Angellis v. Stop & Shop, Inc.

35 Mass. App. Dec. 154
CourtMassachusetts District Court, Appellate Division
DecidedJuly 1, 1966
DocketNo. 39775
StatusPublished

This text of 35 Mass. App. Dec. 154 (Angellis v. Stop & Shop, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Angellis v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 35 Mass. App. Dec. 154 (Mass. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinion

Cox, J.

In this action of tort Mary A. Angellis seeks to recover damages for an injury which she alleges was caused by the defendant’s negligence in maintaining a display of can goods as a result of which a can of tomato puree fell upon her foot. There is a count by her husband for consequential damages.

There was a finding for Mrs. Angellis in the sum of $1,400.00 and for her husband in the sum of $42.00.

The defendant claims to be aggrieved by the denial of its requested rulings that the evidence does not warrant a finding that the defendant was negligent nor a finding for the plaintiffs. A requested ruling that the evidence warranted [156]*156a finding of contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part was waived.

The evidence is not disputed.

The defendant’s store is a discount type operation. This was known to Mrs. Angellis. On March 25,1965 she went to the defendant’s store in the Hingham Shopping Plaza to purchase a case of tomato puree. As was her custom and as on previous occasions she asked a store clerk for a full case of tomato puree. She was told that no full cases were available. She was then directed to the display of tomato puree and was told to take two trays, equivalent to a case of twenty-four cans. It is exceptional for a customer to purchase a full case or tray.

The display of cans of tomato puree was situated at the end of a shelf counter at the front of the store. It consisted of tier upon tier of cans built up from the floor. Between most of the tiers was a cardboard tray, each tray containing twelve cans. Bach can weighed one pound twelve ounces. The trays were fashioned by cutting the cardboard containers so as to leave a rim or edge one inch high around the cardboard bottom. This method of display is known in the trade as a tray pack. The purpose of tray packing is efficiency and expediency in merchandising as well as stability of the display for the safety of customers. It tends to contain the cans in position.

Tray packing is used throughout the de[157]*157fendant’s store. As needed, an employee re-stacks the display. There was testimony that it was not normal practice to put a cardboard separator between every tier, but, if trays were available they were used. Because some containers are used in setting off the display for merchandising purposes there were not enough trays to place between each and every tier. The report is silent as to trays which may become available from the sale of cans or from other sources. Three photographs of the display, which were in evidence, have been examined by us. They show a number of trays in each tier and the display about twelve tiers high.

On the day in question Mrs. Angellis went as directed to the display of tomato puree. She removed a tray from a tier at chest level and placed it in her carrier. It weighed about twenty pounds. She then took hold of the second tray and as she was removing it a can from the third tier fell and injured her right foot. She had not seen that there was no cardboard separator or tray between the third and fourth tiers from the top. That she was in the exercise of duo care is not disputed.

The justice specially found that “The defendant was negligent in failing to use reasonable care in keeping the display of tomato puree in a safe condition, that is: the defendant failed to place the cans in a cardboard tray on the level from which the can fell and struck the plaintiff.”

[158]*158The legal duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff as a business invitee “was to use reasonable care to keep in a safe condition that part of the premises to which she was invited or at least to warn her of dangers not known to her or obvious to a person of ordinary intelligence, which were either known or should have been known to the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care.” Rossley v. S. S. Kresge Co., 339 Mass. 654, 656. See also Letiecq v. Denholm & McKay Co., 328 Mass. 120. Luz v. Stop & Shop, Inc. of Peabody, 348 Mass. 198, 203. This duty extended to the display of tomato puree to which Mrs. Angellis was directed to help herself. It required the defendant to use ordinary care and diligence to keep the. display “in a reasonably safe condition, having regard to its construction, the purpose for which it was arranged, and the customary conduct of the defendant’s invitees who made use of it.” Brooks v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 302 Mass. 184, 186. “What constitutes the required care and diligence is a question of fact. Campbell v. Boston, 189 Mass. 7, 10. Only where no view of the evidence could warrant a jury in finding the defendant negligent can it be held as a matter of law that the plaintiffs cannot recover. See, e.g., Mudge v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 339 Mass. 763.” The quotation is from Luz v. Stop & Shop, Inc. of Peabody, 348 Mass. 198, 203-204. “Whether a case falls on one side of the line or the other is often difficult and some [159]*159of the cases cited above are so close that opinions may well differ. ’ ’ The words are those of Spalding, J. in Letiecq v. Denholm & McKay Co., 328 Mass. 120, 122, in which, cases on both sides of the line are cited.

Conceding, in the case at bar, that opinions may well differ, we must therefore conclude that that of the justice was at least warranted. The case on its facts appears to be similar to cases involving articles in precarious balance, and is governed by them. In such cases findings of negligence have been sustained against the merchants or other persons responsible for the articles. In Purdy v. McWhirr Co., 350 Mass. 769, packing boxes each three feet high, twenty-seven inches wide, three inches thick and weighing twenty-one pounds, which stood “straight up and against the end” of a two foot high display table fell on a passing customer. It was held that “The jury could have found that leaving the cartons in a state of precarious balance was a negligent act which caused the injury.” In Navien v. Cohen, 268 Mass. 427, a storekeeper was held liable for injuries resulting when a radio loud speaker weighing about five pounds and improperly fastened to its shelf was wind blown from its shelf and fell upon a business invitee. In Ryder v. Robinson, 329 Mass. 285, it was held that a section of a fence left in a state of precarious balance warranted a finding of negligence. In Burke v. Jordan Marsh Co., 313 Mass. 119, eight [160]*160or ten of twenty rolls of rugs, six feet high, standing on end, fell and injured a customer. It was held that a finding was warranted that they had been left in an insecure state or that they were stacked insecurely. In Hart v. M. S. Kelliher Co., 308 Mass. 213, the plaintiff was injured by several bags of cement which fell from a pile seven to eight feet high at the ends, twelve feet high in the center and unsafely piled. It was held that “A jury could find that the defendant knew or ought to have known that the pile was insecure and likely to fall, and should have warned the plaintiff of the danger of which, the jury could find, he was ignorant.” In Meehan v. Gordon, 307 Mass. 59, 62-63, a vault door being installed stood unsupported and unbraced. The person unlocking the door was injured when it fell upon him. A finding of negligence was upheld.

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Related

Mudge v. Stop & Shop, Inc.
162 N.E.2d 670 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1959)
Rossley v. S. S. Kresge Co.
162 N.E.2d 26 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1959)
Letiecq v. Denholm & McKay Co.
102 N.E.2d 86 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1951)
Gallagher v. STOP & STOP, INC.
126 N.E.2d 190 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1955)
Ryder v. Robinson
107 N.E.2d 803 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1952)
Luz v. Stop & Shop, Inc. of Peabody
202 N.E.2d 771 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1964)
Campbell v. City of Boston
75 N.E. 96 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1905)
Carriere v. Merrick Lumber Co.
89 N.E. 544 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1909)
Navien v. Cohen
167 N.E. 666 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1929)
Corthell v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
291 Mass. 242 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1935)
Brooks v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
19 N.E.2d 39 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1939)
Dunbar v. Ferrera Bros.
27 N.E.2d 675 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1940)
Meehan v. Gordon
29 N.E.2d 759 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1940)
Hart v. M. S. Kelliher Co.
31 N.E.2d 519 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1941)
Burke v. Jordan Marsh Co.
46 N.E.2d 519 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1943)
Purdy v. R. A. McWhirr Co.
215 N.E.2d 92 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1966)

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Bluebook (online)
35 Mass. App. Dec. 154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/angellis-v-stop-shop-inc-massdistctapp-1966.