Angel Roberson v. SEIU Healthcare 1199NW, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: March 11, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02138
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 ANGEL ROBERSON, CASE NO. C24-2138-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 10 SEIU HEALTHCARE 1199NW, et al.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 Plaintiff Angel Roberson filed this action against her former employer, Defendant SEIU 13 Healthcare 1199NW (“SEIU”), and two SEIU employees, bringing state and federal claims arising 14 from alleged discrimination and retaliation. Dkt. Nos. 1, 17, 20. The Court previously dismissed 15 Plaintiff Angel Roberson’s second amended complaint without prejudice and granted a motion to 16 stay discovery and vacate all other case deadlines. Dkt. No. 42. Roberson filed a third amended 17 complaint (“TAC”) bringing state claims only (Dkt. No. 43), and Defendants renewed their motion 18 to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 45. 19 The Court finds that Roberson’s hostile work environment claim is again inadequately 20 pleaded and will therefore be dismissed without leave to amend, but that the other claims withstand 21 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part 22 Defendants’ motion. 23

24 1 I. BACKGROUND1 2 Roberson is a former nurse at Providence St. Peter Hospital and while employed there, she 3 was a member of SEIU. Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 3.1. Roberson served in various roles with SEIU, including

4 as a member of the bargaining team, a union delegate, and a member of the executive board. Id. 5 ¶¶ 3.2–3.8. After retiring from nursing, Roberson was recruited to join SEIU as a part-time union 6 organizer in February 2021. Id. ¶ 3.10. Roberson was promoted to a full-time position, effective 7 July 5, 2021. Id. ¶ 3.11. Upon her promotion, Roberson directly reported to SEIU’s treasurer 8 Yolanda King-Lowe and “had regular check-ins with then Vice President (now President) 9 [Defendant] Jane Hopkins.” Id. Both King-Lowe and Hopkins are Black women, as is Roberson. 10 Id. ¶¶ 3.9, 3.11. 11 Roberson’s employment with SEIU is subject to a collective bargaining agreement 12 (“CBA”) between SEIU and the 1199 NW Staff Union (“Staff Union”). Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 3.12. The

13 CBA provides new employees with the ability to obtain an experience-based service credit that 14 can affect the employee’s “step” on the pay scale, and, accordingly, their pay. Id. ¶ 3.14. 15 Roberson heard in late 2022 from co-worker Laura Dougherty (a White woman) that Roberson 16 had been placed on the wrong step early in her SEIU career. Id. ¶¶ 3.17, 3.18. Dougherty 17 suggested that Roberson request an audit of her placement on the payscale, and that she should 18 request (as Dougherty had successfully done) that SEIU adjust her pay to account for her prior 19 experience. Id. ¶ 3.18. Roberson requested an audit, and followed up with an email to her 20 supervisor in February 2023 to inquire as to the status of the audit. Id. ¶ 3.19. 21 After Roberson sent the follow-up email, King-Lowe informed Roberson that her wage 22 would not be adjusted because SEIU’s Executive Vice President Casey Rukeyser said that

1 The facts alleged in the operative complaint are assumed to be true for the purposes of resolving the motion to 24 dismiss. 1 Roberson was not a “Leader on Program.” Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 3.20. Roberson alleges that she “more 2 than satisfies” the definition of a “Leader on Program,” which is one of the experiences relevant 3 to the experienced-based service credit, although this term is not defined in the CBA. See id. ¶¶

4 3.14, 3.15, 3.21. Roberson alleges that she was entitled to a wage adjustment due to her experience, 5 and had even more experience than Dougherty, but was nonetheless denied this adjustment due to 6 race and gender discrimination. Id. ¶ 3.23 & n.1. Roberson contends that the disparity between 7 her pay and Dougherty’s pay is due to the fact that Roberson is Black and Dougherty is White 8 and/or due to “racial and gender animus and discrimination.” Id. ¶¶ 3.24, 3.25. 9 Roberson filed a grievance in March 2023 alleging that she was improperly placed on the 10 pay scale. Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 3.26. SEIU denied the grievance. Id. Roberson escalated the grievance 11 to the second step, and King-Lowe denied the grievance for the second step. Id. ¶ 3.28. In order 12 to escalate the grievance to step three, Robertson was required to ask the staff union to escalate the

13 matter to arbitration. Id. ¶ 3.29. At a meeting in either July or August 2023, the staff union voted 14 not to proceed with a step-three grievance. Id. ¶ 3.30. At that meeting, Roberson asked the staff 15 union members whether any of them had also been denied experience credit. Id. ¶ 3.31. Seven 16 women raised their hands (five of them women of color), and no men raised their hands. Id. ¶¶ 17 3.31, 3.32. 18 Sometime after August 30, 2023, and before November 2023, Roberson and other staff 19 union members met with Hopkins and Rukeyser and others, to express concerns that members 20 were placed on the wrong step on the payscale because of their race and gender. Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 21 3.35. These complaints led to the creation of lists of employees who should be considered Leaders 22 on Program. Id. ¶ 3.36. But after Roberson filed her grievance and raised concerns about

23 discrimination, Hopkins stopped speaking to her. Id. ¶ 3.38. Hopkins and King-Lowe gave 24 1 Roberson the silent treatment and shunned her at work and social events, but openly and readily 2 spoke to Dougherty. Id. ¶¶ 3.39, 3.41, 3.44. 3 After making a demand and attempting to communicate with SEIU through counsel,

4 Roberson filed this lawsuit in King County Superior Court in December 2024. Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 3.45, 5 3.47, 3.48. SEIU removed the suit to this Court. Id. ¶ 3.49. On January 22, 2025, Roberson was 6 attending Lobby Day with other SEIU colleagues, and asked Hopkins a question. Id. ¶¶ 3.50, 3.51, 7 3.51. Hopkins interrupted and yelled (in front of Roberson’s colleagues) that Roberson was 8 insubordinate and disrespectful. Id. ¶ 3.52. King-Lowe sent Roberson home early that day, but 9 told her she was not being disciplined. Id. ¶ 3.53. Roberson alleges that Hopkins’ treatment of 10 her on Lobby Day was motivated by race and gender discrimination, and retaliation for her 11 complaints and lawsuit. Id. ¶ 3.54. Roberson filed a grievance related to Hopkins’s Lobby Day 12 behavior on January 24, 2025. Id. ¶ 3.55.

13 Before 1:30 p.m. on January 24, 2025, Rukeyser offered to settle this action directly with 14 Roberson (not via her counsel). Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 3.56. The settlement offer contained a clause 15 prohibiting disclosure of various categories of business information. Id. At 1:30 p.m. on January 16 24, 2025, SEIU terminated Roberson’s employment during a meeting. Id. ¶ 3.57. Roberson and 17 Dougherty asked why Roberson was being terminated, and were told that it was because of the 18 Lobby Day incident. Id. Roberson alleges that her termination was in retaliation for her reports 19 of discrimination. Id. ¶ 3.58. In April 2025, Roberson filed an inquiry with the Equal Employment 20 Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. ¶ 3.60. 21 Roberson amended her complaint in April 2025 (Dkt. Nos. 14, 17, 20), and SEIU filed a 22 motion to dismiss along with a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion to

23 dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 23, 25. The Court granted both motions and stayed the case in August 2025. 24 Dkt. No. 42. Roberson filed the TAC in September 2025 (Dkt. No. 43), and SEIU renewed its 1 motion to dismiss thereafter. Dkt. No. 45. This matter was transferred to the undersigned judge 2 in October 2025. Dkt. No. 47. 3 The briefing on SEIU’s motion to dismiss is complete, the Court heard from the parties at

4 oral argument, and the motion is now ripe for resolution. 5 II. ANALYSIS 6 A. Legal Standard on a Motion to Dismiss 7 In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court 8 examines the complaint to determine whether, if the facts alleged are true, the plaintiff has stated 9 “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To state a plausible claim, a plaintiff must 11 plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 12 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

13 “Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing 14 the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Khoja 15 v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). The judicially created 16 “incorporation by reference” exception allows a court to “treat[] certain documents as though they 17 are part of the complaint itself[,]” for purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1002. This 18 exception allows a court to look beyond the face of the complaint to determine the sufficiency of 19 the allegations in light of a document attached to a motion to dismiss, if that document is referenced 20 in the complaint and central to plaintiff’s claim, and no party disputes its authenticity. United States 21 v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011). 22 “If a motion to dismiss is granted, a court should normally grant leave to amend unless it

23 determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegations of other facts.” Chinatown 24 Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2014). But where a plaintiff 1 has repeatedly “fail[ed] to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed[,]” leave to amend 2 again may be denied. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) 3 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

4 B. The Motion to Dismiss Is Not Converted to a Summary Judgment Motion. 5 Roberson notes that SEIU attached “extraneous material” to its motion to dismiss, and 6 requests that this material be stricken or the motion be converted to a motion for summary 7 judgment and continued to permit discovery. Dkt. No. 51 at 16. The Court previously rejected a 8 similar request, and the Court again finds it unnecessary to either strike the evidence or convert 9 the motion. See Dkt. No. 42 at 5. The Court has not considered SEIU’s extraneous evidence, other 10 than the proposed settlement agreement, which is referenced and quoted in the complaint. See 11 Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 3.56, 8.4. Because the incorporation by reference doctrine permits the Court to 12 consider the settlement agreement in resolving the motion to dismiss without converting the

13 motion, and the Court has not considered any of the other evidence attached to the motion, the 14 Court denies Roberson’s motion to strike and/or convert the motion as moot. 15 C. Plaintiff’s Hostile Work Environment Claim is Inadequately Pleaded, but the Disparate Treatment Claim Survives. 16 The Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) prohibits discrimination in 17 employment on the basis of sex, age, disability, and other protected characteristics. WASH. REV. 18 CODE § 49.60.030. To accomplish the WLAD’s purpose of eliminating and preventing 19 discrimination, the Legislature has directed Washington courts to liberally construe the WLAD’s 20 provisions. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.010, 49.60.020. “‘[A] plaintiff bringing a discrimination 21 case in Washington assumes the role of a private attorney general, vindicating a policy of the 22 highest priority.’” Jin Zhu v. N. Cent. Educ. Serv. Dist.-ESD 171, 404 P.3d 504, 508 (Wash. 2017) 23 (quoting Marquis v. City of Spokane, 922 P.2d 43, 49 (Wash. 1996)). 24 1 Here, Roberson asserts a disparate treatment claim and a hostile work environment claim 2 under the WLAD. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 5.1–5.5. The Court will address each claim in turn. 3 1. Disparate Treatment

4 “An employer who discharges, reassigns, or harasses for a discriminatory reason faces a 5 disparate treatment claim[.]” Pulcino v. Fed. Express Corp., 9 P.3d 787, 793 (Wash. 2000). 6 Disparate treatment claims require showing that the employer treated the employee differently 7 from similarly situated employees. See Haubry v. Snow, 31 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 8 2001). 9 In the TAC, Roberson alleges in conclusory fashion that she and Dougherty were “similarly 10 situated at the times when they made their requests” for a wage audit (Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 3.24), although 11 other allegations in the TAC highlight differences between them. For example, the TAC 12 emphasizes differences in their levels of experience at the time they were hired. See id. ¶ 3.23.

13 The TAC also describes Dougherty as a “team lead,” but does not ascribe this title to Roberson. 14 See id. ¶ 3.17. The TAC also suggests that Dougherty was hired long before Roberson was and 15 that her request for a wage audit was handled long in the past. See id. ¶ 3.18. The TAC compares 16 Dougherty’s salary in 2023 with Roberson’s salary in 2023 (id. ¶ 3.23), and states that the 17 “disparity between their pay cannot be explained by reference to experience or objective metrics 18 [but] [t]his pay disparity is best — and only — described as disparate treatment motivated by racial 19 and gender animus and discrimination.” Id. ¶ 3.24. The following paragraph ascribes the disparity 20 only to racial (not gender) discrimination. Id. ¶ 3.25. 21 These discrepancies or inconsistencies may signal the difficulty that Roberson may face in 22 bringing a prima facie case of discrimination at a later point in this litigation, but the Court

23 nonetheless finds that the TAC adequately pleads a claim for disparate treatment. She alleges that 24 when she requested a wage audit, Defendants refused to adjust her wage step, but that when a 1 White co-worker requested a similar audit, Defendants promptly adjusted her wage step. Dkt. No. 2 43 ¶¶ 3.24, 3.25. She also alleges that in an informal hand-raising poll during a meeting, no men 3 reported that they had been denied the experience credit Roberson unsuccessfully sought. Id. ¶¶

4 3.31, 3.32. These allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss: “At the pleadings 5 stage, we do not require a plaintiff to allege enough detail to state a prima facie case of 6 discrimination—only sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 7 plausible on its face.” Schmitt v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Wash., 965 F.3d 945, 959 n.8 (9th 8 Cir. 2020) (citation modified). Roberson’s allegations clear this hurdle. 9 2. Hostile Work Environment 10 To prove a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) that she is a 11 member of a protected class, (2) that the harassment was unwelcome, (3) that it was because of 12 the protected status, (4) that it affected the terms or conditions of employment, and (5) that it was

13 imputable to the employer. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 616 (Wash. 2002). “To prevail 14 on a hostile-work-environment claim, the plaintiff must show that the workplace was so 15 ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult … that [it] was sufficiently severe 16 or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working 17 environment.’” Diemert v. City of Seattle, 776 F. Supp. 3d 922, 938 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (quoting 18 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). 19 The Court previously found that Roberson’s allegations of a hostile work environment 20 were insufficient because she did not describe incidents of harassment with sufficient detail, nor 21 did she allege that the incidents she experienced affected the terms or conditions of her 22 employment. Dkt. No. 42 at 8. The TAC eliminates some of the previous allegations of

23 harassment, alleging only that Hopkins and King-Lowe stopped communicating with Roberson, 24 until Hopkins yelled at Roberson in front of her colleagues on January 22, 2025, accusing her of 1 insubordination. See Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 3.38, 3.39–.41, 3.44, 3.46, 3.51, 3.52. Roberson’s opposition 2 does not focus on these allegations, but restates her arguments related to the denial of the 3 experience credit, arguing that SEIU’s discriminatory application of the experience credit led her

4 to be denied a wage adjustment. Dkt. No. 51 at 22–23. But those allegations do not pertain to 5 “harassment” such as intimidation, ridicule, or insult, and were addressed with respect to the 6 disparate treatment claim. The TAC does not describe harassment that is sufficiently severe or 7 pervasive as to constitute an abusive work environment. See, e.g., Warren v. Regus Mgmt. Grp., 8 LLC, C24-1320 TSZ, 2025 WL 871670, at * 4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2025) (explaining that even 9 allegations of rude, demeaning, and hostile treatment are not sufficient unless the conduct alters 10 the conditions of employment). 11 Accordingly, the Court finds that the TAC does not cure the deficiencies in the hostile work 12 environment claim previously identified. Because Roberson has amended this claim multiple

13 times already, without avail, the Court will dismiss this claim without leave to amend. 14 D. The Complaint Adequately States Claims for Retaliation and Unlawful Discharge.

15 “The WLAD also prohibits employers from retaliating against persons who oppose 16 discriminatory practices prohibited by the act.” Bittner v. Symetra Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 558 P.3d 17 177, 187 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). A WLAD retaliation claim has three elements: “(1) the employee 18 took a statutorily protected action, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and 19 (3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.” 20 Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 430 P.3d 229, 234 (Wash. 2018). 21 The TAC alleges that Roberson took several statutorily protected actions: she filed a 22 grievance about her wage complaint in March 2023, she complained of discriminatory wage 23 disparities in fall 2023, she filed a lawsuit in December 2024, and she filed a grievance about 24 Hopkins’s Lobby Day treatment in January 2025. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 3.26, 3.35, 3.55, 6.4. Most of 1 the retaliatory conduct alleged in the TAC either does not rise to the level of an adverse 2 employment action (such as silent treatment or yelling), although Roberson’s January 2025 3 termination is clearly an adverse employment action.2 Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 3.48, 3.50–.55, 3.57. 4 Roberson’s termination is also sufficiently close temporally to the filing of her lawsuit and the 5 Lobby Day grievance to suggest a plausible retaliatory motivation. See Estevez v. Faculty Club of 6 Univ. of Wash., 120 P.3d 579, 590 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that “proximity in time 7 between the discharge and the protected activity … suggest[s] retaliatory motivation”). These 8 allegations are sufficient, together with other allegations about Roberson’s recognition as a 9 workplace leader (Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 3.29), to raise a plausible inference that her termination was 10 motivated by retaliation for her filing a lawsuit and/or a January 2025 grievance. See, e.g., Warren, 11 2025 WL 871670, at *7. 12 Likewise, these allegations also support Roberson’s claim for unlawful discharge in

13 violation of public policy. There are four elements to this intentional tort: (1) the existence of a 14 clear public policy; (2) discouraging the conduct in which plaintiff engaged would jeopardize the 15 public policy; (3) the public-policy-linked conduct caused the dismissal; and (4) the defendant 16 must not be able to offer an overriding justification for the dismissal.” Worland v. Kitsap County, 17 546 P.3d 446, 451 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024) (citation and quotation omitted). This tort may arise 18 “where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.” 19 Billings v. Town of Steilacoom, 408 P.3d 1123, 1138 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Roe v. 20 TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt. (Colo.) LLC, 257 P.3d 586, 595 (2011)). 21 22

2 Although the TAC identifies Roberson’s wage dispute as an adverse employment action (Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 6.5), it 24 predated the protected activity identified and thus could not have been retaliatory. 1 For the same reasons that the Court finds that the TAC adequately states a retaliation claim, 2 it also adequately states a claim for termination in violation of public policy. Thus, the Court will 3 deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims.

4 E. The Complaint Adequately States a Claim for Violation of Washington’s Silenced No More Act. 5 Roberson claims that the proposed settlement agreement that SEIU offered her violates 6 Washington’s Silenced No More Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.211(1) (“SNMA”). Dkt. No. 43 7 ¶¶ 8.1–8.7. The SNMA states that 8 [a] provision in an agreement by an employer and an employee not to disclose or 9 discuss conduct, or the existence of a settlement involving conduct, that the employee reasonably believed under Washington state, federal, or common law to 10 be illegal discrimination, illegal harassment, illegal retaliation, a wage and hour violation, or sexual assault, or that is recognized as against a clear mandate of public 11 policy, is void and unenforceable.

12 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.211(1). The SNMA states that it is a violation of the Act “for an 13 employer to request or require than an employee enter into any agreement provision that is 14 prohibited by this section.” Id. § 49.44.211(4). 15 Here, Rukeyser offered Roberson a settlement agreement that prohibits her disclosing 16 information that is not otherwise generally known to the public relating to or pertaining to 1199NW’s operations, projects, members, suppliers, trade secrets, 17 strategies, including but not limited to the following: financial information; techniques, technology, practices, methods of conducting business, information 18 technology systems, published and unpublished know-how, research projects, products, legal affair[s], and future plans. 19 Dkt. No. 23-3 at 61. The proposed settlement agreement contains a section whereby Roberson 20 would agree to waive her right to recover “monetary damages in any charge, complaint or lawsuit 21 filed by [Roberson] or by anyone else on [Roberson’s] behalf.” Id. The proposed settlement 22 agreement clarifies, however, that 23 Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prohibit Employee from pursuing 24 or participating in any investigation or proceeding conducted by the EEOC or 1 another federal, state or local agency with jurisdiction over workplace or employment issues. Further, nothing in this Agreement prohibits, prevents, or 2 interferes with Employee’s right to communicate, and/or initiate communications, with the EEOC and other federal, state or local agencies with jurisdiction over 3 workplace or employment issues.

4 Id. 5 The Court previously found that SEIU’s proposed settlement agreement does not violate 6 SNMA because it included an explicit carve-out for reporting workplace discrimination to the 7 EEOC or another federal, state, or local agency with jurisdiction over workplace or employment 8 issues. Dkt. No. 42 at 12–13. 9 Roberson amended her complaint to add legal argument, essentially seeking 10 reconsideration of the Court’s prior order. See Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 8.3, 8.4. Roberson argues that the 11 carve-out is not sufficiently broad to satisfy the SNMA because it only permits her to disclose 12 Defendants’ discriminatory conduct to an agency, but does not explicitly permit her to disclose 13 Defendants’ discriminatory conduct in the context of a lawsuit such as this one. Id. Thus, 14 according to Roberson, the settlement offer runs afoul of the SNMA. Dkt. No. 51 at 27. 15 Defendants’ briefing does not address Roberson’s argument regarding the extent of the carve-out. 16 Dkt. Nos. 45, 52. 17 The Court finds that when the proposed settlement agreement is read in the light most 18 favorable to Roberson, the carve-out is not broad enough to avoid the application of the SNMA. 19 Its non-disclosure provision could be read to prohibit Roberson from disclosing the facts alleged 20 in this lawsuit, and thus the Court finds that she has adequately stated a claim for violation of the 21 SNMA. The Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. 22 23 24 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to the hostile work 3 environment claim, but DENIES the motion in all other respects. Dkt. No. 45. The courtroom

4 deputy is directed to issue an order setting early case deadlines. 5 Moreover, in light of the related case pending in this Court (Roberson v. SEIU Healthcare 6 1199NW, No. 26-cv-05143-KKE (W.D. Wash.)), the parties are directed to meet and confer and 7 file a joint status report as to their respective positions on consolidation of these two actions, no 8 later than March 27, 2026. 9 Dated this 11th day of March, 2026. 10 A 11 Kymberly K. Evanson 12 United States District Judge 13

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