Andrews v. Lebis

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Andrews v. Lebis

279 A.D. 1014, 111 N.Y.S.2d 826, 1952 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5656

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 14, 1952

StatusPublished

This text of 279 A.D. 1014 (Andrews v. Lebis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Andrews v. Lebis, 279 A.D. 1014, 111 N.Y.S.2d 826, 1952 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5656 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1952).

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Opinion

[1015]*1015While appellant was sued originally solely as eotrustee and no cause of action was asserted wherein the eotrustees were alleged to have conspired with reference to the sale of the mortgage owned by the Brooklyn Trust Company, individually, it was not an abuse of discretion to permit the amendments and to authorize the assertion against appellant individually, of the fourth cause of action. From the allegations thereof, it cannot be said as matter of law that the three-year Statute of Limitations rather than the six-year statute governing fraud is applicable. The respondent realleges in the fourth cause of action the allegation of the second cause of action wherein he asserts there was concealment of negotiations with regard to the sale of the mortgage and failure to discover the alleged fraudulent acts until after the institution of the action. However, appellant by this determination is not precluded from contending that the fourth cause of action on its face is legally insufficient. (Cf. Andrews v. Lebis, ante, p. 1013, decided herewith.) Nolan, P. J., Wenzel, MacCrate and Schmidt, JJ., concur; Carswell, J., not voting.

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[1015]*1015While appellant was sued originally solely as eotrustee and no cause of action was asserted wherein the eotrustees were alleged to have conspired with reference to the sale of the mortgage owned by the Brooklyn Trust Company, individually, it was not an abuse of discretion to permit the amendments and to authorize the assertion against appellant individually, of the fourth cause of action. From the allegations thereof, it cannot be said as matter of law that the three-year Statute of Limitations rather than the six-year statute governing fraud is applicable. The respondent realleges in the fourth cause of action the allegation of the second cause of action wherein he asserts there was concealment of negotiations with regard to the sale of the mortgage and failure to discover the alleged fraudulent acts until after the institution of the action. However, appellant by this determination is not precluded from contending that the fourth cause of action on its face is legally insufficient. (Cf. Andrews v. Lebis, ante, p. 1013, decided herewith.) Nolan, P. J., Wenzel, MacCrate and Schmidt, JJ., concur; Carswell, J., not voting.

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Bluebook (online)

279 A.D. 1014, 111 N.Y.S.2d 826, 1952 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5656, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrews-v-lebis-nyappdiv-1952.