Angelo Luhrsen v. Delaray

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMarch 1, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-08933
StatusUnknown

This text of Angelo Luhrsen v. Delaray (Angelo Luhrsen v. Delaray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Angelo Luhrsen v. Delaray, (C.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 || Mildred K. O'Linn (State Bar No. 159055) missy.olinn@manningkass.com 2 || Craig Smith (State Bar No. 265676) craig □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ || MANNING & KASS ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP 4/801 S. Figueroa St, 15" Floor Los Angeles, California 90017-3012 5 || Telephone: ge) 624-6900 Facsimile: (213) 624-6999 6 Attorneys for Defendants, REDONDO 7 || BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICER DELARAY, OFFICER 8 || GONZALEZ, and OFFICER LOFSTROM 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge: Maria A. Audero = 14 < Vv. = 15 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE REDONDO BEACH POLICE ORDER 16 || OFFICER DELARAY, REDONDO BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT 17 || OFFICER GONZALEZ, REDONDO BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT Filed: 10/23/23 18 OFFICER LOFSTROM, and DOES 1 Trial Date: N/A to 10, 19 Defendants. 20 21 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 22 Discovery in this action 1s likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or 23 private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for 24 any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the 25 parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated 26 |! Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Stipulated Protective Order does not 271! confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the 28 protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited

1 || information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal 2 || principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 13.3 below, that this 3 || Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under 4 || seal; Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards 5 || that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the Court to file material under 6 || seal. 7/2. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 8 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 9 || protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace n 10 || officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for 2 11 || the following reasons. < 12 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of 2 13 || privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein 14 || that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective = procedure of California law. See Sanchez y. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 16 || 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17 || 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies 18 || to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege 19 || law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying 20 || [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 21 || 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based 22 || “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. 23 || Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants 24 || further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can 25 || threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 26 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement 27 || agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 28 || information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client

1 |] privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of 2 || their peace officers — particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files 3 || that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or 4 || evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering 5 || legal advice or analysis — potentially including but not limited to 6 || evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, 7 || evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports 8 || prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering 9 || legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v.

n 10 || United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 2 11 || F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. 12 || Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. 2 13 || Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United 14 || States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further = 15 || contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public 16 || entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 18 || impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and 19 || related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open 20 || and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that 21 || can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial 22 || measures that may be required. 23 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same 24 || rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to 25 || the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 26 || compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 27 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 28 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing

1 || such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 2 || impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, 3 || frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, 4 || preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace 5 || officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, 6 || and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 7 || publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information — as can and often does 8 || result in litigation. 9 Plaintiff agrees that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order so as to

n 10 || preserve the respective interests of the parties without the need to further burden the 2 11 || Court with such issues. Specifically, the parties jointly contend that, absent this 12 || Stipulation and its associated Protective Order, the parties' respective privilege 2 13 || interests may be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulation and its associated 14 || Protective Order may avoid such harm by permitting the parties to facilitate = discovery with reduced risk that privileged and/or sensitive/confidential information 16 || will become matters of public record.

18/13. DEFINITIONS 113.1. Action: Luhrsen v. City of Redondo Beach et. al. (Case No. 2:23-cv-08933- 20 || JFW-MAA) )/ 3.2. Challenging Party: A Party or Nonparty that challenges the 22 || designation of information or items under this Stipulated Protective Order. 23 || 3.3.

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Related

Koire v. Metro Car Wash
707 P.2d 195 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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Angelo Luhrsen v. Delaray, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/angelo-luhrsen-v-delaray-cacd-2024.