Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch Dist

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 29, 2004
• Docket: 03-3912
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

7-29-2004

Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch Dist Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-3912

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Recommended Citation "Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch Dist" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 424. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/424

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu. PRECEDENTIAL Michael I. Levin Paul N. Lalley UNITED STATES COURT OF Levin Legal Group, P.C. APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006

Attorneys for Appellee No. 03-3912

OPINION OF THE COURT DAVID ANGSTADT and BARBARA ANGSTADT, SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. Parents and Natural Guardians of Appellants David and Barbara Megan Angstadt, A M inor, Angstadt brought suit on behalf of their Appellants daughter, Megan Angstadt, against the v. Midd-West School District (the “School District” or “Midd-West”) for civil rights MIDD-WEST SCHOOL DISTRICT violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and for violations of the Pennsylvania On Appeal from the United States Public School Code of 1949, 24 Pa. Cons. District Court for the Middle District of Stat. Ann. §§ 1-101, et seq. The District Pennsylvania Court granted the School District’s motion (D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-02170) to dismiss 1 and the Angstadts appeal this District Judge: Hon. James F. M cClure, Jr. 1 The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR the state law claims both because it had 34.1(a) July 15, 2004 dismissed those claims over which it had original jurisdiction and because the state Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and law claims were complex. The court WEIS, Circuit Judges noted that it had dismissed all federal claims and, quoting the statute that gives (Filed: July 29, 2004 ) it discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that “raises a novel or complex issue of Jeffrey C. Dohrmann State law,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), Rieders, Travis, Humphrey, Harris, concluded that “any question regarding Waters & Waffenschmidt charter schools in Pennsylvania is a Williamsport, PA 17701 novel and/or complex issue of State law.” App. at 19. It also stated that the Attorney for Appellants charter school question predominates decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to a significant portion of its curriculum and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. to deliver a significant portion of instruction to its students through the I. Internet or other electronic means.” 24 Pa. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17-1703-A. HISTORY Once enrolled at WPCCS, which The Angstadts sued the School does not have a basketball team for female District based upon its refusal to permit students of Megan’s grade and age, Megan Megan to participate in interscholastic continued to play interscholastic basketball basketball. Megan is currently seventeen for Midd-West at the beginning of the years old and has never been enrolled in 2001-2002 school year. However, the the School District, which is her “school School District “refused to allow [her] to district of residence.” App. at 6. Instead, continue to practice, play and compete in she was home schooled from the third interscholastic basketball . . . for the grade to the eighth grade. During her remainder of the 2001-2002 school year seventh and eighth grade years (1999-2000 and the 2002-2003 school year by claiming and 2000-2001), Midd-West allowed that [she] has not met the . . . Megan to play interscholastic basketball, requirements.” App. at 31 (Compl. ¶ 18). granting her an exception to its provision The Angstadts contend these requirements disallowing students not enrolled in the are “unreaso na bl e, a rb itra ry and School District from participating in its capricious.” App. at 31 (Compl. ¶ 18). extracurricular activities. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania In 2001, she stopped home School Code, made applicable to cyber schooling and began attending Western charter schools by 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School § 17-1747-A, (“WPCCS”) as a ninth-grade student. . . . . no school district of WPCCS was and is a duly chartered and residence shall prohibit a certified cyber charter school pursuant to student of a charter school the Pennsylvania School Code. The School from participating in any Code defines “cyber charter school” as “an extracurricular activity of independent public school established and that schoo l district of operated under a charter from the residence: Provided, That Department of Education and in which the the student is able to fulfill school uses technology in order to provide all of the requirements of participation in such activity and the charter school does over the federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § not provide the same 1367(c)(2). It therefore dismissed Count extracurricular activity. IV of the complaint without prejudice.

2 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17-1719-A(14) District Court denied the requested (emphasis added). The Angstadts allege te mpor a ry r e str a ining or de r a n d that Megan “has met all charter school, preliminary injunction. cyber charter school, Pennsylvania The School District referenced two Department of Education, and PIAA letters, entered into the record in the first [Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic action, which set forth the requirements Association] requirements, and all imposed on Megan under 25 Pa. Cons. reasonable requirements placed upon her Stat. Ann. § 17-1719-A(14) in order to by [the School District], to practice, play qualify for extracurricular activities. In and compete in interscholastic basketball their responsive pleadings, the Angstadts . . . .” App. at 31 (Compl. ¶ 19) (emphasis contended that the District Court could added). The implication of this statement consider the letters as materials outside the is that there were requirements Megan did pleadings only after converting the motion not meet. to dismiss to a summary judgment motion The Angstadts filed their initial to afford them an opportunity to submit complaint, along with a request for a additional materials under Federal Rule of temporary restraining order and a Civil Procedure 56. preliminary injunction, on January 29, The District Court granted the 2002, seeking to compel the School motion to dismiss, holding that the District to permit Megan to participate in requirements for participation were not interscholastic basketball. The District disputed by the Angstadts and were Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on integral to the complaint, and that the February 4, 2002 and denied the request Angstadts had failed to state a claim on the for a stay, after which the Angstadts First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal voluntarily dismissed their complaint on Protection grounds pleaded. the ground that the Pennsylvania legislature amended the Charter School II. Law to authorize cyber charter schools. DISCUSSION They filed their second complaint, initiating the instant action, on November We exercise plenary review of a 27, 2002, again seeking a temporary dismissal order pursuant to Federal Rule of restraining order, a preliminary injunction Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). and other relief to compel the School A. Motion to Dismiss and Summary District to permit Megan’s participation in Judgment interscholastic basketball competition. This complaint alleged that the School The Angstadts argue that because District violated Megan’s rights to First “[i]n determining whether a claim should Amendment freedom of association, Due be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a court Process, and Equal Protection. The looks only to the facts alleged in the

3 complaint and its attachments without District, was improperly considered by the reference to other parts of the record,” District Court. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & We do not agree that the District Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. Court accepted the School District’s 1994), the District Court erred in characterization of the requirements as considering information set forth outside falling into five over-simplified and rather the complaint. However, we have benign catego ries, “ w ithout even recognized that “[a]lthough a district court reviewing the documents on which that may not consider matters extraneous to the representation was based.” Appellants’ pleadings, a document integral to or Br. at 21 (emphasis in original). First, explicitly relied upon in the complaint may there is no basis for the implication that be considered without converting the the District Judge, who presided over the motion to dismiss into one for summary action in which the two letter documents judgment.” U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. were of record, was unfamiliar with the Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) documents on which the summary was (internal quotation marks and citations based. In fact, many of the requirements omitted) (emphasis deleted). are set forth in the relevant statutes. Such The gravamen of the Angstadts’ requirements include full-time attendance complaint is that the requirements for with attendance meaning “a minimum of participating in extracurricular activities 180 days of instruction,” App. at 46 are unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, (quoting 22 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Code but the Angstadts neither enumerate the 11.1); a day of instruction meaning “time requirements generally nor specify the in the school day devoted to instruction requirements to which they object. These provided as an integral part of the school requirements were integral to the program under the direction of certificated complaint, as the Angstadts’ claim could school employees,” App. at 46; a not be evaluated without some reference to curriculum appro ved by and in them. In light of the Angstadts’ failure to conformance with the regulations of the enumerate them for the District Court, the State Board of Education and the School District sensibly undertook to do Pennsylvania School Code, App. at 49 so. The Angstadts do not dispute the (quoting PIAA Bylaws, Art. IX, § 1); and factual accuracy of the twenty-nine “passing at least four full-credit subjects or requirements set forth by the School the equivalent. Eligibility shall be District in the two letters previously cumulative from the beginning of a referenced, dated October 23, 2001 and grading period, shall be reported on a November 30, 2001. Instead, the weekly basis, and shall be filed in the An gstad ts contend that the lis t principal’s office.” App. at 50 (quoting summarizing these requirements into five PIAA Bylaws, Art. IX, § 1). general categories, provided by the School Having put the re l e v a nt

4 requirements at issue, the Angstadts sports. Furthermore, for the reasons that cannot now claim that their own failure to follow, the Angstadts’ complaint fails to enumerate these requirements creates an state a claim upon which relief may be issue of fact precluding dismissal. The granted, and this failure could not have District Court accepted the School been cured by additional factual evidence. District’s summary of the five categories B. Freedom of Association of requirements as: The Angstadts argue that 1. Megan must have achieved “educational choices of the type and nature at least the 9th grade level at issue in this matter are within the scope academically; of constitutionally protected associations 2. Megan’s curriculum must be and that [the School District’s] actions similar to the curriculum, interfere with or chill those rights as i n c l u de t h e p h y s ic a l exercised by the [sic] Megan and her education course, for the family.” Appellants’ Br. at 24. The students enrolled in Midd- School District respo nds that the West; “Angstadts do not allege that M egan is unable to attend WPCCS as a consequence 3. M eg a n a n d W P C C S must of the [School] District’s requirements . . provide verifiable . ; they have not, in fact, been deprived of attendance documentation; the educational alternative of attending a 4. Mega n and WPC CS mus t cyber charter school by reason of the document on-going passing [School] District’s implementation of its grades; requirements for participation in its extracurricular activities.” Appellee’s Br. 5. Me gan must mainta i n an at 18-19. We agree. average or above citizenship grade. To determine whether the School District’s refusal to allow Megan to App. at 45-46 (footnotes omitted). participate in interscholastic basketball Because Megan did not receive any violates her right to association, we must internet instruction or attend any “real identify the precise nature of the time” courses, which meant that all of her associational right in question, the extent attendance and class time was self-verified to which the state action regulates that instead of verified by certified instructors, right, and thus the appropriate level of and because she studied a curriculum scrutiny under which to view that state provided by the University of Missouri and action. not approved by the State Board of As the right to education is not Education, the School District deemed her constitutionally protected, San Antonio ineligible to participate in interscholastic Independent School District v. Rodriguez,

5 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), we turn to whether for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of there is a protected intimate, as opposed to Phila., 874 F.2d 156, 162-63, 168 (3d Cir. expressive, association right at issue. The 1989). Under the rational basis standard, right of intimate association extends to the Angstadts had the burden of “child rearing and education.” Bd. of Dirs. overcoming the presumption of rationality, of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, see Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). In Pierce v. 594 (3d Cir. 1985), and their bare legal Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534- conclusion that the requirements that they 35 (1925), the Supreme Court struck down failed to enumerate are “unreasonable, a state statute that “unreasonably arbitrary and capricious,” App. at 31 interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and (Compl. ¶ 18), is insufficient to rebut the guardians to direct the upbringing and presumption of rationality. Because the education of children under their control.” burden on the Angstadts’ right to educate Megan, to the extent there is a burden, is at That statute, however, made public best incidental, the District Court did not education compulsory, subject to specific err in dismissing the complaint as to the exceptions, thereby directly impacting the right of association claim. right of parents to educate their children in the manner they desired. Here the C. Due Process regulation in question – the requirements The Angstadts’ due process claim placed upon students who wish to can be summarily dismissed. They participate in interscholastic basketball – concede that “no property interest exists in does not impact the Angstadts’ ability to participation in extracurricular activities, educate their daughter in the manner they including sports, as a general principle, choose.2 At best, the regulation’s impact under the United States Constitution.” on the Angstadts’ right to rear Megan is Appellants’ Br. at 29. Even if the state attenuated. statute were to be viewed as giving Megan Furthermore, state action that a property interest in participating in incidentally affects the parent-child extracurricular sports, the statute expressly relationship is subject to minimum conditions that participation on the proviso scrutiny, requiring only that the action “that the student is able to fulfill all of the rationally advance a legitimate government requirements of participation in such interest. See Phila. Police & Fire Ass’n activity.” 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17- 1719-A(14). The Angstadts’ assertion that Megan has m e t a ll “reasonable 2 requirements,” suggests that they concede There is no constitutionally that she has not met all of the protected right to play sports. Thus the “requirem ents of participation” for fact that the requirements regulate interscholastic basketball. It follows that Megan’s ability to play basketball is of Megan has no property interest for which no legal consequence.

6 due process must be afforded. Thus, we Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). The agree with the District Court that the School District put forth five interests Angstadts fail to state a due process claim animating the list of requirements. As upon which relief may be granted. stated by the District Court, they are: D. Equal Protection (1) ensuring that its student athletes have the academic The Angstadts allege that the eligibility to play high “unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious school sports; (2) ensuring requirements to practice, play and compete that its athletes meet its in interscholastic basketball” deprive ph ysical education Megan “of equal protection of the law requirements; (3) based upon [her] status as a cyber charter discouraging students from school student.” App. at 36 (Compl. ¶ 41). cutting class or taking We apply the highly deferential, rational- unauthorized trips away basis standard of review because the from school during the School District’s requirements do not school day; (4) encouraging burden any fundamental constitutional students to maintain passing right, and the difference between cyber- grades[;] and (5) promoting school students and physical-school good citizenship. students is not a suspect classification, such as those based on race, alienage, or App. at 17 (citations omitted). These national origin. Moreover, there is no reasons provide a rational basis for the differing or unequal treatment because the requirements for participation in extra- requirements imposed upon cyber-school scholastic events by cyber-students as well students are no different than those as physical-school students.3 imposed upon physical-school students. Because the Angstadts fail to The additional difficulty that cyber-school allege, as a preliminary matter, that the students may face is insufficient to plead state action differentially regulates cyber- an equal protection violation absent school students and physical-school membership in a suspect classification. students, which is a non-suspect In any event, the Angstadts’ claim classification, and because the complaint cannot pass the rational-basis threshold. could not defeat rational-basis review, we “Under rational-basis rev iew, th e affirm the decision of the District Court as challenged classification must be upheld to the equal protection claim. ‘if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’” Donatelli v. 3 Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993) Whether they violate the (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Pennsylvania Public School Code is a matter for the state courts to resolve.

7 III. CONCLUSION The District Court did not err when it dismissed the Angstadts’ First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection claims under Rule 12(b)(6). We will therefore affirm its order dismissing the action, without prejudice to the Angstadts’ right to file their state claims in state court.