Angela Rice v. Director, Division of Workforce Services And Thrifty Car Sales of Fort Smith

2024 Ark. App. 97, 684 S.W.3d 337

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: February 14, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 97 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. E-22-608

Opinion Delivered February 14, 2024 ANGELA RICE APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW V. [NO. 2022-BR-01248]

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES; AND THRIFTY CAR SALES OF FORT SMITH REVERSED AND REMANDED APPELLEES

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge

Angela Rice appeals from the decision of the Arkansas Board of Review denying her

claim for unemployment benefits upon finding that she voluntarily left her last work without

good cause connected with the work. We hold that substantial evidence does not support

this finding; accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Beginning in October 2019, Rice worked as a sales representative for Thrifty Car Sales

of Fort Smith selling portable buildings. Rice worked part time and was paid an hourly wage

unless her commissions for the month exceeded her hourly earnings; in that event, she was

paid only her commissions. At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, Rice

was allowed to work from home in order to be home with her minor child. Under this

arrangement, Rice earned commissions only. This arrangement continued until Rice’s

employment ended. The Division of Workforce Services determined that Rice was entitled to benefits because she was discharged for reasons other than misconduct connected with

the work. The employer appealed to the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal, which reversed the

Division’s determination and found that Rice was disqualified from receiving benefits

because she voluntarily left work without good cause connected with the work. Rice then

appealed to the Board, which adopted the Tribunal’s decision.

Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v.

Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 205, 575 S.W.3d 186. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence

that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We view the

evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the

Board’s findings. Id. Even if the evidence could support a different decision, our review is

limited to whether the Board could have reasonably reached its decision on the basis of the

evidence presented. Id. However, our function on appeal is not merely to rubber stamp

Board decisions. Id.

Rice alleged in a discharge form that she was discharged pursuant to a letter dated

January 8, 2021. She stated in the form that due to her working arrangements, her hours

were set by her, and she had never received any warnings regarding her work hours. She

stated that she had communicated with the employer about a customer on December 22,

2020, and when she sent another message regarding a customer in January 2021, she received

no response. The employer completed a discharge form, stating that Rice’s employment

ended when she “abandoned her position” on October 8, 2020; however, the employer also

wrote that Rice’s last day of work was September 12, 2020. 2 At the hearing before the Tribunal, the employer was represented by its president,

Gregg Lawler, and Melissa Lawler, its secretary-treasurer, participated as a witness. Gregg

testified that Rice could do almost all of her work remotely, but she could also come in any

time she wanted since she had an alarm code and gate key. Melissa testified that Rice had

not been coming in much, had not earned any commissions since October 2020, had not

performed work on the employer’s premises since November 16, 2020, and had not set up

any appointments with customers since then. The Lawlers testified that Rice could have

returned to work at the premises during business hours and earned hourly pay again, and

they disputed Rice’s testimony that she had offered to do this. Gregg testified that when

they got to the first of the year and the situation with Rice had not improved, they decided

to send a letter requesting that Rice return her keys due to her “self-abandonment” of her

position.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513(a)(1) (Supp. 2023) provides that an

individual shall be disqualified for benefits if she voluntarily and without good cause

connected with the work left her last work. The Board found that Rice was disqualified

under this provision upon finding that she had declining sales and little contact with the

Lawlers and that she could have started working on the premises again to show that she

intended to stay employed. However, the Board also found that Rice “was not told she had

to keep certain hours or to make regular contacts.” Furthermore, there is no evidence that

the employer ever asked or directed Rice to begin working on the premises again. While the

evidence suggests that the employer was displeased with the amount or results of Rice’s work

3 since implementing her work-from-home arrangement, the employer did not implement any

changes to the arrangement, and it continued until the employer decided to end Rice’s

employment. Under these circumstances, the evidence does not support the finding that

Rice quit; instead, it demonstrates that she was discharged. Accordingly, we reverse and

remand for the Board to determine whether the circumstances of Rice’s discharge entitle her

to benefits in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514 (Supp. 2023).

Reversed and remanded.

BARRETT and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Angela Marie Rice, pro se appellant.

Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.