Angela Dawn Perez- Dowling v. Legacy at Cypress

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 26, 2023
• Docket: 01-23-00319-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued September 26, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00319-CV ——————————— ANGELA D. DOWLING-PEREZ, Appellant V. LEGACY AT CYPRESS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1200767

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this forcible-detainer action, appellant, Angela D. Dowling-Perez,

proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal from the judgment and writ of possession

granting possession of certain real property to appellee, Legacy at Cypress.

We dismiss the appeal as moot. The only issue in a forcible-detainer action is the right to actual possession of

the subject property, and the merits of any title dispute shall not be adjudicated. See

Tellez v. Rodriguez, 612 S.W.3d 707, 709 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020,

no pet.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e)). An appeal from a forcible-detainer action

becomes moot if the appellant is no longer in possession of the property, unless the

appellant holds and asserts “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual

possession” of the property. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of the City of San Antonio,

198 S.W.3d 782, 786–87 (Tex. 2006); Wilhelm v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 349

S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Gallien v. Fed.

Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-07-00075-CV, 2008 WL 4670465, at *2–4 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23, 2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.).

On May 3, 2023, appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that this appeal

is moot because the writ of possession was executed, “[a]ppellant was dispossessed

of the lease[d] premises on March 22, 2023 when [the] writ of possession was

executed,” and possession was “returned . . . back to” appellee. Appellant did not

respond to appellee’s motion to dismiss but has filed an appellant’s “brief.”

However, we conclude that appellant’s “brief” fails to assert a potentially

meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property. See

Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787; Wilhelm, 349 S.W.3d at 768; see also Soza v. Fed.

Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-11-00568-CV, 2013 WL 3148616, at *1 (Tex.

2 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating appellant who

failed to respond to appellee’s motion to dismiss had failed to assert potentially

meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession).

Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion and dismiss the appeal as moot. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); see also Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785, 787, 790;

Wilhelm, 349 S.W.3d at 769; Bey v. ASD Fin., Inc., No. 05-14-00534-CV, 2014 WL

4180933, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing

appeal of forcible detainer action as moot because appellant no longer possessed

property at issue). All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Farris.