June 28, 2021
Supreme Court
No. 2020-48-Appeal. (PC 13-5786)
Angela Dextraze et al. :
v. :
Timothy Bernard et al. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Long, for the Court. This case arises from an assault by one student
on another in the hallway of Ponaganset High School (the high school). The
defendant, Foster-Glocester Regional School District (the school district or
defendant), appeals from the Superior Court’s denial of its motions for judgment as
a matter of law and for a new trial and from the resulting judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing
the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not
be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions
and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this
appeal may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set
forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
-1- Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiffs, Corey Dextraze and his parents Angela Dextraze and Mark
Dextraze (collectively plaintiffs), filed suit against defendants Timothy Bernard and
his parents in November 2013, after Mr. Bernard assaulted Mr. Dextraze at the high
school without provocation. All three Bernards were defaulted in December 2014. 1
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming the school district as a
defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district was responsible for
educating high school students from Foster and Glocester and, therefore, owed a
duty to Mr. Dextraze, as a student, to “provide him with a school which was safe
and secure, was conducive to learning, and which was free from the threat, actual or
implied, of physical harm from disruptive students[,]” and that the school district
failed to do so. The plaintiffs further alleged that the school district knew or
reasonably should have known that Mr. Bernard’s conduct “substantially impeded
the ability of other students to learn and * * * posed [a] threat of * * * physical harm
to fellow students[.]” 2
1 For ease of reference, because the defendant student and his father share the same first and last name, we refer to the defendant student as Mr. Bernard. Mr. Bernard’s parents, Timothy Bernard and Jennifer Bernard, were dismissed from the suit prior to the start of trial, and a stipulation was later entered to that effect. Final judgments were also entered against Mr. Bernard and in favor of plaintiffs. The school district is the only party that has appealed. 2 As plaintiffs made clear during arguments before the trial justice, they contended that the high school, and therefore the school district, acted negligently. -2- A four-day jury trial commenced on September 24, 2019; plaintiffs’ first
witness was Lisa Odom-Villella, the assistant superintendent of the school district.
Ms. Odom-Villella testified that the high school employed a progressive discipline
policy and that special services were available for students, such as referral to a
guidance counselor, social worker, or school psychologist. She testified that
teachers are primarily responsible for controlling students, according to the high
school handbook, and that teachers are expected to be “visible” in the hallway during
class changes. She explained that the handbook also prohibits students from using
profanity, shouting, and engaging in destructive behavior.
During her testimony, Ms. Odom-Villella reviewed many complaints filed
against Mr. Bernard, beginning with a teacher complaint filed in October 2010,
approximately one month after Mr. Bernard began high school. Despite numerous
instances of misbehavior, including conduct that violated the high school’s sexual
harassment and anti-bullying policies, Mr. Bernard received no progressive
punishment beyond detention until January 2011, when he was suspended. Nor did
the high school refer him to a guidance counselor, social worker, or school
psychologist. Ms. Odom-Villella admitted that Mr. Bernard was exhibiting
significant behavioral problems, including involvement in a prior fight in April
2011, but that no behavioral plan was developed for him. Ms. Odom-Villella
testified that a teacher assistant could be assigned to supervise a student for a whole
-3- day, but, according to her, nothing in Mr. Bernard’s disciplinary records would have
required this. Importantly, she also admitted that Mr. Bernard’s behavioral issues
persisted during the 2011-2012 school year. She acknowledged that, in November
2011, Mr. Bernard pushed another student in the hallway and received a three-day
suspension.
Two months later, on January 18, 2012, Mr. Bernard assaulted Mr. Dextraze
in the hallway, breaking Mr. Dextraze’s jaw in two places and dislocating his teeth.
After this incident, the high school finally referred Mr. Bernard to support services
in the form of a school psychologist.
Mr. Dextraze testified that on the day of the assault, as he walked down the
hallway after lunch, Mr. Bernard and two or three other people were walking behind
him and yelling “swears.” Mr. Dextraze testified that he told the boys at least ten
times to “leave me alone.” He passed five or six classrooms in the hallway while
this occurred and did not see any teachers, nor did any teachers intervene.3
Mr. Dextraze stopped in a classroom to get a water bottle, and when he went
back into the hallway, Mr. Bernard punched him. Mr. Dextraze testified, “[I]t felt
like somebody had taken a chair from one of the classrooms and just swung and hit
me on the side of the face with it.” As a result, he fell and hit his head on the lockers
3 Mr. Dextraze later testified that he “possibly” saw teachers in the hallway while Mr. Bernard was yelling at him. -4- in the hallway. He was dazed but stood up, and Mr. Bernard then hit him again on
the front of the mouth. The teacher who was in the classroom that Mr. Dextraze had
exited came into the hallway and told everyone to get to class. Mr. Dextraze told
the teacher that Mr. Bernard had hit him, and the teacher only reiterated that they
needed to get to class.
Mr. Dextraze testified that he then went to his math class, and his math teacher
noticed that he was bleeding from his mouth and from the back of his head. In
response, she sent a student to get paper towels and then had that same student walk
Mr. Dextraze to the nurse’s office. Mr. Dextraze testified, “I was really shooken up.
* * * I was in pain, and I was confused really.” He further testified that his front
teeth felt loose, and he avoided talking or moving his mouth at all because of the
pain.
Mr. Dextraze left school to seek medical attention. The following day, he
consulted an oral surgeon who wired his jaw closed and placed four screws in his
mouth. Soon after the surgery, while his jaw was wired closed, the high school held
the football banquet for his team; Mr. Dextraze attended, but he was unable to eat
anything or talk with anyone.
Mr. Dextraze explained that he missed over two weeks of school, including
midterms, because of surgery and follow-up appointments. He testified that the
-5- police never reached out to him, no teachers discussed with him how they would
keep him safe from Mr. Bernard, and his grades suffered.
Mr. Dextraze’s mother testified about caring for Mr. Dextraze in the aftermath
of the assault. She described the impact on the whole family, and particularly on her
son, who seemed withdrawn and frustrated during the six weeks he was unable to
talk with his jaw wired closed. Furthermore, she testified that the high school neither
reached out to see if Mr. Dextraze needed counseling or tutoring nor discussed how
they could keep him safe, nor did his teachers respond to her emails regarding her
son’s schoolwork.
At the close of plaintiffs’ case, the school district moved for judgment as a
matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
The school district argued that it could not be held civilly liable for the assault
because G.L. 1956 § 16-2-17, which provides that a school must provide a safe
environment for its students, does not provide for civil liability and, therefore, cannot
be a source of duty in a negligence claim. The school district further argued that
expert testimony was required to show that it had deviated from the standard of care.
The plaintiffs countered that the school district had waived its argument
pursuant to § 16-2-17 and, alternatively, that liability could attach because the high
school had a common-law duty to supervise its students. Furthermore, plaintiffs
contended that the high school’s handbook established the duties the school owed to
-6- students, including developing a behavioral plan or scheduling a disciplinary
hearing. The plaintiffs also maintained that no expert testimony was needed under
this Court’s caselaw.
The trial justice determined that § 16-2-17 did not confer a private right of
action but, nevertheless, that there was a duty to “provide adequate supervision to
the students” under this Court’s holding in Daniels v. Fluette, 64 A.3d 302 (R.I.
2013). The trial justice therefore denied the school district’s motion for judgment
as a matter of law and found that there was sufficient evidence in the record of Mr.
Bernard’s “behavioral issues” such that the case could be submitted to a jury without
expert testimony.
The school district rested without calling witnesses and renewed its motion
for judgment as a matter of law based on the same arguments it had previously
presented. The trial justice did not alter her previous ruling, and the case went to the
jury.4
The jury found that the school district was negligent and that such negligence
was a proximate cause of all three of the Dextrazes’ injuries. The jury awarded
$70,000 to Mr. Dextraze and $5,000 to his parents for their separate pain and
suffering.
4 The trial justice instructed the jury that “schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their care, and they may be held liable for foreseeable acts proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision.” -7- After the jury returned its verdict, defendant renewed its motion for judgment
as a matter of law and moved for a new trial. The trial justice again denied the
motion for judgment as a matter of law and stated that, in this case, deviation from
the standard of care and proximate cause were not outside of the “purview of an
average juror[.]”
In support of its motion for a new trial, the school district reiterated its
argument that expert testimony was required to determine how it had breached the
standard of care. The school district contended that plaintiffs presented no evidence
on the issue of causation, and, because plaintiffs also failed to allege a specific act
of negligence, a causation determination was actually impossible.
The plaintiffs objected, arguing that Mr. Bernard’s disciplinary records
demonstrated that the high school was aware of his “poor conduct” yet failed to
supervise him properly or intervene while Mr. Bernard “harassed” Mr. Dextraze in
the hallway prior to the assault. According to plaintiffs, “[t]he jury could thus
reasonably infer * * * that the defendant failed to adequately supervise Mr. Bernard
* * * and that its failure to supervise * * * constituted a proximate cause of the
assault.”
The trial justice issued a bench decision denying defendant’s motion for a new
trial; however, she first reviewed some of Mr. Bernard’s high school incidents,
including a fight in April 2011, and an incident where Mr. Bernard pushed another
-8- student in November 2011. The trial justice found that Mr. Bernard had engaged in
multiple incidents that showed his aggressive and assaultive behavior toward other
students, which put the high school on notice that he might engage in conduct that
was dangerous to others and that he required supervision by the high school, but that
“very little was done by way of supervision.” The trial justice determined that there
was sufficient evidence of proximate cause—in light of Mr. Bernard’s “known
history of aggressive behavior” and lack of school supervision—such that she would
not overturn the jury’s verdict. Judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs on October
24, 2019, and the school district timely appealed.
Before this Court, the school district argues that the trial justice erred by
denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, its motion
for a new trial, for two primary reasons. First, defendant contends that plaintiffs
offered no evidence (expert or otherwise) to establish the standard of care. Second,
defendant contends that plaintiffs failed to establish proximate causation between
defendant’s actions (or failure to act) and plaintiffs’ injuries.
Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and a New Trial
This Court has stated that its “review of a trial justice’s decision on a motion
for judgment as a matter of law is de novo.” Rhode Island Resource Recovery
Corporation v. Restivo Monacelli LLP, 189 A.3d 539, 545 (R.I. 2018) (quoting
Giron v. Bailey, 985 A.2d 1003, 1007 (R.I. 2009)). The Court examines “the
-9- evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing the
evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses” and will “draw from the record
all reasonable inferences that support the position of the nonmoving party.” Id. at
545-46 (quoting Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 617 (R.I. 2003)).
It is equally well settled that this Court’s “review of a trial justice’s decision
on a motion for a new trial is deferential.” Letizio v. Ritacco, 204 A.3d 597, 602 (R.I.
2019) (quoting Kemp v. PJC of Rhode Island, Inc., 184 A.3d 712, 719 (R.I. 2018)).
“In considering a motion for a new trial, the trial justice sits as a super juror and is
required to make an independent appraisal of the evidence in light of his or her
charge to the jury.” Id. (quoting Kemp, 184 A.3d at 719). “If, after conducting this
analysis, the trial justice concludes that the evidence is evenly balanced or that
reasonable minds could differ on the verdict, she or he should not disturb the jury’s
decision.” Id. (quoting Kemp, 184 A.3d at 719). “If the trial justice has performed
this task, then his or her decision will not be disturbed unless the plaintiff can show
that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence or
was otherwise clearly wrong.” Id. (quoting Kemp, 184 A.3d at 719).
“[T]o prevail on a claim of negligence a plaintiff must establish a legally
cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate
causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or
damage.” Daniels, 64 A.3d at 304-05 (quoting Habershaw v. Michaels Stores, Inc.,
- 10 - 42 A.3d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 2012)). In this case, the trial justice determined that the
school district had a duty to adequately supervise the students in its care. Neither
party has challenged that ruling.
The school district argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claims
because, it asserts, plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence of breach, i.e., the
standard of care and deviation from that standard. More specifically, the school
district maintains that our decision in Medeiros v. Sitrin, 984 A.2d 620 (R.I. 2009),
compels the presentation of expert testimony because, according to the school
district, “the school setting is beyond the typical knowledge of [a] common juror.”
We disagree.
Although it is true that a plaintiff in a negligence action must establish a
standard of care and a deviation from that standard, not every action sounding in
negligence requires expert testimony. See Almonte v. Kurl, 46 A.3d 1, 17 (R.I. 2012)
(“It is a general rule that * * * ‘a plaintiff must establish a standard of care as well
as a deviation from that standard.’”) (quoting Malinou v. Miriam Hospital, 24 A.3d
497, 509 (R.I. 2011)). In fact, in a case decided after Medeiros, we held, in the
context of the school setting, that “a plaintiff seeking to hold a school liable for
injuries resulting from the acts of another student must show that such acts could
have been reasonably foreseen by the school.” Daniels, 64 A.3d at 307. Although
we do not expect schools to be insurers of students’ safety, we do require schools to
- 11 - exercise a degree of care that includes protecting students from reasonably
foreseeable harm.5 See id.
The plaintiffs’ burden in this case was to establish that the school district
breached its duty to adequately supervise the students in its care. The plaintiffs
presented compelling evidence that the school district failed to exercise the degree
of care required to protect its students in circumstances where a known disruptive
and aggressive student presented a reasonably foreseeable harm to other students.
Given the evidence of Mr. Bernard’s lengthy disciplinary history, including a fight
with a student in 2011, and an assault in the high school hallway two months before
the assault on Mr. Dextraze, Mr. Bernard’s assault on Mr. Dextraze was reasonably,
even abundantly, foreseeable.
Moreover, plaintiffs presented documentary evidence and testimony to show
that the school district designated teachers as the primary supervisors of students.
Ms. Odom-Villella testified that teachers were expected to be visible in the hallways
or in the door to their classrooms during class changes. The plaintiffs established
5 Although not pertinent to the outcome of this appeal, we pause to note that the way in which the high school handled the aftermath of this situation is as egregious as its handling of the assault. According to the testimony presented, the first teacher to see Mr. Dextraze after the assault sent him to his next class, where that classroom teacher sent a student to get paper towels for Mr. Dextraze because he was bleeding. Moreover, the testimony showed that the high school did not work with the Dextraze family to ensure Mr. Dextraze’s safety after the assault or help him with the schoolwork that he missed because of the assault and the resulting medical treatment and recovery. - 12 - that the handbook prohibits students from shouting or using profanities. Despite
these expectations, and in light of Mr. Bernard’s progressively more serious
disciplinary problems—of which the high school was well aware—the high school
did nothing to supervise Mr. Bernard or to supervise the hallway as he followed Mr.
Dextraze and yelled profanities before the assault occurred. The need for the high
school to act in this situation is a matter of common sense, and its failure to do so
was within the ken of a layperson. See Almonte, 46 A.3d at 18 (“[E]xpert testimony
is required to establish any matter that is not obvious to a lay person and thus lies
beyond common knowledge.”) (quoting Mills v. State Sales, Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 468
(R.I. 2003)).
The evidence presented in this case differs from Medeiros, where the
defendant teacher provided uncontradicted testimony about his classroom practices,
and where the plaintiff student failed to present evidence of a specific act or omission
by the defendant teacher, or “to suggest that [the defendant teacher] knew or should
have known that the three students [who assaulted the plaintiff student] were in the
[adjacent] laboratory at that particular moment.” Medeiros, 984 A.2d at 627. We
therefore conclude that where, as here, there is evidence that the school district
exercised no degree of care in the face of a known, foreseeable danger, no expert
testimony is required.
- 13 - Finally, proximate cause is a matter most usually left to the jury, so long as
plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts to support their negligence claim. See, e.g.,
Gianquitti v. Atwood Medical Associates, Ltd., 973 A.2d 580, 593 (R.I. 2009). As
we have indicated, the record demonstrates that plaintiffs presented sufficient facts
upon which a jury could find that the school district’s failure to act was a substantial
cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. Thus, the jury’s verdict will not be disturbed.
This Court has previously noted “that the standard for granting a motion for
judgment as a matter of law is a higher standard for the moving party to meet than
that for granting a motion for a new trial.” Martin v. Lawrence, 79 A.3d 1275, 1284
(R.I. 2013). “Once the trial justice had concluded, upon an independent review of
the evidence, that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, [s]he was perforce
required to conclude that [the defendant’s] motion for a judgment as a matter of law
must also fail.” Id. It is clear that the trial justice engaged in the proper analysis
when evaluating the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we will not
disturb the trial justice’s decisions denying the school district’s motion for judgment
as a matter of law and motion for a new trial.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court and
remand the record in this case to the Superior Court.
- 14 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Angela Dextraze et al. v. Timothy Bernard et al.
No. 2020-48-Appeal. Case Number (PC 13-5786)
Date Opinion Filed June 28, 2021
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Maureen B. Keough
For Plaintiffs:
Lisa M. DeMari, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal William M. Heffernan, Esq. For Defendant:
Ryan D. Stys, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)