Andrew v. Andrew

182 A. 706, 121 Pa. Super. 152, 1936 Pa. Super. LEXIS 179
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 11, 1935
DocketAppeal, 11
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 182 A. 706 (Andrew v. Andrew) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andrew v. Andrew, 182 A. 706, 121 Pa. Super. 152, 1936 Pa. Super. LEXIS 179 (Pa. Ct. App. 1935).

Opinion

Opinion by

Parker, J.,

In this action of divorce the husband charged his wife with cruel and barbarous treatment and indignities to the person such as to render his condition intolerable and life burdensome. The master appointed to take the testimony of witnesses recommended that a decree be refused the libellant. Exceptions to the master’s report were sustained and the court below granted a divorce on the ground of indignities to the person.

After a review of the evidence by this court, as is required in a case of this character, we are of opinion that libellant is entitled to a decree. The master and court below were in agreement that the conduct of the respondent toward the libellant constituted indignities as that term is used in our divorce laws, but the master was of the opinion that the conduct of the respondent of which her husband complains was provoked by the *154 husband and that he was not an “injured and innocent spouse.” This presents the real issue in the case.

We will not enter into the details of the evidence gleaned from an examination of the voluminous record and tending to show the indignities visited upon the libellant by the respondent except insofar as the facts have a bearing on the question of provocation. Suffice it to say that the conduct on the part of the respondent manifested a settled hatred of and estrangement from the libellant consisting of nagging, the use of abusive language, calling him vile names, continuous charges concerning his running around with other women made to third persons as well as himself and wholly unsupported by proofs, charges that he had been intimate with young girls, frequent attempts to humiliate and embarrass him in his business finally resulting in violent outbursts reiterating such charges in the presence of his employees — sufficient to warrant a decree in his favor if his conduct did not amount to such provocation as would defeat such right. (Mullen v. Mullen, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 300, 175 A. 710.)

The parties were married in 1917, the wife being four years the senior of her husband, and had two children, aged twelve and fourteen years at the time of the hearing. For a short time after their marriage the parties lived together without serious disruption of their marital relations. The husband engaged with his brother in operating an automobile garage and repair shop and appears to have had a struggle to make ends meet. During this time the wife secured employment and contributed materially to the financial support of the family in addition to performing her duties as a housewife and mother. While the husband was engaged in the automobile business the wife became suspicious of his conduct toward a girl employed in the garage part time as a bookkeeper and, although there was no evidence of any improper conduct upon the part of the *155 libellant, he found it necessary in the interest of domestic harmony to discharge that employee. The husband, seeking a more profitable employment became interested in the insurance business and engaged as an investigator, adjuster of- losses, and salesman. During this time, the wife’s suspicious disposition developed into unreasoning jealousy and she indicated a settled hatred and estrangement from the libellant by constant quarreling, nagging, and the use of abusive language in the presence of third parties wherein she accused him of immorality, charged him with failing to support the family, and called him such names as “whore-master”. The libellant, in connection with his insurance business, found it necessary to employ several girls in his office. The wife, in addition to charging her husband in the presence of strangers and of their children with running around with other women and with immoral conduct, made frequent trips to his office where these charges were publicly made. Her outbursts of jealousy and rage reached their climax on some of these visits. On one occasion, on coming into the office she said to the girl employees that events occurred by threes; that two girls who had worked in her husband’s office had become pregnant; that in one case the girl had died; that in the other case the baby had died, and suggested that this experience be remembered as a warning. On another occasion, she burst into his private office where he was engaged in conversation with another man and, after some violent displays of temper and the use of objectionable language, broke the glass in the door of his office. On another occasion she called one of the girls in the office a liar when the employee informed her that her husband was not in. At another time, after a display of temper, she attempted to jump out of a window from a high story of the office building. There was considerable corroboration of the libellant’s testimony not only by the employees in his office but *156 to some extent by others. While the respondent categorically denied most of these charges, she made a number of admissions which indicated quite clearly the fact that she had exceeded all reasonable bounds in the manner in which she had acted on these visits to her husband’s place of business.

Counsel for the respondent, in support of his position that the respondent’s conduct was provoked by the husband, depended for proof almost exclusively upon an event which occurred in 1931. A young woman who was expert in taking down statements of witnesses and securing their signatures thereto was engaged by libellant to assist him in the taking of such evidence. In January, 1931, the libellant was directed by his home office to secure the written statements of certain witnesses who resided in Trenton, New Jersey. In company with this young woman, he went to Trenton in Ms automobile in the late afternoon and during the early evening procured several statements which were produced in evidence and authenticated by the personal presence and testimony of at least one of the witnesses on the hearing of this cause. On their return and while on the Roosevelt Boulevard they were held up by bandits and the girl was shot through her right arm and the libellant was wounded in one of his hands. They immediately reported the crime to one of the park guards and were taken to a hospital. The city policemen in the meantime investigated the affair and conceived the idea that either the libellant or his companion had done the shooting. They developed this theory from the fact that the libellant had in his car a revolver which had been discharged. The libellant claimed that the revolver was discharged at the bandits. However, it subsequently appeared by unquestionable proof that they had been held up, for the bandits were apprehended, confessed, and were convicted. The city policemen detained the libellant in custody until the *157 following afternoon and placed the young lady under restraint. He was not released until the following afternoon when he states that he immediately told all of the facts in connection with this affair to his wife in the presence of witnesses, while she maintains that she first learned'of it through a lurid description in a local paper. The wife, in company with a witness, immediately went to the hospital and. interviewed the young lady. The wife and her companion state that in the course of this interview the young lady stated that she loved respondent’s husband. This, however, was very positively denied by the employee.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
182 A. 706, 121 Pa. Super. 152, 1936 Pa. Super. LEXIS 179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrew-v-andrew-pasuperct-1935.