Andrew Ramirez Martinez v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 10, 2008
• Docket: 14-06-00573-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 10, 2008

 Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 10, 2008.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

_______________

NO. 14-06-00573-CR

ANDREW RAMIREZ MARTINEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 180th District Court

 Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1006866

M E M O R A N D U M  O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant, Andrew Ramirez Martinez, guilty of murder.  The trial court assessed a sentence of thirty years= confinement.  In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. 

All dispositive issues are clearly settled in law.  Accordingly, we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

I. Background

Helen Bryers met complainant, Mario Prado, in July or August of 2004, when complainant helped her change a flat tire near an apartment complex on Westview Drive in Houston, Texas.  The two quickly became friends after complainant helped Bryers acquire crack cocaine a few days later.  Subsequently, they saw each other a few times a week, primarily to smoke crack cocaine.

On October 30, 2004, Bryers drove to the apartment complex to pick up complainant.  Bryers noted complainant seemed unusually scared and nervous that day.  The two drove to Bryers=s house where they ate dinner, watched movies, and drank beer.  Bryers testified that they did not use any cocaine that evening because, at the time, she could not afford it. 

At approximately 10:00 p.m., Bryers and complainant returned to the apartment complex.  As complainant stepped out of Bryers=s car, another vehicle approached and complainant argued with the vehicle=s driver.  Immediately after complainant and the driver concluded their argument and the driver left, two men, one on foot and another on a bicycle, approached complainant.  Complainant then argued with these men.  During this argument, the man on foot produced a handgun and ultimately fired a number of shots at complainant.  One bullet struck complainant in the back of the head, killing him. 

At trial, eyewitnesses Bryers and Jennifer Nicasio identified appellant as the gunman.  Investigating police officers and an assistant medical examiner also testified for the State.  The jury convicted appellant of murder, and this appeal followed.

II. Analysis

In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for murder.^[1]  

A.        Legal Sufficiency

In evaluating legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  We ensure only that the jury reached a rational decision and do not act as a second arbiter of the weight and credibility of testimony.  See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).  The jury  is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness=s testimony.  Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

A person is guilty of murder if he (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another or (2) commits an act clearly dangerous to human life with the intent to cause serious bodily injury that causes the death of an individual.  See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 19.02 (Vernon 2003).

Appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for murder because the State presented no physical evidence that he murdered the complainant.  Specifically, appellant notes that no weapon was recovered or presented at trial, no fingerprint evidence linked him to the murder despite the police recovering a number of fingerprints from the crime-scene, and no DNA evidence linked him to the murder despite the police recovering some fluid that appeared to be saliva or semen.  However, appellant ignores the well-established rule that the testimony of a single eyewitness may be sufficient to support a jury=s verdict.  Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).

In this case, two eyewitnesses identified appellant as complainant=s murderer.  Jennifer Nicasio testified that, although she did not witness the actual shooting, she heard gunshots and then observed appellant running away from the shooting, carrying a gun.  Additionally, Helen Bryers testified that she observed appellant, in the midst of an argument with complainant, produce a handgun and fire three to five shots, killing complainant.  The testimony of these witnesses is sufficient to prove that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of complainant or that he committed an act clearly dangerous to human life with the intent to cause serious bodily injury that caused the death of complainant.  Consequently, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant=s conviction for murder.

B.        Factual Sufficiency

In evaluating factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and will set aside the verdict only to prevent manifest injustice.  Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we engage in a two prong test to determine whether there is some objective basis to find: (1) the evidence in support of the jury=s verdict, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the jury=s verdict seems clearly wrong and unjust; and (2) in considering conflicting evidence, the jury=s verdict, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 417.  Although a factual-sufficiency review authorizes an appellate court to act in the capacity of a so-called Athirteenth juror,@ due deference must be accorded the fact finder=s determinations, particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence.  See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Appellant contends the evidence in support of the jury=s verdict is factually insufficient because there was no physical evidence connecting him to the murder and the State=s two eyewitnesses were not credible.  However, as stated above, the jury=s verdict may be sufficiently supported on the testimony of a single witness, even where the State introduces no corroborating physical evidence.  See Aguilar, 468 S.W.2d at 77.  Both eyewitnesses= testimony at trial connected appellant to complainant=s murder.  Nicasio heard gunshots and subsequently observed appellant running with a gun, and Bryers observed appellant argue with complainant, produce a gun, and shoot complainant.

Appellant further argues that a litany of facts should have caused the jury to disbelieve both witnesses= testimony.  With respect to Nicasio, appellant notes she had a long criminal history including convictions for prostitution, possession of crack cocaine, and the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.  Further, she testified at appellant=s trial while wearing a prison jumpsuit after she was arrested for criminal trespass.  Nicasio described complainant as her Apartner in crime@ and testified that they Aused to go stealing together.@  Additionally, she could only identify appellant by the nickname AFlaco,@ and on the night of the murder she hid and did not speak to the police until the following month when police approached her in the morning outside a sports bar after she had spent the prior night under the influence of crack cocaine.  With respect to Bryers, appellant notes she also had a long criminal history including convictions for prostitution, criminal trespass, possession of crack cocaine, and assault.  Additionally, during the police investigation of the murder, she gave police an alias in order to avoid arrest for outstanding traffic warrants.  Lastly, appellant notes that although Bryers originally told the police she would be unable to identify the gunman, she subsequently identified appellant in both photo and physical lineups.

Appellant also contends it is likely that Bryers was mentally impaired on the night of complainant=s murder.  He notes that during the time Bryers knew complainant, they smoked cocaine together approximately two to three times a week.  Further, the assistant medical examiner testified that a toxicology analysis indicated complainant used cocaine within an hour of his death.  Therefore, appellant alleges that Bryers likely used cocaine with complainant shortly before his death.  Additionally, appellant notes that Bryers drank three beers with complainant prior to his murder.

The jury was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we defer to its judgment unless the record clearly indicates that a different result is appropriate.  See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9.  The jury could have reasonably believed the eyewitnesses= testimony despite the challenges to their credibility.  Both Bryers and Nicasio testified that they were sober on the  night of complainant=s murder.  Additionally, Bryers testified that, at the time of trial, she had been sober for sixty days.  The jury could have relied on Nicasio=s identification of appellant despite her ignorance of his given name.  Nicasio identified appellant as the gunman; testifying that she saw AFlaco@ running away from the shooting with a gun, and that she knew appellant as AFlaco.@  Moreover, the jury was entitled to decide the weight, if any, to assign to Nicasio and Bryers=s past convictions, their history of drug abuse, and any inconsistencies in their testimony when evaluating their credibility.  After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude the evidence was so weak that the verdict is clearly unjust, nor can we conclude that any conflicting evidence is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s two issues.  The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/        Charles W. Seymore

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed Janurary 10, 2008.

Panel consists of Justices Fowler, Frost, and Seymore.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]  In his brief, appellant presents his factual-insufficiency claim as his first issue for review and his legal-insufficiency claim as his second issue.  However, because a finding that the evidence is legally insufficient would require us to reverse the trial court=s judgment and render a judgment of acquittal, we will review appellant=s legal-sufficiency claim first.