Angela W. Debose v. USA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 25-12299
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12299 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 05/21/2026 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12299 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

ANGELA W. DEBOSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, MICHAEL WASHINGTON, LAVONNE WASHINGTON, Intervenor Plaintiffs, versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, RONALD FICARROTTA, Chief Judge, in official capacity, ELIZABETH G. RICE, individually and/or in her official capacity, GREGORY P. HOLDER, individually and/or in his official capacity, et al., Defendants-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 25-12299 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 05/21/2026 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 25-12299 ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02127-SDM-AAS ____________________

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Angela DeBose, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se,1 ap- peals the denial of her motion to dissolve a limited filing injunction enjoining her from filing further lawsuits about her employment at the University of South Florida without the signature of an attor- ney barred in Florida or the Middle District of Florida. The injunc- tion was imposed on her in 2022, and we affirmed the imposition of the injunction. See DeBose v. United States, No. 22-13380, 2024 WL 489699 at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024). She contends there has been a significant change in circumstances that justifies dissolution of the injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), including a letter from a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) indicating that it had investi- gated DeBose and found “no misconduct” on her part. 2 She also asserts the original imposition of the injunction violated due pro- cess when the district court failed to provide her with notice and

1 While we liberally construe pro se pleadings, this rule does not apply to a

licensed attorney. Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977). 2 DeBose is admitted to the State Bar of Wisconsin. USCA11 Case: 25-12299 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 05/21/2026 Page: 3 of 4

25-12299 Opinion of the Court 3

an opportunity to be heard before its issuance. After review, 3 we affirm. District courts have both the inherent power and constitu- tional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072-73 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (listing several different injunctions that courts have historically permitted to curtail vexatious litigation); see also Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993). A litigant can thus be “severely restricted” as to what he may file and how he must behave when seeking judicial relief so long as he is not “completely foreclosed from any access to the court.” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) permits a party to obtain relief from an order if, among other things, “applying [the order] prospectively is no longer equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). Although this rule may not be used to challenge the legal conclusions on which a prior judgment rests, the rule allows parties to modify or vacate an existing order if “a significant change either in factual conditions or in law” renders its continued enforcement “detrimental to the public interest.” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433,

3 The district court’s decision as to whether to modify an injunction is re-

viewed for abuse of discretion. SuVicMon Dev., Inc. v. Morrison, 991 F.3d 1213, 1224 (11th Cir. 2021). USCA11 Case: 25-12299 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 05/21/2026 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 25-12299

447 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). The party seeking relief un- der this rule bears the burden of establishing that changed circum- stances warrant relief. Id. DeBose fails to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of her motion to dissolve, because she does not carry her burden of establishing a significant change in fact or law that justifies dissolution. See id. The sole ground she raises on appeal to make her showing is the OLR letter clearing her of any “miscon- duct.” But this argument misunderstands the original injunction. The district court did not impose the injunction because it found DeBose’s actions to constitute professional misconduct with the State Bar of Wisconsin. It imposed the injunction because it found her duplicitous lawsuits relitigating the same issues against the same defendants to be vexatious. Therefore, the existence of the OLR letter clearing her of any professional misconduct with the State Bar of Wisconsin is immaterial to the injunction’s original aims. Accordingly, DeBose’s contention that there was a signifi- cant change in factual conditions necessitating the injunction’s dis- solution is unpersuasive, and the district court did not abuse its dis- cretion in denying her motion. Because DeBose’s due process, First Amendment, and inherent authority arguments go to the le- gal conclusions of the underlying injunction, we do not address them further. See id.; DeBose, 2024 WL 489699 at *1. AFFIRMED.