Andrew Stephen Nunez v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

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No. 02-23-00300-CR

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ANDREW STEPHEN NUNEZ, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 396th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1456916

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Andrew Stephen Nunez pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child in exchange for 10 years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021; see also id. § 12.32 (stating first-degree felony punishment range of 5–99 years or life and up to a $10,000 fine). The State later sought to proceed to adjudication, and the trial court found “true” three of the State’s allegations that Nunez had violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision, adjudicated Nunez guilty, and sentenced him to 20 years’ confinement.

Nunez’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion in which he avers that, in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967), by professionally evaluating the appellate record and demonstrating why no arguable grounds for relief exist. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Counsel also complied with Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Although Nunez obtained a copy of the appellate record, he did not file a pro se response to the Anders brief. Likewise, the State did not file a response but agreed with counsel’s evaluation in a letter to this court.

After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills Anders’s requirements, we must

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independently examine the record for any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf. See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511. Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. We agree with counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the appellate record that otherwise arguably might support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Having found that the appeal is frivolous, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Mike Wallach

Mike Wallach

Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: January 9, 2025