Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2026-0736 ____________
ANDREW RICHARD LUKEHART, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
May 27, 2026
PER CURIAM.
Andrew Richard Lukehart was convicted and sentenced to
death for the 1996 murder of Gabrielle Hanshaw. On May 1, 2026,
Governor DeSantis issued a death warrant scheduling Lukehart’s
execution for June 2, 2026. Lukehart unsuccessfully sought
successive postconviction relief in the circuit court and now
appeals. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.;
see also State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla.
1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate jurisdiction over
sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”). We affirm. We
also deny Lukehart’s motion for a stay of execution.
I
On February 25, 1996, Lukehart killed five-month-old
Gabrielle Hanshaw in Jacksonville. At the time, Lukehart lived with
Gabrielle’s mother, Misty Rhue, who was his girlfriend. After
Lukehart took Gabrielle to a room to change her diaper, Rhue saw
Lukehart drive away from the house. Rhue searched the house but
could not find Gabrielle. Lukehart initially told Rhue and the police
that Gabrielle had been abducted, leading to an eighteen-hour
search by the Jacksonville and Clay County Sheriff’s Offices.
Lukehart eventually told the officers that he had killed Gabrielle
and directed them to a pond where they found her body. Lukehart
told the police that he had dropped Gabrielle on her head while
changing her diaper and then shook her. He said that, realizing
Gabrielle had died, he panicked, drove to a rural area, and threw
her into the pond, injuring her head on the car door in the process.
Gabrielle’s injuries were inconsistent with Lukehart’s story.
She had suffered five separate impacts to her head, two of which
caused skull fractures and could have each been fatal. Lukehart
-2- testified during the guilt phase of his trial that he had lied when he
told the police that he had dropped Gabrielle on her head. He
testified that Gabrielle would not lie flat on the floor as he tried to
change her diaper. So, he repeatedly and forcefully pushed her
head and neck back onto the floor, killing her.
A jury convicted Lukehart of first-degree murder and
aggravated child abuse. Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 911
(Fla. 2000). At the penalty phase, the State established that
Lukehart had pleaded guilty to felony child abuse for injuring a
previous girlfriend’s baby and was on probation for that offense at
the time he murdered Gabrielle. Id. The jury recommended the
death sentence by a nine-to-three vote. Id. The trial court agreed
and sentenced Lukehart to death for the first-degree murder. Id.
In the trial court’s sentencing order, it found the State
established three statutory aggravators: (1) the murder was
committed during the commission of the felony of aggravated child
abuse; (2) the victim was under twelve years of age;1 and
1. We struck this aggravator on direct appeal as improperly doubling the same aspect of the crime as the aggravator about the murder having been committed by a person engaged in aggravated child abuse. But we found that its inclusion was harmless beyond
-3- (3) Lukehart had a prior felony conviction for child abuse and was
on felony probation for that offense (two factors merged). 2 Id. at
911. The trial court found two statutory mitigators: (1) Lukehart’s
age (twenty-two) and (2) his substantially impaired capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law. Id. The trial court also found four
nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Lukehart’s alcoholic and abusive father;
(2) Lukehart’s drug and alcohol abuse; (3) his having been sexually
abused and suicidal as a child; and (4) his employment. Id.
On direct appeal, we affirmed Lukehart’s convictions and
death sentence. 3 Id. at 927. We found that while the State did not
a reasonable doubt, as Gabrielle’s age increased the weight of the aggravated child abuse aggravator. Id. at 925.
2. We found that applying the probation aggravator to Lukehart violated his ex post facto rights. But we found this error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as (1) evidence of his probation was relevant to proving the prior violent felony aggravator and (2) the trial court merged the probation aggravator with the prior violent felony aggravator in its weighing decision. Id. at 924-25.
3. Lukehart raised the following claims on direct appeal: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to suppress certain statements from Lukehart; (2) the trial court erred by limiting cross- examination; (3) Lukehart’s convictions of first-degree murder and aggravated battery were invalid because of insufficient evidence of
-4- prove premeditated murder, the State had proven first-degree felony
murder, with aggravated child abuse as the underlying felony. Id.
at 921-22.4 On June 25, 2001, the United States Supreme Court
denied Lukehart’s petition for writ of certiorari. Lukehart v. Florida,
533 U.S. 934 (2001).
Lukehart unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief in state
court. See Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503 (Fla. 2011) (affirming
the denial of Lukehart’s initial motion for postconviction relief filed
premeditation and the lack of a felony independent of the homicide; (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on justifiable or excusable homicide; (5) the disproportionality of Lukehart’s death sentence; (6) the trial court erred in finding that the murder in the course of a felony aggravator had been established; (7) the trial court erred in applying the new aggravator of a crime committed while on felony probation; (8) the trial court erred in finding both murder in the course of a felony and that the victim was under twelve as aggravators (improperly doubling); (9) the victim-under- twelve aggravator and the standard jury instruction on the aggravator were unconstitutional; (10) the trial court erred in allowing a collateral crime (found to be a prior violent felony) to be a feature of the penalty phase; (11) the prosecutor’s closing argument comments during the penalty phase were fundamental error; and (12) the trial court erred regarding the sentence for the noncapital conviction and the restitution orders. Id. at 911 n.1.
4. We remanded for the trial court to resentence Lukehart for his aggravated child abuse conviction with instructions for the trial court to fill out a sentencing guidelines scoresheet, which it had failed to do. Id. at 927.
-5- under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus); 5 Lukehart v. State, 103 So. 3d
134 (Fla. 2012) (affirming the denial of Lukehart’s first successive
5. In his initial postconviction proceeding, Lukehart raised the following claims before us: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the prior violent felony aggravator during the penalty phase; (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to cease Lukehart’s medication and a motion for continuance; (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to present Dr. Harry Krop’s testimony during the guilt phase; (4) Lukehart’s amended postconviction motion should relate back to the filing of his shell motion; (5) counsel was ineffective for failing to include an additional argument in the motion to suppress; (6) counsel was ineffective for failing to properly argue and object to the jury instructions and the State’s allegedly improper arguments regarding instructions; (7) counsel was ineffective under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); (8) counsel was ineffective for failing to present live testimony rather than deposition testimony during the penalty phase; (9) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to allegedly improper prosecutorial comments; (10) the rule prohibiting juror interviews was unconstitutional; (11) Florida’s lethal injection protocol was unconstitutional; and (12) cumulative error. Id. at 511 n.5. For claim (4), we concluded that Lukehart’s motion was governed by rule 3.850 and his amended motion related back to the date of his original filing. Id. at 517. But we denied relief on all other claims and affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of rule 3.850 relief. Id. at 525.
Regarding Lukehart’s habeas petition, we denied relief on the following claims: (1) this Court should have revisited its prior proportionality review in light of a witness’s testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing; (2) Florida’s lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the inclusion of pancuronium bromide in Florida’s lethal injection protocol violates free speech. Id. at 512 n.6, 524-25.
-6- motion for postconviction relief filed under rule 3.851); 6 Lukehart v.
Jones, No. SC2016-1225, 2017 WL 1033691 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2017)
(denying Lukehart’s successive habeas petition seeking relief under
Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016) 7). 8 Lukehart was also one of
6. In Lukehart’s first successive postconviction proceeding, he raised the following claims: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) learn the effects of the medication Lukehart was taking, (b) inform the court and the jury that Lukehart was on medication and explain its effects, (c) move the court for the medications to cease, and (d) request a continuance; (2) Lukehart was incompetent at trial due to medication; and (3) Lukehart was involuntarily required to take medication. Id. at 135. We denied relief on all claims as procedurally barred. Id. at 136.
7. In Hurst, the United States Supreme Court held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, in which the jury’s role was to make a recommendation as to the death sentence, did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that a jury find each fact necessary to impose the death sentence. 577 U.S. at 94. For Lukehart, we held that pursuant to our decision in Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), Hurst did not retroactively apply to him. Lukehart v. Jones, 2017 WL 1033691, at *1.
8. Simultaneously with his successive habeas petition, Lukehart sought Hurst relief by filing a second successive rule 3.851 motion in circuit court and requested we hold his successive habeas petition in abeyance or relinquish jurisdiction. See Motion to Hold in Abeyance or Relinquish Jurisdiction to the Circuit Court for Consideration of Successive Rule 3.851 Motion, Lukehart v. Jones, SC2016-1225 (Jan. 10, 2017). We denied that motion. See Order Denying Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, Lukehart v. Jones, SC2016-1225 (Feb. 2, 2017). The circuit court denied Lukehart’s rule 3.851 motion, and Lukehart did not appeal.
-7- the death row petitioners in Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla.
2000), who sought a judgment that the Death Penalty Reform Act of
2000 was unconstitutional. We held that portions of the Act were
unconstitutional and proposed new Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure 3.851 and 3.852. Id. at 67.
Lukehart sought habeas relief in federal court, too. On April
28, 2020, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida denied Lukehart habeas relief but granted a certificate of
appealability on a Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
suppression claim. Lukehart v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No.
3:12-CV-585-J-32PDB, 2020 WL 2183150, at *59 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
28, 2020). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit expanded the certificate to include an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim and then ultimately affirmed the denial of federal
habeas relief. See Lukehart v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.4th 32,
41 (11th Cir. 2022).
Governor DeSantis signed Lukehart’s death warrant on May 1,
2026. On May 4, 2026, the Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial
Circuit held a status conference, where Lukehart was represented
by counsel. On May 5, 2026, Lukehart directed records demands to
-8- the District Eight Medical Examiner’s Office, the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), and the Department of
Corrections (DOC) under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.852(h) and (i). On May 6, 2026, all three state agencies objected,
and the circuit court denied Lukehart’s demands after a hearing
that same day.
On May 8, 2026, Lukehart filed a third successive
postconviction motion and a separate motion seeking to stay his
execution. He raised three claims: (1) Florida’s lethal injection
protocol, as applied to him, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution; (2) Florida’s lethal injection protocol is facially
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;
and (3) Lukehart’s thirty-two-day warrant period deprives him of a
full and fair postconviction proceeding in violation of his due
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Following a case management conference, the circuit court issued a
written order on May 12, 2026, summarily denying Lukehart relief
on each of his claims.
This appeal follows. Lukehart raises four claims before us:
-9- (1) the circuit court erred in denying his as-applied Eighth
Amendment method-of-execution challenge; (2) the circuit court
erred in denying his facial Eighth Amendment method-of-execution
challenge; (3) the circuit court erred in denying his warrant timeline
challenge; and (4) the circuit court abused its discretion in denying
his demands for additional public records. Lukehart asks that we
vacate his death sentence or stay his execution and remand his
case for an evidentiary hearing.
II
We have consistently said:
Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is appropriate if the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. We review the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny a successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief.
Jennings v. State, 422 So. 3d 107, 113 (Fla.) (quoting Zakrzewski v.
State, 415 So. 3d 203, 208 (Fla. 2025)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 402
(2025). Applying this standard, we affirm the circuit court’s
summary denial of Lukehart’s successive postconviction motion.
- 10 - A
Lukehart argues that Florida’s lethal injection protocol, as
applied to him, is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment because of his severe kidney disease. The circuit court
summarily denied this claim as untimely and meritless. We agree.
This claim is untimely. A capital defendant must file any
postconviction claim within one year after the conviction judgment
and sentence becomes final. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1).
Lukehart’s judgment and sentence became final nearly twenty-five
years ago when the United States Supreme Court denied his
petition for certiorari review in 2001. Lukehart, 533 U.S. 934. An
exception exists for newly discovered evidence: “[f]or an otherwise
untimely claim to be considered timely as newly
discovered evidence, it must be filed within a year of the date the
claim became discoverable through due diligence.” Mungin v. State,
320 So. 3d 624, 625-26 (Fla. 2020) (citing Reed v. State, 116 So. 3d
260, 264 (Fla. 2013)). But the facts on which Lukehart predicates
this claim were discoverable more than a year ago. Florida’s
“current three-drug protocol has remained essentially unchanged
since 2017.” Randolph v. State, 422 So. 3d 166, 172 (Fla.), cert.
- 11 - denied, 146 S. Ct. 819 (2025). And Lukehart admits that his
medical records show deteriorating kidney values starting in 2023.
Lukehart’s assertion that this claim only became discoverable when
his kidney disease grew more severe in January 2026 is without
merit. We repeatedly reject arguments that method-of-execution
claims are ripe during warrant litigation when the worsening
medical condition was discovered years earlier. See Cole v. State,
392 So. 3d 1054, 1064 (Fla.) (Parkinson’s disease since 2017), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 109 (2024); Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 392
(Fla.) (medical conditions since 2009), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914
(2025); Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257, 1266-67 (Fla.) (porphyria
diagnosis), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (2025); Randolph, 422 So.
3d at 172-73 (lupus diagnosis since 1990).
This claim is also meritless. The Eighth Amendment, made
applicable to Florida through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits
“cruel and unusual punishments.” Amend. VIII, U.S. Const. 9 To
9. The Florida Constitution also prohibits cruel and unusual punishments and directs that the prohibition “be construed in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.
- 12 - succeed on an as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge to his
method of execution, Lukehart must “(1) establish that the method
of execution presents a substantial and imminent risk that is sure
or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering and
(2) identify a known and available alternative method of execution
that entails a significantly less severe risk of pain.” Asay v. State,
224 So. 3d 695, 701 (Fla. 2017) (citing Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S.
863, 877 (2015)). Lukehart has done neither.
Lukehart claims that due to his kidney disease, Florida’s lethal
injection protocol’s use of etomidate “may” create the “potential” for
exaggerated negative consequences in his heart and lungs. 10 These
conclusory speculations do not present an imminent risk that
Florida’s lethal injection protocol is sure or very likely to cause
Lukehart needless suffering. This is especially true given the DOC
“is entitled to the presumption that it will comply with the lethal
injection protocol,” which includes “safeguards to ensure the
10. Lukehart also claims that his allergy to diphenhydramine, an antihistamine, could result in a severe allergic reaction during his execution. Not so. As Lukehart admits, that drug is not used in Florida’s lethal injection protocol, and, moreover, the antihistamine that DOC allegedly offers the condemned to reduce anxiety before their execution is entirely optional.
- 13 - condemned is unconscious throughout the execution.” Cole, 392
So. 3d at 1065 (first citing Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 203
(Fla. 2013); and then citing Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938, 945 (Fla.
2019)). It is also worth repeating that “the Eighth Amendment ‘does
not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out
executions.’ ” Tanzi, 407 So. 3d at 392-93 (quoting Bucklew v.
Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 134 (2019)). And Lukehart has not
sufficiently pled how his kidney disease would cause him to feel
pain over “the well-established fact that the administration of
etomidate will render him unconscious likely within one minute,”
Rogers, 409 So. 3d at 1268 (citing Asay, 224 So. 3d at 701), after
which “a consciousness check is required and ‘the execution cannot
proceed until [he] is rendered unconscious,’ ” King v. State, No.
SC2026-0336, 2026 WL 672101, at *5 n.9 (Fla. Mar. 10) (quoting
Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d 1223, 1233 (11th Cir. 2011)), cert. denied,
No. 25-7018, 2026 WL 730666 (U.S. Mar. 16, 2026). Moreover,
Florida’s lethal injection protocol does “take into consideration the
individual physical attributes of each inmate and provide for
individualized procedures in light of any health concerns.” Tanzi,
407 So. 3d at 393 (quoting Grossman v. State, 5 So. 3d 668 (Fla.
- 14 - 2009)).
Lukehart has also not “establish[ed] the existence of a known
and available alternative method of execution that would entail a
significantly less severe risk” than Florida’s lethal injection protocol.
Glossip, 576 U.S. at 878 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 57-60
(2008)). Before us, Lukehart has not offered any alternative
method. Instead, he argues that he should not have to provide one
because doing so is morally repugnant, against his religion, and
impossible to realistically offer.11 Yet “it is settled that capital
punishment is constitutional,” and “there must be a [constitutional]
means of carrying it out.” Glossip, 576 U.S. at 869 (alteration in
original) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 47). So, because Lukehart
chooses to raise a method-of-execution claim, he “must make the
11. Lukehart also argues that Glossip wrongly requires that he provide an alternative method because doing so would violate his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But we have rejected the claim that the test articulated in Glossip “incorrectly requires a prisoner scheduled for execution to prove the existence of an available alternative method of execution.” Correll v. State, 184 So. 3d 478, 489 (Fla. 2015). That is because we are “bound by the conformity clause of the Florida Constitution to construe the state prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment consistently with pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court.” Id. (citing Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 538-39 (Fla. 2011)).
- 15 - case that the State really can put him to death, though in a
different way than it plans.” Heath v. State, 426 So. 3d 1253, 1262
(Fla.) (quoting Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 169 (2022)), cert.
denied, No. 25-6746, 2026 WL 363902 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2026). He
fails to do so. 12 We affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim.
B
Lukehart next argues that Florida’s lethal injection protocol is
facially unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. The circuit court summarily denied this
claim as untimely and meritless for the same reasons as Lukehart’s
first claim. We agree.
As for timeliness, Lukehart has not justified his delay in
bringing this claim given that, as we have said, Florida’s lethal
injection protocol “has remained essentially unchanged since 2017.”
12. In the circuit court below, Lukehart pointed to other states that begin their lethal injections with analgesics and still others that use electrocution or lethal gas. But he failed to say how any of these methods are “feasible, readily implemented, and [would] in fact significantly reduce[] a substantial risk of severe pain” compared to Florida’s lethal injection protocol. Tanzi, 407 So. 3d at 393 (second alteration in original) (quoting Glossip, 576 U.S. at 877). And he does not argue for any alternative method on appeal.
- 16 - Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 172. As for the argument’s merits, “[o]nce
we have upheld the constitutionality of a lethal injection protocol,
that protocol is facially constitutional as a matter of law.” Banks v.
State, 150 So. 3d 797, 801 (Fla. 2014). In Asay, 224 So. 3d at 702,
we approved Florida’s current three-drug protocol against an Eighth
Amendment challenge. We have repeatedly rejected invitations to
hold otherwise and do so again here. See Jimenez v. State, 265 So.
3d 462, 474-75 (Fla. 2018); Long, 271 So. 3d at 945-46; Cole, 392
So. 3d at 1064-65; Tanzi, 407 So. 3d at 392-93; Rogers, 409 So. 3d
at 1268-69; Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 173; Heath, 426 So. 3d at
1262-63. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim.
C
Lukehart also argues that his thirty-two-day warrant period
deprives him of his due process rights under the United States and
Florida Constitutions. The circuit court summarily denied this
claim as meritless. We agree.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” Amend. XIV, U.S. Const.
Florida’s Constitution similarly ensures that “[n]o person shall be
- 17 - deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”
Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. We have consistently said “[d]ue process
requires that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be
heard on a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1,
5 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 982 (Fla. 1993)).
Lukehart has not identified any matter in his warrant litigation
about which he was denied notice or an opportunity to be heard
before it was decided. Lukehart argues that his expedited warrant
litigation schedule nevertheless deprives him of a meaningful
opportunity to challenge his execution. We have repeatedly rejected
similar claims and have held that “an expedited warrant litigation
schedule does not deprive a defendant of his right to due process.”
Windom v. State, 416 So. 3d 1140, 1150 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S.
Ct. 66 (2025); see also Knight v. State, No. SC2026-0718, 2026 WL
1361316, at *7-8 (Fla. May 15), cert. denied, No. 25-7415, 2026 WL
1425695 (U.S. May 21, 2026); Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 173;
Jennings, 422 So. 3d at 119; Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619, 625-26
(Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025); Bates v. State, 416 So. 3d
312, 321 (Fla.) (“A thirty-day warrant period does not, in and of
itself, deprive a capital defendant of the rights [to due process and
- 18 - counsel].”), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 66 (2025); Zakrzewski, 415 So.
3d at 210-11; Bell v. State, 415 So. 3d 85, 106-07 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 2872 (2025); Hutchinson v. State, 416 So. 3d
273, 279-80 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1980 (2025); Tanzi, 407
So. 3d at 390-91; Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 789-91 (Fla.
2023). 13
Lukehart has challenged his death sentence numerous times
over nearly twenty-five years. See supra pp. 5-8 (outlining
Lukehart’s postconviction litigation). His current thirty-two-day
warrant litigation schedule does not deprive him of due process.
We affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim.
D
Lukehart argues that the circuit court wrongly denied his
various demands for additional public records under rule 3.852.
We review such claims for abuse of discretion. Dailey v. State, 283
So. 3d 782, 792 (Fla. 2019). We find none.
13. To the extent that Lukehart argues that his warrant schedule deprives him of effective counsel, such a claim is not cognizable because “[u]nder Florida and federal law, a defendant has no constitutional right to effective collateral counsel.” Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1203 (Fla. 2005).
- 19 - Lukehart made demands under rule 3.852(h) and (i), which
permits “counsel for a defendant subject to a death warrant to
request the production of certain public records.” Cole, 392 So. 3d
at 1065-66 (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(h)(3)). This “discovery tool
is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition
for records unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.”
Id. at 1066 (quoting Asay, 224 So. 3d at 700). Accordingly,
records requests under Rule 3.852(h) are limited to persons and agencies who were the recipients of a public records request at the time the defendant began his or her postconviction odyssey, whereas, records requests under Rule 3.852(i) must show how the requested records relate to a colorable claim for postconviction relief and good cause as to why the public records request was not made until after the death warrant was signed.
Id. (citation modified) (quoting Dailey, 283 So. 3d at 792).
Lukehart demanded records related to recent and scheduled
administrations of Florida’s lethal injection protocol from the
District Eight Medical Examiner’s Office, FDLE, and DOC. The
circuit court denied these demands as either not related to a
colorable claim or as overly broad and burdensome. These denials
were far from being the type of “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable”
decision that is an abuse of discretion. State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d
- 20 - 120, 137 (Fla. 2003) (quoting White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799, 806
(Fla. 2002)). Indeed, we have said that “requests related to actions
of lethal injection personnel in past executions do not relate to a
colorable claim concerning future executions because there is a
presumption that members of the executive branch will perform
their duties properly.” Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 203 (citing Valle,
70 So. 3d at 549). Moreover, “because we have upheld the
constitutionality of the current lethal injection protocol, such
records ‘are unlikely to lead to a colorable claim for relief.’ ” Dailey,
283 So. 3d at 792 (citation modified) (quoting Hannon v. State, 228
So. 3d 505, 512 (Fla. 2017)).
It bears repeating that in Lukehart’s method-of-execution
claim described above, he makes no attempt to allege an alternative
to Florida’s lethal injection protocol—making the claim legally
insufficient. So, this method-of-execution claim that he argues is
related to his records demands cannot proceed. Lukehart
acknowledges our precedent against his position but argues that
redacted records obtained in a federal lawsuit by Frank Walls, who
was recently executed, justify his additional records requests here.
- 21 - We have rejected this argument. See Heath, 426 So. 3d at 1263-64;
King, 2026 WL 672101, at *5-6.
To the extent that Lukehart contends that rule 3.852 violates
his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, we have “previously rejected efforts to morph a
challenge to the denial of a public records demand into a
constitutional challenge.” King, 2026 WL 672101, at *6 (citing
Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 172). The limitations imposed by rule
3.852 are “reasonable in the context of capital postconviction
claims.” Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 111 (Fla. 2011).
III
We affirm the summary denial of Lukehart’s motion for
postconviction relief, along with the circuit court’s denial of his
demands for additional public records. Accordingly, we also deny
his motion for a stay of execution.
No oral argument is required, no motion for rehearing will be
entertained, and the mandate shall issue immediately.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, SASSO, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
- 22 - An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, Mark Jeffrey Borello, Judge Case No. 161996CF002645AXXXMA
Dawn B. Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Adrienne Joy Shepherd, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Alicia Hampton, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Jason W. Rodriguez, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
- 23 -