Andrus v. Harris

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Andrus v. Harris

126 A.D. 564, 110 N.Y.S. 819, 1908 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3403

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 22, 1908

StatusPublished

This text of 126 A.D. 564 (Andrus v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Andrus v. Harris, 126 A.D. 564, 110 N.Y.S. 819, 1908 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3403 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1908).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam :

In our opinion the third defense is good as a partial defense, as it alleges facts which may be considered a provocation for the utterance claimed to be slanderous. The fifth defense is not good, because the matters alleged are neither matters of provocation, nor are they shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the [565]*565defendant before the utterance alleged to be slanderous. Judgment should, therefore, be modified so as to sustain plaintiff’s demurrer to the fifth defense, with leave to amend upon payment of costs of the demurrer. Only one bill of costs, however, is to be charged the defendant for the privilege of amending, if the defendant shall avail himself of the right to amend the second and fonr.th defenses under the privilege granted him in the original judgment. As thus modified the interlocutory judgment is affirmed, without costs of this appeal.

All concurred, except Kellogg, J., who considered the fifth defense proper in mitigation.

Interlocutory judgment modified as per opinion, and as so modified affirmed, without costs of this appeal.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Per Curiam :

In our opinion the third defense is good as a partial defense, as it alleges facts which may be considered a provocation for the utterance claimed to be slanderous. The fifth defense is not good, because the matters alleged are neither matters of provocation, nor are they shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the [565]*565defendant before the utterance alleged to be slanderous. Judgment should, therefore, be modified so as to sustain plaintiff’s demurrer to the fifth defense, with leave to amend upon payment of costs of the demurrer. Only one bill of costs, however, is to be charged the defendant for the privilege of amending, if the defendant shall avail himself of the right to amend the second and fonr.th defenses under the privilege granted him in the original judgment. As thus modified the interlocutory judgment is affirmed, without costs of this appeal.

All concurred, except Kellogg, J., who considered the fifth defense proper in mitigation.

Interlocutory judgment modified as per opinion, and as so modified affirmed, without costs of this appeal.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

126 A.D. 564, 110 N.Y.S. 819, 1908 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3403, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrus-v-harris-nyappdiv-1908.