ae ee a ee rae Southern District of Texas a ee a en February 21,.2025 a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS” ee HOUSTONDIVISION, 8
Petitioner, WS. ee § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-3466 □ HALL, Warden, _ § a □
+ + Respondent. Boe MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER) The petitioner, Marlene Anduha, (BOP #10421-022), is currently incarcerated. - Federal Prison’ Camp Bryan (FPC Bryan). -She filed a petition and an.amended petition for @ writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the □ □ ealeulation of her First Step Act (FSA) time:credits and her anticipated placement". when she is. released from prison. (Dkt. 6). The Court ordered Warden Hall answer the amended petition, (Dkt. 7); and she responded with a motion to dismiss □ □
“and/or for’ sirmimary judgmént, supported by, authenticated records, kt. □□□□ □□ «Anduha did not file a response, and her time to do so ‘has now expired: Having □ □□ _créviewed the petition and amended petition, the motion, all matters of record, and | the law, the Court determines’ that Warden Hall’s motion should be granted; □□□ Anduha’s petition and ainended petition should be dismissed without prejudice. □□□
reasons aré explained below: a oO □□ □□ we BACKGROUND: | In 2021; Anduha was’ charged in Hawai federal coutt with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 0 grams or more of methamphetamine. (Dkt. 6, p. □ 12). On September 15, 2022, she was sentenced to 70 months in prison followed by □□ 5 years. of supervised release (Id. She was given jail credit against her sentence □□
for the time she-spent in custody from the date of her arrest on October 21, 2021, □ until entry of judgment on September 14, 2022. (id. at 13). . On September 13, 2024, ‘Anduha filed a § 2241 petition, alleging that □□□ □ ~Senitence was: being administered improperly because she was being denied FSA □ credits that she alléged she eared, while she was detained at the Hawaii Federal □ □
Detention Center (Hawaii EDC) before she arrived at FPC Bryan, (Dkt. 1), She also. alleged that if she were awarded those credits, she would be entitled to immediate □□ releagé'to a halfway house or hoine confitement (Id. at 1-2). os □ □□ In her amerided petition; Anduba alleges that she has been iinproperly denied - FSA oréaits that she earned between the date of sentencing and when she artived a . “RPC Bryan. Dit. 6, p. 6). She alleges that she was engaged in PSA programming “while at the Hawaii FDC and so should have earned FSA credits during that time. □ (Id.). She also alleges that her anticipated placement upon release at a halfway house in California is inappropriate because she will have no family support there. (Id.).
She contends that she should be released to home confinement in Hawaii because that is where she has family and support. (/d.). Anduha asks this Court to order her immediate release from FPC Bryan and transfer to home confinement in Hawaii. (Ud. at 7). Anduha attached several documents to her amended petition, including an FSA time-credit assessment dated October 8, 2024, and copies of administrative □
remedy forms she alleges that she filed. (/d. at 9-20). Warden Hall responded to Anduha’s amended petition with a motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 13). Warden Hall also filed the affidavit of FRC Bryan Case Management Coordinator Tanya Smith, along with authenticated records concerning Anduha’s administrative remedy requests. (Dkts. 13-1, 13-2). Warden Hall asserts that these records show that Anduha did not exhaust her available administrative remedies before filing her § 2241 petition. (Dkt. 13, pp. 5-10).' Anduha did not respond to Warden Hall’s motion, and her time
_. to do so has now expired. . .
"Warden Hall also argues that Anduha’s motion should be denied on the merits . because the Bureau of Prisons has properly calculated and awarded Anduha’s FSA credits. □ (Dkt. 13, pp. 10-21). Given Anduha’s undisputed failure to exhaust her administrative □ remedies, and because a conflict. in the law exists concerning the proper start-date for earning FSA credits, compare Yufenyuy v. Warden, FCI Berlin, 659 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D.N.H. 2023), with Stevens v. Jacquez, No. 3:23-cv-01482-AA, 2024 WL 3200546 (D. _. Or. June 25, 2024), the Court declines to reach the merits of Anduha’s claims. 3/11
oh DISCUSSION. AL Phe Nature of Warden Hall’ Motion . o
Warden Hall has titled her motion as a motion to dismiss and/or for summary : “judgment. (Dkt, 1 3), These ae different progedural vehicles, but either may be used □ to test the sufficiency of a petitioner's claims. : oe : : a □ “Motions ‘to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ‘are appropriate when the defendant contends that the pleading fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be pranted. FED.R. Civ. P, 12(b)(6). To properly state a claim upon : which relief can be granted, the petitioner inust allege “a short and plain statement
ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R: Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
While “the pleading standard Rule'8 “announces does not require. detailed vas facta atlegations, it demands moje than labels and conclusions.” Asheroft v, Iqbal, 556 US. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ai Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US. 544, 555 □□ @007)) (leaned us. in determining whether a pleading meets this standard, “the -faetual information to which the court addresses its inquiry is limited to the (1) the. □ facts set forth in. the complaint, Q) documents ‘attached to the complaint, and □ 3 inattets of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of Biideade 20 1”. Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist °938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019). The Court niiay not consider othier evidence or dociiments in ruling on a Rule | 2(b)(6) motion. Therefore; t6 survive'a motion t6 diaiise under Rule 12(b)(6), the petition aN te ee
itself must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If the petition does not include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on face,” it must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 USS. at 570. On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party ‘demonstrates that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it is
. “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When a party
relies on evidence outside of the petition to assert its entitlement to dismissal, the
motion is properly considered as one. summary judgment. See Pryor v. Wolfe, 196 F. App’x 260; 262 (Sth Cir. 2006) (per curiam). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, - Inc., 477 USS. 242, 255 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). If the moving party satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to point to record evidence that supports a “S/L1
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ae ee a ee rae Southern District of Texas a ee a en February 21,.2025 a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS” ee HOUSTONDIVISION, 8
Petitioner, WS. ee § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-3466 □ HALL, Warden, _ § a □
+ + Respondent. Boe MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER) The petitioner, Marlene Anduha, (BOP #10421-022), is currently incarcerated. - Federal Prison’ Camp Bryan (FPC Bryan). -She filed a petition and an.amended petition for @ writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the □ □ ealeulation of her First Step Act (FSA) time:credits and her anticipated placement". when she is. released from prison. (Dkt. 6). The Court ordered Warden Hall answer the amended petition, (Dkt. 7); and she responded with a motion to dismiss □ □
“and/or for’ sirmimary judgmént, supported by, authenticated records, kt. □□□□ □□ «Anduha did not file a response, and her time to do so ‘has now expired: Having □ □□ _créviewed the petition and amended petition, the motion, all matters of record, and | the law, the Court determines’ that Warden Hall’s motion should be granted; □□□ Anduha’s petition and ainended petition should be dismissed without prejudice. □□□
reasons aré explained below: a oO □□ □□ we BACKGROUND: | In 2021; Anduha was’ charged in Hawai federal coutt with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 0 grams or more of methamphetamine. (Dkt. 6, p. □ 12). On September 15, 2022, she was sentenced to 70 months in prison followed by □□ 5 years. of supervised release (Id. She was given jail credit against her sentence □□
for the time she-spent in custody from the date of her arrest on October 21, 2021, □ until entry of judgment on September 14, 2022. (id. at 13). . On September 13, 2024, ‘Anduha filed a § 2241 petition, alleging that □□□ □ ~Senitence was: being administered improperly because she was being denied FSA □ credits that she alléged she eared, while she was detained at the Hawaii Federal □ □
Detention Center (Hawaii EDC) before she arrived at FPC Bryan, (Dkt. 1), She also. alleged that if she were awarded those credits, she would be entitled to immediate □□ releagé'to a halfway house or hoine confitement (Id. at 1-2). os □ □□ In her amerided petition; Anduba alleges that she has been iinproperly denied - FSA oréaits that she earned between the date of sentencing and when she artived a . “RPC Bryan. Dit. 6, p. 6). She alleges that she was engaged in PSA programming “while at the Hawaii FDC and so should have earned FSA credits during that time. □ (Id.). She also alleges that her anticipated placement upon release at a halfway house in California is inappropriate because she will have no family support there. (Id.).
She contends that she should be released to home confinement in Hawaii because that is where she has family and support. (/d.). Anduha asks this Court to order her immediate release from FPC Bryan and transfer to home confinement in Hawaii. (Ud. at 7). Anduha attached several documents to her amended petition, including an FSA time-credit assessment dated October 8, 2024, and copies of administrative □
remedy forms she alleges that she filed. (/d. at 9-20). Warden Hall responded to Anduha’s amended petition with a motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 13). Warden Hall also filed the affidavit of FRC Bryan Case Management Coordinator Tanya Smith, along with authenticated records concerning Anduha’s administrative remedy requests. (Dkts. 13-1, 13-2). Warden Hall asserts that these records show that Anduha did not exhaust her available administrative remedies before filing her § 2241 petition. (Dkt. 13, pp. 5-10).' Anduha did not respond to Warden Hall’s motion, and her time
_. to do so has now expired. . .
"Warden Hall also argues that Anduha’s motion should be denied on the merits . because the Bureau of Prisons has properly calculated and awarded Anduha’s FSA credits. □ (Dkt. 13, pp. 10-21). Given Anduha’s undisputed failure to exhaust her administrative □ remedies, and because a conflict. in the law exists concerning the proper start-date for earning FSA credits, compare Yufenyuy v. Warden, FCI Berlin, 659 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D.N.H. 2023), with Stevens v. Jacquez, No. 3:23-cv-01482-AA, 2024 WL 3200546 (D. _. Or. June 25, 2024), the Court declines to reach the merits of Anduha’s claims. 3/11
oh DISCUSSION. AL Phe Nature of Warden Hall’ Motion . o
Warden Hall has titled her motion as a motion to dismiss and/or for summary : “judgment. (Dkt, 1 3), These ae different progedural vehicles, but either may be used □ to test the sufficiency of a petitioner's claims. : oe : : a □ “Motions ‘to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ‘are appropriate when the defendant contends that the pleading fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be pranted. FED.R. Civ. P, 12(b)(6). To properly state a claim upon : which relief can be granted, the petitioner inust allege “a short and plain statement
ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R: Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
While “the pleading standard Rule'8 “announces does not require. detailed vas facta atlegations, it demands moje than labels and conclusions.” Asheroft v, Iqbal, 556 US. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ai Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US. 544, 555 □□ @007)) (leaned us. in determining whether a pleading meets this standard, “the -faetual information to which the court addresses its inquiry is limited to the (1) the. □ facts set forth in. the complaint, Q) documents ‘attached to the complaint, and □ 3 inattets of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of Biideade 20 1”. Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist °938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019). The Court niiay not consider othier evidence or dociiments in ruling on a Rule | 2(b)(6) motion. Therefore; t6 survive'a motion t6 diaiise under Rule 12(b)(6), the petition aN te ee
itself must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If the petition does not include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on face,” it must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 USS. at 570. On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party ‘demonstrates that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it is
. “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When a party
relies on evidence outside of the petition to assert its entitlement to dismissal, the
motion is properly considered as one. summary judgment. See Pryor v. Wolfe, 196 F. App’x 260; 262 (Sth Cir. 2006) (per curiam). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, - Inc., 477 USS. 242, 255 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). If the moving party satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to point to record evidence that supports a “S/L1
ceoriclusion that giitujne issues of material fact exist. See Celotex Corp. v Catrett, “47708.311, 323 (1986). The nonmoving party may not avoid summary judgment by relying on the allegations of denials in pleadings oron unsubstantiated assértions ay See Anderson, 417 US: at 256; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (Sth. ‘Cir, 1994) (en banc), If the nonmoving party fails to show that disputed issues of ~ faot exist as to every element essential to the case on which she bears the burden of □
proof sutbinery juidgrient may be granted in favor of the moving party See Celotex, an US. 0 322-23. . □□ In this cise, Warden Hall.seeks relief under either Rule 13(b)(6) or Rule 56. □
Because Warden Hall’ motion relies in large part on the authenticated documenis □□ she attached to it, the Court will consider her motion a one for summary judgment’ □ ~ under Rule 56. Se □ □ Be Anduha’s Claims are Unexhatisted | x ae □ WwW arden Hall argues that Anduhe’s amended petition should be disttissed ‘because she failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to Het through the Bureau of Prisons before filing her habeas petition. oe . : □
“The law is wal settled that a prisoner must exhaust all available administrative □ remedies before challenging the administration of his or her sentence in a federal habeas petition. See Gallegos:-Herndndez 9 United States, 688 F.3d 190, 194 (sth. Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (Sth Cir. 1994) (per curiarn); □□□
Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (Sth Cir, 1993). The exhaustion doctrine requires the prisoner to “fairly present all of his claims” through all steps of the
available administrative remedy process before pursuing federal habeas relief. Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 228 (Sth Cir. 1987). Prisoners who voluntarily stop pursuing their administrative remedies prematurely have not | exhausted those remedies. See Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (Sth Cir.
2001). When a prisoner fails to exhaust her available administrative remedies before filing a habeas petition, the petition is subject to dismissal See Fuller, 11 F.3d at □
62. Relevant to a claim for FSA crédits, the Bureau of Prisons provides a four- step administrative remedy process through which prisoners can present a complaint.
See 28 C.F.R. §§542.10-542.18.? In the first step, the prisoner presents the issue to. staff at the facility where she is housed using a BP-8 form, and staff attempts to informally resolve the issue. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If the issue is not resolved’ to the prisoner’s satisfaction, the second step is for the prisoner to file a formal Administrative Remedy Request with the warden using a BP-9 form. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). The warden has 20 days in which to respond to the request, but this
Warden Hall provided documentation concerning the administrative remedy _ process in the affidavit from FPC Bryan Case Management Coordinator Smith attached to ne motion. (Docket Entry Nos. 13-1, 13-2).
time nay be extended once’ for an additional 20 days. See 28 CER. § 542.18, If the prisoner docs ‘hot reveive a resporise within the permitted time, including any
eon the request is deemed denied. Id. If the prisoner is not satisfied with the : ‘warden’s respotise, or if the prisoner does not receive a response within the permitted □□ time, the third step requires the prisoner to appeal to the Regional Director within 20 □ days by submitting □ BP-10 form. See 28 CFR§ 542.15(a). The Regional Director has 30 days een to respond to the appeal, but this 30-day period may be "extended once for another 30 days, See 28 CER § 542.18. If the prisoner not 7 teceive a response within the perinitted time, including any extension, the appeal is. “viewed as denied. td If the peeene! is not satisfied with the Regional Director’ □ □ response, the final step requires the prisoner-to appeal siithin 30 days.of that response □ to the Office of General Counsel using a Central Office Administrative Remedy □□ a Appeal BP-11 form. See 28 CFR § 542.15. ‘That Office has 40 days in which to respond to the appeal, and this 40-day period may be extended once by 20 faved See. 28 CE R§ 542.1 8. If the prisonet does not receive a response within the permitted □ ‘time, including any extension, the appeal i viewed as denied. Ta. The appeal to the Office of General Counsel is the final administrative remedy step provided by the □ □ Bureau of Prisons: Td. a : a oe □ □ □ The evidence provided by both Anduha and Warden Hall shows that Anduha
_ ‘failed to: fully ‘exhaust “her administrative remedies before filing het amended
petition. The documents Anduha attached to her amended petition show that □□□ started the administrative remedy process by submitting an informal request ona BP-8 form on May 28, 2024. (Dkt. 6, p. 15). In that request, she asked only for her “RRC/HC paperwork” to be processed because she contended that she was within
days of her projected eligible date. (/d.). Anduha did not assert thather FSA credits were being improperly calculated or applied. (/d.). However, inaJune 10, □ :
2024, email to Unit Management staff, Anduha asserted that she was told by her case
manager that she needed to “fix” her time. (/d. at 16). In a later undated email to a
“Mr. Patterson,” Anduha states that she should be entitled to FSA credits for the “time that I was incarcerated in Hawaii... after my sentencing.” (/d. at17). Anduha did not include any documents showing that she ever received a response. □ Anduha also attached to her amended petition a completed Request for Administrative Remedy using. form BP-9 that is dated June 29, 2024. (Dkt. 6, p. □ □ 20). In this request, Anduha asserted that she should have been awarded FSA credits
beginning from the date of her incarceration on October 21, 2021. (/d.). She seems _ to allege that she was eligible for FSA credits before her trial and before her
_ sentencing because she was being held in a BOP facility. (/d.). This document does not show that it was ever submitted to the Warden or accepted by BOP. (/d.). Anduha did not provide any documents showing that she pursued her remaining "administrative remedies by submitting either a BP-10 or BP-11 form before she filed. 9/11 □□
“her § 2241 petition. oe The authenticated records filed by Warden Hall show that FPC Bryan ‘has no “record of feceiving the BP-9 from that Anduha allegedly completed.” (Dkts. 134, □ 13-2). Further, there an evidence that Anduha ever pursued either of the réniaining 7 □□ steps of the administrative remedy process by filing eden BP-10 or BP-11 forth. ‘(Id:). Anduha did not respotid to Warden Hall’s motion. Viewing the summary judgment evidence in ‘the light most favorable to :
Anduha as the nonmoving party, the Court cannot conclude that she has inet hed. □ : cburten to show that there are factual disputes material to the eeees whséther shé □ □ properly and fully exhausted her available administrative remedies before filing her : onnens petition. Anduha peat: allege that she pursued her adtiinistrative ~ - remedies through all the steps of the administrative remedy process by filing either □ 7 BP-10 Administrative Remedy Appeal or a BP-11 Central Office Administrative □ ‘Remedy Appeal. She also offers no documentary evidence to show that she pursied. □□ her complaint ‘beyond the Administrative Remedy Request BP-9 step.” By : voluntarily stopping the pursuit of her available administrative remedies before □□ ; attempting all the steps of that process, Anduha has not exhausted those remedies See Wright 260 F.3d at 358, And beceiise she filed her § 2241 petition before □ pursuing all the available ne of the administrative remedy process, she has not □
met the exhaustion requirement, See Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62. Anduha’s netition must
be dismissed withdut prejudice fo lack ofexhaustion. == □□□□ an CONCLUSION AND ORDER oe □□ Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: nd, Respondent's tiotion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, (Dit. 13),
A 2. Anduha’s pétition ‘and amended petition, (Dkts. 1, 6), a DISMISSED _ a without prejudice for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. 3. Any pending motifs are DENIED as moot. 7 □□ □□
4. No cettficate 6f appealability will issue from this decision, See Hunter a “Taimez, 622 F.3d 427, 430 (Sth Cir. 2010) (“[A] COA is not required to . appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition.” (quoting Pack v Yusuff, 218 □□□□□ 448, 451 n3 (Sth Cit, 2000))). as □ _ The Clerk will provide acopy of this order to the parties □ SIGNED at Houston, Texas on _ Fie ay 5 □ □□
ee DAVIDHITINER ayes ee UNTIED STATES DISTRICT IDOE