Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK

960 A.2d 281, 2008 D.C. App. LEXIS 435, 2008 WL 4809269

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedNovember 6, 2008

Docket08-CV-1087

StatusPublished

This text of 960 A.2d 281 (Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK, 960 A.2d 281, 2008 D.C. App. LEXIS 435, 2008 WL 4809269 (D.C. 2008).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

On September 15, 2008, counsel for Chevy Chase Buick wrote a letter to the Clerk of this Court in which he noted that, while the dispositive issues below had been resolved, a motion for attorney’s fees filed by Hyundai Motor Finance Co. remained pending in the trial court. Construing the letter as a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, we deny it. A judgment is final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of a post-trial motion for attorney’s fees. See Pallie v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 697 A.2d 1289, 1242 n. 1 (D.C.1997); Dyer v. William S. Bergman & Assocs., Inc., 635 A.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C. 1993) (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Marlyn Condo., Inc. v. McDowell, 576 A.2d 1346, 1347 n. 1 (D.C.1990); see also Valentine v. Elliott (In re Estate of Delaney), 819 A.2d 968, 1001 (D.C.2003) (“[W]hen a requested amendment raises issues that are, for all practical purposes, collateral to and separate from the decision on the merits, the order disposing of the merits remains ap-pealable.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

So ordered.

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PER CURIAM:

On September 15, 2008, counsel for Chevy Chase Buick wrote a letter to the Clerk of this Court in which he noted that, while the dispositive issues below had been resolved, a motion for attorney’s fees filed by Hyundai Motor Finance Co. remained pending in the trial court. Construing the letter as a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, we deny it. A judgment is final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of a post-trial motion for attorney’s fees. See Pallie v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 697 A.2d 1289, 1242 n. 1 (D.C.1997); Dyer v. William S. Bergman & Assocs., Inc., 635 A.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C. 1993) (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Marlyn Condo., Inc. v. McDowell, 576 A.2d 1346, 1347 n. 1 (D.C.1990); see also Valentine v. Elliott (In re Estate of Delaney), 819 A.2d 968, 1001 (D.C.2003) (“[W]hen a requested amendment raises issues that are, for all practical purposes, collateral to and separate from the decision on the merits, the order disposing of the merits remains ap-pealable.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

So ordered.

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960 A.2d 281, 2008 D.C. App. LEXIS 435, 2008 WL 4809269, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrew-v-chevy-chase-buick-dc-2008.

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