ANGELA GEWECKE & Others v. EVAN SMITH.
This text of ANGELA GEWECKE & Others v. EVAN SMITH. (ANGELA GEWECKE & Others v. EVAN SMITH.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1014
ANGELA GEWECKE & others1
vs.
EVAN SMITH.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Evan Smith, appeals from a judgment issued
by a judge of the Housing Court in favor of the plaintiffs for
possession of 42R Cape Street in Goshen (premises). We affirm.
Background. The trial judge found the following facts.
Evan Smith is the brother of Jamie Smith, Molly Smith, and
Johannah Roberts.2 Angela Gewecke is their aunt. The premises
are part of a parcel of land (property), which at the time of
trial, was owned in equal parts by Gewecke, on the one hand, and
Jamie, Molly, and Johannah on the other hand. In 2017, Gewecke
1 Jamie Smith, Molly Smith, and Johannah Roberts.
2Because some of siblings share a last name, we refer to all of them hereafter by their first names. allowed Evan to move into the premises. In exchange, Evan
agreed to pay for his utilities at the premises. Gewecke
intended to allow Evan to live at the premises until Molly moved
to the premises from New Jersey. During much of the relevant
time period, Evan sporadically resided at the premises. Jamie
lived at another residence on the property. Evan had
interactions with Jamie's dog that made him uncomfortable. For
some of the time that Evan resided at the premises, mice were
present in the basement. Evan lost access to water at the
premises for one day due to an accidental "shut-off." At some
point, Evan's access to the barn on the property was blocked.
On March 25, 2022, Evan received a ninety-day notice to
quit the premises. Evan did not relinquish possession at the
end of the notice period. On July 22, 2022, the plaintiffs
filed this summary process action. Evan counterclaimed and
defended the action on the grounds that the plaintiffs breached
the warranty of habitability and the covenant of quiet
enjoyment. After a bench trial, the judge issued a judgment for
possession in favor of the plaintiffs.
Discussion. We review a trial judge's findings of fact for
clear error. See H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington St., LLC,
489 Mass. 1, 13 (2022). A finding is clearly erroneous when,
"although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
2 conviction that a mistake has been committed" (citation
omitted). Id. We review the judge's legal conclusions de novo.
See Robert & Ardis James Found. v. Meyers, 474 Mass. 181, 186
(2016).
A tenant at sufferance has the right to defend against a
landlord's claim of possession.3 Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207,
209 n.3 (2016). "[I]f a tenant raises a defense or counterclaim
within the meaning of [G. L. c. 239,] § 8A[,] the judge must
first determine whether the landlord is liable on the defense or
counterclaim." Ferreira v. Charland, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 194,
207 (2023).
1. Warrant of habitability. The implied warranty of
habitability requires the landlord to "maintain a rented unit,
[a]t a minimum, in compliance with the State sanitary code"
(quotation and citation omitted). South Boston Elderly
Residences, Inc. v. Moynahan, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 462 (2017).
Although a sanitary code violation "may provide compelling
evidence that a dwelling is not habitable," the issue is
"whether the premises are fit for human habitation, not merely
3 The judge found that Evan was a tenant at sufferance. Evan asserts that he was a tenant at will. For the purposes of this appeal, the distinction is irrelevant because under G. L. c. 239, § 8A, both tenants at will and tenants at sufferance may raise defenses and counterclaims in response to summary process actions. See Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Gabriel, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 572-573 (2012).
3 . . . whether the landlord committed a code violation." Goreham
v. Martins, 485 Mass. 54, 65 (2020). "The warranty of
habitability applies only to substantial violations or
significant defects" (quotation and citation omitted). Id.
Evan contends that the judge disregarded evidence of the
mice on the premises and of the interruption of water service.
We disagree. The judge explicitly considered evidence of the
presence of mice, found that the credible evidence failed to
show a serious infestation of mice, and concluded that the
presence of the mice was not a substantial violation of the
State sanitary code. The judge's findings are supported by the
evidence. On July 29, 2022, Evan contacted the local health
department to request an inspection of the premises. On August
4, 2022, the local health director issued a correction order
requiring the plaintiffs to prevent mice from entering the
premises. On October 27, 2022, the plaintiffs' contractors
removed damaged insulation and sealed gaps in the premises.
After the issue did not abate, the plaintiffs hired a pest
control company to treat the premises. By December 21, 2022,
the issue was resolved.
Similarly, the judge concluded that the short period that
the premises were without water did not impair the premises'
rental value and thus did not breach the warranty of
habitability. On August 30, 2022, access to water at the
4 premises was inadvertently shut off and then restored the next
day. The judge's findings were supported by the evidence, and
Evan points to no evidence to the contrary. See Robert & Ardis
James Found., 474 Mass. at 186 ("credibility of the witnesses
rests within the purview of the trial judge").
2. Quiet enjoyment. The covenant of quiet enjoyment
"guarantees tenants the right to be free from 'serious'
interferences with their tenancies." Jablonski v. Clemons, 60
Mass. App. Ct. 473, 476 (2004), quoting Simon v. Solomon, 385
Mass. 91, 102 (1982). See G. L. c. 186, § 14. "A landlord
violates G. L. c. 186, § 14, when its acts or omissions impair
the value of the leased premises" (quotation and citation
omitted). Jablonski, supra.
With respect to this claim, Evan asserts that the judge
disregarded evidence of his being locked out of the barn,
"harassment" by Jamie's dog, and the interruption of water
service. We discern no error in the judge's conclusion that
Evan failed to provide credible evidence that he was entitled to
exclusive access to the barn. The judge's finding that the
unpleasant interactions between Evan and Jamie's dog were
relatively minor was also supported by the evidence. At times,
Jamie's dog was not leashed and barked at Evan, making him
uncomfortable.
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