Andrus v. LAD CORP.

875 So. 2d 124, 2004 WL 1171150
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 26, 2004
Docket03-CA-1488
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 875 So. 2d 124 (Andrus v. LAD CORP.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andrus v. LAD CORP., 875 So. 2d 124, 2004 WL 1171150 (La. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

875 So.2d 124 (2004)

Sheldon ANDRUS
v.
L.A.D. CORPORATION, De Auduong, Acceptance Insurance Company and ABC Insurance Company.

No. 03-CA-1488.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

May 26, 2004.
Rehearing Denied July 13, 2004.

*125 Stephen N. Elliott, Howard B. Kaplan, Francine Giugno, Bernard, Cassisa, Elliott & Davis, Metairie, LA, for Appellants.

Richard J. Dodson, Kenneth H. Hook, III, Dodson & Hooks, APLC, Baton Rouge, LA, for Appellee.

Panel composed of Judges JAMES L. CANNELLA, MARION F. EDWARDS and WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD.

JAMES L. CANNELLA, Judge.

The Defendants, L.A.D. Corporation (L.A.D.) and Acceptance Insurance Company, appeal from the trial court judgment rendered in favor of the Plaintiff, Sheldon Andrus (Andrus), holding the Defendants liable for damages that Andrus suffered in the amount of $30,443.84. For the reasons which follow, we reverse.

*126 Andrus filed suit against the Defendants[1] alleging that he had suffered severe injuries on August 13, 2000 from a dog attack. He alleges that he was a patron at De Auduong's (Auduong) service station. He stated that he had walked over to the dumpster on the side of the building to dispose of trash. A dog, Princess, owned by L.A.D., is kept behind the fence next to the dumpster for security of the rear of the premises. Andrus contends that the dog was originally behind a dilapidated fence near the trash dumpster but when Andrus walked away from the dumpster, the dog got out by crawling under the fence and attacked him, biting him and causing him to fall and sustain serious injuries. Andrus' injuries were primarily from the fall and not the alleged bite.

The Defendants disputed Andrus' version of the events. Their witnesses testified that Princess did not get out on the day of the incident and, moreover, had never been out previously nor ever bitten anyone. At most, the Defendants argued that Andrus may have been startled by the dog barking, causing him to fall or he may have simply tripped and fell on his own.

Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Andrus and against the Defendants, awarding damages in the amount of $30,443.84. However, the jury was charged with an erroneous strict liability charge which, according to communications between the jury and the trial judge, placed on the record by the trial judge, led the jury to believe it should return a verdict in favor of Andrus, even if it found that the dog did not escape from her yard but simply startled him into falling. The trial court entered judgment in accord with the jury verdict. After denying the defense motion for a new trial and Andrus' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the defense appealed the liability finding and Andrus answered the appeal requesting an increase in damages.

The first issue raised on appeal by the Defendants is that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that the Plaintiff had to prove that the dog "posed an unreasonable risk of harm." The jury was charged with the law regarding dog bites under La. C.C. art. 2321 as interpreted by Allen v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 36,377 (La.App. 2nd Cir.9/18/02), 828 So.2d 190. The Allen interpretation did not require a showing that the dog posed an unreasonable risk of harm, but rather included a stricter liability obligation. Following the rendition of judgment in this case, Allen was overruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Pepper v. Triplet, 03-0619 (La.1/21/04), 864 So.2d 181. In Pepper the Court concluded:

we find that, to establish a claim in strict liability against a dog owner under La. Civ.Code art. 2321 as amended in 1996, the plaintiff must prove that his person or property was damaged by the owner's dog, that the injuries could have been prevented by the owner, and that the injuries did not result from the injured person's provocation of the dog. We hold that, to establish that the owner could have prevented the injuries under Article 2321, the plaintiff must show the dog presented an unreasonable risk of harm.

Where one or more trial court legal errors interdict the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable and, if the record is otherwise *127 complete, the reviewing court should make its own independent de novo review and assessment of the record. Campo v. Correa, 01-2707 (La.6/21/02), 828 So.2d 502; Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742, 746-47; Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So.2d 163 (La.1975). More specifically, when reviewing courts have found that a lower court utilized an improper burden of proof, the jurisprudence has recognized that such an error may have interdicted the fact-finding process and calls for a de novo review of the evidence. Campo v. Correa, supra; Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., supra; Duncan v. Safeway Ins. Co. of La., 35,240 (La.App.2nd Cir. 10/31/01), 799 So.2d 1161, 1163; Valley v. Specialty Restaurant Corp., 98-0438 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/19/99), 726 So.2d 1028, 1032;

Andrus concedes that the trial court charge to the jury was erroneous and that this Court must review the evidence relating to liability de novo.

In reviewing the record de novo to determine whether the Defendant's dog posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the Plaintiff, we are again guided by Pepper v. Triplet, supra. In Pepper, the Court noted:

In Boyer v. Seal, 553 So.2d 827, 832 (La.1989), we stated that the criterion for determining whether a defendant has created or maintained an unreasonable risk of harm is a balancing of claims and interest, a weighing of the risk and gravity of harm, and a consideration of individual and societal rights and obligations. We have explained that the judicial process involved in deciding whether a risk is unreasonable is similar to that employed in determining whether a risk is unreasonable in a traditional negligence problem, and in deciding the scope of duty or legal cause under the duty risk analysis. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So.2d 1146 at 1149 (La.1983). The rationale is that in "both delictual areas the judge is called upon to decide questions of social utility that require him to consider the particular case in terms of moral, social and economic considerations, in the same way that the legislator finds the standards or patterns of utility and morals in the life of the community." Id.

In reviewing this case de novo, the evidence in the case reveals the following. The first witness to testify was Auduong, part owner of L.A.D., which owns Princess. Auduong testified that he was not present on the day of the accident, August 13, 2000. His brother, Sam, was present and an employee. He testified that L.A.D. owned Princess for ten years and she stays in the fenced area behind the store for security. He stated that she does bark at people if they get too close to the fence. He testified that his brother did not tell him about the incident, but a delivery man told his wife about a week later and she told him. He stated that he had security cameras around the store but that most of them did not work. The security camera that worked was focused on the cash register only. He stated that he did not have the tape from the camera because it is his custom to reuse it every week if it is not needed or does not contain anything important.

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875 So. 2d 124, 2004 WL 1171150, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrus-v-lad-corp-lactapp-2004.