Angela Harvey v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 23, 2024
DocketDC-315H-19-0486-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Angela Harvey v. Department of the Air Force (Angela Harvey v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Angela Harvey v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANGELA HARVEY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-315H-19-0486-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: February 23, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Angela Harvey , St. Leonard, Maryland, pro se.

Jonathan Mott and Trinh G. Warner , Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. Generally, we grant petitions such as these only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the appellant has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). For the reasons discussed below, we FORWARD the appellant’s claim of whistleblower reprisal to the regional office with instructions for the administrative judge to docket a new Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal.

BACKGROUND Effective May 1, 2017, the agency awarded the appellant a career-conditional appointment to the competitive service position of GS -07 Contract Specialist, subject to a 2-year initial probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 7-8. On April 24, 2019, the agency terminated the appellant for post-appointment reasons under 5 C.F.R. § 315.804. Id. at 11-13. On May 6, 2019, the appellant filed a Board appeal and requested a hearing, challenging the merits of her termination and arguing that her termination was in reprisal for whistleblowing and equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. Id. at 2-5. She attached a copy of a whistleblower complaint that she had filed with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) that same day. Id. at 14-25. The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order, notifying the appellant of the standards for proving Board jurisdiction over her appeal under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, 5 C.F.R. part 315, subpart H, and the Whistleblower 3

Protection Act (WPA). IAF, Tab 3 at 2-6. He ordered her to file evidence and argument on the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 6. After the appellant failed to respond within the deadline, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. IAF, Tab 5, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that the Board lacks jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 because the appellant did not fit the definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). ID at 3-5. He found that the Board lacks jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 because the appellant did not allege that her termination was based on partisan political reasons or marital status, and he found that the Board lacks jurisdiction under the WPA because the appellant had not yet exhausted her administrative remedies with OSC. ID at 5 & n.4. The administrative judge further found that, to the extent that the appellant was claiming that her termination was based on other prohibited personnel practices, the Board lacks jurisdiction over such claims absent an otherwise appealable action. ID at 5-6. The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that, under agency regulations, her probationary period should have been 1 year rather than 2 years, and otherwise challenging the merits of the termination. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 9. She has attached numerous documents to her petition for review form. Id. at 10-134. The agency has not filed a response.

ANALYSIS At the outset, we find that the appellant should have submitted to the administrative judge the evidence and argument that she now submits for the first time on review. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board will not consider evidence or argument presented for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it was previously unavailable despite the party’s due diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980); Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). The appellant has made no such 4

showing here. 2 Nevertheless, under the particular circumstances of this case, we find it appropriate to waive the regulatory requirement and consider the appellant’s late-raised evidence and argument. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.12. The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s findings as they pertain to the Board’s jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 315.806 or the WPA. For the reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree with these findings. ID at 5 & n.2; see Calixto v. Department of Defense, 120 M.S.P.R. 557, ¶¶ 20-21 (2014); Williams v. Department of Defense, 96 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 14 (2004). To the extent that the appellant is contesting the administrative judge’s jurisdictional findings regarding her discrimination and EEO retaliation claims, PFR File, Tab 1 at 9, we agree with the administrative judge that these do not provide an independent source of Board jurisdiction, ID at 5-6; see Wren v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Regarding the Board’s chapter 75 jurisdiction, the appellant argues that she fits the definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511

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Angela Harvey v. Department of the Air Force, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/angela-harvey-v-department-of-the-air-force-mspb-2024.