FILED
Aug 26 2026, 10:00 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Andrew Rashawn Crossley,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
August 26, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-644
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court The Honorable Christopher C. Fronk, Judge Trial Court Cause No.
71D01-2508-F3-28
Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges Bailey and Brown concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-644 | August 26, 2026 Page 1 of 13
Weissmann, Judge.
[1] A jury found Andrew Crossley guilty of two counts of rape and one count of child exploitation after he sexually assaulted and photographed a 16-year-old girl in a dressing room at a South Bend community center. The trial court entered judgment on one rape count and the child exploitation count and sentenced Crossley to maximum, consecutive sentences totaling 22 years imprisonment.
[2] Crossley contends the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character due to his mental illness, traumatic childhood, homelessness, and history of employment. But Crossley’s offenses were serious and had a particularly devastating impact on the child victim. His character, marked by prior sexual offenses, also reflects poorly on him. As his claim of an inappropriate sentence is unpersuasive, we affirm.
Facts [3] In February 2025, 16-year-old G.M. and her friend went to the Kroc Center in
South Bend to swim. Crossley, then 29, was not a member there nor did he have a pass to enter. He gained entry by telling the Kroc Center front desk he needed to use a restroom. He then lingered inside the center for the next two hours. Eventually, Crossley approached G.M. and her friend, gave them a false name, and offered them $1,000 and a Mercedes to go to the mall and engage in sexual acts. The girls declined, after which G.M. headed to a dressing room to change into her swimsuit. Crossley followed and repeatedly knocked on the dressing room door, but G.M. ignored him.
[4] When the girls headed to the pool, Crossley followed and offered them thousands of dollars from his bank account if they accompanied him to the mall. G.M.’s friend called her mother for permission to go to the mall. The friend’s mother said no.
[5] G.M. eventually reentered the dressing room to change out of her swimsuit. Crossley then knocked on the door until G.M. opened it, telling her that he wanted to discuss the trip to the mall. When she opened the door, Crossley forced his way into the dressing room and pushed her against the wall. He kissed and touched G.M. despite her objection. G.M. believed Crossley had a gun because he repeatedly moved his hand in and out of his pocket. She also feared what he would do if she refused him.
[6] Crossley exposed himself, masturbated, pulled down G.M.’s swimsuit top, and photographed her exposed breasts. He also offered her “ice,” which police identified as a slang term for methamphetamine. Tr. Vol. I, p. 55. Crossley then turned G.M. toward the wall, covered her mouth, and penetrated her either vaginally or anally as she told him to stop. G.M. testified that she had not had intercourse before and described experiencing “the worst pain imaginable.” Id. at 58.
[7] Crossley stopped the assault only after G.M.’s friend knocked on the door. He hid in the shower and told G.M. to be quiet, claiming that her friend already knew what he had done. Too embarrassed to immediately report the sexual attack, G.M. accompanied her friend back to the pool but eventually pulled her aside in a private bathroom and revealed part of what happened. G.M. also gave a partial report of Crossley’s actions to a Kroc Center employee. Crossley was escorted out of the building by a staff member, to whom he provided a false name.
[8] The mother of G.M.’s friend picked the girls up early because she was concerned about the mall offer. G.M. told her friend’s mother that Crossley kissed her, photographed her “private parts,” and “touched her private parts.” Id. at 84. The friend’s mother relayed this information to the Kroc Center and to G.M.’s mother.
[9] Five days later, G.M. revealed to her mother that she had been raped but that she had concealed that information out of fear of getting in trouble. G.M.’s mother immediately took G.M. to the hospital. Due to the lapse of time since the attack, the hospital’s examination of G.M. yielded no identifiable male DNA.
[10] A forensic examination of Crossley’s phone revealed about 2,400 pornographic files, including a photograph of a naked G.M. that investigators found in the trash folder. The State charged Crossley with two counts of Level 3 felony rape and one count of Level 5 felony child exploitation. At his jury trial, the prosecutor observed Crossley laughing and making faces as G.M. testified.
[11] G.M.’s mother testified that her daughter’s schoolwork and demeanor declined sharply after the offense. G.M. attempted suicide at least three times, requiring hospitalization each time. She had no history of suicidal ideation before the assault. The jury found Crossley guilty as charged, but due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court only entered judgment of conviction on the child exploitation count and one of the two rape counts.
[12] At Crossley’s sentencing, the evidence showed he had a prior felony conviction for both sexual battery and sexual misconduct with a minor in 2020. He also had been convicted twice in 2025 for failing to register as a sex or violent offender. His Static-99R score placed him in the “Well Above Average Risk” category for committing another sexual offense, and the Indiana Risk Assessment System rated his overall risk to reoffend as “HIGH.” App. Vol. II, pp. 59-60.
[13] The court imposed the maximum sentences for rape and child exploitation and then ordered the two sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 22 years imprisonment. Crossley appeals, claiming his sentence is inappropriate.
Discussion and Decision [14] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits this Court to revise a sentence authorized
by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,” we find it “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The nature of the offense and the character of the offender are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Because Rule 7(B) review requires a holistic approach, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.
[15] When conducting sentencing review, we do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s; the role of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers,” not to achieve a perceived correct result. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We focus on the aggregate sentence in light of the defendant’s culpability, the severity of the offense, and the harm caused. Id. Crossley bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate.1 Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
I. Nature of the Offenses [16] In assessing the appropriateness of a sentence in light of the nature of the
offense, we first look to the statutory sentencing range established for that class
1 Crossley’s brief often veers into discussion of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. That is a claim of sentencing error reviewed for abuse of discretion, and it is separate from the appropriateness question before us. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. A trial court’s stated reasons for a sentence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion; the “relative weight or value assignable to” those reasons “is not subject to review for abuse”; and the merits of the sentence are reviewed only under Rule 7(B). Id. Crossley develops no independent argument that the trial court abused its discretion in identifying reasons for his 22-year sentence, so we need not address that issue. Id. at 491.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-644 | August 26, 2026 Page 6 of 13 of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. The legislature set the penalty for rape as a Level 3 felony, punishable by a term of 3 to 16 years imprisonment, with an advisory sentence of 9 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). Child exploitation is a Level 5 felony punishable by a term of 1 to 6 years, with an advisory sentence of 3 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Crossley received the maximum on each count.
[17] Crossley concedes that his crimes were “grave.” Appellant’s Br., p. 9. He argues that his mental illness left him “impulsive and abnormal.” Id. at 12. But the record shows that Crossley’s offenses were not impulsive and were consistent with the poor character he had previously revealed.
[18] Crossley talked his way into the community center under false pretenses, waited two hours before singling out two teenaged girls, and offered them money and a car in an attempt to draw them aside. When both girls refused the proposition, he did not relent. He waited until the girls separated to make his move. He followed G.M. to a locked dressing room and gained entry by persistently knocking and lying about his motivation for entering. He also engaged in repetitive actions that left her reasonably believing he was armed. The tactics used in these offenses were similar to those used in his previous sex crimes, which involved a 15-year-old girl.
[19] Crossley committed two separate acts against G.M.: photographing the child’s exposed body and then raping her while covering her mouth to silence her.
When it was over, and G.M. had partially reported Crossley to community center staff, Crossley gave the employee a false name and deleted the photograph from his phone. Planning, tactical choice of a vulnerable victim, persistence in the face of refusal, isolation of the victim, and concealment are the marks of calculated conduct, not the spontaneous loss of control that Crossley suggests.
[20] Moreover, the offenses caused profound and lasting harm. As a result of the assault, G.M. was hospitalized for suicidal ideation and attempted to take her own life at least three times. Because the evidence of the nature of the offenses weighs against relief, his showing on the character prong must be correspondingly stronger. Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127.
II. Character of the Offender [21] Crossley argues that mental illness, a traumatic childhood, homelessness, and a
history of employment establish a character that does not warrant the maximum sentence. First, we note that the only evidence of Crossley’s mental illness and traumatic childhood is his own account to the probation officer preparing the presentence investigation report. That statement conflicted with Crossley’s statements in an earlier presentence investigation report in which he revealed good mental health and denied childhood mistreatment or abuse. The trial court considered all the proffered mitigating circumstances but did not explicitly find Crossley’s alleged mental illness, employment, or homelessness to be mitigating. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 69-71; App. Vol. II, p. 73. As to Crossley’s suggestion of a troubled childhood, the court gave it little weight as a mitigator.
[22] The court found Crossley’s character to be that of a “predator” based on the underlying facts in this prosecution which closely resembled those in his prior sex crimes. Tr. Vol. II, p. 70. A defendant’s criminal history is a central measure of character, and its significance turns on “‘the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.’” Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on a defendant’s character. Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[23] Crossley’s criminal history is neither minor nor unrelated. He was convicted in 2020 of sexual battery and sexual misconduct with a 15-year-old girl, and in 2025 he was twice convicted of failing to register as a sex or violent offender. The record’s risk assessments confirm the concern that he will reoffend, placing him in the “Well Above Average Risk” category to commit another sexual offense and rating his overall risk to reoffend as “HIGH.” App. Vol. II, pp. 59-60. This is the character of an offender for whom a maximum sentence is not inappropriate.
III. Maximum Sentences [24] Finally, Crossley contends that maximum sentences are reserved for the “worst
of the worst,” and that a single mitigating circumstance is enough to spare him one. Appellant’s Br., p. 11 (“[E]ven very bad crimes and criminals are not the worst of the worst if some mitigating factors can be found.”). In coming to this conclusion, he relies on a string of old Indiana cases from the 1990s and early 2000s that applied sentencing law that no longer exists. Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002); Bacher v. State, 686 N.E.2d 791, 802 (Ind. 1997); Spears v. State, 811 N.E.2d 485, 491-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
[25] These cases were decided under a regime long since dismantled. At the time they were handed down, Indiana used a presumptive-sentencing scheme. A trial court could deviate from the fixed presumptive term only by identifying the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and articulating its evaluation and balancing of them. See, e.g., Neale v. State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 636 (Ind. 2005). Appellate courts reviewed the result for whether the sentence was “manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender” under former Indiana Appellate Rule 17(B). See, e.g., Bacher, 686 N.E.2d at 801. The conclusion that a maximum sentence must rest on a proper balancing of aggravators against mitigators is a product of that old framework.
[26] Effective January 1, 2003, Appellate Rule 7(B) replaced the “manifestly unreasonable” analysis with the present “inappropriate” standard. Neale, 826 N.E.2d at 636. Then in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-05 (2004), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from enhancing criminal sentences based on facts other than those decided by the jury or admitted by the defendant.
[27] Soon thereafter, in Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ind. 2005), our Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Indiana’s fixed term sentencing framework because it was the functional equivalent of the sentencing scheme set aside in Blakely. As the Smylie Court explained:
Both [schemes] establish[ed] a mandatory starting point for sentencing criminals based on the elements of proof necessary to prove a particular offense and the sentencing class into which the offense falls. The trial court judge then [had to] engage in judicial fact-finding during sentencing if a sentence greater than the presumptive fixed term [was] to be imposed. It is this type of judicial fact-finding that concerned the Court in Blakely.
Id. Ultimately, the Smylie Court concluded that the sentencing scheme then- applicable in Indiana violated the Sixth Amendment because it “mandate[d] both a fixed term and permit[ted] judicial discretion in finding aggravating or mitigating circumstances to deviate from the fixed term.” Id. at 685 (emphasis in original).
[28] Within weeks of Smylie, the Indiana General Assembly replaced the presumptive scheme with the current advisory system. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 487-88. It did so by amending Indiana’s sentencing statutes to eliminate fixed presumptive terms in favor of “advisory sentences” that are between the minimum and maximum terms left intact by the legislature. Id.; see Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-3 to -7 (2005). “In addition, the Legislature eliminated the requirement that trial courts must consider certain mandatory circumstances when determining the exact sentence to be imposed.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 488. “Rather, the amended statute now includes a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances trial courts ‘may consider.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)-(b) (2005)). This sentencing scheme remains in similar form today.
[29] Under our present system, a trial court may impose any sentence within the statutory range, and “[t]he relative weight or value assignable to” the reasons for a sentence “is not subject to review for abuse.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Crossley is inviting us to return to the old sentencing scheme by asking us to weigh the mitigating circumstances and lower his sentence because he is not the worst offender and his crimes are not the worst offenses. We reject that invitation.
Conclusion [30] Crossley has not demonstrated that his maximum 22-year sentence for rape and
child exploitation is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses or his character. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A. Robert Masters St. Joseph County Deputy Public Defender Nemeth, Feeney, Masters & Campiti, P.C. South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Caroline G. Templeton Assistant Section Chief Alfredo Navarro Certified Legal Intern Indianapolis, Indiana