects (document no. 57).

xIn its motion for summary judgment, A-B erroneously references section 35 of the Lanham Act, instead of section 32, as the basis of its trademark infringement claim.

2A-B does not move for summary judgment on its claim for federal trademark dilution in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (count three), nor on its claim of common law trademark infringement and unfair competition (count five). Background3

_____ A. A-B's "Bud" Trademarks

_____ A-B and its predecessors have brewed and marketed beer in

the United States under the trademark "Budweiser" since 187 6.

Within a few years of the beer's introduction, the public came to

refer to it as "Bud." As early as the 1930s, A-B began using the

name "Bud" to market Budweiser, beginning by placing the word on

beer taps distributed to bars and later incorporating other

methods. A-B has capitalized on the Bud mark by creating a

"family" of beers over time which use "Bud" in their names,

including "Bud Light," "Bud Dry," and "Bud Ice."

The Budweiser mark has been federally registered since 1878

and is owned by A-B under United States Trademark Registration

number 922,481 for beer, and number 952,277 for beer and malt

liguor. Some of A-B's other federally registered trademarks for

beer include "Bud," "Bud Man," "Bud Light," "Bud Bowl," "Bud

Dry," and "Bud Ice."4 A-B sold more than 400 million barrels of

3Only A-B has provided a factual statement as reguired by Local Rule 7.2(b). All properly supported facts submitted by A-B are conseguently deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment. See LR 7.2(b)(2). To the extent that C-O-B has stated contrary facts in its objection and supported those facts with precise citation to the record, the court will consider such facts to be in dispute.

4The term "Bud mark," as used herein, refers to any of A-B's marks which include the word "Bud."

2 beer under the Bud mark between 1996 and 2002, achieving more

than $40 billion in sales. Bud Light and Budweiser have been the

two best-selling brands of beer in the United States since 1994.

These beers are sold to bars, restaurants, and package, grocery,

and convenience stores in every state.

Both Budweiser and Bud Light bottles have labels with a

scroll, seal, and field presented against a red background.

These elements and the outline of the label itself appear in

white on a Budweiser bottle and in silver on a Bud Light bottle.

Budweiser bottles use blue cursive to set out the name of the

beer, while those of Bud Light use blue block capitals outlined

in white and red. Budweiser and Bud Light cans use designs

similar to those of the bottles: Budweiser cans are white with a

red frame around the scroll, seal, and a white field with blue

cursive lettering, while Bud Light cans feature the beer's name

in blue block capitals against a silver field and a silver scroll

and seal with blue lettering against a red background. Many of

A-B's promotional products are red in color with white lettering

spelling out the name of one of the Bud marks.

A-B has extensively promoted the Bud mark in connection with

its beers, spending more than $1 billion in advertising those

products between 1999 and 2002 alone. The mark has been featured

in thousands of television and radio commercials and print

3 advertisements, as well as on billboards, race cars, and an

airship. A-B has used the word "Bud" in slogans like "Nothing

Beats a Bud," "This Bud's for You," and "Make it a Bud Light."

The Bud marks also appear on a wide range of merchandise,

including clothing, sporting goods, and glassware. These items

are available through a mail order catalog at 1-800-PICK BUD

(also a registered A-B mark) and online at < www.BudShop.com>.

Elaborate advertising campaigns have centered around the Bud

mark, including the "Bud Bowl" in which Budweiser and Bud Light

teams comprised of beer cans and bottles play a football game

over the course of commercial breaks before, during, or after the

Super Bowl. The Bud Bowl began in 198 9, and has been promoted

over the years through print advertisements, point-of-sale

displays, and an official website. A-B has gone so far as to

anoint some of the Bud Bowl players with names, including "Billy

Bud," a star running back.

B. COB's "Billy Budd" Mark

It was a dark and stormy night in November 1995 when COB's

president, Lisamarie Sapuppo-Bertrand, first thought of naming a

product after Billy Budd, the title character from Herman

Melville's posthumously published and unfinished work Billy Budd,

Sailor (An Inside Narrative). Sapuppo-Bertrand shared her

4 thought with Bernice Keeney, C-O-B's vice president, during a

conversation that night about, inter alia, the labels of products

like wine and salad dressing. Impressed by "Billy Budd" as a

"manly name," the two considered it as a brand name for shampoo,

cologne, and "maybe several other products" before deciding to

use it for a beer. Keeney Dep. at 51-52. At that time, Keeney

was aware that A-B used the Bud mark in connection with beer.

Nearly two years later, on October 28, 1997, C-O-B's

predecessor-in-interest applied to register a "Billy Budd" mark

with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The

application described the design as a "sailor steering a ship on

a stormy sea as seen through a portal." The words "Billy Budd,"

which the application stated as the "name of [the] product,"

appeared across the top of the portal in cursive lettering, while

"Classic American Ale," described as a subheading, appeared in a

smaller version of the same font on a ribbon across the bottom.

Below the ribbon was an eagle with outstretched wings. A

rectangular box enclosed the entire design.

Although "Beers" and a number of nonalcoholic beverages were

listed as the goods to be covered by the mark, C-O-B amended that

section of the application on September 11, 1998, to list only

"Beers." In a subseguent amendment, submitted by telephone on

April 5, 1999, the word "Beers" was changed to "ALES." The

5 September, 1998, amendment also detailed the mark's design more

fully, describing the ribbon as red and the color of the mark as

"shaded blue from the top to the center and gradually shad[ing]

into a light brown . . . at the bottom of the mark." A-B opposed

C-O-B's trademark application.

In September 1999, C-O-B contracted with New Hampshire

Custom Brewers, Inc. ("NHCB") to produce "Billy Budd Classic

American Ale" and to distribute it in New Hampshire.5 Pursuant

to the contract, NHCB later submitted an application to the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") for approval of

a label to be placed on kegs of the product. The application

presented the label as black and white, with "Billy Budd Classic

American Ale" written across the top in capitalized, underlined

block lettering. The words "1-877-488-BUDD" and

"www.billybudd.com," respectively, were written in the upper left

and upper right corners of the rectangular label.6 Apart from

NHCB's seal and name and address, the label contained no other

information identifying its source.

Later in the fall of 1999, NHCB manufactured twenty-five

5The agreement also covered another C-O-B product, "Boston Bluebeard Golden Amber Ale," which has never been produced and is not at issue here.

6This telephone number was never activated.

6 barrels of Billy Budd Classic American Ale. Each keg was marked

in two different places with the label which had been approved by

the ATF, in addition to another sticker and a plastic cap on top

which said "Billy Budd Classic American Ale." Per instructions

from C-O-B, on October 8, 1999, NHCB delivered one keg of the

beer to both Red Coach Inn and Hillwinds Restaurant and Lodge in

Franconia, and another to Fabyan's Station Restaurant and Lounge

in Bretton Woods for seventy-five dollars each. At some point,

Duffy's Tavern in Manchester also purchased a keg. Two more kegs

were delivered to the New Hampshire College Alumni Association

for consumption at a "Microbrew Fest" on October 16, 1999.7

Fabyan's carries Budweiser on tap, as well as a number of other

A-B brews (including Bud Light) in bottles. Duffy's carries Bud

and Bud Light, but it is unclear in what form.

Everyone who received a keg of Billy Budd Classic American

Ale also received an accompanying tap handle. The handle was in

the shape of a tapered cylinder, widest near the top, and blue in

color. Attached to each handle was a flat, oval-shaped sign with

the words "Billy Budd" in red cursive lettering (similar to that

from C-O-B's trademark application) against a white background.

An anchor, drawn in black and white, appeared between the words

"Billy" and "Budd," which were arranged vertically, one atop the

71he alumni association was not charged for these kegs.

7 other. The "i" in "Billy" was dotted in blue, rather than red.

At Fabyan's, the "Billy Budd" tap handle was placed in a display

behind the bar with seven other handles which serves to inform

customers of the available draft beers. At both Fabyan's and

Duffy's, patrons can discern the available brands of draft beer

only by seeing the tap handles or asking a server.

NHCB described Billy Budd Classic American Ale to its

customers as a "bountiful blend of traditionally brewed light,

dark, roasted and crystal malts, with a full-bodied English First

Gold hop for a spriteful, yet shameless, flavor, not likely to be

forgotten." In terms more easily understood by the average

person, Larry Bowse, NHCB's general manager at the time the beer

was produced, described it as "dark" and "different."

In approximately the fall of 1999, C-O-B launched a website

at the www.billybudd.com address which had appeared on the Billy

Budd Classic American Ale keg labels. The site consisted of a

single page with the words "Caught-on-Bleu, Inc. presents"

written in an italicized font above two side-by-side renditions

of the Billy Budd Classic American Ale design in the form in

which it had appeared on C-O-B's trademark application. "Billy

Budd" was written in white with a red outline, while "Classic

American Ale" appeared in white against the red background of the

ribbon (as described in the trademark application). The box which enclosed the mark was shaded from blue on the top into red

on the bottom.8 The phrase "the legend lives on" appeared in an

italicized script in the middle of the page. Below that was a

drawing of a pirate in a pose similar to that of the sailor in

the Billy Budd Classic American Ale mark, but without the portal

and with the words "Boston Bluebeard" written across the top and

"Golden Amber Ale" written across the bottom on a ribbon. The

statement "Billy Budd Classic American Ale and Boston Bluebeard

Golden Amber Ale are pending trademark registrations of Caught-

on-Bleu, Inc." was written across the very bottom of the page.

The www.billybud.com site, however, did not expressly

mention any beer. Instead, it solicited orders for "Promotional

Sale Items," including white cotton T-shirts and magnets, to be

faxed to a local New Hampshire number.9 C-O-B produced a number

of shirts, the fronts of which bore the Billy Budd Classic

American Ale design shown on the site, while on the back the

words "the Legend lives on... can't keep a good man down!" and

"www.billybudd.com" and "1-877-GO-4-BUDD" appeared. Red hats

with "Billy Budd" and "Classic American Ale" in white lettering

8Keeney described one of the two designs as having "slightly different colors." There is no evidence in the record, however, as to what those colors were, and no merchandise bearing that version of the mark was ever created.

9Ihe magnets were never manufactured. in the same font used in the trademark application (with the

latter phrase appearing on a red ribbon in the same shape as that

on the application) were also made. None of these items was ever

sold, although a single hat was given to a friend of Keeney's

father. C-O-B discontinued the website in March 2001. Other

than the hats and T-shirts, C-O-B has never produced any

advertising or promotional materials for the Billy Budd mark.

NHCB stopped brewing Billy Budd Classic American Ale in

early November 1999, in response to the threat of an injunction

from A-B.10 In the late spring and early summer of 2000, C-O-B

attempted to interest other brewers in producing the beer but was

ultimately unsuccessful. As a result, the only sales of the

product to date were those to the bars already discussed.11

C-O-B nevertheless plans to produce Billy Budd Classic American

Ale "sometime in the future" and to distribute it to "bed and

breakfasts, [and] a little more upper class restaurants" as well

as to bars and taverns, and to package and convenience stores.

Keeney Dep. at 85-87.

10A-B's contact with NHCB was the basis of C-O-B's counterclaim in this action for tortious interference. This court granted summary judgment in A-B's favor on that and C-O-B's other counterclaims in an order of July 22, 2003.

“ With C-O-B's authorization, NHCB destroyed the remaining kegs of Billy Budd Classic American Ale when theyreached their "past prime date" in early February 2000.

10 Standard of Review

" 'While infringement and unfair competition cases often

present factual issues that render summary judgment

inappropriate, this is not invariably so.'" Boston Athletic

Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1989) (guoting

Kazmaier v. Wooten, 761 F.2d 46, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1985)). Summary

judgment is appropriate "in a trademark infringement case in this

circuit . . . 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.'" Volkswaqenwerk Aktienqesellschaft v.

Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 815 (1st Cir. 1987) (guoting Astra Pharm.

Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1204

(1st Cir. 1983) (further internal citation andguotation

omitted)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "A

factual dispute is material if it 'affects the outcome of the

litigation,' and genuine if manifested by 'substantial' evidence

'going beyond the allegations of the complaint.'" Astra, 718

F.2d at 1204 (guoting Piqnons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v.

11 Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 1981)); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)). A party opposing a properly supported motion for

summary judgment must present competent evidence of record that

shows a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

Discussion

I. Lanham Act Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition

Counts one and two of A-B's complaint assert trademark

infringement and unfair competition in violation of the Lanham

Act. The Act protects both the public and the owner of a

trademark by "prevent[ing] the use of the same or similar marks

in a way that confuses the public about the actual source of the

goods or service." Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aastar Mortgage

Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1996); see also I.P. Lund Trading

ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 1998); Int'1 Ass'n

of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr.,

103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1996). Likelihood of confusion is

the "key guestion" for both of A-B's Lanham Act claims. See Bird

v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir. 2002); compare 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a)(1) (defining unfair competition as use of "any word,

term, name, symbol, or device, . . . likely to cause confusion")

with 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (defining trademark infringement as "use

12 . . . of any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable

imitation of a registered mark . . . likely to cause confusion")

(emphasis added).

"To win a trademark case, a plaintiff must show 1) that he

uses, and thereby 'owns,' a mark, 2) that the defendant is using

that same or a similar mark, and 3) that the defendant's use is

likely to confuse the public, thereby harming the plaintiff."

DeCosta v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 605 (1st Cir. 1992);

see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 103 F.3d at 200 & n.5. C-O-B

does not dispute its use of the Billy Budd mark or A-B's

ownership of the Bud mark. Accordingly, the success of A-B's

summary judgment motion as to its Lanham Act claims depends on

the absence of a disputed issue of fact which is material to the

likelihood of confusion between the two marks.

"[T]he likelihood of confusion inguiry centers on whether

members of the purchasing public are likely to mistake

defendant['s] products . . . for plaintiff ['s] protected

products . . . within the same category." Boston Athletic Ass'n,

867 F.2d at 28. Whether an allegedly infringing mark is likely

to cause confusion is a guestion of fact, determined by assessing

eight factors, no single one of which is conclusive. See

Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 3-4

(1st Cir. 1993); Kappa Sigma Fraternity v. Kappa Sigma Gamma

13 Fraternity, 654 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (D.N.H. 1987). The eight

factors are: "(1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the

similarity of the goods; (3) the relationship between the

parties' channels of trade; (4) the relationship between the

parties' advertising; (5) the classes of prospective purchasers;

(6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) the defendant's intent in

adopting its mark; and (8) the strength of the plaintiff's mark."

Volkswaqenwerk, 814 F.2d at 817; see also Boston Athletic Ass'n,

867 F.2d at 29.

In weighing the factors, "[n]o one factor is necessarily

determinative, but each must be considered" by the court in

assessing the factors "on the whole." Volkswaqenwerk, 814 F.2d

at 817. They "must be evaluated in context, [and] any meaningful

inguiry into the likelihood of confusion necessarily must

replicate the circumstances in which the ordinary consumer

actually confronts (or probably will confront) the conflicting

mark." Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 103 F.3d at 201.

In claiming that C-O-B's mark infringes a number of

different marks which include the word "Bud," A-B is invoking the

"family of marks" doctrine. See generally 3 McCarthy § 23:61. A

family of marks is "a group of marks having a recognizable common

characteristic . . . [so] that the public associates not only the

individual marks, but the common characteristic of the family.

14 with the trademark owner." J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's

Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (ruling that

McDonald's has established a family of marks in product names

starting with the prefix "Me"). C-O-B does not dispute that A-B

has established a family of marks with "Bud" as the common

element. Accordingly, the court will compare C-O-B's mark to

A-B's family of "Bud" marks when applying the likelihood of

confusion factors.

A. Similarity of the Marks

Similarity may be found in the "sound, appearance, and

meaning" of words within marks. Volkswaqenwerk, 814 F.2d at 817;

see also PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243,

252 (6th Cir. 2003); Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition §

21(a) (1995). Marks are to be assessed "on the basis of the

total effect of the designation, rather than a comparison of

individual features." Piqnons, 657 F.2d at 487 (internal

guotation omitted); see also Best Flavors, Inc. v. Mystic River

Brewing C o ., 886 F. Supp. 908, 913 (D. Me. 1995). Marks should

not be simply compared side-by-side, but "in light of what occurs

in the marketplace, taking into account the 'circumstances

surrounding the purchase of the goods. . . .'" Copy Cop, Inc. v.

Task Printing, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 37, 44 (D. Mass. 1995) (guoting

15 Calamari Fisheries, Inc. v. Village Catch, Inc., 698 F. Supp.

994, 1009 (D. Mass. 1988)); see also PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 252;

Best Flavors, 886 F. Supp. at 913.

It is undisputed that "Bud" and "Billy Budd" sound alike.

In fact, C-O-B's vice president has acknowledged that "if

somebody says out loud Billy Budd there's no way for someone

listening to know whether or not they mean it with two Ds or with

one D . . . ." Keeney Dep. at 98-99. Keeney has also

acknowledged that bar and restaurant patrons generally order

their beer by name. Indeed, one of the only two ways for a

customer at Fabyan's or Duffy's (two of the four establishments

at which Billy Budd Classic American Ale has been sold) to find

out what brews are available on draft is to ask a server to

relate that information verbally. Under these circumstances, the

similarity in sound between "Bud" and "Billy Budd" becomes

"particularly important." 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on

Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:22 (4th ed. 2002); see

also Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 731-

32 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (confusion likely between sound-alike marks

for soft drinks, "which may freguently be purchased by the spoken

word"). Thus, the similarity in sound between the names of the

marks indicates a likelihood of confusion. See Beck & Co. v.

Package Distribs. of Am., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 573, 577 (T.T.A.B.

16 1978) (finding likelihood of confusion between "Beck's Beer" and

"Ex Bier" based on similar sound).

C-O-B argues that the placement of the word "Billy" to

precede "Budd" sufficiently distinguishes its mark from A-B's

marks, many of which use "Bud" in conjunction with a second word

which follows, as in "Bud Light." This argument is unpersuasive.

As an initial matter, A-B's marketing has not used the word "Bud"

solely in product names in which it was followed by another word,

but has extensively employed it on its own to refer to Budweiser

since the 1930s, including its use as a part of slogans ending in

"Bud."12 The American public has also used the word "Bud" alone

to refer to A-B's beer since the late 19th century--a fact which

was considered long-established nearly sixty-five years ago. See

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Power Citv Brewery, Inc., 2 8 F. Supp.

740, 742 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).

Secondly, C-O-B itself had used "Budd" without the "Billy"

to refer to its beer, as part of the phone number printed on its

keg labels and T-shirts. C-O-B also regularly omitted "Classic

American Ale" when referring to its product, most prominently on

12A-B also points out that it has used a character named "Billy Bud" to promote its products through its popular Bud Bowl ad campaign.

17 the tap handles.13 In light of these undisputed facts, the

placement of "Billy" before "Budd," or "Classic American Ale"

after "Budd," in C-O-B's mark does not diminish the likelihood of

confusion the name creates with respect to A-B. See Best

Flavors, 886 F. Supp. at 913-14 (likelihood of confusion caused

by use of soda bottles labeled "Mystic Seaport" in face of

plaintiff's use of "Royal Mistic" to describe line of similar

products); Power Citv, 28 F. Supp. at 743 (likelihood of

confusion between "Bud" and "Niagra Bud" as names for beer).

The appearance of the two marks also weighs in favor of a

likelihood of confusion. Budweiser and Bud Light labels have

blue lettering and white or silver elements against a red

background, while C-O-B used white lettering with a red outline

or against a red background to spell out "Billy Budd" on both the

tap handles which accompanied in its kegs and the T-shirts and

hats for sale on its website.14 A number of A-B's promotional

goods also feature white script setting out the name of the Bud

mark against a red background, including Dale Earnhardt, Jr.'s

13In any event, because the phrase "Classic American Ale" is merely a descriptive element, its addition to the mark is insufficient to avoid confusion. See 3 McCarthy § 23:50.

14In addition, the tap handles themselves were blue, a color prominent on Bud Light labels.

18 Winston Cup series car, the Bud One airship, and much of the

clothing and other items offered through A-B's catalog and

website. In addition, both the word "Budweiser" as it appears on

cans and bottles and the words "Billy Budd" as they appear on

C-O-B's tap handles and trademark application (and conseguently

the website and related merchandise) appear in looping cursive.

These undisputed facts all point to the conclusion that the

parties' marks are similar in appearance.

C-O-B raises a number of arguments to the contrary. First,

it asserts that the labels on its kegs make "clear that this was

a non A-B product," because they indicate that Billy Budd Classic

American Ale is brewed by NHCB rather than A-B. Confusion,

however, necessarily depends on the context where consumers

themselves will encounter the mark in guestion. See Int'1 Ass'n

of Machinists, 103 F.3d at 201. There is no evidence that most

beer drinkers would ever see the label on a keg of Billy Budd

Classic American Ale.15 In any event, even if they did, the

label raises as many guestions as it answers as to the source of

the keg, because it includes a telephone number with the word

15C-0-B concedes in its memorandum that "the beer-consuming public" is "the relevant consumer group in this case." The court will therefore assess confusion among the consumer, rather than the retailer, class. See 3 McCarthy § 23:100.

19 "BUDD" in it.

Furthermore, even if the labels made clear that NHCB--and

not A-B--was the source of Billy Budd Classic American Ale,

confusion would linger as to whether the product was nevertheless

affiliated with A-B. Use of a mark likely to confuse the public

as to the user's affiliation with the senior holder violates the

Lanham Act, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion as

to source. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The keg labels do not

decrease the likelihood of confusion caused by C-O-B's use of the

Billy Budd mark as a whole.

C-O-B also argues that its mark employs "a completely

nautical theme . . . not evident on any [A-B] products." The

theme finds its primary expression in the artwork submitted as

part of C-O-B's trademark application and later displayed on its

website and T-shirts, which shows a "sailor steering a ship on a

stormy sea as seen through a portal," as well as the anchor which

appeared between the words "Billy" and "Budd" on the tap

handles.16 Based on the evidence submitted, C-O-B is correct

16In its memorandum, C-O-B claims that the tap handles distributed with the kegs were used only because of the manufacturer's delay in producing the handles C-O-B actually wanted, which would have included the phrase "Classic American Ale" and markings "to look more like a ship's wheel rather than a simple circular design." C-O-B has not submitted any evidenceof

20 that A-B has never used a nautical theme to market its beers.

Its argument fails, however, because C-O-B itself made only

minimal use of a nautical theme in promoting its product.

C-O-B's commercial use of the depiction of the sailor was

limited to its website, which did not even make clear that Billy

Budd Classic American Ale existed apart from the promotional

materials offered for sale. Indeed, Boston Bluebeard Golden

Amber Ale, also mentioned by name in artwork shown on the site,

has yet to be brewed. None of the T-shirts featuring the artwork

was ever sold. Thus, the only way in which a consumer could have

encountered the "nautical theme" was through the anchor depicted

on the tap handles and the name of the product itself.17

this claim, however. Sapuppo-Bertrand's declaration merely refers to the "full BILLY BUDD CLASSIC AMERICAN ALE TAP HANDLE," without describing it. While C-O-B also relies on a page from a tap handle catalog where one of the handles has been circled and marked with what look like spokes of a ship's wheel, Keeney's deposition testimony identifies a different handle on the page as the one C-O-B ordered, and Sappupo-Bertrand's declaration does not refer to the document at all. Keeney also described as "plain" the "kind of design [which] would have been put on [the] keg handles" for which the manufacturer provided a price guote. The record contains no properly submitted evidence of C-O-B's intent to use a tap handle of the design described in its memorandum.

17In its memorandum, C-O-B claims that "any bottle production" would have included labels boasting the image of the sailor, but does not refer to any record evidence to this effect. Instead, C-O-B cites a document consisting of a number of

21 C-O-B has failed to come forward with any proof that

consumers associate the phrase "Billy Budd" with the sailor in

Melville's work of the same name. Furthermore, because the

anchor on the tap handles was surrounded by the words "Billy

Budd" in red cursive lettering on a white background, the tap

handle still resembles the Bud mark despite the inclusion of the

nautical symbol. See Power Citv, 28 F. Supp. at 743 (use of

picture of rosebud on "Niagra Bud" tap handle to convey floral

meaning "adds nothing" to distinguish it from "Bud"). C-O-B's

minimal use of the nautical theme is not sufficient to

distinguish its mark from those of A-B.

The similarity in sound and appearance between C-O-B's Billy

Budd Classic American Ale mark and the Bud mark weigh in favor of

a likelihood of confusion.

B. Similarity of the Goods

It is undisputed that the Billy Budd Classic American Ale

mark and the Bud mark have both been used to promote beer, and

that C-O-B intends to continue using its mark to promote beer.

differently colored versions of the artwork, which it represents as the "bottle labels produced" at Keeney's deposition. In the absence of any explanatory testimony, however, this document has no evidentiary value.

22 C-O-B contends, however, that "the similarities end there,"

because its product is classified as an ale, while "A-B has

always viewed itself as a producer of lagers . . . This

argument does not tip this factor in C-O-B's favor.

As an initial matter, C-O-B has not provided any support for

its characterization of A-B's current self-image. Although A-B's

earliest registered trademarks were for "lager-beer," that

designation had changed to "beer" alone by 1907. Similarly,

while the Budweiser mark as registered in 1886, 1878, and 1969

included the phrase "lager beer," the phrase does not appear on

the current labels of Budweiser, Bud Light, Bud Dry, Bud Ice, or

Bud Ice Light, all of which include the word "Beer." Nor has

C-O-B come forward with any evidence that consumers recognize any

of the beers in the Bud family as lagers, rather than simply as

beers. On this record, it is undisputed that the class of goods

covered by the Bud mark consists, simply, of beer.

C-O-B also has not submitted any proof that consumers would

recognize its product as an ale, rather than as simply a beer.

In its memorandum, C-O-B purports to explain the distinction

between lager and ale, which includes differences in "the look of

the beer in a consumer's glass." There is insufficient record

evidence, however, as to the appearance of either C-O-B's product

23 or any of the various brews sold under the Bud mark. Nor is

there evidence of consumer awareness as to the allegedly

different "look" of ale and lager. Moreover, although the full

name of C-O-B's product identifies it as an ale, that description

was regularly omitted from the company's own references to its

brew and is likely to be dropped by retailers and consumers alike

in communicating orders for it in a bar or restaurant.

Accordingly, there is no evidence to support C-O-B's position

that consumers would recognize its product as an ale and thereby

distinguish it from the beers sold under the Bud mark.

Even if C-O-B could demonstrate a triable issue as to

whether consumers recognize the difference between the ale sold

under the Billy Budd Classic American Ale mark and the lagers

sold under the Bud mark, the undisputed fact that ales and lagers

are both beers makes them similar goods for purposes of the

likelihood of confusion analysis. Products sold under similar

marks need not be identical to engender confusion. See, e.g.,

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149,

159 (9th Cir. 1963) (confusion between beer and scotch whiskey);

Guinness United Distillers & Vintners B.V. v. Anheuser-Busch,

Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1039, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Best

Flavors, 886 F. Supp. at 914 ("all chilled nonalcoholic

24 beverages, other than perhaps milk, are closely related for many

beverage purchasing decisions. . . Arthur Guinness, Son &

Co. v. Oscar Von Bernuth, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 210, 211-12 (S.D.N.Y.

1923) (confusion between stout and nonalcoholic malt beverage);

Beck, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 577 (same).

The Lanham Act "gives the trademark owner protection against

use of its mark on any product or service which would reasonably

be thought by the buying public to have come from the same source

. . . ." 4 McCarthy § 24:6. There is no dispute that the

buying public would reasonably think that an ale and a lager came

from the same source. The similarity of the parties' goods

weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

C . Relationship Between The Parties' Advertising, Channels of _____ Trade, and Classes of Prospective Purchasers

In the First Circuit, the factors of the relationship

between the parties' channels of trade and advertising and the

classes of prospective purchasers are generally considered

together. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 867 F.2d at 29; Volkswaqenwerk,

814 F .2d at 818.

A-B sells products under the Bud mark to bars, restaurants,

and package, grocery, and convenience stores in every state.

25 C-O-B has sold Billy Budd Classic American Ale to bars and

restaurants in New Hampshire and intends to make future sales to

bars and restaurants and convenience stores in New Hampshire and

possibly beyond. The products sold under the parties' marks,

then, share nearly identical channels of trade. In fact, two of

the four establishments which purchased C-O-B's product also sell

products under the Bud mark.

C-O-B contends that the parties' channels of trade differ in

that "BUDWEISER is delivered via 'A-B' distributors, who are well

known for their total commitment to [A-B] products." C-O-B's

evidence of this proposition consists of an unidentified

photograph of a parked van bearing some of the Bud marks and a

page apparently printed from the website of "Clarke Distributors

Inc [sic]" which contains the marks and descriptions of a number

of A-B products. These materials are without evidentiary

value.18 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) . In any event, C-O-B's

argument misses the point of examining channels of trade as part

of the likelihood of confusion analysis. This part of the

18C-0-B also submitted a page from the deposition of William Gannon, who apparently acted as counsel to NHCB during its bankruptcy, where he testified that he uses the phrase "AB [sic] distributors" to mean "distributors whose principal products were [A-B] products." This evidence does not establish anything other than how Gannon uses the phrase "A-B distributors."

26 inquiry seeks to gauge the extent to which consumers might

encounter the parties' products in the same context and therefore

confuse them. There is no evidence that beer consumers would

know or care whether products for sale at a retail outlet came

from different distributors. Consequently, there is no evidence

that the distinction helps the consumer class in distinguishing

one product from another.19 The fact that distributors who carry

Bud brands would not carry Billy Budd Classic American Ale, then,

has no bearing on the likelihood of confusion analysis.

C-O-B attempted to advertise Billy Budd American Ale through

the promotional T-shirts available on its website, through hats

bearing the name of the product, and through the 1-877-G04-BUDD

(or 1-877-488-BUDD) number printed on the T-shirts and keg

labels. A-B uses methods similar to these, and a host of others,

in advertising its Bud marks. It sells a variety of T-shirts,

hats, and other merchandise featuring the Bud marks over its own

website and through its own toll free number, 1-800-PICK BUD.

The parties thus use similar advertising, including the nearly

19C-0-B's claim that " [d]istributors routinely place microbrews apart from A-B products at the retail level" arguably has some relevance to the likelihood of confusion inquiry, but is unsupported by any evidence, save a photograph of an unidentified supermarket aisle which shows A-B products shelved together. This does not create an issue of fact.

27 identical 1-877-G04-BUDD and 1-800-PICK BUD numbers.

C-O-B suggests that the national scope of A-B's advertising

actually works to differentiate the Bud products from Billy Budd

Classic American Ale, because "if it was [sic] an A-B product or

related to BUDWEISER in any way, consumers would have an

expectation that the brand would be nationally advertised."

While C-O-B's assumption may be reasonable, it does not

necessarily follow that a consumer coming across any of the Billy

Budd promotional materials--or the product itself--would rule out

A-B as the source of the product simply because he or she had not

seen any national advertising for the brew. A beer drinker might

attribute the lack of national advertising to the relative

newness or limited seasonal availability of the product, or a

conscious attempt to target a particular regional market. In the

absence of any record evidence to the contrary, the inference

which C-O-B asks the court to draw from the lack of national

advertising for Billy Budd is not reasonable.

C-O-B's memorandum acknowledges that "the beer-consuming

public" comprises the class of prospective purchasers for both

its product and those of A-B. Nevertheless, C-O-B disputes any

likelihood of confusion based on this identical class of

prospective purchasers, asserting that its product appeals to

28 "microbrew or craft beer drinkers" while A-B's products do not.

C-O-B does not submit any market studies which support its

division of the "beer-consuming" public into two mutually

exclusive categories. The testimony of NHCB's former manager

that "[p]eople who you talk to who drink Budweiser wouldn't dare

think of drinking a micro beer and the people who drink micro

beers wouldn't dare think of drinking a Budweiser" is not

sufficient to defeat summary judgment.20 Bowse Dep. at 117.

In a related vein, C-O-B suggests that Billy Budd American

Ale appeals to "those beer drinkers who discriminate in their

purchasing habits," while Bud products are consumed by "those

beer drinkers that order the same brand every time." It is true

that the likelihood of confusion between two goods decreases when

consumers engage in careful consideration before making a

purchase. See Piqnons, 657 F.2d at 489; Best Flavors, 886 F.

Supp. at 916. There is no evidence, however, that beer is the

kind of product which inspires deliberation in purchasing

decisions. The deposition testimony of Fabyan's manager that its

customers "almost always" ask "a guestion or two" before ordering

"a beer they haven't seen before" does not support C-O-B's

20Ihe same is true of the testimony of Jane Lynch, the manager of Duffy's, to which C-O-B refers in its memorandum.

29 theory. Marcum Dep. at 28. "[A] question or two" is not careful

consideration, and the testimony deals only with new beers, not

necessarily microbrews.

C-O-B also asserts that "relatively speaking, a microbrew

beer is expensive compared to a BUDWEISER or a BUD LIGHT," and

that would-be Billy Budd Classic American Ale drinkers are thus

distinguished from those who drink A-B's products. A disparity

in price between the products in question can serve to

demonstrate that they travel in different channels or target

different classes of customers. See 4 McCarthy § 24:52. While

kegs of Billy Budd Classic American Ale were sold to retailers

for $75 each, there is no evidence as to the prices of any Bud

product at wholesale, or as to the price of either product to the

consumer. Nor is there any evidence of what, if any, role price

plays in a drinker's decision as to which beer to purchase. Cf.

E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 7 82 F. Supp.

457, 465 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding that wines are "relatively

inexpensive, 'impulse' products to which the average,

'unsophisticated' consumer does not devote a great deal of care

and consideration in purchasing"). C-O-B has failed to show any

issue of fact material to the court's consideration of the

relevant class of consumers.

30 Based on the summary judgment record, the parties' channels

of trade, advertising, and classes of prospective purchasers all

weigh in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

D. Evidence of Actual Confusion

_____ "Actual confusion is often taken to be the most persuasive

possible evidence that there is a likelihood of confusion." Copy

C o p , 908 F. Supp. at 45. Nevertheless, a "showing of actual

confusion is not essential in order to find a likelihood of

confusion." Volkswaqenwerk, 814 F.2d at 818. Consumer survey

evidence is often used to demonstrate actual confusion in

trademark infringement cases.21 See Boston Athletic Ass'n, 867

F.2d at 31-32 & n.9; Copy Cop, 908 F. Supp. at 46.

To be relevant, a consumer survey must measureconfusion in

21In evaluating the actual confusion caused by C-O-B's mark, the court has considered only A-B's survey evidence and C-O-B's response to it. A-B's other evidence of actual confusion consists primarily of the actions of NHCB in reguiring an indemnification provision in its license agreement with C-O-B and mentioning A-B's objection to the registration of the mark as a "Litigation Risk" in its reorganization plan. A-B does not explain how these actions show actual confusion between the marks, and that proposition is not apparent to the court. A-B also cites Marcum's self-described "impression" of C-O-B's mark that "you see the name Bud and people go I'll try that," which is merely his opinion as to a likelihood of confusion. Marcum Dep. at 13. The court concludes that there is no record evidence of actual confusion apart from the survey.

31 "the potential buyers of the junior user's goods and services." 5

McCarthy § 32:159; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v.

Nintendo C o ., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1984) . A survey need

not demonstrate that all consumers, or even a majority of them,

would actually be confused. See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v.

Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400-01 (8th Cir. 1987) (survey showing 10-

12% confusion sufficient); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp.,

603 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1979) (15-20% confusion sufficient);

Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch., Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th

Cir. 1980) (15% confusion sufficient).

A-B has submitted a survey which found "a substantial

likelihood of source confusion" between A-B and C-O-B based on

the use of the Billy Budd mark. The survey, conducted by Walter

McCullough of Monroe Mendelsohn Research, revealed that a total

of twenty-four percent of consumers who were shown a tap handle

identical to that distributed with the kegs of C-O-B's product

believed that A-B put out the product or was affiliated or

connected with, or had given permission to, whomever did. The

survey was conducted by interviewing adult shoppers in five

different malls throughout New England who had either ordered

micro brewed beer or ale in a bar or restaurant "during the past

year or so" or believed that they might do so "in the next year

32 or so." Each shopper was shown either a tap handle identical in

all respects to that which had been distributed with the kegs of

C-O-B's product, or one identical in all respects except the

insertion of the word "Boy" for "Budd."22

Each participant was then asked whether he or she had an

"opinion about who puts out the product whose tap handle you just

saw." If the answer was "yes," the interviewee was then asked

(1) who he or she believed put out the product, and why, (2)

whether he or she believed that the company that puts out the

product was affiliated or connected with any other brand or

company, and if so, which one and why, and (3) whether he or she

believed that the company that puts out the product has

permission to do so from any other brand or company, and if so,

which one and why.

Twenty-seven percent of those exposed to the "Billy Budd"

handle claimed to have an opinion about the source of the

22C-0-B points out that the photograph of "Tap Handle Example" attached to McCullough's study shows the "i" in "Billy Budd" dotted in red, rather than in blue as it was on the tap handles distributed with kegs of Billy Budd Classic American Ale. With A-B's reply materials, however, McCullough submitted a supplemental declaration stating that the "i" on the tap handles used in his survey was, in fact, dotted in blue. There is no issue of fact, then, going to whether the tap handle used in the survey was identical to those distributed with C-O-B's kegs.

33 product. Of that group, eleven percent believed A-B put out the

beer, thirteen percent believed that A-B was affiliated or

connected with whomever put out the beer, and five percent

believed that whoever put out the beer had permission from A-B to

do so. Thus, a total of twenty-five percent of those exposed to

the Billy Budd tap handle associated the product with A-B.

McCullough used this figure as the basis of his opinion that "the

survey demonstrates a substantial likelihood of confusion between

the Billy Budd product and those of [A-B] . . . ."

C-O-B attempts to challenge McCullough's conclusion with the

testimony of its own expert, Andrew Smith, Ph.D., the director of

the University of New Hampshire Survey Center. While Smith

concedes that McCullough's guestionnaire was "unbiased" and his

data "accurate," Smith claims to disagree with McCullough's

conclusion on a number of grounds. The fact that C-O-B has

procured an expert affidavit which purports to contradict that of

A-B's expert, however, does not necessarily render summary

judgment inappropriate. See Maqarian v. Hawkins, 321 F.3d 235,

24 0 (1st Cir. 2 003).

Smith asserts, based on the fact that seventy-four percent

of the interviewees who saw the "Billy Budd" handle either had no

opinion on, or otherwise did not know, who put out the product,

34 that "few if any of the experimental subjects . . . had any idea

whatsoever who put out the product . . . He does not

articulate, however, what effect his characterization of the size

of this class as "few" has upon McCullough's conclusion. Smith

does not explain, for example, how many more of the subjects

would have needed to have an opinion about the source of the

product in order for McCullough's conclusion to be supportable.

His statement does not create a triable issue as to the actual

confusion caused by C-O-B's use of the Billy Budd mark.23

Smith also concludes that "those subjects who said they had

an opinion about who puts out the product were simply guessing."

A-B correctly notes, however, that a consumer survey properly

designed to measure confusion necessarily asks participants to

guess as to the source of the product upon seeing the junior

mark. Such a survey does not attempt to gauge what respondents

objectively know about the source of the goods advertised by the

mark at issue, but rather "the subjective mental associations and

23Indeed, Smith's opinion has been rejected as a matter of law by one court. See Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing C o ., 875 F. Supp. 966, 981 & n.23 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (rejecting defendant's argument that survey in which fewer than 3% of all participants identified mark with plaintiff failed to show confusion, because 34% of the participants who had a belief as to the source of the mark identified it with plaintiff).

35 reactions of prospective purchasers" with respect to the mark. 5

McCarthy § 32:158. Accordingly, Smith's opinion that the

consumers who expressed a belief that A-B put out Billy Budd

based on the tap handle "were displaying pseudo-opinions, keying

on the syllable 'bud' in both the Billy Budd and Budweiser

names," does not create a factual dispute. To the contrary, it

confirms McCullough's conclusion that the Billy Budd Classic

American Ale mark confuses consumers into believing that A-B

either is or is affiliated with the source of that brew.24

Smith also calls McCullough's survey "problematic" because

the interviews occurred in the "artificial environment" of a

shopping mall, rather than in a bar, restaurant, or store. Smith

opines that in such a "realistic purchase environment, the

chances that a beer purchaser would be confused between Billy

Budd and Budweiser are guite remote." As an initial matter, this

testimony is insufficient to defeat summary judgment because it

lacks any foundation, i.e.. Smith does not present the

24Put differently. Smith's testimony that the respondents who expressed an opinion as to the source of Billy Budd were guessing, instead of demonstrating their actual knowledge, is irrelevant to the actual confusion inguiry. Also irrelevant, then, is his opinion that McCullough's survey is faulty because it does not include demographic information on the participants from which their susceptibility to guessing could be deduced.

36 conflicting results of a consumer study which was actually

conducted in a bar, restaurant, or other beer retail outlet or

provide any other basis for his opinion. Furthermore, Smith's

testimony runs afoul of settled law that mall-intercept surveys

of the kind conducted by McCullough are acceptable proof of

actual confusion. See 5 McCarthy § 32:165. To the extent his

opinion simply challenges McCullough's methods, then, it is

contrary to law and therefore fails to create an issue of

material fact. See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d

1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998); 11 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's

Federal Practice § 56.14[1] [e] (3d ed. 2003) .

Finally, even if all of Smith's objections to McCullough's

report were proper, they would not constitute evidence rebutting

the report as proof of actual confusion, but would merely affect

its weight in that regard.25 This is inadeguate for purposes of

opposing a summary judgment motion. See Collier v. City of

Chicopee, 158 F.3d 601, 604 (1st Cir. 1998). Smith's affidavit

25Smith's final criticism of McCullough's report is that it swept too broadly in including participants based solely on their having ordered a microbrewed beer in the past year or saying that they might order one in the next year. Smith expresses no opinion, however, on how--or even whether--reducing the participant class to "the consumers to whom Billy Budd Classic American Ale is targeted" would change the survey result. Accordingly, this testimony creates no issue of material fact.

37 fails to create a triable issue as to the actual confusion factor

of the likelihood of confusion test. Therefore, the court finds

that the actual confusion inquiry weighs in A-B's favor.

A-B's favor.

E. C-O-B's Intent in Adopting Its Mark

The assessment of a defendant's intent as a component of the

likelihood of confusion analysis focuses on whether the defendant

has tried to take advantage of the senior user's "good will,

reputation and market recognition or whether it was simply using

its own name without any such intent." See Best Flavors, 886 F.

Supp. at 917. A lack of bad faith on the defendant's part,

however, does not rule out the existence of a likelihood of

confusion in the final analysis. See Century 21 Real Estate

Corp. v. Century 21 Real Estate, Inc., 929 F.2d 827, 829 (1st

Cir. 1991); see also Best Flavors, 886 F. Supp. at 917-18.

Indeed, "[l]ittle weight" is given to the conclusion that a

defendant did not intentionally copy a plaintiff's mark. See

I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 44.

A-B argues that the summary judgment record shows that

C-O-B "clearly intended to take advantage of the fame and

reputation of the famous BUD brand." As evidence of this

38 proposition, A-B points to (1) Keeney's admission that she knew

of A-B's use of the Bud mark for beer at the time C-O-B decided

to use the Billy Budd mark for beer, (2) Bowse's comment to

C-O-B's officers that he imagined their choice of the name would

"raise a few eyebrows,"26 Bowse Dep. at 112, and (3) the

inclusion of a telephone number containing the word "BUDD" on

both the keg labels and the T-shirts.

C-O-B responds with Sapuppo-Bertrand's testimony that both

the name and artwork for the Billy Budd Classic American Ale

trademark registration were inspired by Melville's literary work,

together with unauthenticated documents represented in the

memorandum to be the original sketches for the artwork and a

contract with a local artist "to finalize the oil paintings of

the Billy Budd and Boston Bluebeard designs." Sapuppo-Bertrand

explains the toll-free phone number as the product of a choice of

a number with digits "similar" to those of her home number from

among several offered to her. These digits also happened to

spell out "BUDD" on a telephone keypad, so Sapuppo-Bertrand "took

advantage of the opportunity to have a toll free number which

26A-B also submits C-O-B's November 10, 1999, letter to Bowse which referenced A-B's potential opposition to C-O-B's trademark application. A-B does not explain how this document shows C-O-B's bad faith in using the Billy Budd mark.

39 would reflect [C-O-B's] product." Sapuppo-Bertrand Aff. 5 5.

A-B protests that Sapuppo-Bertrand's explanation of her

actions "defies credibility."27 In deciding a motion for summary

judgment, however, a court may not inguire into an affiant's

credibility. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. C-O-B has come

forward with enough evidence to create a factual dispute as to

its intent in adopting the Billy Budd Classic American Ale mark.

Drawing all reasonable inferences from this evidence in C-O-B's

favor, the defendant's intent inguiry weighs in favor of C-O-B.

F. The Strength of the Bud Mark

"[S]trong marks enjoy the greatest protection against

infringement." Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 103 F.3d at 206

(citing Aktiebolaget, 999 F.2d at 5). To determine the strength

27A-B also makes much of Keeney's testimony that C-O-B chose to market a beer under the name Billy Budd because "it suited perhaps a beer more than any other product." Keeney Dep. at 52. A-B's reference to this testimony takes this statement out of context, where Keeney explained that Billy Budd "suited perhaps a beer" because it was a "manly name or it could be a manly figure." Id. Indeed, A-B's memorandum even goes so far as to replace Keeney's use of the word "perhaps" with an ellipse in guoting her testimony. The court looks with disfavor on such distortions of the record. The cited testimony provides no basis for inferring that C-O-B thought the name "Billy Budd" suited a beer because of the existence of A-B's Bud products. In any event, such an inference in A-B's favor would not be proper in deciding its motion for summary judgment.

40 of a mark, courts examine "the length of time a mark has been

used and the plaintiff's relative renown in its field; the

strength of the mark in plaintiff's field of business, especially

by looking at the number of similar registered marks; and the

plaintiff's actions in promoting its mark." Boston Athletic

Ass'n , 867 F.2d at 32 (internal citations omitted).

In its memorandum, C-O-B states that it "does not object to

the fact that A-B's BUD and BUDWEISER marks are strong marks."

Indeed, based on the record evidence, that proposition is beyond

dispute. C-O-B argues, however, that the Bud mark is not

entitled to "absolute protection" because " [m]any other marks

with the use of the 'bud' name are currently in use." This

argument largely misses the point. Far from seeking "absolute

protection" for the Bud mark, A-B is seeking to restrain C-O-B's

use of a similar mark on a similar product sold and advertised in

similar channels.28 C-O-B has not come forward with any proof

28C-0-B's reliance on this court's decision in Cal. Prods. Co. v. PPG Indus.. Inc.. 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1232 (D.N.H. 1990), is misplaced. While it is true that the court there relied on the existence of four other trademarks using the word "Storm" in refusing to enjoin the defendant's marketing of "Stormguard" stain, the court also found for the defendant on all but one of the other likelihood of confusion factors, including a finding that the marks were not similar. Id. at 1234-36. Moreover, it is unclear from the decision whether "Storm" had been used in connection with products related or unrelated to those of the

41 that anyone other than A-B has ever been permitted to use the

word "Bud" in the name of a beer. C f . Power City, 2 8 F. Supp. at

743 (enjoining use of name "Niagra Bud" for beer).

Instead, C-O-B has submitted an unauthenticated document

entitled "Trademark Office Research" which purports to show "22

active marks that contain the word 'bud' from a search of the

Patent and Trademark Office database." Even if this document

were competent evidence under Rule 56(e), it does not show the

use of the word "bud" to describe any products similar to those

sold under A-B's Bud mark. C f . Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Florists

Ass'n of Greater Cleveland, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 35, 37 (N.D. Ohio

1984) (allowing defendant florist's use of slogan "This Bud's for

you" because it had no "strength with respect to fresh-cut

flowers").29 It merely demonstrates the registration of marks

which include the word "bud" for a number of wholly unrelated

products, including auto parts, frozen pies, and a catfish

restaurant, as well as lawn care and janitorial services and a

public literacy program. Many of these marks also use the word

plaintiff. See id.

29The unauthenticated photograph submitted by C-O-B appears to demonstrate the use of "This Bud's for you" authorized by this litigation.

42 "bud" with descriptive phrases which would seemingly eliminate

consumer confusion, e.g., "Budd Van Lines" and "Bud Brothers

Hemporium Smoke Supplies Hemp Products." The list of third-party

registrations of "bud" therefore fails to create an issue of fact

as to the strength of A-B's mark. C f . Boston Athletic Ass'n, 867

F.2d at 32. The strength of the mark inguiry weighs in A-B's

favor.

In sum, C-O-B has failed to raise a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to seven of the eight factors which

inform the likelihood of confusion analysis, namely (1) the

similarity of the marks, (2) the similarity of the goods, (3) the

relationship between the parties' channels of trade, (4) the

relationship between the parties' advertising, (5) the classes of

prospective purchasers, (6) evidence of actual confusion, and (7)

the strength of the Bud mark.

There is a factual dispute as to C-O-B's intent in using the

Billy Budd mark. Nevertheless, the absence of evidence as to a

defendant's intent does not in of itself preclude summary

judgment for the plaintiff in an infringement case. See Copy

C o p , 908 F. Supp. at 45. There is therefore no genuine issue of

fact sufficient to reguire a trial on the likelihood ofconfusion

43 engendered by C-O-B's use of the Billy Budd mark. Accordingly,

A-B's motion for summary judgment on its Lanham Act claims,

comprising counts I and II of its complaint, is granted.

II. Trademark Dilution under New Hampshire Law

A-B also seeks summary judgment on count four of its

complaint, brought under the New Hampshire anti-dilution statute,

RSA 350-A:12.30 Because A-B would not be entitled to any

remedies under RSA 350-A:12 beyond those provided by the Lanham

Act, the court declines to address the state-law claim in the

context of A-B's summary judgment motion.31 See Ouabaug Rubber

30 This statute provides that:

Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive guality of a mark registered under this chapter, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods and services.

RSA 35 0-A:12 (2002) .

31Although it is unnecessary to resolve A-B's state anti­ dilution claim, the court notes that "in several cases, where traditional likelihood of confusion of sponsorship is found, the court will also find, almost as an after thought, that there has been dilution. This seems to be a harmless redundancy." E . & J . Gallo, 782 F. Supp. at 469 (internal guotation marks and citation omitted).

44 Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 161 n.14 (1st Cir. 1977) .

It also appears that A-B would not be entitled to any

additional relief if it were to succeed on its claims for federal

trademark dilution (count three) , or its claims for common law

trademark infringement and unfair competition (count five), which

were not presented in its motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, counts three, four, and five will be dismissed

without prejudice as moot unless A-B objects by October 17, 2003.

III. Appropriate Remedy

A-B has reguested the following relief: (1) a judgment that

C-O-B has violated A-B's rights in the Bud mark; (2) a permanent

injunction preventing C-O-B and its owners, officers, directors,

agents and those otherwise related to C-O-B from using the Billy

Budd Classic American Ale mark or any other confusingly similar

mark in the promotion of beer and other related products; (3) an

order reguiring the destruction of any material depicting the

infringing marks; (4) a report from C-O-B detailing its

compliance with the court's order in this regard; and (5)

attorneys' fees under 15 U.S.C. § 117(a), with costs and

prejudgment interest.

"A victim of infringement is entitled to as much protection

45 as is required to stop the infringement." Aktiebolaget, 999 F.2d

at 5. Nevertheless, "[i]n ju n c t i v e relief should be no more

burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete

relief to [the] plaintiffs, . . . and courts must closely tailor

injunctions to the harm that they address." Tamko Roofing

Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 40 (1st Cir.

2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The "safe

distance rule," however, "counsels that 'an infringer, once

caught, must expect some fencing in. . . .'" Id. (quoting 5

McCarthy § 30:4). Furthermore, "[s]trong marks . . . require

stronger measures to remedy infringement." Aktiebolaget, 999

F.2d at 5. With these principles in mind, the court rules that

the plaintiff is entitled to the relief it seeks, with one

exception. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).

The Lanham Act provides that a court "in exceptional cases

may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party."

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). If the party seeking attorneys' fees proves

by clear and convincing evidence that such exceptional

circumstances exist, the court may award attorneys' fees at its

discretion. See Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Prods. Co., 69

F. Supp. 2d 246, 267 (D. Mass. 1999) . A non-exclusive list of

46 conduct justifying an award of attorneys' fees includes

"malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful" infringement.

Tamko Roofing Prods., 282 F.3d at 31 (internal guotation marks

omitted); see also Kappa Sigma, 654 F. Supp. at 1103 (awarding

fees based on defendant's willful and deliberate exploitation of

plaintiff's mark).

Although C-O-B may have been careless in its selection of a

name for its brew and arguably should have been aware of the

likelihood that the Billy Budd mark would result in confusion

with A-B's Bud products, C-O-B's conduct was not so egregious as

to reguire it to pay A-B's attorneys' fees. As discussed, the

summary judgment record is less than convincing as to A-B's

charge that C-O-B adopted its mark with the intent of unfairly

capitalizing on A-B's substantial investment in the Bud mark.

A-B did not come forward with evidence that any real-world beer

drinker was ever actually confused into buying C-O-B's product

instead of one of A-B's brews because he or she thought Billy

Budd Classic American Ale emanated from or was affiliated with

A-B, although McCullough's study constitutes undisputed

circumstantial proof of actual confusion. Finally, it is

undisputed that C-O-B grossed only $385 from NHCB's kegs of Billy

47 Budd Classic American Ale, suggesting that C-O-B made only the

slimmest of profits by infringing upon the Bud mark, and even

this infringement was very limited both geographically and

temporally. An award of attorneys' fees is therefore not

appropriate in this case. See Volkswaqenwerk, 814 F.2d at 821.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment (document no. 44) is granted as to counts one

and two. A-B shall propose an order setting forth the relief

allowed by the court, and in accordance with the legal principles

outlined by the court, including specific parameters for C-O-B's

destruction of infringing materials as authorized by 15 U.S.C. §

1118. The proposed order shall be filed and served upon opposing

counsel by October 17, 2003. C-O-B is to file any objections to

the proposed order by October 24, 2003.

If A-B seeks additional relief on counts three, four, and

five, it shall notify the court by October 17, 2003. If no such

48 notice is filed, the court will dismiss counts three through

five, without prejudice, as moot.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge October 9, 2003

cc: Arpiar G. Saunders Jr., Esguire Michael W. Rafter, Esguire George L. Little Jr., Esguire Brian S. Withers, Esguire Robert A. Shaines, Esguire Peter Bennett, Esguire