Andrews v. Andrews

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Andrews v. Andrews

219 So. 3d 1006, 2017 WL 2491568, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 8538

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJune 9, 2017

DocketCase 2D16-238

StatusPublished

This text of 219 So. 3d 1006 (Andrews v. Andrews) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Andrews v. Andrews, 219 So. 3d 1006, 2017 WL 2491568, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 8538 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

SLEET, Judge.

Lisa G. Andrews challenges the. trial court’s final order granting her former husband James P. Andrews’ motion for modification of alimony and child support. In the order, the trial court concluded that Mr. Andrews had established a substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances and reduced his alimony and child support obligations. We reverse only that portion of the court’s order that directs Mrs. Andrews to pay $521 a month in child support to her former husband prospectively until the parties’ second oldest child’s eighteenth birthday. We affirm the final order in all other aspects.

Section 61.30(ll)(c), Florida Statutes (2015), allows for modification of a child support award based on one parent’s failure to exercise the parties’ time-sharing schedule, and the statute directs that modification shall be retroactive to the date the parent first failed to exercise time-sharing. Here, the trial court made a finding that Mrs. Andrews had failed to exercise her time-sharing since September 1, 2014, but it did not order a modification of the parties’ time-sharing schedule. As such, we conclude, and Mr. Andrews concedes, that Mrs. Andrews’ prospective monthly payment of the $521 was not warranted. See Buhler v. Buhler, 83 So.3d 790, 792 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (recognizing that “[b]y its nature,” a parent’s failure to exercise time-sharing “occurs over a period of time” and that pursuant to section 61.30(ll)(c), “during that time frame” the other parent'is entitled to a modification in the child support award (emphasis added)).-•

On remand, the trial court shall amend the final order to reflect that Mrs. Andrews is only responsible for the $521 pay *1007 ment from September 1, 2014—the date she first failed to exercise her time-sharing—to December 16, 2015—the date the final order was rendered. If in the future Mrs. Andrews continues to fail to exercise her time-sharing, Mr. Andrews may seek further modification of the child support award and a modification of the time-sharing schedule. We affirm the final order in all other respects.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CASANUEVA, J., and CASE, JAMES, R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE,' Concur.

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SLEET, Judge.

Lisa G. Andrews challenges the. trial court’s final order granting her former husband James P. Andrews’ motion for modification of alimony and child support. In the order, the trial court concluded that Mr. Andrews had established a substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances and reduced his alimony and child support obligations. We reverse only that portion of the court’s order that directs Mrs. Andrews to pay $521 a month in child support to her former husband prospectively until the parties’ second oldest child’s eighteenth birthday. We affirm the final order in all other aspects.

Section 61.30(ll)(c), Florida Statutes (2015), allows for modification of a child support award based on one parent’s failure to exercise the parties’ time-sharing schedule, and the statute directs that modification shall be retroactive to the date the parent first failed to exercise time-sharing. Here, the trial court made a finding that Mrs. Andrews had failed to exercise her time-sharing since September 1, 2014, but it did not order a modification of the parties’ time-sharing schedule. As such, we conclude, and Mr. Andrews concedes, that Mrs. Andrews’ prospective monthly payment of the $521 was not warranted. See Buhler v. Buhler, 83 So.3d 790, 792 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (recognizing that “[b]y its nature,” a parent’s failure to exercise time-sharing “occurs over a period of time” and that pursuant to section 61.30(ll)(c), “during that time frame” the other parent'is entitled to a modification in the child support award (emphasis added)).-•

On remand, the trial court shall amend the final order to reflect that Mrs. Andrews is only responsible for the $521 pay *1007 ment from September 1, 2014—the date she first failed to exercise her time-sharing—to December 16, 2015—the date the final order was rendered. If in the future Mrs. Andrews continues to fail to exercise her time-sharing, Mr. Andrews may seek further modification of the child support award and a modification of the time-sharing schedule. We affirm the final order in all other respects.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CASANUEVA, J., and CASE, JAMES, R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE,' Concur.

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219 So. 3d 1006, 2017 WL 2491568, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 8538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrews-v-andrews-fladistctapp-2017.

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