Angela Chapman v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: September 18, 2025
• Docket: 2024-SC-0208
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2025 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2024-SC-0208-MR

ANGELA CHAPMAN APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE NO. 22-CR-01057

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

Angela Chapman was convicted of two counts of wanton murder, one

count of wanton first-degree assault, and driving under the influence. She now

appeals her wanton murder and first-degree assault convictions and resulting

65-year sentence as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).

This appeal requires this Court to address whether the trial court erred

in denying her motions for directed verdict. After a thorough review, we affirm

the trial court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 4, 2022, Angela Chapman arrived at the Landmark

Recovery Center in Louisville, Kentucky to be treated for her substance use

disorder. On November 13, 2022, Chapman complained of knee pain, became

upset with Landmark staff, and demanded to leave. She left the facility in her 2015 Chrysler Town and Country minivan and traveled to a nearby Walgreens

where she withdrew $200 from the ATM and bought syringes. She next

stopped to buy what she said she believed to be a gram of heroin from her drug

dealer. While sitting in her van, she injected some of the drug in her arm.

Chapman expected this “shot” to make her knee feel better and it did.

Afterwards, she decided to drive to her home to Radcliff, Kentucky, taking her

usual route, traveling southbound on US 31W.

US 31W is a busy four-lane highway between Hardin County and

Jefferson County, Kentucky with two northbound lanes and two southbound

lanes. The weather was unremarkable that day and the posted speed limit was

55 mph. In addition, two brightly colored and continuous yellow lines

separated the northbound lanes from the southbound lanes. The yellow lines

were also grooved with rumble strips 1. As Chapman was driving towards

Radcliff, her knee began bothering her again, so she prepared and injected the

drug into her shoulder while driving. After Chapman injected this shot, she

looked down to check her tire pressure when “everything w[ent] black.”

Chapman ultimately crashed her van into Jasilyn Gardener’s 2005

Nissan Altima. Ms. Gardener was pregnant at the time and traveling

northbound with her two young boys, Jareese and Jarrell Hunter. The

collision was so violent that the car split into two halves, sending the front and

back halves in opposite directions. The front end of the car was smashed in,

1 Rumble strips provide both auditory and tactile warnings to an inattentive

driver.

2 the driver’s door was completely ripped off, and an infant car seat sat on the

road completely dislodged from the car. The collision left Ms. Gardener with

two fractured ribs, two collapsed lungs, and a ruptured spleen which required

surgery. Ms. Gardener’s two boys died from blunt force trauma from the

collision: Jareese had massive head trauma; Jarrell had blunt force trauma to

the upper torso, head, and neck area. Ms. Gardener later lost her pregnancy

but testified that her doctors told her that it was not due to the wreck.

Chapman was not seriously injured.

Witnesses to the collision all noted Chapman’s erratic driving. One

witness noticed Chapman’s van swerving in and out of traffic in their rearview

mirror; another witness became frightened when Chapman’s van sped past

while a third witness pulled over to call 911. Witnesses also observed

Chapman’s van cross the yellow rumble strips and travel in the wrong lane for

approximately 10 seconds. Furthermore, two additional witnesses to the

collision stopped to assist at the accident scene. One witness testified that his

wife saw a syringe between the steering wheel and driver door of Chapman’s

van; the other witness noticed a syringe in Chapman’s hand that had not been

fully ejected.

Hardin County detectives arrived on scene and found an off-white

greyish powder in a cellophane bag and a bag of new syringes in Chapman’s

van and a used syringe with a bent needle in her purse. A blood test two hours

later revealed that Chapman’s blood contained four nanograms per milliliter

(ng/mL) of fentanyl. The Hardin County Sheriff’s Office also obtained the event

3 data recorder (EDR) 2 from both Chapman’s van and Ms. Gardener’s car, but

only the data from Chapman’s van could be translated due to compatibility

issues. 3 The EDR report showed that: 1) Chapman’s van accelerated from

85mph to 94mph; 2) there was minimal steering input; and 3) no brake lights

had activated.

Chapman was taken to the Hardin County Detention Center and charged

with a first offense driving under the influence (DUI), two counts of wanton

murder, one count of first-degree assault, and being a second-degree persistent

felony offender. The jury found Chapman guilty of all charges except the

second-degree persistent-felony-offender charge. The trial court accepted the

jury’s recommendation for a sentence of 25 years for each murder, 15 years for

first-degree assault, and 30 days for the DUI resulting in 65 years,

consecutively.

2 The EDR saves data from a vehicle five seconds before a collision, including,

but not limited to: whether seatbelts were worn at the time of the collision; how fast the tires were rotating; if there was a turn signal activated; whether the brakes had been depressed; and steering input from the driver. 3 Ofc. Sallee testified he executed a search warrant to get both Chapman’s and Ms. Gardener’s EDR and took them to Ofc. Thomas in Elizabethtown, KY to input the data into a device that translates supported data into coherent information. Ofc. Sallee further testified that Ms. Gardener’s data was not supported by the system in Elizabethtown. Ofc. Sallee then contacted the Kentucky State Police for assistance in translating the data, but KSP responded that they used, in effect, the same system as Elizabethtown; so, if Elizabethtown was unable to translate the data, then KSP would also be unable to translate the data.

4 II. ANALYSIS

A. The Hardin Circuit Court did not err in denying Chapman’s motion for a directed verdict.

KRS 4 500.070(1) outlines the Commonwealth’s burden to “prov[e] every

element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wanton murder is when a

person engages in wanton conduct while driving “under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to human life…which creates a grave risk of

death…and [] causes the death of another person.” KRS 507.020(1)(b)

(emphasis added). Similarly, wanton first-degree assault is when the person’s

conduct causes serious physical injury, not death, to another. See KRS

508.010(1)(b). Chapman argues that the Commonwealth failed to produce

sufficient evidence showing Chapman acted under circumstances manifesting

an extreme indifference to human life. Thus, Chapman’s argument turns on a

degree of “wantonness.”

The Commonwealth sought to prove these offenses by presenting both

Chapman’s blood test two hours after the collision and EDR data from

Chapman’s van, coupled with expert testimony. Furthermore, the

Commonwealth presented multiple witnesses who observed both Chapman’s

van speeding southbound in the northbound fast lane on US 31W before the

collision, and syringes in Chapman’s possession immediately after the collision.

And although the collision did not cause Ms. Gardener’s pregnancy loss, it did

4 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

5 kill Ms. Gardener’s two young boys and left Ms. Gardener with serious physical

injuries.

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, defense counsel

moved for a directed verdict on the charges of wanton murder and wanton first-

degree assault. The trial court, looking at the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, denied the motion. See Bowling v.

Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 231, 235 (Ky. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v.

Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991)). Chapman then challenged the

Commonwealth’s characterization by testifying in her own defense that while

she did leave Landmark to buy and use drugs, she did not believe her conduct

would affect anyone else. She simply believed that she would take US 31W

home without issue.

Following the conclusion of all the evidence, defense counsel again

moved for directed verdict on the charges of wanton murder and wanton first-

degree assault arguing the Commonwealth failed to show that Chapman acted

wantonly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human

life. The Commonwealth argued that Chapman’s own testimony made it even

more apparent that her conduct was wanton under KRS 507.020(1)(b) and KRS

508.010(1)(b). The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth that a

reasonable jury could find Chapman’s conduct wanton from the

Commonwealth’s evidence. Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion for

directed verdict.

6 Chapman’s motions for directed verdict at the trial court level properly

preserved this issue for our review. See Ray v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d

250, 266 (Ky. 2020). A motion for directed verdict at trial is appropriate when

the prosecution fails to produce “more than a mere scintilla of evidence.”

Bowling, 553 S.W.3d at 236-37 (quoting Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d

3, 5 (Ky. 1983)); Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Ky.

1991). The trier of fact has the responsibility “to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979) (emphasis added). And on appeal, we must review whether, under the

totality of the evidence, it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find

Chapman guilty of wanton murder and wanton first-degree assault. Benham,

816 S.W.2d at 187.

Here, the Commonwealth fully met its burden to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Chapman’s conduct on November 13, 2022, was wanton

and manifested extreme indifference to human life, causing a collision that

killed two children and left their mother with serious physical injuries. As

such, we hold that Chapman was not entitled to a directed verdict as it was not

clearly unreasonable for a jury to find Chapman guilty of wanton murder and

wanton first-degree assault.

In Bowling, 553 S.W.3d at 234, the defendant was driving under the

influence of Xanax when “his [SUV] crossed the center line and struck a

[pickup truck]” carrying three occupants inside. The driver of the truck died at

the scene while the other two passengers sustained serious physical injuries.

7 Id. A test of the defendant’s blood confirmed the presence of Xanax. Id. A jury

found the defendant guilty of murder, two counts of assault, and a DUI. Id. at

234-35. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his

motion for directed verdict because “mere intoxication was not enough to rise

to the requisite level of wantonness.” Id. at 237. However, this Court disagreed

as it “made clear that intoxication, along with other factors, can suffice to prove

the wanton murder element of ‘circumstances manifesting extreme indifference

to human life.’” Id. (emphasis added). This Court found the defendant

“admitted to having taken [both Xanax and Oxycodone] on the day of the

collision”; the defendant drove into the wrong lane multiple times “before

striking [the victim’s vehicle] head-on”; and evidence indicated the defendant

suffered a Xanax overdose. Id. at 237-38. Consequently, this Court concluded

that “the totality of the facts ‘[permit] a reasonable jury to conclude that

Appellant was [driving] under circumstances manifesting an extreme

indifference to human life.’” Id. at 238.

Here, it is abundantly clear that the Commonwealth produced “more

than a mere scintilla of evidence” to permit a reasonable jury to find Chapman

guilty of wanton murder and wanton first-degree assault. Id. at 236-37.

On November 13, 2022, Chapman left Landmark, bought syringes and a

gram of what she testified she believed to be heroin, and injected herself in the

8 arm. She clearly became intoxicated by the drug 5 because she testified that

her knee felt better afterwards. And even if Chapman was unaware that she

was using fentanyl, she nonetheless 1) intended to become impaired upon

leaving Landmark; 2) knew how her body would respond once impaired; 3)

intended to drive home impaired; and 4) began driving home impaired.

Chapman then injected herself again while driving.

Additionally, while Chapman was driving under the influence of fentanyl,

multiple witnesses observed Chapman’s van speed past traffic, cross the

brightly colored, double-yellow-lined rumble strips, and travel in the wrong

lane. Chapman’s van crashed into Ms. Gardener’s car shortly after, which

killed Ms. Gardener’s two children and left her with serious physical injuries.

Immediately following the collision, multiple witnesses observed syringes

and what appeared to be heroin in a cellophane bag in Chapman’s van.

Chapman’s blood tested positive for fentanyl at the hospital. And the EDR data

from Chapman’s van was the final proof of her wanton conduct. See Welsh v.

Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 132, 134-35 (Ky. 2022) (discussing the

defendant’s wanton conduct relative to his EDR data to support wanton

assault and murder charges).

Certainly, injecting oneself with what is believed to be heroin before

driving down a busy highway “creates a grave risk of death to another.” KRS

5 See Estep v. Commonwealth, 957 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Ky. 1997) (“Intoxication

may be caused by either drugs or alcohol” (citing Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1955))).

9 507.020(1)(b); KRS 508.010(1)(b). Likewise, simultaneously preparing and

injecting oneself with drugs while driving impaired “[i]s wanton as defined by

KRS 501.020(3).” 6 Estep, 957 S.W.2d at 193. Chapman’s conduct while

driving is wholly unlike Johnson v. Commonwealth 7 where this Court was

compelled to reverse the conviction.

Based on the totality of the facts and evidence, the jury was well within

its authority to find her guilty of wanton murder and wanton first-degree

assault.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm.

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Robert C. Yang Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky

Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Solicitor General

6 “A person who creates such a [substantial and unjustifiable] risk but is

unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly.” KRS 501.020(3) (emphasis added). 7 885 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Ky. 1994) (reversing a conviction for wanton murder, in-

part, because evidence showed the defendant was completely sober, “[t]he road was dry,” and, although the speed limit was 55mph, there was no evidence he was speeding).