Andrew Stewart v. Department of Justice

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 27, 2024
DocketDA-3330-21-0059-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Andrew Stewart v. Department of Justice (Andrew Stewart v. Department of Justice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andrew Stewart v. Department of Justice, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANDREW J. STEWART, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-3330-21-0059-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DATE: August 27, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jack Whitehead, Jr. , Esquire, John-Ed L. Bishop , Esquire, and Joshua L. Davis , Esquire, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for the appellant.

Kenneth Bork , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED as to the reason why the appellant is not entitled to corrective action on his claim of denial of a right to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1), we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND The appellant, a preference-eligible veteran, is a GS-11 Engineering Technician at the agency’s Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, 9, Tab 5 at 14-15, Tab 6 at 4, Tab 9 at 49. In July 2020, the agency posted a vacancy announcement for a GS-12 Correctional Program Specialist (Emergency Preparedness Officer) position. IAF, Tab 9 at 9. It is undisputed that the vacancy announcement was open to current BOP employees and certain applicants outside of its own workforce, i.e., military spouses, and that the agency filled it using merit promotion procedures. IAF, Tab 5 at 4-5, 16, Tab 9 at 4-5 & n.6, Tab 13 at 6. The appellant applied for the position, but he received a notification stating that the agency determined he did not meet the qualifications for the position. IAF, Tab 1 at 9, 13, Tab 5 at 18-19. On October 1, 2020, he timely filed a VEOA complaint with the Department of Labor (DOL) regarding his nonselection. IAF, Tab 5 at 7-10. 3

After receiving a close-out letter from DOL dated October 28, 2020, the appellant filed the instant appeal arguing that the agency’s failure to forward his application to the selecting official violated his right to compete as a preference-eligible applicant under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). 2 IAF, Tab 1 at 1-2, 9, 13-14. The administrative judge issued an initial decision denying the appellant’s request for corrective action under VEOA, finding that he failed to establish by preponderant evidence that the agency denied him the opportunity to compete. IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 7-8. Specifically, the administrative judge found that the appeal was within the Board’s jurisdiction, the appellant was a preference-eligible veteran, and the agency’s action occurred after December 10, 2004. ID at 3. She further found that the agency provided the appellant the right to compete because it evaluated his application on the same basis as those of the other applicants. ID at 7. The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW To prevail on the merits of a VEOA appeal involving a veterans’ preference claim, 3 an appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that he is a preference eligible or veteran who was separated from the armed forces under honorable conditions after 3 years or more of active service; that the actions at issue took place on or after the October 31, 1998 enactment date of VEOA for preference eligibles or the December 10, 2004 enactment date of the Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 2004 for veterans covered by section 3304(f)(1); and that the 2 The appellant expressly elected not to pursue a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A) that the agency violated other statutory or regulatory rights he might have as a preference eligible. IAF, Tab 3 at 2-4, Tab 5, Tab 10 at 2 n.3. 3 The parties do not dispute, and we find no reason to disturb, the administrative judge’s finding that the Board has jurisdiction over this appeal. ID at 2-4. 4

agency denied him the opportunity to compete under merit promotion procedures for a vacant position for which the agency accepted applications from individuals outside its own workforce. See Oram v. Department of the Navy, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 6 (setting forth an appellant’s jurisdictional burden); see also Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.P.R. 209, ¶¶ 10, 19 (2010) (reflecting that an appellant’s burden to prove the merits of his VEOA claim is preponderant evidence). Here, the parties do not dispute, and we find no reason to disturb, the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant is preference eligible and the nonselection took place after VEOA’s enactment. ID at 3-4; IAF, Tab 1 at 9, Tab 5 at 8-9, Tab 6 at 4-5, Tab 9 at 9-13; see 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (defining “preference eligible” for purposes of Title 5). Therefore, the remaining issue is whether the agency’s action violated his right to compete. See Oram, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 6.

We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to any corrective action under VEOA, however, we modify the initial decision as to the legal basis for this determination. Under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1), preference eligibles and certain veterans “may not be denied the opportunity to compete for vacant positions for which the agency making the announcement will accept applications from individuals outside its own workforce under merit promotion procedures.” The administrative judge concluded that the agency did not violate the appellant’s right to compete under 5 U.S.C. §

Related

Kerner v. Department of the Interior
778 F.3d 1336 (Federal Circuit, 2015)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Cyril Oram v. Department of the Navy
2022 MSPB 30 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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Andrew Stewart v. Department of Justice, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrew-stewart-v-department-of-justice-mspb-2024.