Angela Standlee v. Abbott Laboratories

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: May 5, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-09586
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANGELA STANDLEE, Case No. 2:24-cv-09586-FLA (MAAx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING REQUEST FOR 14 ATTORNEY’S FEES [DKT. 20] 15 ABBOTT LABORATORIES, et al., 16 Defendants.

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 ORDER 2 Before the court is Plaintiff Angela Standlee’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Remand 3 to the Los Angeles County Superior Court (“Motion”). Dkt. 20 (“Mot.”); Dkt. 20-1 4 (“Mot. Br.”). Defendants Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) and St. Jude Medical S.C., 5 Inc. (“SJMSC”) (together, “Corporate Defendants”) oppose the Motion. Dkt. 22 6 (“Opp’n”). Defendant Tony Li (“Li”) did not respond to the Motion. On January 8, 7 2025, the court found the Motion appropriate for resolution without oral argument and 8 vacated the hearing set for January 10, 2025. Dkt. 29; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local 9 Rule 7-15. 10 For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS the Motion and REMANDS 11 this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. 12 BACKGROUND 13 This action arises from the purported retaliation, discriminatory treatment, and 14 failure to accommodate that Plaintiff was subjected to during her employment as a 15 technical services specialist for Corporate Defendants. Dkt. 4-1 at 3–25 (“Compl.”).1 16 On December 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the Los Angeles County 17 Superior Court, asserting ten causes of action against Abbott, SJMSC, and Li for: (1) 18 retaliation; (2) discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and 19 Housing Act (“FEHA”); (3) failure to accommodate in violation of FEHA; (4) failure 20 to engage in a timely and good-faith interactive process; (5) harassment in violation of 21 FEHA; (6) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (7) failure to prevent discrimination, 22 harassment, retaliation; (8) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; (9) 23 defamation; and (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 35–116. 24 Plaintiff asserts the fifth, ninth, and tenth causes of action against all Defendants, and 25 the remaining causes of action against the Corporate Defendants only. 26

27 1 The court cites documents by the page numbers added by the court’s CM/ECF 28 system, rather than any page numbers that appear within the documents natively. 1 On November 5, 2024, Corporate Defendants removed this action to this court 2 alleging diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). In the instant 3 Motion, Plaintiff contends complete diversity does not exist because Plaintiff and Li 4 are both California citizens. Mot. Br. at 5, 7. Corporate Defendants, in opposition, 5 argue Li is a “sham defendant,” who was named solely to defeat subject matter 6 jurisdiction. Opp’n at 11. 7 DISCUSSION 8 I. Legal Standard 9 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power 10 authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 11 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “It is to be presumed 12 that a cause lies outside [of federal courts’] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of 13 establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 14 U.S. at 377 (citations omitted); Sopcak v. N. Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 15 818 (9th Cir. 1995). 16 A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction “can be either facial, confining the 17 inquiry to allegations in the complaint, or factual, permitting the court to look beyond 18 the complaint.” Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 2 (9th 19 Cir. 2003). Therefore, the court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings and may 20 review evidence, such as declarations and testimony, to resolve any factual disputes 21 concerning the existence of jurisdiction. See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 22 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). 23 Federal courts have jurisdiction where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse 24 from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 25 exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Diversity jurisdiction 26 requires “complete diversity, meaning that each plaintiff must be of a different 27 citizenship from each defendant.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th 28 Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 1 “In determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may 2 disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently 3 joined.” Id. (citation omitted). “A defendant invoking federal court diversity 4 jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a ‘heavy burden’ since there is a 5 general presumption against finding fraudulent joinder.” Id. (cleaned up); see also 6 Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007) 7 (“Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). 8 “There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: (1) actual fraud in the 9 pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of 10 action against the non-diverse party in state court.”2 Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 11 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Fraudulent joinder is established 12 the second way if a defendant shows that an individual joined in the action cannot be 13 liable on any theory.” Id. (cleaned up). “But if there is a possibility that a state court 14 would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident 15 defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the 16 case to the state court.” Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). 17 II. Analysis 18 Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot state a claim for hostile work environment 19 under FEHA against Li because “[b]ased on her deposition testimony, she cannot 20 prevail on a harassment claim against Li based on age, sex/gender, or disability.” 21 Opp’n at 22. The court disagrees. 22 A. Hostile Work Environment Under FEHA 23 Under FEHA, an employee who harasses another employee may be held 24 personally liable. Lewis v. City of Benicia, 224 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1524 (2014) 25 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(3)). To establish a prima facie case of a hostile 26 2 Here, Corporate Defendants seek to establish fraudulent joinder in the second way, 27 by arguing Plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action against Li in California state 28 court. See Opp’n at 13–26. 1 work environment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; 2 (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her 3 protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work 4 performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and 5 (5) defendants are liable for the harassment.” Ortiz v. Dameron Hosp. Ass’n, 37 Cal. 6 App. 5th 568, 581 (2019). 7 To show “unreasonable interference,” 8 the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment. It suffices to prove that a 9 reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, 10 as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions 11 as to make it more difficult to do the job. 12 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923(a) (approving standard set forth in Harris v. Forklift Sys., 13 Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)) (quotation marks omitted). 14 Additionally, to be actionable, the conduct must be “severe or pervasive enough 15 to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a 16 reasonable person would find hostile or abusive[.]” Bailey v. S.F. District Att’ys 17 Office, 16 Cal. 5th 611, 628 (2024). As the California Supreme Court explained: 18 Whether a work environment is reasonably perceived as hostile or abusive is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise 19 test. The working environment must be evaluated in light of the 20 totality of the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 21 threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether 22 it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. The required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the 23 pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct. Simple teasing, offhand 24 comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) are not 25 sufficient to create an actionable claim of harassment. 26 Id. (cleaned up). “[A]n isolated act of harassment may be actionable if it is 27 sufficiently severe in light of the totality of the circumstances[.]” Id. at 620. “The 28 objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a 1 reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” Id. at 629. 2 “[H]arassment is generally concerned with the message conveyed to an 3 employee, and therefore with the social environment of the workplace, whereas 4 discrimination is concerned with explicit changes in the terms or conditions of 5 employment.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 708 (2009) (emphasis in 6 original). “[I]n some cases the hostile message that constitutes the harassment is 7 conveyed through official employment actions, and therefore evidence that would 8 otherwise be associated with a discrimination claim can form the basis of a 9 harassment claim.” Id. 10 B. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Allegations 11 Plaintiff alleges Li created a hostile work environment during her employment 12 through acts including: “forcing her to work in the field even during the Covid-19 13 pandemic, pressuring her to return from a later medical leave of absence, conveying to 14 her an illegal requirement that she be ‘100% healed’ to return to work, then upon her 15 eventual return to work, pushing her down the totem pole for a potential promotion for 16 which she was close in line, and not scheduling her for her regular clinics, and 17 generally excluding her.” Mot. Br. at 12–13. Plaintiff additionally argues “Li 18 harassed her based on her sex/gender, by questioning her work ethic based on her 19 having a family.” Id. at 15. 20 Here, the relevant question is whether “there is a possibility that a state court 21 would find that the complaint states a cause of action against [Li].” See Grancare, 22 889 F.3d at 548 (emphasis in original).” Based on the facts pleaded and the evidence 23 presented, the court finds there is a possibility a state court could find Li conveyed a 24 hostile message to Plaintiff through his conduct—as judged by a reasonable person in 25 Plaintiff’s position—that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to state a FEHA 26 harassment claim. See Bailey, 16 Cal. 5th at 629; Roby, 47 Cal. 4th at 708. 27 Accordingly, Corporate Defendants fail to meet their “heavy burden” to 28 establish Li as a sham defendant. Because there is a possibility Plaintiff can state a 1 valid harassment claim against Li, the court declines to consider the parties’ remaining 2 arguments, including regarding the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims against Li for 3 intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. See Mot. at 15–18. 4 Therefore, the court GRANTS the Motion for lack of complete diversity between 5 Plaintiff and Li. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 6 III. Plaintiff’s Request for Attorney’s Fees 7 Lastly, Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“§ 1447(c)”). 8 Mot. Br. at 18. “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), an order remanding the case may require 9 payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a 10 result of the removal.” Leon v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1072 11 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (cleaned up) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). “Absent unusual 12 circumstances, attorney’s fees should not be awarded under § 1447(c) when the 13 removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal. Conversely, where 14 no objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be awarded.” Martin v. Franklin 15 Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). 16 Although the court finds Corporate Defendants have failed to meet their “heavy 17 burden” to establish Li is a sham defendant, the removal was objectively reasonable 18 and does not merit an award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 19 request for attorney’s fees is DENIED. 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the Motion and REMANDS the 3 | action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 23STCV30364. 4 | Plaintiff's request for attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED. All dates and deadlines in 5 | this court are VACATED. The clerk of the court shall close the action 6 | administratively. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 | Dated: May 5, 2025 ll FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28