Angela C. Martinez, et al. v. Ford Motor Company

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: November 14, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01213
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 ANGELA C. MARTINEZ, et al., Case No.: 25-cv-01213-AJB-DDL

14 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 15 v. DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES, 16 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, COSTS, AND EXPENSES 17 Defendant. (Doc. No. 18) 18 19 20 Before the Court is a motion for attorney fees, costs, and expenses filed by Plaintiffs 21 Angela C. Martinez and Katy Martinez (“the Martinezes”). (Doc. No. 18.) The Martinezes 22 seek a total of $18,710.50 consisting of (1) $14,205.00 in fees incurred at the time of the 23 motion, (2) $505.50 in costs, and (3) $4,000.00 in anticipated fees for submitting a reply 24 and attending a hearing on the motion. (Id.) The motion is fully briefed. (Doc. Nos. 18, 21, 25 22.) Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition 26 without oral argument. 27 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 28 PART the Martinezes’ motion and awards the Martinezes $7,220.50 in fees and costs. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 On April 17, 2019, the Martinezes purchased a 2019 Ford Escape. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 4 5 ¶ 8.1) Between 2021 and 2024, the Martinezes began to encounter various issues with the 5 vehicle, including “abnormal noise” and “black smoke” being emitted from the engine 6 compartment, a malfunctioning “SYNC system,” “excessive shaking,” and “a failure to 7 accelerate.” (Id. 5–6 ¶¶ 11–15.) In November 2024, the Martinezes “request[ed] a 8 resolution from the manufacturer,” Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”). (Doc. No. 9 21-2 at 2.) 10 On December 2, 2024, Ford requested additional information from the Martinezes. 11 (Doc. No. 21-3 at 2.) After receiving the requested information, on December 10, 2024, 12 Ford requested more information so that it could purchase the vehicle from the Martinezes. 13 (Doc. No. 21-4 at 2–3.) The Martinezes do not dispute that they never responded to Ford’s 14 second request. (Compare Doc. No. 21 at 7 (“Plaintiffs never responded.”), with Doc. No. 15 22.) 16 B. Procedural Background 17 On January 30, 2025, the Martinezes initiated this action in San Diego County 18 Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1-2.) 19 On May 12, 2025, Ford removed the action to this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) The parties 20 disputed whether the removal was timely and proper. (Compare id. ¶¶ 4–6, with Doc. No. 21 6.) 22 On June 3, 2025, Ford offered the Martinezes judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the 23 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 21-6; see also Doc No. 18-1 ¶ 49.) 24 On July 1, 2025, during an early neutral evaluation before Magistrate Judge David 25 D. Leshner, the parties reached an agreement to settle. (Doc. No. 12.) The settlement 26 27 28 1 apparently entailed Ford reopening its Rule 68 offer and the Martinezes accepting it. (See 2 Doc. No. 21-1 ¶ 12.) The parties did not agree on the amount of attorney fees incurred, 3 however. (Doc. No. 12.) 4 On July 3, 2025, the Martinezes accepted the reopened Rule 68 offer. (Doc. No. 21- 5 6 at 4.) 6 On September 23, 2025, the Martinezes filed the present motion for fees. (Doc. No. 7 18.) 8 II. Legal Standard 9 Under California’s Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing buyer is entitled “to recover as 10 part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including 11 attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been 12 reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution 13 of such action.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). 14 The Song-Beverly Act “requires the trial court to make an initial determination of 15 the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the 16 case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time 17 expended are reasonable.” Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am., 31 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The court may consider “factors such as the complexity of the case 19 and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved.” Id. If the court finds 20 the time expended or fee request is “not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the 21 court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” Id. “A 22 prevailing buyer has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were 23 ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’” 24 Id. (quoting Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 4 Cal. App. 4th 807, 816 (Cal. Ct. 25 App. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Goglin v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 26 4 Cal. App. 5th 462, 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (same). If a fee request is opposed, “[g]eneral 27 arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” 28 Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guar. Assoc., 163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 564 (2008). 1 Rather, the opposing party has the burden to demonstrate the hours spent are duplicative 2 or excessive. Id. 3 III. Discussion 4 A. Local Civil Rule 2.1. 5 Before turning to the merits of the present motion, the Court reminds the parties and 6 their counsel of their duties to one another under Local Civil Rule 2.1.3. 7 This short-lived litigation has been contentious, with each party’s counsel asserting 8 that the opposing party and their counsel are acting in bad faith. For example, in their 9 motion for remand, the Martinezes’ attorneys stated that motion was “based on Ford’s 10 deliberate misrepresentation of the timeliness of its removal.” (Doc. No. 6 at 2.) In the 11 present motion briefing, the Martinezes’ counsel accuse Ford of intransigence, stating that 12 “this action would not have been necessary in the first instance if [Ford] agreed to abide by 13 its duties under the [Song-Beverly Act] by either affirmatively offering to repurchase 14 Plaintiffs’ vehicle, or at the very least by offering to repurchase Plaintiffs’ vehicle pursuant 15 to the [Song-Beverly Act] prior to filing this lawsuit.” (Doc. No. 18 at 6.) Ford makes 16 similar allegations, insisting, for example, that the Martinezes’ counsel have engaged in 17 “tactics designed exclusively to generate attorney fees, wasting the Court’s time, and 18 imposing a ‘death-by-a-thousand-cuts’ campaign against [Ford] postured in compliance 19 with the law.” (Doc. No. 21 at 10.) 20 This antagonistic behavior is neither helpful to the Court nor beneficial to the parties. 21 “Although adversarial, the [litigation] experience does not have to, and should not, be 22 antagonistic or hostile. Civility is paramount and not to be confused with weakness.” Local 23 Civ. R. 2.1a.1. “We expect lawyers to address legal arguments with other lawyers 24 professionally, and not personally.” Id. 2.1.a.3.a. “We expect lawyers to treat adverse . . . 25 litigants and opposing counsel with courtesy, fairness and respect.” Id. 2.1.a.3.b. “We 26 expect lawyers to conduct themselves so that they may conclude each case amicably with 27 the opposing party.” Id. 2.1.a.3.m. 28 1 The Court hopes that, moving forward, the parties’ counsel conduct themselves in 2 compliance with Local Civil Rule 2.1. 3 B. The Martinezes are entitled to reduced fees. 4 Turning to the merits, the Martinezes seek a total of $18,710.50, or (1) $14,205.00 5 in attorney fees incurred by the time of this motion, (2) $505.50 in costs, and (3) $4,000 6 for fees incurred to submit a reply and attend a hearing on the present motion. (Doc. No. 7 18 at 18.) In support of their request, the Martinezes provide the Declaration of Kevin 8 Jacobson and billing records from January 30, 2025, through September 22, 2025. (Doc. 9 Nos. 18-1; 18-7.) 10 Ford opposes the Martinezes’ request, arguing that the Court should deny the 11 Martinezes any attorney fees because they are not prevailing parties and, alternatively, the 12 requested fees are not reasonable. (Doc. No. 21 at 9–15.) 13 Contrary to Ford’s argument, the Martinezes are prevailing parties. Nevertheless, 14 Ford is correct that the Martinezes’ requested fees are not reasonable. 15 1. The Martinezes are prevailing parties. 16 Under the Song-Beverly Act, a party is a “prevailing party if it is clear that the party 17 has . . . achieved its main litigation objective.” Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 18 Cal. App. 4th 140, 150–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Castro v. Sup. Ct., 116 Cal. App. 19 4th 1010, 1019–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)). 20 The parties dispute whether the Martinezes have prevailed in this litigation. The 21 Martinezes state that “[p]er [Ford’s] admission, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party for the 22 purposes of attorney fees.” (Doc. No. 18 at 11.) The motion does not include any citation 23 or exhibit demonstrating an admission. (See generally id.) 24 Ford responds that the Court should “infer that Plaintiffs’ primary objective was to 25 pursue that which was not already offered—restitution, a civil penalty, and prejudgment 26 interest.” (Doc. No. 21 at 9.) Ford adds that the Martinezes did not obtain this objective. 27 (Id. at 9–10.) 28 1 The Martinezes reply that they prevailed because Ford’s Rule 68 offer of judgment 2 “unambiguously states ‘In ruling in [sic] Plaintiffs’ fee/cost motion(s)[. . .] the fees, 3 expenses, and costs amount shall be calculated as if Plaintiffs were found to have prevailed 4 in this action under section 1794(d) of the California Code of Civil Procedure[.]” (Doc. 5 No. 22 at 5 (quoting Doc. No. 21-6 ¶ 2).) 6 Both parties are incorrect. First, there is no admission in the record that the 7 Martinezes prevailed. Ford’s offer of judgment simply states that any calculation of fees 8 shall be made “as if Plaintiffs were found to have prevailed.” (Doc. No. 21-6 ¶ 2 (emphasis 9 added).) This framing indicates a hypothetical scenario. It is not an admission. 10 Second, nevertheless, the Martinezes prevailed because the Court finds that their 11 main litigation objective was to obtain a resolution for the problems they had with their 12 vehicle, which they received. Specifically, the Martinezes first contacted Ford “to request 13 a resolution” of “the ongoing issues [they] have been facing with [their] 2019 Ford 14 Escape.” (Doc. No. 21-2 at 2.) The Martinezes subsequently initiated this action seeking 15 multiple forms of relief, including the “rescission of the [vehicle] purchase contract and 16 restitution of all monies expended.” (Doc. No. 1-2 at 11 ¶ 2.) This is one of the remedies 17 provided by the Song-Beverly Act. Cal. Civil Code §§ 1793.2(d)(2), 1794(b). It is also a 18 resolution for the problems they had with their vehicle. 19 The Martinezes did not obtain this resolution before initiating this litigation. Ford 20 contends that it made a “repurchase offer” to the Martinezes before they initiated this 21 action, and so this litigation was not necessary for the Martinezes to obtain a resolution. 22 (See, e.g., Doc. No. 21 at 6.) That is not entirely accurate. Yes, Ford indicated that it 23 intended to repurchase the vehicle from the Martinezes. (Doc. No. 21-4.) However, Ford 24 did not make a repurchase offer before the Martinezes initiated this litigation. “An offer is 25 the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person 26 in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” Donovan v. 27 RRL Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 261, 271 (Cal. 2001) (citations omitted). Ford’s December 10, 2024 28 letter simply requested additional information from the Martinezes. (See Doc. No. 21-4.) 1 It did not include any terms such that the Martinezes’ assent to those terms would conclude 2 a bargain. (See id.) In fact, the letter explained that the Martinezes would “have an 3 opportunity to review the financial terms of Ford’s repurchase, and [the Martinezes and 4 Ford] can discuss any questions or concerns [the Martinezes] may have.” (Id. at 2.) 5 The Court understands that the Martinezes did not respond to Ford’s request. 6 (Compare Doc. No. 21 at 7 (“Plaintiffs never responded.”), with Doc. No. 22.) It may very 7 well have been more prudent for the Martinezes to work with Ford to obtain a resolution 8 without this action. Indeed, “[w]e expect lawyers to attempt to resolve disputes promptly, 9 fairly and reasonably, with resort to the Court for judicial relief only if necessary.” Local 10 Civ. R. 2.1.a.2.f (emphasis added). That does not mean, however, that the Martinezes were 11 precluded from obtaining such a resolution through litigation. 12 Thus, the Court concludes that the Martinezes achieved their main litigation 13 objective and qualify as prevailing parties. See Graciano, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 150–51. 14 2. The Martinezes’ requested attorney fees are unreasonable. 15 Because the Martinezes are prevailing parties, they are entitled to attorney fees and 16 costs. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). The Martinezes seek $18,205.00 in attorney fees and 17 $505.50 in costs for a total of $18,710.50. (Doc. No. 18 at 18.) Ford does not dispute that 18 the Martinezes are entitled to recover their costs if the Court finds that the Martinezes 19 prevailed. (See generally Doc. No. 21 at 10–15.) The Court accordingly awards the 20 Martinezes the requested $505.50 in costs. Instead, Ford argues that the Martinezes are 21 only entitled to a reduced amount of fees. (Id.) Ford is correct. 22 a. The Martinezes’ submitted billable hours are unreasonable. 23 The Martinezes submit records for attorney fees incurred between January 30, 2025, 24 and September 22, 2025. (Doc. No. 18-7.) Although the Martinezes seek $4,000.00 for 25 attorney fees they anticipate incurring for submitting a reply and attending a hearing on the 26 present motion, they do not provide any records for fees incurred in submitting a reply. 27 (See generally Doc. Nos. 22; 22-1.) 28 1 Ford raises three objections. First, Ford asserts that the Martinezes are not entitled 2 to any fees incurred after Ford made its Rule 68 offer of judgment on June 3, 2025. (Doc. 3 No. 21 at 10–11.) Second, Ford argues that the Martinezes are not entitled to fees incurred 4 for their motion for remand. (Id. at 11.) Third, Ford contends that the time billed for the 5 present fee motion is excessive. (Id. at 12.) 6 Ford correctly notes that the Martinezes are not entitled to a portion of the fees 7 incurred after June 3, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 68(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 “[i]f the judgment that [the Martinezes] finally obtain[] is not more favorable than the 9 unaccepted offer, [the Martinezes] must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.” 10 Here, Ford provided the Martinezes with a Rule 68 offer of judgment on June 3, 2025. 11 (Doc. No. 21-6.) The offer limited the Martinezes’ ability to seek fees and costs to those 12 incurred “as of the date of th[e] date of the offer of judgment.” (Id. ¶ 2.) 13 The Martinezes had 14 days to accept the offer. (Id. at 3.) The Martinezes did not 14 accept the offer in that time. (See Doc. No. 18-1 ¶¶ 40–48 (providing the Martinezes’ 15 timeline of the litigation and lacking any evidence of accepting Ford’s offer); see also Doc. 16 No. 21-1 ¶¶ 11–12 (explaining the Ford “agreed to re-open the Rule 68 offer . . . without 17 changing the date of issuance of the initial Rule 68 offer.”).) The Martinezes ultimately 18 accepted the reopened offer. (Doc. No. 21-6 at 4.) Because the Martinezes accepted the 19 reopened offer, they did not obtain a final result that is “more favorable” than the previously 20 unaccepted offer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d). 21 The Martinezes do not dispute that their failure to accept the offer of judgment 22 precludes them from seeking the bulk of the fees incurred after June 3, 2025. (See Doc. No. 23 22 at 9–11 (challenging Ford “tak[ing] issue with the 5.8 hours billed to draft a Motion to 24 Remand” and Ford “tak[ing] issue with Plaintiffs’ counsels’ time spent on this [fee] 25 Motion”).) Accordingly, the Martinezes are not entitled to fees for the 10.5 hours of work 26 performed between June 3, 2025, and August 25, 2025. 27 However, the Court notes that the offer of judgment authorized the Martinezes to 28 “recover for fees and costs reasonably incurred in bringing . . . a fee/cost motion(s).” (Doc. 1 No. 26-6 ¶ 2.) The Court thus finds that the Martinezes’ counsel are entitled to fees for the 2 6.7 hours of work performed in preparing the instant motion. (Id.) 3 The Martinezes are also entitled to some fees incurred in their counsels’ preparation 4 of the motion for remand. The Song-Beverly Act entitles prevailing parties to attorney fees 5 that were “reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and 6 prosecution of such action.” Cal. Civil Code § 1794(d). In arguing that the Martinezes are 7 not entitled to fees for their counsels’ preparation of the motion for remand, Ford insists 8 that the 5.8 hours of work billed “could have been done by one attorney,” so the Court 9 should exclude or reduce the time to that billed by one attorney. (Doc. No. 21 at 11.) Ford 10 does not argue that the filing of the motion for remand was unreasonable “in connection 11 with the . . . prosecution of [this] action.” Cal. Civil Code § 1794(d). (See generally Doc. 12 No. 21 at 11.) Because the Martinezes are not entitled to any fees incurred after June 3, 13 2025, the Court notes that the remaining time spent preparing the motion for remand 14 consists of 0.2 hours by Mr. Jacobson on May 12, 2025; 1.2 hours by Mr. Treybig on May 15 12, 2025; and 3.4 hours by Mr. McIntire on May 30, 2025. (Doc. No. 18-7 at 3–4; see also 16 Doc. No. 22 at 10 (identifying work done to prepare the motion for remand).) Although 17 Ford is correct that the work could have been done by one attorney, Ford does not offer 18 any evidence that any of the time spent on the motion for remand was duplicative or 19 unreasonable. (See Doc. No. 21 at 11.) The Martinezes are thus entitled to fees for 4.8 hours 20 of work performed to prepare the motion for remand. See Premier Med., 163 Cal. App. 4th 21 at 564. 22 The Martinezes are entitled to fees for 6.7 hours of work performed in preparing the 23 fee motion. Ford contends that the time the Martinezes’ counsel have expended on the 24 present fee motion is excessive because “the present Motion must have been taken from a 25 prior motion Plaintiffs’ counsel previously used as Plaintiffs’ counsel even left in and 26 premised this motion on basis [sic] that Ford ‘refused to offer a repurchase of Plaintiffs’ 27 vehicle’ and that ‘[Ford] refused to abide by its obligations under the law.’” (Doc. No. 21 28 at 12.) Although Ford indicated that it intended to repurchase the vehicle, it did not make 1 a repurchase offer before the Martinezes initiated this action. (See Doc. No. 21-4.) Nor 2 does Ford point to any case in which the Martinezes’ counsel filed a similar motion such 3 that the Court can discern that the present motion was “taken from a prior motion Plaintiffs’ 4 counsel previously used.” (See generally Doc. No. 21 at 12.) The Court accordingly 5 declines to conclude that the fee motion is recycled and reduce the time spent on the 6 motion. 7 Ford also contends that the time opposing counsel spent on the motion is excessive 8 because Mr. Treybig “clearly needs guidance on multiple occasions on this fee motion . . . 9 and also bills for having strategy meetings with Mr. Jacobson.” (Id.) However, the 10 Martinezes do not seek fees for Mr. Jacobson’s time spent advising Mr. Treybig and 11 reviewing the fee motion. (Doc. No. 18-7 at 9.) It is thus not clear that the amount of time 12 that Mr. Treybig spent on preparing the motion was duplicative or unreasonable. The Court 13 therefore finds the Martinezes are entitled to the fees requested for preparing the fee 14 motion. 15 Furthermore, because the Martinezes have not submitted any billing records to 16 substantiate the amount of time their counsel spent on preparing the reply brief and because 17 the Court is disposing of this matter without a hearing, their request for $4,000 for 18 preparing a reply brief and to attend the now-vacated hearing is unreasonable. The request 19 is accordingly denied. 20 In sum, the Court finds that the Martinezes’ counsel reasonably expended the 21 following hours in connection with the prosecution of this action: 22 Attorney Hours 23 Kevin Jacobson 0.2 24 Michael Jahangani 0.6 25 Gabriel McIntire 3.4 26 Erik Schmitt 2.4 27 Matthew Treybig 12.8 28 1 b. The Martinezes’ requested hourly rates are unreasonable. 2 In seeking attorney fees, “the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory 3 evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line 4 with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 5 comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 6 (1984). Generally, the “relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits.” 7 Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). 8 The Martinezes request the following rates for their counsel: 9 Attorney Law School California Bar Requested Graduation Admission Year Hourly Rate 10 Year 11 Kevin Jacobson (Partner) 2017 2018 $5502 12 Michael Jahangani (Assoc.) 2023 2024 $3503 13 Gabriel McIntire (Assoc.) 2024 2025 $3754 14 Erik Schmitt (Assoc.) 2016 2017 $4755 15 Matthew Treybig (Assoc.) 2018 2021 $5006 16

18 19 2 (Doc. No. 18-1 ¶¶ 3–11.) The Declaration of Kevin Jacobson does not identify when Mr. Jacobson graduated from law school or when he was admitted to the California Bar. (See id. ¶ 3.) Based on the 20 Court’s independent research, Mr. Jacobson was admitted to the California Bar in May 2018. Kevin Y. 21 Jacobson #320532, The State Bar of California, https://perma.cc/G4TP-6MD5. The Court assumes for the purpose of resolving this Motion that Mr. Jacobson graduated from law school by December 2017. 22 3 (Doc. No. 18-1 ¶¶ 18–19.) 23 4 (Doc. No. 18-1 ¶¶ 16–17.) The Jacobson Declaration does not identify when Mr. McIntire was admitted to the California Bar. (See id.) Based on the Court’s independent research, Mr. McIntire was admitted to 24 the California Bar in May 2025. Gabriel Isaiah McIntire #361141, The State Bar of California, https://perma.cc/2CVY-H7WG. 25 5 (Doc. No. 18-1 ¶¶ 12–13.) The Jacobson Declaration does not identify when Mr. Schmitt was admitted 26 to the California Bar. (See id.) Based on the Court’s independent research, Mr. Schmitt was admitted to the California Bar in February 2017. Erik Kronholm Schmitt #314285, The State Bar of California, 27 https://perma.cc/C849-ZWAK. 28 6 (Doc. No. 18-1 ¶¶ 14–15.) 1 (Doc. No. 18 at 14.) In support of these requested rates, the Martinezes offer two cases in 2 the Southern District of California and the Declaration of Kevin Jacobson. (Id. (citing 3 Jurosky v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 19-cv-00706-JM-BGS, 2020 WL 5033584 (S.D. Cal. 4 Aug. 25, 2020); Doc. No. 18-1); Doc. No. 22 at 7 (citing Montero v. General Motors LLC, 5 No. 37-2022-00026373-CU-BC-CTL (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 7, 2025)).) The Martinezes also 6 offer a number of cases arising from the Central District of California. (See Doc. No. 18-1 7 ¶¶ 7–11, 13, 15, 17, 19.) Additionally, the Martinezes’ counsel point out in reply that their 8 rates are based on the Laffey Matrix. (Doc. No. 22 at 6 (citing The Laffey Matrix, Laffey 9 Matrix, https://perma.cc/Y9Z9-44XT.) 10 Ford objects to the Martinezes’ requested rates as excessive. (Doc. No. 21 at 13.) 11 The Court agrees with Ford. 12 At the outset, the Court notes that the requested rates invite skepticism. For example, 13 the Martinezes request a higher rate for Mr. Treybig even though he has less experience 14 than Mr. Schmitt. (Doc. No. 18-1 ¶¶ 12–15.) The Martinezes similarly request a higher rate 15 for Mr. McIntire even though he has less experience than Mr. Jahangani. (Id. ¶¶ 16–19.) 16 The Martinezes’ counsel do not offer any explanation for these inconsistencies. (See 17 generally Doc. Nos. 18; 18-1 ¶¶ 12–19; 22.) 18 Setting aside the inconsistencies, the cases on which the Martinezes’ counsel rely do 19 not justify the requested rates. First, the Central District of California is not “the forum in 20 which the [Court] sits.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979. The Central District of California cases 21 that the Martinezes’ counsel point to consequently do not show that the requested rates are 22 in line with prevailing rates in the Southern District of California. See id. Nor do the 23 Martinezes offer any explanation for why the Court should not rely on reasonable rates 24 within the Southern District of California. Cf. id. The Court thus declines to rely on the 25 Central District of California cases and the rates they approve. 26 Second, the two Southern District of California cases the Martinezes identify present 27 their own issues. Beginning with Jurosky, it does not appear that any of the Martinezes’ 28 attorneys were involved in that case. See generally 2020 WL 5033584 (identifying Anh 1 Nguyen, Gregory Sogoyan, Tionna Dolin, Kyle Raine Tracy, Payam Shahian, Christine J. 2 Haw, Jacob William Cutler, Caitlin Scott, Michael Harris Rosenstein, and Dara Tabesh as 3 the plaintiff’s attorneys). Although the fee motion states that “Mr. Sogoyan was one of 4 Plaintiff’s [sic] counsel on this case,” the Martinezes do not seek fees for any work 5 performed by Mr. Sogoyan. (Doc. Nos. 18 at 16; 18-7.) 6 The Martinezes’ counsel indicate that Mr. Sogoyan’s prior rates constitute evidence 7 of reasonable rates here. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 18-1 ¶ 17 (identifying Mr. Sogoyan’s 8 approved rates of $350 and $385 per hour in Jurosky, 2020 WL 5033584)). But they do 9 not present any evidence regarding Mr. Sogoyan’s skill, experience, or reputation to allow 10 the Court to evaluate whether Mr. Sogoyan is an appropriate point of comparison to any of 11 the attorneys for whom they seek fees. Cf. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (requiring evidence 12 “that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar 13 services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation”). Courts 14 “are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” Indep. Towers of Wash. v. 15 Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 16 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)). Further, “the Court is not obligated to paw over files . . . in order 17 to make a party’s claim.” Krause v. Nev. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00342-JCM-CWH, 18 2014 WL 99178, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 3, 2014). The Court thus declines to develop the 19 Martinezes’ counsels’ incomplete argument. 20 As for Montero, the Martinezes’ counsel indicate that the court there approved rates 21 of $500 and $525 per hour for Mr. Jacobson, and $425 per hour for Mr. Treybig. (Doc. No. 22 22-1 ¶ 5.) But the decision they provide does not identify what hourly rates were approved. 23 (See generally Doc. No. 22-4.) It merely states that “the Court will approve the hourly 24 rates.” (Id. at 3.) The Court therefore does not rely on Montero as evidence of reasonable 25 rates for the Martinezes’ counsel. 26 Relatedly, the Martinezes’ counsels’ reliance on the Laffey Matrix is misplaced. 27 “The Laffey Matrix is based on rates for attorneys practicing federal litigation in the 28 District of Columbia.” Case Law, Laffey Matrix, https://perma.cc/YA4M-8TXA. But the 1 District of Columbia is not “the forum in which the [Court] sits” either. Camacho, 523 F.3d 2 at 979. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “just because the Laffey matrix has been 3 accepted in the District of Columbia does not mean that it is a sound basis for determining 4 rates elsewhere, let alone in a legal market 3,000 miles away.” Prison Legal News v. 5 Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010). 6 Despite the dearth of reliable evidence of reasonable rates provided by the 7 Martinezes’ counsel, Ford indicates that the Court may look to publications like the Real 8 Rate Report to determine reasonable rates. (Doc. No. 21 at 14 (citing Nguyen v. BMW of 9 N. Am., LLC, No. 20-cv-02432-JLS-BLM, 2023 WL 173921 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2023)7).) 10 The Martinezes’ counsel appear to agree. (See Doc. No. 22 at 6 (citing approvingly rates 11 Ford attributes to the 2021 Real Rate Report)8.) 12 The Court agrees that the Real Rate Report provides reliable evidence of reasonable 13 rates for the Southern District of California. The 2024 Real Rate Report identifies the 14 following market rates for San Diego attorneys: 15 Title Years of First Quartile Median Third Experience Quartile 16 Partner Fewer Than $385 $428 $515 17 21 Years 18 Associate 7 or More $369 $425 $435 19 Years 20 Associate Unspecified $225 $295 $435 21

22 7 The Court notes that Ford misreads Nguyen. The court there did not find that “the prevailing rate in basic 23 lemon law matters for partners practicing in the same field in San Diego to be $557 per hour, and $425 24 per hour for associates.” (Doc. No. 21 at 14.) Instead, the court stated that “[a]ccording to the 2021 Real Rate Report, the mean hourly rate for litigation partners in San Diego in 2021 was $557/hour, while the 25 median rate was $425/hour.” Nguyen, 2023 WL 173921 at *3 (citing Wolters Kluwer, 2021 Real Rate Report: The Industry’s Leading Analysis of Law Firm Rates, Trends, and Practices 21 (2021) (“2021 Real 26 Rate Report”)). It added that “[t]he mean rate for litigation associates in San Diego was $254/hour, while the median was $175/hour.” Id. (citing 2021 Real Rate Report at 22). 27 8 Given Ford’s misreading of Nguyen, the Martinezes’ counsels’ assertion that their rates are reasonable 28 because they are in line with Ford’s misreading is a house built on sand. 1 Wolters Kluwer, 2024 Real Rate Report: The Industry’s Leading Analysis of Law Firm 2 Rates, Trends, and Practices 32, 59, 63 (2024) (“2024 Real Rate Report”). The Court finds 3 that these rates are reasonable for this District. See also, e.g., Guerrero v. SFS Beauty CA 4 LLC, No. 25-cv-01133-JES-KSC, 2025 WL 2460193, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025) 5 (taking judicial notice of the 2024 Real Rate Report); Iconic Mars Corp. v. Kaotica Corp., 6 No. 22-cv-00092-CAB-DEB, 2025 WL 2440887, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2025) 7 (considering 2024 Real Rate Report). 8 Based on the 2024 Real Rate Report, the Court concludes that the following adjusted 9 rates are reasonable for the Martinezes’ counsel: 10 Attorney Law School California Bar Adjusted Graduation Admission Year Hourly Rate 11 Year 12 Kevin Jacobson (Partner) 2017 2018 $425 13 Michael Jahangani (Assoc.) 2023 2024 $235 14 Gabriel McIntire (Assoc.) 2024 2025 $225 15 Erik Schmitt (Assoc.) 2016 2017 $385 16 Matthew Treybig (Assoc.) 2018 2021 $375 17

18 Using these adjusted hourly rates and the hours reasonably expended on this 19 litigation, the Court finds that the Martinezes are entitled to $6,715.00 in fees, as calculated 20 below. 21 Attorney Adjusted Adjusted Modified Fee Hours Hourly Rate 22 Kevin Jacobson 0.2 $425 $85 23 Michael Jahangani 0.6 $235 $141 24 Gabriel McIntire 3.4 $225 $765 25 Erik Schmitt 2.4 $385 $924 26 Matthew Treybig 12.8 $375 $4,800 27 TOTAL 19.4 $6,715 28 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 The Martinezes are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs because they 3 || prevailed in this action. However, they are not entitled to the requested $18,710.50 in fees 4 ||and costs. The request for $14,205.00 in fees incurred at the time of filing the motion is 5 || based on excessive hours and rates; it is accordingly reduced. The request for $4,000.00 in 6 ||fees for submitting a reply and attending a hearing is wholly unsubstantiated; it is 7 ||consequently rejected in whole. The request for $505.50 in costs is undisputed; it is 8 || therefore allowed in whole. 9 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 10 ||the Martinezes’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses in the modified amount 11 || of $7,220.50. (Doc. No. 18.) 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 || Dated: November 14, 2025

15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28