Angel Caro v. Department of Justice

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 26, 2026
DocketSF-0752-25-0161-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Angel Caro v. Department of Justice (Angel Caro v. Department of Justice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Angel Caro v. Department of Justice, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANGEL CARO, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-25-0161-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DATE: February 26, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Angel Caro , Yuma, Arizona, pro se.

Luke Archer , Esquire, and Julia Martin , Esquire, Springfield, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to supplement the jurisdictional analysis to find that the appellant is not an “employee” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii), we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND On November 20, 2022, the agency appointed the appellant, a nonpreference eligible, to the excepted service position of GL-1811-09 Criminal Investigator. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 3 at 135-36. The appointment was subject to a 2-year initial probationary period. Id. The appellant had prior Federal service as a GL-1869-09 Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Agent with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Id. at 204, 224. Effective November 14, 2024, during his probationary period, the agency terminated the appellant, citing his poor performance. Id. at 89-94. The appellant filed an appeal with the Board alleging that the agency subjected him to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. IAF, Tab 1. He also indicated that he was challenging his termination during his initial probationary period. Id. at 1-2. On December 20, 2024, the administrative judge issued an order informing the appellant that the Board may lack jurisdiction over his appeal, outlining the applicable law, and explaining the appellant’s burden of proof to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over his appeal as a probationary employee in the excepted service. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-6. He ordered the appellant to file, within 10 days of the 3

date of the Order, evidence or argument establishing why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 5. The agency moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that it terminated the appellant during his probationary period. IAF, Tab 3 at 9-17. The appellant did not respond to the order but filed a response to the agency’s motion arguing that he is an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). IAF, Tab 4 at 4-7. The administrative judge issued an initial decision based on the written record dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 2 IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 9. He concluded that the appellant did not establish that he has a statutory right of appeal as an “employee” under chapter 75. ID at 5-7. He also found that the appellant did not establish Board jurisdiction under any other bases. 3 ID at 7. He further found that, absent an otherwise appealable action, the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s claim of discrimination and harmful procedural error. ID at 10. The appellant has filed a petition for review. 4 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6-9. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

2 The appellant originally requested a hearing, IAF, Tab 1 at 2, but subsequently withdrew his request, IAF, Tab 4 at 4. 3 The administrative judge considered whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he had a regulatory right of appeal under 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805-315.806, or established Board jurisdiction over his appeal under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA), or as an individual right of action (IRA) appeal. ID at 7-9. However, he determined that the appellant did not allege, and there was nothing in the record to suggest, that the Board had jurisdiction under these bases. Id. We agree. 4 The appellant submits several documents for consideration for the first time on review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-13. The Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (declining to grant review based on arguments and documentary submissions that did not address the dispositive jurisdictional issue in the appeal). We therefore decline to consider them further. 4

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). An appellant bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that his appeal is within the Board’s jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i). As a nonpreference eligible in the excepted service, the appellant has a statutory right to appeal a termination if he qualifies as an “employee” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). Martinez v. Department of Homeland Security, 118 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 5 (2012). An “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511

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Angel Caro v. Department of Justice, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/angel-caro-v-department-of-justice-mspb-2026.