Angela Baker, et al. v. Henry Pelham, et al.

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Angela Baker, et al., No. CV-25-08259-PCT-DJH

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Henry Pelham, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiffs Angela Baker (“Baker”) and Kevin Pittsinger (“Pittsinger”) (collectively, 16 “Plaintiffs”) each filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees 17 or Cost (Docs. 2 & 3). Upon review, Plaintiffs’ Applications, signed under penalty of 18 perjury, indicates that they are financially unable to pay the filing fee. The Court will grant 19 Plaintiffs’ Applications and allow them to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court 20 will proceed to screen Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 21 I. Legal Standard 22 When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to 23 determine whether the action: 24 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 25 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 26 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only

28 1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, §1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” 1 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires complaints to make “a short and plain 4 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While Rule 8 does 5 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, ‘the 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 7 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual 9 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting 10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the 11 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 12 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 13 A complaint is frivolous if it is based on a nonexistent legal interest or delusional 14 factual scenario. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–30 (1989); see also Denton v. 15 Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (dismissal is also appropriate when the facts alleged 16 are “clearly baseless,” “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional”). This Court has “not only 17 the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also 18 the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those 19 claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. 20 The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the 21 facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 22 435 (9th Cir. 2000). That rule, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 23 U.S. at 678. The Court is mindful that it must “construe pro se filings liberally when 24 evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2014) 25 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). 26

27 Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies 28 to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”)). 1 II. Discussion 2 Plaintiffs’ claims all relate to the acquisition of a search warrant and the subsequent 3 execution of the search on Plaintiff Baker’s home. (See generally Doc. 1). Plaintiffs allege 4 that the warrant was obtained unlawfully, the search was conducted with excessive force, 5 and Plaintiff Baker was wrongfully prosecuted. (Id.) Additionally, they allege that 6 Plaintiff Pittsinger is an individual with a disability, who resided in a motor home on 7 Baker’s property, and during the search, Defendants failed to reasonably accommodate 8 Pittsinger’s disability. (Id. at ¶¶ 17–20). As a result, Plaintiffs have brought the following 9 claims for violations of either their Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights or the 10 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act: § 1983 claim for 11 judicial deception (Count I); § 1983 claim for “unreasonable investigation” (Count II); § 12 1983 claim for trespassory search (Count III); § 1983 claim for excessive force (Count IV); 13 § 1983 claim for “exceeding scope” of a search warrant (Count V); § 1983 claim for 14 “failure to provide warrant” (Count VI); § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution (Count 15 VII); and violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (Count VIII). (See id. at ¶¶ 28– 16 36). Plaintiffs additionally assert a Monell claim (Count IX) based on the Arizona 17 Department of Public Safety’s (“DPS”) failure to train. (Id. at ¶ 36). Alongside DPS, 18 Plaintiffs name Colonel Jeffrey Glover, Director of the DPS, as well as officers Henry 19 Pelham, Matthew Turriff, Kyle Creager, John Gigous, Max Perea, and John Does 1–20 in 20 their individual and official capacities as Defendants. 21 A. Rule 8 22 Initially, Plaintiffs do not make it clear, which claims are brought against which 23 Defendants. Plaintiffs have listed numerous Defendants but, with the exception of Count 24 VIII for ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations and Count IX for Monell claims, they do 25 not identify which Defendants are implicated under each claim. 2 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint gives sufficient facts to 27 2 Counts I, II, and VII do not state against whom they are brought, but based on the 28 allegations supporting the claims, it can be seen that the claims are brought against Defendant Pelham. 1 give a defendant fair notice of the claims against them. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 2 (1957). Rule 8 also requires that a complaint clearly establish the claims and parties such 3 that a defendant would have “no difficulty in responding to the claims with an answer 4 and/or with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 5 530 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008). The purpose of Rule 8 is defeated unless a complaint 6 contains “clear and concise averments stating which defendants are liable to plaintiffs for 7 which wrongs, based on the evidence[.]” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 8 1996). Several claims in the Complaint here fail to meet these standards: Counts III, IV, 9 V, and VI fail to specify any particular Defendant, including unnamed defendants, that the 10 claim is brought against. (See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 30–33). By not specifying which claims are 11 brought against which Defendants and for what relief, the Court is unable to assess the 12 viability of Plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Count III for trespassory search, Count 13 IV for excessive force, Count V for “exceeding scope,” and Count VI for “failure to provide 14 warrant” are dismissed without prejudice. 15 Moreover, to state a cognizable claim against individual defendants, a plaintiff must 16 “set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s” role in depriving a plaintiff of 17 their protected rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.1988). Furthermore, 18 liability may be imposed only if the plaintiff can allege and show that the defendant actually 19 and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See id. Here, the 20 Complaint is devoid of any allegations as to how Officers Matthew Turriff, Kyle Creager, 21 John Gigous, and Max Perea violated either Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In fact, with 22 one exception, after being named as parties to this action, not a single one of the 23 aforementioned officers is mentioned again in the Complaint. (See generally Doc. 1). 24 Plaintiffs claim that Kyle Creager “initially reported ‘no seizable [sic] evidence’ in Trailer 25 B.” (Id. at ¶ 22). However, this alleged action did not deprive either Plaintiff of any 26 constitutional right. As a result, Defendants Matthew Turriff, Kyle Creager, John Gigous, 27 and Max Perea are dismissed as Defendants from this matter without prejudice. 28 Relatedly, it is true that Plaintiffs are not required to know the identity of every 1 defendant at the outset. “Nonetheless, to state a claim against a Doe defendant, plaintiff 2 must be able to pinpoint the individual who caused him harm, even if he does not know the 3 individual’s name.” Grace v. Samuels, 2023 WL 8168823, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2023); Segura 4 v. City of La Mesa, 647 F. Supp. 3d 926, 941 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (“Plaintiff must nevertheless 5 still allege specific facts showing how each particular [DOE] defendant violated [her] 6 rights.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, “when a plaintiff has claims 7 against an unknown defendant, the plaintiff must still meet federal pleading standards when 8 alleging facts against such defendants.” Lomeli v. Cnty. of San Diego, 637 F. Supp. 3d 9 1046, 1058 (S.D. Cal. 2022). Despite listing Doe Defendants 1–20, Plaintiffs make no 10 factual allegations against any specific, unnamed defendant in the Complaint, much less 11 identify which claims are brought against them. Therefore, the Complaint is insufficient 12 to allow Plaintiffs to proceed against any Doe Defendants, and Doe Defendants will be 13 dismissed from this matter without prejudice. 14 B. Remaining Claims 15 Presently, Count I for judicial deception, Count II for unreasonable investigation, 16 Count VII for malicious prosecution, Count VIII for ADA and Rehabilitation Act 17 violations, and IX under Monell remain in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Counts I, II, and VII are 18 § 1983 claims against Defendant Pelham for violations of the Fourth Amendment. Count 19 VIII regards Plaintiff Pittsinger and is brought under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act 20 against Defendants DPS and Glover in his official capacity. Finally, Count IX is a Monell 21 claim brought against Defendants DPS and Glover in his official capacity. At this time, 22 the Court finds that Plaintiffs may proceed with Count I for judicial deception against 23 Defendant Pelham in his individual capacity and Count VIII for violations of the ADA 24 against Defendants DPS and Glover. Counts II, VII, and IX are dismissed for the following 25 reasons. 26 1. Count II for Unreasonable Investigation/Failure to Consider Exculpatory Evidence Against Pelham 27 As to Count II, Plaintiffs brings a claim under the Fourth Amendment against 28 Detective Pelham for “Unreasonable Investigation and Failure to Consider Exculpatory 1 Evidence” (Count II). (Doc. 1 at ¶ 29). Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Pelham 2 “unreasonable ignored readily available exculpatory facts and failed to undertake 3 minimally adequate investigative steps before seeking a warrant[.]” (Id.) To the extent 4 that Plaintiffs’ claim is based on Defendant Pelham ignoring exculpatory evidence, the 5 Court was unable to locate any authority that supports such a claim under the Fourth 6 Amendment. While caselaw says that an officer’s willful failure to divulge exculpatory 7 evidence that resulted in a plaintiff’s unusually long detention can be a due process 8 violation, see Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2014), the Complaint is 9 clear that Baker was not arrested (Doc. 1 at ¶ 24), so no such claim is feasible here. 10 To the extent that Plaintiffs’ claim is based on Defendant Pelham’ failure to conduct 11 a more thorough investigation before seeking a warrant, it likewise fails. Plaintiffs allege 12 that Defendants “failed to undertake minimally adequate investigative steps before seeking 13 a warrant[.]” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 29). However, “[o]nce he has probable cause, an officer is not 14 ordinarily required to continue to investigate or seek further corroboration.” Ewing v. City 15 of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Thoms, 2011 WL 87337, at *3 16 (D. Alaska 2011) (“An officer seeking a search warrant has no obligation to conduct a 17 thorough investigation as to an alleged crime before seeking a search warrant to obtain 18 evidence of the crimes being investigated.”). Consequently, Plaintiffs have not alleged a 19 violation of Baker’s Fourth Amendment rights, and Count II is dismissed with prejudice. 20 2. Count VII for Malicious Prosecution against Pelham 21 “In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must 22 show that the defendants prosecuted [her] with malice and without probable cause, and that 23 they did so for the purpose of denying [her] equal protection or another specific 24 constitutional right.’ ” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) 25 (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir.1995)). “Malicious 26 prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be brought, as here, 27 against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed.” Id. 28 Plaintiffs allege that “Baker was prosecuted without probable cause and based on 1 judicial deception and unlawful searches” and assert that “the criminal case terminated 2 favorably by dismissal. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 34). Plaintiffs further allege that “Pelham’s conduct 3 violated the Fourth Amendment and proximately caused Baker’s damages.” (Id.) 4 However, earlier in the Complaint, Plaintiffs made it clear that a “stolen-vehicle report” 5 had been opened regarding a vehicle that was in Baker’s possession. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–12). 6 Although she may not have known the vehicle was reported stolen, the officers discovered 7 Baker in possession of the vehicle reported stolen. (Id. at ¶ 24). By Plaintiffs’ own account, 8 the officers seized “a small amount of methamphetamine,” along with the reportedly stolen 9 vehicle. (Id.) Based on these allegations, the “two felonies” Baker was charged with did 10 not lack probable cause, even if they were later dismissed. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Douglas 11 Cnty., 2017 WL 5709568, at *5 (E.D. Wash. 2017) (“[T]he officers discovered [the 12 plaintiff] in possession of the stolen farm equipment, categorically demonstrating the 13 existence of probable cause.”). As a result, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their malicious 14 prosecution claim, and it is dismissed with prejudice. 15 3. Count IX for Monell Violations against Defendants DPS and Glover in his Official Capacity as DPS Director 16 Lastly, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim, Count IX, is brought against Defendants DPS and 17 Glover. A municipality or other local government entity may be sued for constitutional 18 torts committed by its officials according to an official policy, practice, or custom. Monell 19 v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). However, DPS is an 20 Arizona agency, and Defendant Glover acts as its Director and the Supreme Court has 21 rejected the argument that a plaintiff can pursue a Monell claim against an arm of a state. 22 Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Mukaida v. Hawaii, 23 159 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1227 (D. Haw. 2001), aff’d, 85 Fed. Appx. 631 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A 24 suit against a state official in that person’s official capacity is the same as an action against 25 a state.”). “Monell claims are only cognizable against municipalities or local governments, 26 not state entities or officials.” Smithson v. Hammond, 2023 WL 7110554, at *12 (W.D. 27 Wash. 2023). Thus, Count IX is dismissed with prejudice as it is brought against Arizona, 28 not a municipality or local government. 1 Accordingly, 2 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Baker and Pittsinger’s Applications to Proceed in 3 || District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docs. 2 & 3) are GRANTED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following claims: § 1983 claim for || “unreasonable investigation” (Count ID); § 1983 claim for trespassory search (Count II); 6|| § 1983 claim for excessive force (Count IV); § 1983 claim for “exceeding scope” of a 7 || search warrant (Count V); § 1983 claim for “failure to provide warrant” (Count VI); § 1983 8 || claim for malicious prosecution (Count VII); and Monell violations (Count IX) are 9|| DISMISSED. Plaintiffs may proceed with Counts I for judicial deception against Defendant Pelham and VIII for violations of the ADA against Defendants DPS and Glover. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Matthew Turriff, Kyle Creager, John Gigous, 12 || Max Perea, and John Does 1—20 are DISMISSED as Defendants from this matter. 13 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall be responsible for the service of 14]| all necessary documents. 15 Dated this 14th day of May, 2026. 16 17 oC. . God L □ 18 norable' Diangé4. Hunietewa 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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