Angela Sager v. Sprouts Farmer’s Market, Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03015
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANGELA SAGER, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03015-JES-MSB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DISCHARGING ORDER TO 14 SPROUTS FARMER’S MARKET, INC., SHOW CAUSE; 15 Defendant. (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 16 MOTION TO DISMISS; 17 (3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 18 MOTION TO STRIKE; and 19 (4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 20 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 21 PAUPERIS

22 [ECF Nos. 6, 7, 12] 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 1 Before the Court is Defendant Sprouts Farmer’s Market, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) 2 Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 6, 7. On November 14, 2025, the Court 3 set a hearing on the motions for December 12, 2025, and mailed notice to Plaintiff Angela 4 Sager (“Plaintiff”). ECF No. 8. On December 8, 2025, the notice was returned as 5 undeliverable. ECF No. 13. On January 22, 2026, the Court issued an order to show cause 6 (“OSC”) to Plaintiff for not keeping her address current with the Court. ECF No. 15. After 7 due consideration and for the reasons discussed below, the OSC is DISCHARGED, the 8 motion to dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend, the motion to strike is DENIED 9 as moot, and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) is DENIED as moot. 10 I. BACKGROUND 11 A. Procedural Background 12 On July 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the San Diego Superior Court 13 alleging causes of action for premises liability, negligence, and punitive damages. See 14 generally ECF No. 1-5 (“Compl.”). On November 6, 2025, Defendant removed this matter 15 from the San Diego Superior Court. See generally ECF No. 1. On November 13, 2025, 16 Defendant filed a motion to strike and motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 6, 7. A hearing on the 17 motion was set for December 12, 2025. ECF No. 8. Any opposition to the motions was to 18 be filed by November 28, 2025. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(e)(2). Plaintiff failed to file a 19 timely opposition, and on December 5, 2025, Defendant filed a notice of non-opposition 20 stating that Plaintiff had missed her deadline of November 28, 2025, to oppose its motion 21 to strike and motion to dismiss. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff then filed an opposition on December 22 8, 2025. ECF No. 11. On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff also filed an IFP motion. ECF No. 23 12. That same day, the Court’s notice of the December 12, 2025, hearing mailed to Plaintiff 24 was returned to the Court as undeliverable. ECF No. 13. On December 11, 2025, the Court 25 vacated the December 12, 2025, hearing. ECF No. 14. 26 On January 22, 2026, the Court issued an OSC to Plaintiff for not keeping her 27 address current with the Court. ECF No. 15. On February 3, 2026, Plaintiff responded to 28 the OSC and within her response, she argued against the motion to dismiss and motion to 1 strike. ECF No. 16. On February 13, 2026, the Court reset the hearing on the motions to 2 March 6, 2026. ECF No. 17. On February 27, 2026, Defendant filed a notice of non- 3 opposition since Plaintiff did not timely file an opposition. ECF No. 18. On March 6, 2026, 4 Plaintiff filed a briefing that she titled as “Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause,” 5 but the briefing was actually a response to the motion to strike and motion to dismiss. ECF 6 No. 19. 7 B. Factual Background 8 On August 6, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that she was shopping at Sprouts Farmer’s 9 Market when a 16 ounce can of goat milk fell from a negligently stacked shelf and hit her 10 on the head. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that the cans were heavy and of various sizes, 11 and stacked on top of other cans, making it look like one tall can. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Plaintiff says 12 she picked up a can from the bottom, thinking it was one tall can, and the top can fell and 13 hit her on the nose and face, causing her injuries. Id. ¶ 10. 14 Plaintiff alleges that she momentarily blacked out following the can falling on her 15 and then felt dizzy and was transported to the hospital in an ambulance. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff 16 states that she was diagnosed with a concussion and treated for nausea, dizziness, and pain. 17 Id. ¶ 12. She states that she suffered from a visible scar and bruise on her nose, as well as 18 pain, mental distress, and long-term health damages including dizziness and partial loss of 19 balance while walking and standing due to the concussion. Id. ¶ 13. 20 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owed a duty to its customers to maintain a safe 21 environment, and that it breached that duty by negligently stacking merchandise high up, 22 on an unstable shelf, with heavy cans on top. Id. ¶¶ 14-16. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 23 knew or should have known that this stacking method created a risk of injury to customers. 24 Id. ¶ 16. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A. Motion to Dismiss 3 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 4 state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 5 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When considering the motion, the court must accept as true all 6 well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 7 544, 555 (2007). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast as factual 8 allegations. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[t]hreadbare recitals of the 9 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient). 10 A complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 11 550 U.S. at 570. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include non-conclusory 12 factual content. Id. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The facts and the reasonable inferences 13 drawn from those facts must show a plausible—not just a possible—claim for relief. 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 15 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The focus is on the complaint, as opposed to any new facts alleged 16 in, for example, the opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Schneider v. 17 California Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), reversed and 18 remanded on other grounds as stated in 345 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2003). “Determining 19 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 20 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 21 556 U.S. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant- 22 unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 23 see also Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 24 When a court dismisses a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), it must then decide whether 25 to grant leave to amend. Federal Rule 15(a) provides that a district court should “freely 26 give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A district court has 27 discretion to deny leave to amend when a proposed amendment would be futile. Chappel 28 v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal without leave to 1 amend is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that the deficiencies of the complaint 2 could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 3 2003). In other words, if allowing a party to amend its pleading would be futile, district 4 courts properly decline to grant leave to amend. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun 5 Microsys., Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 6 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991)). 7 B. Motion to Strike 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that courts “may strike from a 9 pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous 10 matter”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). As with other challenges to a party’s pleading, “[w]hen 11 ruling on a motion to strike, th[e] Court ‘must view the pleading under attack in the light 12 most favorable to the pleader.’” Novick v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 570 F. Supp. 2d 13 1207, 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting RDF Media Ltd v. Fox Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 14 556, 561 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). When a Court strikes matter from a pleading, “[i]n the absence 15 of prejudice to the opposing party, leave to amend should be freely given” Wyshak v. City 16 Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979). “Motions to strike are ‘generally disfavored 17 because they are often used as delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of 18 pleadings in federal practice.’” Cortina v. Goya Foods, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1182 19 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Rosales v. Citibank, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 20 2001)) 21 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 22 A. Discharge of OSC 23 On November 13, 2025, Defendant filed their motion to strike and motion to dismiss 24 (ECF Nos. 6, 7), but the filings did not have a hearing date on the motions. Civil local rules 25 require all motions list the hearing date and time in the caption of the motion. S.D. Cal. 26 CivLR 7.1(f)(1). Defendants did not list such hearing date or time in the caption of their 27 motions. See generally ECF Nos. 6,7. Notwithstanding that, on November 14, 2025, the 28 Court set a hearing on the motions for December 12, 2025, and mailed notice to Plaintiff. 1 ECF No. 8. Plaintiff failed to file an opposition by November 28, 2025, the date in which 2 any opposition was due. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(e)(2). On December 5, 2025, Defendant 3 filed a notice of non-opposition stating that Plaintiff had missed her deadline of November 4 28, 2025, to oppose its motion to strike and motion to dismiss. ECF No. 10. On December 5 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motions. ECF No. 11. That same day, the 6 Court’s notice of the December 12, 2025, hearing mailed to Plaintiff was returned to the 7 Court as undeliverable. ECF No. 13. On December 11, 2025, the Court vacated the 8 December 12, 2025, hearing. ECF No. 14. On January 22, 2026, the Court issued an OSC 9 to Plaintiff for failing to comply with local rules by keeping her address up to date pursuant 10 to S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(e)(2). ECF No. 15. 11 On February 3, 2026, Plaintiff responded that her address should be deliverable as 12 entered into the system but could not explain why previous mailings were returned to the 13 Court. ECF No. 16. Future mailings appear to have been delivered to that address since. 14 Defendant filed a further notice of non-opposition, asserting: (1) that Plaintiff did not 15 properly explain the issue regarding her mailing address and failed to meet and confer with 16 them; (2) that no opposition to its motion had been filed and that; (3) should the Court 17 consider Plaintiff’s late filing an opposition, it would prejudice Defendant because they 18 were unable to reply to the opposition. See generally ECF No. 18. The notice then goes on 19 to substantively refute the opposition. Id. at 3-5. Noncompliance with local rules may be 20 grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions. S.D. Cal. CivLR 83.1(a). 21 While pro se plaintiffs are afforded special considerations, they are still “expected 22 to abide by the rules of the court in which [they] litigate[].” Carter v. Comm’r of Internal 23 Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986). While Plaintiff did respond to the Court’s 24 OSC regarding her address, she did not explain why her mail was returned as undeliverable, 25 attributing it to a post-office error. ECF No. 16 at 1. Defendant is correct that Plaintiff filed 26 her opposition late without excuse, however this has not prejudiced Defendant’s ability to 27 respond, as they did in their notice of non-opposition. See ECF No. 18 at 3-5. Regardless, 28 filing an opposition late without excuse or justification is a significant procedural error and 1 is ordinarily grounds for the Court to strike the opposition for failure to comply with the 2 local rules. However, the Court declines to strike Defendant’s motion to strike and motion 3 to dismiss and Plaintiff’s opposition for failure to comply with local rules. The Court will 4 therefore consider Plaintiff’s opposition filed on December 8, 2025. The Court cautions 5 both parties that any future failures to comply with local rules or late filings will be stricken 6 and will not be considered by the Court. 7 B. Motion to Proceed IFP 8 On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed IFP. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff 9 did not fully fill out the IFP motion but alleges she has no savings and makes $1,100 per 10 month from disability and has a 2004 Ford Explorer which is worth $800. See id. 11 Considering Defendant paid the filing fee at removal, the Court’s DENIES Plaintiff’s IFP 12 motion without prejudice. In the future, if Plaintiff files a motion to proceed IFP, she must 13 fill out all sections honestly and completely. 14 C. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim for Premises Liability and Negligence 15 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims for premises liability and general negligence 16 are duplicative, and that all of Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficiently pled. ECF No. 7-1 17 at 4-9. Plaintiff argues that she has pled sufficient facts to show her claims. ECF No. 11 at 18 3. 19 Plaintiff pleads two claims that have the same elements and are based upon the same 20 facts, so the Court evaluates them together. See Compl. ¶¶ 18-25. Under California law, to 21 state a claim for premises liability or negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing: 22 (1) the defendant owed a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach 23 was the proximate legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) the plaintiff suffered 24 damages. Bean v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 561 F. Supp. 3d 915, 920 (E.D. Cal. 2021). 25 Plaintiffs injured in stores must additionally show “the owner’s actual or constructive 26 knowledge of the dangerous condition.” Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1206-07 27 (2001). Notice must be such that the owner had time to correct it. Louie v. Hagstrom’s 28 Food Stores, 81 Cal. App. 2d 601, 607 (1947). 1 Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not allege knowledge. “Knowledge may be 2 shown by circumstantial evidence which is nothing more than one or more inferences 3 which may be said to arise reasonably from a series of proven facts.” Ortega, 26 Cal. 4th at 4 1206-07 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 5 knew of improperly secured or displayed canned goods, and that the conduct in question 6 was ratified by or the result of policies or decisions made by leadership. Compl. ¶¶ 28-29. 7 Plaintiff alleges that the stacking method itself also provided notice. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff’s 8 factual allegations fall short of the plausibility standard as they are conclusory. Plaintiff 9 does not allege how Defendants knew of the improperly secured or displayed canned 10 goods. Nor does Plaintiff allege how the practice was obviously dangerous, or any other 11 facts showing that her alleged injuries were the result of more than an errant bad stacker. 12 Thus, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss both causes of action with leave to amend. 13 Since the Court is allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to address the deficiencies in her 14 complaint, the Court will also address Defendant’s argument that premises liability and 15 negligence are duplicative causes of action. ECF No. 7-1 at 2, 7. The California Supreme 16 Court has explained that “[a]s to any given defendant, only one standard of care obtains 17 under a particular set of facts, even if the plaintiff attempts to articulate multiple or alternate 18 theories of liability.” Flowers v. Torrance Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., 8 Cal. 4th 992, 998 19 (1994). However, in federal court, duplicative claims are not subject to dismissal just on 20 that basis at the motion to dismiss stage. See Doe v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 4:23-CV- 21 05166-SAB, 2024 WL 1705925, at *6 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 19, 2024). The Court agrees that 22 the causes of action are duplicative, but at the motion to dismiss stage, that is an insufficient 23 basis to dismiss the causes of action. Id. 24 D. Motion to Strike 25 Defendant argues that punitive damages should be stricken from the complaint 26 because Plaintiff cannot show more than mere neglect on the facts pled. ECF No. 6-1 at 9. 27 Further, Defendant argues that punitive damages cannot be a cause of action, but rather a 28 1 remedy. ECF No. 7-1 at 8-9. Plaintiff argues that her allegations are sufficient because she 2 has alleged malicious and conscious disregard of her rights. ECF No. 11 at 2. 3 “There is no cause of action for punitive damages. Punitive or exemplary damages 4 are remedies available to a party who can plead and prove the facts and circumstances set 5 forth in [California] Civil Code section 3294.” Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. App. 6 3d 374, 391 (1983). “Punitive damages are merely incident to a cause of action and can 7 never constitute the basis thereof.” Id. (internal citations and quotation omitted); see also 8 McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 23 Cal. App. 4th 1132, 1163 (1994) (“In 9 California there is no separate cause of action for punitive damages.”). Thus, the Court 10 GRANTS the motion to dismiss the third cause of action for punitive damages without 11 leave to amend. 12 Since the Court dismisses the first and second causes of action for failing to properly 13 allege a claim, the Court declines to address Defendant’s argument regarding the 14 sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations to support a request for punitive damages. Thus, the 15 motion to strike the prayer for relief for punitive damages from the complaint is DENIED 16 as moot. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the reasons discussed above, the Court: 19 1. DISCHARGES the OSC; 20 2. GRANTS the motion dismiss all three causes of action alleged; 21 3. DENIES AS MOOT the motion to strike the prayer for relief for punitive 22 damages; and 23 4. DENIES AS MOOT the motion to proceed IFP. 24 The Court gives Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint to address the deficiencies 25 highlighted above. In the event that Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, she must 26 do so within thirty (30) days of this Order. Any amended complaint must be complete in 27 itself, without reference to any prior complaints. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach 28 Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 1 |}pleading supersedes the original.) The Court cautions Plaintiff that failure to file an 2 ||amended complaint will result in dismissal of this case. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: May 26, 2026

6 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28