STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A25-1274
Ramsey County Thissen, J.
Andrew Vernard Glover,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: April 1, 2026 Office of Appellate Courts State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
________________________
Andrew Vernard Glover, Rush City, Minnesota, pro se.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
SYLLABUS
The district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying petitioner’s
postconviction petition alleging that the judge at his jury trial was not impartial.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
1 OPINION
THISSEN, Justice.
The question before us in this appeal from the postconviction court’s summary
denial of appellant Andrew Vernard Glover’s postconviction petition is whether the judge
at his jury trial for first-degree murder was impartial. We conclude that the judge was
impartial. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
We briefly summarize the facts underlying Glover’s conviction, with a focus on the
facts relevant to Glover’s current appeal. A full recitation of the facts is set forth in
Glover’s direct appeal from the judgment of his conviction. See State v. Glover, 4 N.W.3d
124 (Minn. 2024).
On February 23, 2021, Saint Paul police responded to a shooting outside the Saint
Paul Saloon. Responding officers found Raymond Renteria-Hobbs and another victim
suffering gunshot wounds. Renteria-Hobbs later died at a nearby hospital. He had been
shot ten times with 9-millimeter bullets. The second victim survived.
At the scene, officers reviewed the Saloon’s security footage. The footage from just
before the shooting showed Glover sitting outside the bar in a Dodge Journey sport utility
vehicle and Renteria-Hobbs standing in the street near the vehicle’s driver side. Shots were
fired, the Dodge sped away, and Renteria-Hobbs stumbled across the street and collapsed
in the Saloon’s vestibule. Officers canvassed the area and found numerous spent 9-
millimeter bullet casings in the street.
2 The subsequent investigation implicated Glover. Police impounded Glover’s SUV
and searched an apartment where he was staying. Glover’s vehicle tested positive for
gunshot residue, indicating that someone fired a gun while inside or near the SUV, or that
someone had gunshot residue on them and then got into the vehicle. Inside Glover’s
apartment, police found a .380-caliber handgun and several rounds of 9-millimeter and .22-
caliber ammunition atop a shelf in a bedroom closet. Glover was indicted on three counts
of murder, two counts of drive-by shooting, and one count of being an ineligible person in
possession of a firearm; he pled not guilty to all charges.
Before trial, Glover opposed the State’s motion to introduce evidence of the .380-
caliber handgun and the 9-millimeter ammunition found in his closet. The district court
agreed with Glover and excluded the evidence. 1 During jury selection, however, Glover
(then represented by different counsel) asked the court to revisit that ruling. Glover wanted
to use the evidence of the ammunition found in his closet to counter the State’s evidence
that Glover’s vehicle tested positive for gunshot residue. Glover intended to argue that the
.380-caliber handgun found in the apartment search was not capable of firing the 9-
1 This ruling arose from the State’s motion in limine to introduce the firearm and ammunition as Spreigl evidence of Glover’s prior bad act because, after law enforcement discovered the firearm and ammunition in his home—and prior to being charged in this case—Glover was separately charged with being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm. Glover opposed this motion. After applying the Spreigl test, the district court ruled in Glover’s favor, prohibiting the State from introducing the firearm and ammunition evidence because his possession charge was “not sufficiently similar to the charged offense” of murder in this case and the evidence’s prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. 1965) (observing that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible except to establish motive, absence of mistake, identity, or common scheme or plan).
3 millimeter rounds that killed Renteria-Hobbs and that Glover had transferred the gunshot
residue to his vehicle when he fired the .380-caliber handgun on an occasion unrelated to
Renteria-Hobbs’ murder.
The parties had the following discussion with the district court on the record:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I’m going to be asking the Court to revisit a motion that suppressed the .380 that was found at [Glover’s] home. And I’m going to ask the Court to allow that to be back into evidence.
...
DISTRICT COURT: Let’s address the .380 firearm. . . . This is sort of an unusual situation, because I’ve ruled it inadmissible . . . . [A]nd I believe that ruling also encompassed ammunition that was located in the same closet . . . . [H]ave the parties reached an agreement?
STATE: The State is agreeing . . . that the firearm and ammunition that was found in the defendant’s . . . apartment . . . is admissible as evidence.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I’d ask the Court to, essentially, reverse its previous order and allow me to introduce evidence . . . that this particular firearm was found at the defendant’s home.
DISTRICT COURT: Okay. And not to belabor the point, but Spreigl is . . . intended to protect the defendant. . . . And I just wanted to be clear if the limits were just the firearm. But it sounds like it’s the ammunition as well that you’re intending to question on; is that right?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right.
Though the State did not object to admission of the .380-caliber handgun, it raised
the question of whether Glover needed to consent to admitting the handgun as part of his
trial strategy on the record before admission. The charges against Glover included
4 unlawful possession of the .380-caliber handgun. The State argued that if Glover
acknowledged that he possessed the gun in his murder trial it could be interpreted as an
admission of guilt on the possession charge. Because of this possible inference, the State
asserted that Glover needed to personally consent to admitting the gun into evidence on the
record; Glover’s attorney disagreed. 2 The district court declined to rule from the bench on
this issue and stated, “we should all research . . . the question . . . and make sure we’re clear
on it.”
The next day, the district court and the parties returned to the issue of Glover’s
consent to admit the firearm. The district court informed the parties that he “did some
research yesterday,” provided a brief discussion of the relevant case law, and stated that
getting Glover’s consent on the record was the safest course to avoid a potential ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Glover then consented to admitting the gun into evidence on
the record.
Before Glover’s trial began, the State told the district court that it was concerned
about media coverage and suggested it may move to sequester the jury during its
deliberations. Prior to jury deliberations, the district court asked if the State still intended
to make the sequestration motion. It noted that potential jurors were not asked about
sequestration during voir dire and expressed concern that sequestration might render some
jurors unavailable for deliberations. The district court stated:
2 The district court and the attorneys also discussed potential implications for charges then pending against Glover in a separate case. The court considered these implications, but they are not relevant to resolution of this case and we do not address them here.
5 I think it is . . . my discretion when it comes to sequestration. [Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03] identifies . . . the issues that motivate a sequestration in terms of notoriety of the case or the possibility of external influences.
I, despite the seriousness of this case, have not seen much media coverage. And so that’s one of the issues that I wanted to just raise and make sure I’m not missing something so that I can do, you know, sort of, independent research before we have a full argument on the case.
Following this statement, the State did not request sequestration of the jury and the district
court did not order it.
The jury acquitted Glover of first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.185(a)(1), but found him guilty of first-degree intentional murder while committing
a drive-by shooting, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3); felony drive-by shooting, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.66, subd. 1e(b) (2020); 3 and being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm,
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2(b). The district court convicted Glover on those counts and
imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of release after 30 years for the first-degree
murder conviction, a 60-month concurrent sentence for the ineligible person in possession
of a firearm conviction, and a consecutive 48-month sentence for the felony drive-by
shooting conviction. Glover, 4 N.W.3d at 132.
Glover appealed directly to us. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.02, subds. 1(a) (stating
that “[a] defendant may appeal as of right from the district court to the Supreme Court from
a final judgment of conviction of first-degree murder”), 1(d) (stating that “[o]ther charges
that were joined for prosecution with the first-degree murder charge may be included in
3 In 2021, the Legislature amended this statute. The offense of felony drive-by shooting is now located at Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(a).
6 the appeal”). He argued that the district court (1) erred in concluding that police had
probable cause to arrest him, (2) erred in finding that the police did not misrepresent
material information on a search warrant application, (3) abused its discretion by denying
his request to admit reverse-Spreigl evidence against an alleged alternative perpetrator, and
(4) abused its discretion and violated his confrontation rights by denying his request to
cross-examine the lead investigator about the investigation’s scope. Glover, 4 N.W.3d at
129. We affirmed his convictions. Id. at 138.
Glover timely filed the postconviction petition before us in this appeal. His petition
alleged that the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to an impartial judge
by “tipping off the prosecution about an avenue for obtaining discovery” and by
“conducting his own independent investigation of a disputed fact in Glover’s trial.”
Glover’s petition provided no record cites, did not clearly articulate how the district court
“tipped” off the prosecution, and failed to specify the facts the court supposedly
investigated.
The postconviction court issued an order summarily denying Glover’s petition
without an evidentiary hearing. In its order, the court evaluated Glover’s claims based on
the vague assertions in the petition and found them meritless. It also found that Glover’s
claims were procedurally barred under our decision in State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737
(Minn. 1976), because the claims arose at trial and Glover failed to raise them in his direct
appeal.
This appeal followed.
7 ANALYSIS
This case comes to us following the postconviction court’s summary denial of
Glover’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. We construe claims
brought by self-represented postconviction petitioners “liberally and with an understanding
eye.” Andersen v. State, 940 N.W.2d 172, 181 (Minn. 2020).
In determining whether a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a
postconviction court accepts “the facts alleged in the petition as true and construes them in
the light most favorable to the petitioner.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn.
2017). A petitioner bears the burden to show facts entitling them to relief and, to meet that
burden, “must do more than offer conclusory, argumentative assertions, without factual
support.” State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2007). A postconviction court
may summarily deny a petition without holding an evidentiary hearing when “the petition
and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled
to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1. We review decisions summarily denying
postconviction petitions without an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Munt v.
State, 984 N.W.2d 242, 249 (Minn. 2023).
In his petition and before us on appeal, Glover argues that he is entitled to a new
trial because the judge who presided over his trial was not impartial. Glover identifies two
circumstances which he alleges show that the judge was not impartial. First, Glover claims
that the judge engaged in advocacy for the State when he “initiated” or “tipped off” the
prosecution to an issue related to Glover’s request to admit a .380-caliber handgun and 9-
millimeter ammunition at trial. Second, Glover asserts that the judge improperly conducted
8 independent research on whether Glover had to consent to admission of the .380-caliber
handgun into evidence and on a question related to jury sequestration.
Whether a defendant was denied the right to an impartial judge is a legal question.
State v. Duol, 25 N.W.2d 135, 141 (Minn. 2025). While “[w]e review a district court’s
denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion, . . . we review any embedded
issues of law de novo.” Petersen v. State, 937 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn. 2019). Because
the postconviction court summarily denied the petition, on review, we, like the
postconviction court, accept the allegations in the petition as true and we review the legal
question of whether Glover was denied the right to an impartial judge at trial de novo.
A.
A defendant has a constitutional right to a trial before “a fair and impartial judge.”
Duol, 25 N.W.3d at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cuypers v. State,
711 N.W.2d 100, 104 (Minn. 2006)) (explaining that the constitutional right derives from
the right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution). In addition, Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 14(3), provides that “[a] judge may not preside over
any criminal proceeding if [they are] disqualified from doing so under the Code of Judicial
Conduct.” 4 State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 712–13 (Minn. 2019). Under the Code,
4 At trial, Glover made no claim that the district court judge was partial or biased. Thus, the chief judge never considered or ruled on the question of the district court’s partiality. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(3) (requiring that “[a] request to disqualify a judge for cause must be heard and determined by the chief judge of the district”). Glover also failed to raise the issue of the district court’s impartiality on direct appeal.
9 judges must disqualify themselves from “any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” Minn. R. Jud. Conduct 2.11. Judges are impartial when
they do not show “bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of
parties” and “maint[ain] an open mind in considering issues” that come before them. State
v. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d 868, 876 (Minn. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Terminology, Minn. R. Jud. Conduct). We assess partiality from the perspective of an
objective, unbiased layperson, with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances. Id. at
876 n.8. 5 The party challenging a judge’s impartiality bears the burden of showing the
judge was partial. See State v. Burrell, 743 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. 2008) (concluding
State failed to meet its burden to show judge was partial); State v. Lopez, 988 N.W.2d 107,
117 (Minn. 2023) (“The challenging party has the burden of proving actual bias.”).
Based on our resolution of the case, we do not reach the issue of whether Glover’s timely postconviction petition is barred by Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741, or by Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. We have yet to decide whether the Knaffla rule or its common-law exceptions survived amendments to the postconviction review statute that were made in 2005. Heard v. State, 22 N.W.3d 154, 167 n.8 (Minn. 2025). 5 The United States Supreme Court has observed that “most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level,” which requires a showing that “under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,” the interest at issue “poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment” that due process requires recusal. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876, 883–84 (2009) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not address the precise outer contours of the constitutional due process right to an impartial judge because Glover failed to demonstrate the trial judge was partial under the broader Code of Judicial Conduct standard: that an objective, unbiased layperson, with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances, might question the district court’s impartiality in this case. See Minn. R. Jud. Conduct 2.11.
10 Over the years, we have identified several situations where judges, through words
and conduct, deprived defendants of fair trials by failing to maintain judicial impartiality.
Two are relevant to Glover’s claims.
First, we have determined judges are partial when they act as advocates or counsel
by suggesting new arguments to one party. For instance, in State v. Schlienz, 774 N.W.2d
361 (Minn. 2009), we held that a judge denied the defendant’s right to a fair hearing before
an impartial decision-maker by communicating ex parte with the prosecutor and suggesting
substantive responses to the defendant’s anticipated plea withdrawal motion. Id. at 367–
69; see also State v. Malone, 963 N.W.2d 453, 466 (Minn. 2021) (concluding judge was
not impartial where judge (among other things) suggested to prosecutor a new strategy to
prove defendant knowingly violated an order for protection and identified a witness to call);
State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 251 (Minn. 2005) (concluding judge was not impartial
where judge (among other things) introduced facts adverse to the defendant that the State
had not introduced into the case). In so ruling, we distinguished several other
circumstances that may not cross the line into partiality. For instance, we stated that “a
judge expressing an opinion about the merits of an ongoing dispute with both parties
present,” where the judge “d[oes] not introduce new arguments into the proceeding,” is
clearly not acting as an advocate for one party. Schlienz, 774 N.W.2d at 369 (discussing
Burrell, 743 N.W.2d at 602). We also distinguished circumstances where a judge
“question[s] counsel during proceedings in order to clarify facts and aid in his decision
making.” Id. We are particularly concerned when a judge acts as advocate on an essential
element of a crime. Malone, 963 N.W.2d at 466.
11 Second, in several cases we have determined that a judge is partial when they
independently seek out facts that neither party introduces. See, e.g., id. (determining that
a judge was disqualified for having independently investigated a fact not in evidence,
notifying the parties of that fact, relying on the fact in denying a motion to dismiss, and
suggesting a specific witness the State might want to call and facilitating contact with that
witness); Duol, 25 N.W.3d at 143 (concluding that a judge was not impartial when he
intentionally conducted an independent investigation and considered facts outside the
record in denying a petition for postconviction relief); Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 251
(concluding judge was not impartial in questioning, and subsequently independently
investigating, the truth of a defense witness’s testimony). In those cases, “the very act of
seeking information outside the record effectively transform[ed] the court into an
investigator . . . thereby eliminating any vestige of impartiality.” Duol, 25 N.W.3d at 143
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis removed). We have
applied this rule to fact-finding when a judge presides over a bench trial, a postconviction
petition, and pretrial issues. See Malone, 963 N.W.2d at 466–67 (stating that the
prohibition on investigation is not limited to bench trials).
B.
With this background in mind, we turn to the district court judge’s actions that
Glover argues demonstrate that the court failed to remain impartial. First, Glover asserts
that the district court judge engaged in advocacy for the State after his attorney requested
that the court “revisit [the] motion that suppressed the .380 that was found at [Glover’s]
home.” In response, the court replied that the request was “unusual” because it had
12 previously ruled the .380-caliber handgun inadmissible and the ruling “encompassed
ammunition that was located in the same closet.” Glover contends that by mentioning the
ammunition, the district court advocated or “tipped” off the prosecutor and that the tip led
to the admission of damaging evidence. Glover urges that, because the murder weapon
was never found and the evidence showed that Renteria-Hobbs was shot with 9-millimeter
bullets, the 9-millimeter ammunition found in Glover’s closet and the gunshot residue
found in his vehicle were significant firearm-related evidence that linked Glover to the
murder. Glover thus asserts that the district court judge improperly inserted himself into
the argument over whether that evidence should be admitted.
We disagree. It was reasonable for the district court judge to ask counsel about the
ammunition. Glover’s attorney requested that the court revisit the motion that excluded
the .380-caliber handgun; the ammunition was excluded under the same motion and for
similar reasons. The court did not act as an advocate for the State and did not
inappropriately highlight or emphasize previously unknown or incriminating ammunition
evidence for the State. The State was previously aware of the ammunition; it had, in fact,
initially moved to admit that evidence. Glover opposed the State’s original motion and
succeeded in having both the firearm and the ammunition suppressed. Only because his
new trial counsel pursued a new strategy and requested that the firearm be admitted did the
district court revisit its ruling and reasonably readdress all related evidence on which it had
previously ruled. The court sought clarification on a disputed issue, concerning facts
already in the record, with both parties present to aid in its decision-making.
13 Further, the record shows that Glover himself sought to admit the .380-caliber
handgun and the 9-millimeter ammunition:
DISTRICT COURT: I just wanted to be clear if the limits were just the firearm. But it sounds like it’s the ammunition as well that you’re intending to question on; is that right?
Accordingly, Glover did not show that the district court’s reference to the ammunition
demonstrated that the court was partial, nor that an objective, unbiased layperson, with full
knowledge of the facts and circumstances, might question the court’s impartiality.
C.
Glover also claims that the judge was partial because he conducted improper
independent investigations when he (1) considered whether Glover had to consent to the
trial strategy of admitting the .380-caliber handgun and the 9-millimeter ammunition on
the record, and (2) inquired into a potential jury sequestration motion. Again, we disagree.
As to the question of the necessity of Glover’s consent to trial strategy, Glover refers
to the district court judge’s statement that he “did some research” into whether Glover
needed to consent to his attorney’s trial strategy before the .380-caliber handgun was
admitted. Notably, the prosecutor—not the district court judge—raised the issue, pointing
out Glover’s charge for illegal possession of a firearm. The record shows that the court’s
research was legal rather than factual. After stating that he had conducted the research, the
judge described the results and relevant case law.
Glover’s second claim of improper investigation arises from a discussion between
the district court and the parties about the potential for jury sequestration. The State had
14 previously suggested that sequestration might be a possibility. During that discussion, the
district court noted that jury sequestration was within a judge’s discretion, under Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, and that because he had not observed much media
coverage over the course of the trial, he intended to conduct “independent research” before
having a full argument on the issue.
In context, the district court was referring to legal research. The judge observed that
there had been a relative lack of media coverage about the case and stated his intent to
conduct legal research on the amount of media coverage justifying sequestration under
Rule 26.03. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 5(2) (providing that “[s]equestration must
be ordered if the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of such a nature that, in the
absence of sequestration, highly prejudicial matters are likely to come to the jurors’
attention”). As it turned out, neither party requested that the jury be sequestered.
We have never held that a district court’s legal research on issues the parties present
creates a specter of impartiality. Indeed, judges must make sure they understand the law
before deciding issues the parties raise—which may require legal research. Conducting
legal research on issues and arguments the parties raise before making decisions does not
render a judge partial. The district court judge’s legal research on issues the State and
Glover raised at trial does not establish that the district court was actually biased, nor that
an objective, unbiased layperson, with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances, might
question the court’s impartiality in this case.
15 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.