IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2019-CT-01423-SCT
ANGELA T. LAIRY, TURNER & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, CAROLYN T. KARRIEM, AND THE ESTATE OF BENNIE L. TURNER
v.
LORI CHANDLER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/08/2019 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LARRY E. ROBERTS TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JOHN H. COCKE ROBERT ALEXANDER CARSON, III CORRIE SCHULER ANGELA TURNER FORD BARBARA LEE CLARK RANDOLPH WALKER COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CLAY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: RANDOLPH WALKER ANGELA TURNER FORD BARBARA LEE CLARK ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: CHARLES M. MERKEL, JR. EDWARD P. CONNELL, JR ROBERT ALEXANDER CARSON, III JOHN H. COCKE CORRIE SCHULER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - LEGAL MALPRACTICE DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CLAY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND THE CASE IS REMANDED - 06/16/2022 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: EN BANC.
MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. While driving a forklift at work, Lori Chandler was hit by another forklift and injured.
She retained Turner & Associates to file a workers’ compensation claim. But Turner &
Associates failed to file her claim within the statute of limitations. And worse than that, the
firm’s case manager engaged in a year-and-a-half-long cover-up, which included false
assurances of settlement negotiations, fake settlement offers, and a forged settlement letter
purporting to be from Chandler’s former employer. Because of this professional negligence,
Chandler filed a legal malpractice action.
¶2. Liability is not in dispute.1 So the only issue at trial was damages. The trial judge,
sitting as fact-finder, concluded that Chandler had suffered a compensable work-related
injury—an injury that caused her to lose her job and left her unemployed for nearly two
years. Based on her hourly wage, the trial judge determined, had Turner & Associates timely
filed Chandler’s workers’ compensation claim, Chandler could have reasonably recovered
$50,000 in disability benefits. So the trial judge awarded her $50,000 in compensatory
damages. The trial judge also awarded Chandler $100,000 in punitive damages against the
case manager due to her egregious conduct.
1 The only question on remand is whether defendant Angela T. Lairy, an attorney alleged to have worked for the firm, in her individual capacity, is jointly liable with the other defendants for the $50,000 in compensatory damages awarded to Lori Chandler. See Lairy v. Chandler, No. 2019-CT-01423-COA, 2021 WL 4566740, at *4 (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2021). The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment against Lairy individually, finding there was a material fact dispute as to Lairy’s involvement in Chandler’s case. Id.
2 ¶3. The Court of Appeals affirmed the punitive-damages award.2 But the court reversed
and remanded the compensatory-damages award.3 Essentially, the Court of Appeals held that
Chandler had failed to present sufficient medical evidence to support a $50,000 workers’
compensation claim.4
¶4. Were this a workers’ compensation case, we might agree with the Court of Appeals.
But this is a legal malpractice case. And part of what Chandler lost, due to attorney
negligence, was her ability to prove her work-related injury led to her temporary total
disability. The Court of Appeals faulted Chandler for not providing evidence she sought
medical treatment after May 2008. But the precise reason Chandler hired Turner &
Associates in August 2008 was to navigate the workers’ compensation process, of which she
was unfamiliar. And Turner & Associates’ case manager confirmed that part of her
job—which she did not perform in Chandler’s case—was to follow clients through the
medical-treatment process.
¶5. Based on these particular circumstances, we find the Court of Appeals erred by
applying exacting statutory requirements for a workers’ compensation claim to Chandler’s
common-law legal malpractice claim. Chandler was not seeking workers’ compensation
benefits from her employer. She was seeking legal malpractice damages from her former
legal representative. And she supported her damages claim with evidence that she suffered
2 Id. at *8. 3 Id. at **5-7. 4 Id.
3 a compensable work-related injury, causing her to lose employment. The record supports the
trial judge’s finding that, had Turner & Associates timely filed her claim, she could have
reasonably recovered $50,000 in disability benefits. These benefits were based on her
average weekly wage and the amount of time she remained unemployed due to her injury.
¶6. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the issue of
compensatory damages and reinstate the trial judge’s $50,000 compensatory-damages award.
Because this is the only issue for which Chandler sought certiorari review, we affirm the
remainder of the Court of Appeals’ decision, which affirmed the punitive-damages award but
reversed and remanded the grant of partial summary judgment against attorney Angela T.
Lairy in her individual capacity.5
Background Facts & Procedural History
I. Work-Related Injury
¶7. Chandler worked as a forklift driver for Cooper Tire. In March 2008, her forklift was
struck by another forklift, injuring her. Chandler went to the emergency room the next day.
Her pain continued, so she followed up with her doctor. Her doctor placed her on sedentary
work restrictions and prescribed physical therapy. Chandler returned to work at Cooper Tire
that same month. But based on her physician-imposed restrictions, she was let go three days
later.
¶8. Chandler discontinued physical therapy in May 2008 after she discovered she was
pregnant and thus could not perform the prescribed exercises.
5 See supra n.1.
4 II. Turner & Associates’ Failure to File Claim and Fake Settlement Offers
¶9. Two months later, in August 2008, Chandler sought legal representation from Turner
& Associates. At the time, Bennie Turner was the managing partner and sole owner. His
daughter Angela T. Lairy, who is an attorney, contends that she worked for her father’s firm
as an independent contractor. His other daughter Carolyn T. Karriem, who is not an attorney,
worked as a case manager. Chandler testified she met with Lairy at the initial meeting, and
Lairy agreed to represent her. But Lairy and Karriem denied this. According to Lairy, she
never worked on Chandler’s case.
¶10. From our review, it appears that no one at Turner & Associates did any legitimate
work on Chandler’s case. And the statute of limitations ran without Chandler’s workers’
compensation claim being filed. Chandler contacted Karriem about her claim in 2011. But
instead of informing Chandler of the mistake, Karriem assured Chandler that Turner &
Associates was actively negotiating a settlement with Chandler’s former employer. Not only
was this false, but Karriem actually conveyed a fake settlement offer of $25,000. Chandler
rejected this. After that, Karriem falsely told Chandler that Cooper Tire had made a new
settlement offer of $30,000. Chandler rejected this “offer” too. Over the next year, Karriem
continued to make up false settlement offers of increasing amounts. During this time period,
Bennie Turner died. And his daughter Lairy took over as managing partner of Turner &
Associates. Lairy has denied any involvement with the fake settlement offers.
¶11. Finally, Chandler “accepted” a supposed offer to settle for $100,000. To make it look
like a real settlement had been reached, Karriem drafted a fake settlement agreement, which
5 Chandler signed. Karriem also forged a letter purporting to be from “Blake Berry” at Cooper
Tire.
¶12. Six months then passed with Chandler receiving no money—only empty promises that
the firm was working on finalizing the settlement. Finally, Chandler faxed Turner &
Associates a letter of termination and sought help from another attorney. She also contacted
Cooper Tire directly. It was then she learned there was no settlement offer because no claim
had ever been filed on her behalf. She also discovered “Blake Berry” did not exist and every
settlement document she had received from Karriem was bogus.
III. Chandler’s Legal Malpractice Lawsuit
¶13. Chandler filed a legal malpractice action against Turner & Associates, Bennie
Turner’s estate, Lairy, and Karriem. The trial judge granted Chandler partial summary
judgment on the issue of liability as to all defendants. And a successor trial judge6 held a
bench trial on damages. He awarded Chandler $50,000 in actual damages against all
defendants jointly. He awarded $100,000 in punitive damages against Karriem.
¶14. The defendants appealed, and this Court assigned their appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals made three rulings:
(1) The trial judge reversibly erred by granting partial summary judgment against Lairy because of genuine fact disputes as to whether Lairy was a member of the PLLC or independent contractor and whether Lairy actually worked on Chandler’s case.
6 The local circuit judges recused. This Court originally appointed Judge Henry Lackey as special judge. After Judge Lackey passed away, this Court appointed Judge Larry Roberts.
6 (2) The trial judge reversibly erred by awarding $50,000 in compensatory damages because Chandler failed to support her damages claim with substantial evidence. Specifically, Chandler did not provide medical evidence to support her being totally temporarily disabled after May 2008.
(3) The trial judge did not err by awarding punitive damages against Karriem in the amount of $100,000 because Karriem waived her claim that the trial judge failed to consider her net worth.
Lairy, 2021 WL 4566740, at **4-8.
¶15. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the first two issues and affirmed on
the third. Id. We granted Chandler’s petition for a writ of certiorari, which sought review
of only one issue—the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the compensatory-damages award.
Thus, our opinion focuses solely on this issue. We do not disturb the other two rulings.
Discussion
¶16. This Court has held that an attorney’s failure to file an action within the prescribed
statute of limitations is negligence as a matter of law. Byrd v. Bowie, 933 So. 2d 899, 904
(Miss. 2006) (citing Hickox ex rel. Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So. 2d 626, 635 (Miss. 1987),
superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. McLemore, 863
So. 2d 31, 35-36 (Miss. 2004); Thompson v. Erving’s Hatcheries, Inc., 186 So. 2d 756, 759
(Miss. 1966)). But that does not mean the former client automatically recovers damages.
Such “negligence is actionable only where it is the proximate cause of the damages
complained of . . . [, which] are usually the value of the claim lost or judgment suffered as
an alleged result of the attorney’s negligence . . . .” Thompson, 186 So. 2d at 759 (quoting
45 A.L.R. 2d § 5 (1956)).
7 ¶17. This proximate-causation requirement is sometimes referred to as “the trial-within-a-
trial test.” E.g., Trigg v. Farese, 266 So. 3d 611, 621 (Miss. 2018). And it requires the
former client to show that, “but for the negligence of the attorney, the client would have been
successful in the prosecution or defense of an action.” Thompson, 186 So. 2d at 759
(quoting 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 188 (1963)). By reversing the $50,000
compensatory-damages award, the Court of Appeals essentially held that Chandler had failed
the trial-within-a-trial test—that is, she failed to sufficiently prove that, had the firm she
retained timely filed her workers’ compensation claim, she would have recovered $50,000
in workers’ compensation benefits. Lairy, 2021 WL 4566740, at *7. But after review, we
find the Court of Appeals missed the impact of the law firm’s neglect on Chandler’s ability
not only to file but also to prove her workers’ compensation claim. When this practical
reality is factored in, we find the trial court’s award is sufficiently supported by the evidence
and should be affirmed.
I. Due to her attorneys’ negligence, Chandler lost her ability not only to file but also to prove her disability claim.
¶18. In particular, the Court of Appeals appeared persuaded by Chandler’s inability to
prove she was entitled to temporary total-disability benefits beyond a couple of months
because she did not provide medical evidence that her work-related injury kept her from
working for two years. In other words, the Court of Appeals reversed the legal-malpractice
damages award because, in its view, the client did not have sufficient medical evidence to
support her workers’ compensation claim.
8 ¶19. Were this a straight-up workers’ compensation case, we might agree with the Court
of Appeals. Indeed, recovery of workers’ compensation benefits for temporary disability due
to a work-related injury is exclusively governed by Mississippi’s Workers’ Compensation
Law. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 71-3-1 to -129 (Rev. 2021). And Section 71-3-7(1) does
require that, “[i]n all claims in which no benefits, including disability, death and medical
benefits, have been paid, the claimant shall file medical records in support of his claim for
benefits when filing a petition to controvert.” Miss. Code. Ann. § 71-3-7(1) (Rev. 2021).
¶20. But this is not a workers’ compensation case. This is a legal malpractice case. And
it is at least partly due to the law firm’s negligence—which is not in dispute—that Chandler
was unable to obtain the required medical proof to be compensated by the Workers’
Compensation Commission, had her claim been properly filed. This is a practical reality that
both the Court of Appeals and the dissent miss.
¶21. Chandler was injured at work in March 2008. She began physical therapy but
discontinued in May 2008 due to her pregnancy. The Court of Appeals and the dissent fault
Chandler for not seeing a doctor or physical therapist after May 2008 and for not providing
any medical proof that she “remained under any work restrictions after May 2008.” Lairy,
2021 WL 4566740, at *7. But Chandler retained Turner & Associates in August 2008. As
she testified at trial, she did so specifically to navigate the workers’ compensation claim
process with which she was unfamiliar. As a practical matter, this representation would have
certainly involved not only the timely filing her petition to controvert—which the firm
undeniably did not do—but also guiding Chandler to the appropriate medical providers to
9 assess her disability. Karriem herself confirmed this. In her deposition, she testified that part
of her role as case manager was to “follow clients through their treatment process.”
(Emphasis added.)
¶22. While the dissent finds it striking that Chandler never followed up with a physician
about her work-related restrictions, Chandler explained why this was so. She testified she
was unable to receive further treatment for her work-related injury following the birth of her
child in October 2008 without her attorney’s assistance. As she put it, her doctor kept giving
her “the runaround,” explaining she needed to go through her workers’ compensation
attorney. In other words, through Turner & Associates’ undisputed negligence, Chandler lost
not only the ability to file a workers’ compensation claim but also the ability to prove her
workers’ compensation claim through sufficient medical evidence.
¶23. We find the Court of Appeals erred to the extent it overlooked this practical reality
and faulted Chandler for not being able to do the very thing she hired Turner & Associates
to do—help prove her workplace injury led to compensable total temporary disability.
II. The trial judge applied the correct legal standard and supported his compensatory-damages award with substantial evidence.
¶24. Even so, that does not mean Chandler was relieved of the burden to pass the trial-
within-a-trial test. Chandler still had to show proximate cause—that had her workers’
compensation claim been properly pursued, she would have been successful. See Thompson,
186 So. 2d at 759. For a workers’ compensation claim to be successful, the employee must
“show[] an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment and causal
connection between the injury and the claimed disability.” Potts v. Lowery, 242 Miss. 300,
10 308, 134 So. 2d 474, 476 (1961). Here, the trial judge, acting as the fact-finder, concluded
that Chandler showed both.
¶25. First, the trial judge found that Chandler undisputedly suffered an on-the-job injury
when she was struck by a forklift. And the record shows Chandler immediately sought
medical treatment and submitted to the court medical records connecting her medical
treatment to her on-the-job injury.
¶26. Next, the trial judge found that Chandler established her on-the-job injury caused her
claimed disability. Chandler’s testimony and medical records detailed the restrictions her
treating physician placed on her, which kept Chandler from performing her normal
employment tasks. While Chandler returned to work and performed secretarial duties, after
three days, she was terminated because her employer had no real need for this type of work.
¶27. From this, the trial judge reasonably concluded that, had Chandler been represented
by competent counsel, she would have been entitled to some workers’ compensation benefits
for lost wages due to her disability. At the time she was injured, Chandler’s hourly wage was
$14.75 per hour. If she had been temporarily totally disabled, she would have been entitled
to sixty-six and two-thirds of her averaged weekly wage during the time of her disability.
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-17(b) (Rev. 2021). Chandler testified that her workplace injury
resulted in her inability to obtain any employment through 2010. Her legal malpractice
attorneys tied this information to its calculation that she would have been entitled to $59,000
in benefits. The trial judge awarded her $50,000.
11 ¶28. In Thompson, on which the Court of Appeals relied, this Court quoted hornbook law
that “the damages claimed [in a failure-to-file legal malpractice case] are usually the value
of the claim lost or judgment suffered as an alleged result of the attorney’s negligence[.]”
Thompson, 186 So. 2d at 759 (emphasis added) (quoting 45 A.L.R. 2d § 5 (1956)). Further,
it is for the jury to “determine the collectability and value of the judgment” that would have
been obtained but for attorney negligence. Thompson, 186 So. 2d at 760. In this bench trial,
the trial judge acted in the role of jury. And he determined sufficient evidence existed to
prove that, with competent legal counsel, Chandler would have obtained workers’
compensation benefits or a settlement with her former employer. He further determined that,
based on calculations provided by Chandler’s attorney, $50,000 was the reasonable value of
Chandler workers’ compensation claim. That is all the law required.
¶29. “‘A circuit court judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with
regard to his findings as a chancellor,’ and his findings are safe on appeal where they are
supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence.” City of Jackson v. Perry, 764
So. 2d 373, 376 (Miss. 2000) (quoting Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So. 2d 978, 982 (Miss.
1993)). Here, the trial judge did not pull the $50,000 compensatory-damages award out of
thin air. Instead, he made specific findings based on the evidence presented, which included
medical records. Therefore, his decision should have been “safe on appeal.” Id.
Conclusion
¶30. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed on the issue of compensatory
damages, and the trial court’s $50,000 compensatory-damages award is reinstated and
12 affirmed. We leave undisturbed the Court of Appeals’ rulings on the two issues outside of
our certiorari review. Thus, the trial court’s $100,000 punitive-damages award against
Karriem is affirmed. And the question of whether Lairy, as an individual, is jointly liable for
the $50,000 compensatory-damages award is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
¶31. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CLAY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND THE CASE IS REMANDED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS, P.J., BEAM, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, P.J.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶32. The majority correctly states that the instant case sounds in legal negligence rather
than workers’ compensation. Maj. Op. ¶ 4. However, as discussed below, in order to prevail
in her legal negligence claim, the plaintiff was required to prove that her underlying workers’
compensation claim had value. She failed to produce sufficient evidence, as required by
Mississippi’s workers’ compensation law, to do so. I therefore am of the opinion that the
Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court’s award of compensatory damages, and,
with respect, I dissent.
¶33. In a legal-malpractice claim, “a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship, negligence on the part of the lawyer
in handling his client’s affairs entrusted to him, and some injury proximately caused by the
lawyer’s negligence.” Trigg v. Farese, 266 So. 3d 611, 621 (Miss. 2018) (internal quotation
13 marks omitted) (quoting Est. of St. Martin v. Hixson, 145 So. 3d 1124, 1128 (Miss. 2014)).
Without question, these elements are satisfied in the instant case. A relationship between
Chandler and the firm, albeit a poor one, existed. The firm negligently handled her case—
the case manager’s blatant fraud glares the brightest example. Finally, because the statute
of limitations expired, Chandler lost her opportunity to file her claim, resulting in injury.
While the elements appear satisfied, it must be noted that the third element of proximate
causation is elevated in legal malpractice claims.
¶34. “[A] plaintiff in a negligence-based malpractice action must establish proximate cause
by the so-called “trial-within-a-trial” test. That is to say, the client “must show that, but for
[his] attorney’s negligence, he would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of
the underlying action.” Trigg, 266 So. 3d at 621 (¶ 24) (second alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687
So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1996); Crist v. Loyacono, 65 So. 3d 837, 842 (Miss. 2011)). Thus,
Chandler must show that, but for the firm’s negligence, she would have been successful in
the pursuit of her workers’ compensation claim. Per this trial-within-a-trial test, it appears
Chandler would have been successful on at least some award from her workers’
compensation claim now barred due to the firm’s negligence.
¶35. The question is whether the $50,000 award for compensatory damages is substantiated
by the evidence. The trial court and the majority assert that it was, focusing on Chandler’s
lack of employment following the accident as evidence that she would have received an
14 amount equal to more than two years of assistance from her workers’ compensation claims.
But the evidence does not truly support such a holding.
¶36. In cases in which the attorney’s negligence consists of the failure to file a claim within
the statue of limitations, “the damages claimed are usually the value of the claim lost or
judgment suffered as an alleged result of the attorney’s negligence[.]” Thompson v.
Erving’s Hatcheries, Inc., 186 So. 2d 756, 759 (Miss. 1966) (emphasis added) (quoting 45
A.L.R.2d § 5 (1956)). Because Chandler sought a workers’ compensation claim, the relevant
statutes dictate how her award should be computed. See Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-17(b) (Rev.
2021) (compensation for temporary total disability); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-21 (Rev. 2021)
(compensation for temporary partial disability).
¶37. Further, and of particular importance here, the statutes require medical findings to
support the disability from which relief is sought. Under Mississippi. Code Section
71-3-3(i) (Rev. 2021) (emphasis added), “[d]isability” means incapacity because of injury
to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other
employment, which incapacity and the extent thereof must be supported by medical findings.
Chandler fails to provide medical findings here that warrant an award equal to an amount for
more than two years of assistance through her workers’ compensation claims. Immediately
after her injury in March 2008, Chandler visited the emergency room and eventually received
consultation from one Dr. Clifton Storey. Dr. Storey placed Chandler under sedentary
restrictions and prescribed physical therapy, though not indefinitely. Indeed, an end goal for
her return to work after attending physical therapy sessions was set for May 9, 2008.
15 However, before that day came, Chandler discovered she was pregnant and ceased attending
therapy sessions due to her inability to perform certain movements. Thereafter, even
following the birth of her child for roughly two years, Chandler remained unemployed, often
citing her inability to work physically demanding jobs due to the sedentary restrictions
identified by Dr. Storey in March 2008. In addition, Chandler asserts she had never been
cleared for work. Yet, strikingly, Chandler never consulted with Dr. Storey, or any other
physician, regarding any update on her sedentary restrictions or work clearance
¶38. Accordingly, for two years Chandler relied upon Dr. Storey’s sedentary restrictions
without ever following up on such consultation, though admitting her back pain occurs
‘‘every now and then’ but her neck is fine now.” Lairy v. Chandler, No.
2019-CA-01423-COA, 2021 WL 4566740, at *6 (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). Chandler, and the
majority both ignore the end goal set for her physical therapist for a return to work in May
2008 prior to the discover of her pregnancy. Such is the evidence the majority asserts as
sufficient to support the $50,000 award as the value of her claim lost pursuant to Thompson.
¶39. In short, the medical findings do not support the award of $50,000. The majority
would prefer hypothesizing that Chandler could have proved her injury lasted the two years
awarded. This is not what the statutes require to prove a disability and, therefore, is not
sufficient to make a prima facie case of legal malpractice. Without further consultation,
Chandler has provided no proof to support an award of support for more than two years. At
best, Chandler has provided medical proof of a disability that lasted for less than two whole
16 months. Indeed, “[t]here is no presumption that temporary total disability continues
indefinitely.” Cooper’s, Inc., of Miss. v. Long, 224 So. 2d 866, 871 (Miss. 1969).
¶40. Finally, it is worth noting the majority’s interpretation of the nature of this claim to
determine the value of the claim lost pursuant to Thompson. Specifically, the majority
rejects the Court of Appeals’ analysis regarding compensatory damages under the workers’
compensation statues because this is a legal malpractice claim. The majority contends that
the Court of Appeals erred by applying the statutory requirements for a workers’
compensation claim for the value of the claim lost since Chandler filed a legal malpractice
claim.
¶41. But the value of the claim lost is specifically related to the workers’ compensation
statutes. The entire mathematical process adopted by the trial court, with which the majority
agrees, is consistent with interpreting the statutes governing workers’ compensation claims
which led to the hypothetical $59,000 entitlement to benefits. Maj. Op. ¶ 27. Indeed, this
formulation is how the trial court eventually decided $50,000 as the appropriate award and
did not pull the amount “out of thin air.” Maj. Op. ¶ 29. If true, then this Court should also
consider that the workers’ compensation claim requires medical findings to support the
$50,000 award which Chandler failed to do.
¶42. Undoubtedly,
if the trial judge’s findings of fact are supported by substantial, credible and reasonable evidence, we must afford deference to these findings on appeal and thus, we will not disturb the trial judge’s findings of fact “unless they are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.”
17 Upchurch Plumbing, Inc. v. Greenwood Utils. Comm’n, 964 So. 2d 1100, 1107 (Miss.
2007) (quoting City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 2000)). Here, the medical
findings do not support receiving benefits for more than two years. Therefore, the trial judge
erred by awarding $50,000 in compensatory damages. The Court of Appeals recognized the
trial court’s error: the trial court granted an award of damages roughly equal to more than
two years of assistance rather than the medical proof that only supports roughly two months.
Lairy 2021 WL 456740, at * 9. As such, I agree with the Court of Appeals and would
reverse the trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, and respectfully, I dissent.
KING, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION.