1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDREW JESSE HERNANDEZ, SR., Case No. 2:21-cv-1629-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 BRIAN KIBLER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brought this action under section 1983 alleging that defendants 19 Kibler, Gray, Miranda, and Spearman violated his Eighth Amendment rights by discontinuing his 20 access to four medical devices: a TENS device, a CPAP machine, a speaker pillow, and a 21 wheelchair bag. ECF No. 56 at 4. He also alleges that defendants discontinued his pain 22 medication (Robaxin) and denied him a neurological consult and various surgeries. Id. at 11, 13. 23 Defendants have moved for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 65, arguing that plaintiff failed 24 to administratively exhaust all claims against defendants Kibler and Spearman, and his claims 25 related to the denial of the CPAP machine, Robaxin, consultation, and surgeries. Plaintiff has 26 filed an opposition, ECF No. 68, and defendants have filed a reply, ECF No. 69. 27 28 1 Legal Standards 2 A. Summary Judgment 3 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 4 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 5 Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine 6 only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, 7 while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 8 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 9 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 10 Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, also known as partial summary 11 judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a claim or a portion of that claim. 12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 13 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 14 single claim . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a 15 motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. 16 Civ. P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 17 Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 18 in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or 19 (2) argument showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 20 genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 21 its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 22 other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. 23 Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 24 2001); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 25 “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 26 material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 27 moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 28 party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 1 essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 2 Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 3 initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 4 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 5 376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The non-moving party must “show more than 6 the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 7 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). However, the non-moving party is not required to establish a material 8 issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to 9 require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. 10 Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 11 The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 12 party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 13 appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 14 “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 15 determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 16 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 17 nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 18 Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 19 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 B. Administrative Exhaustion 21 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought 22 with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a 23 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 24 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This statutory exhaustion 25 requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life,” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 26 (2002), regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or the relief offered by the process, Booth v. 27 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Unexhausted claims require dismissal. See Jones v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDREW JESSE HERNANDEZ, SR., Case No. 2:21-cv-1629-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 BRIAN KIBLER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brought this action under section 1983 alleging that defendants 19 Kibler, Gray, Miranda, and Spearman violated his Eighth Amendment rights by discontinuing his 20 access to four medical devices: a TENS device, a CPAP machine, a speaker pillow, and a 21 wheelchair bag. ECF No. 56 at 4. He also alleges that defendants discontinued his pain 22 medication (Robaxin) and denied him a neurological consult and various surgeries. Id. at 11, 13. 23 Defendants have moved for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 65, arguing that plaintiff failed 24 to administratively exhaust all claims against defendants Kibler and Spearman, and his claims 25 related to the denial of the CPAP machine, Robaxin, consultation, and surgeries. Plaintiff has 26 filed an opposition, ECF No. 68, and defendants have filed a reply, ECF No. 69. 27 28 1 Legal Standards 2 A. Summary Judgment 3 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 4 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 5 Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine 6 only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, 7 while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 8 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 9 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 10 Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, also known as partial summary 11 judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a claim or a portion of that claim. 12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 13 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 14 single claim . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a 15 motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. 16 Civ. P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 17 Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 18 in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or 19 (2) argument showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 20 genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 21 its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 22 other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. 23 Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 24 2001); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 25 “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 26 material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 27 moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 28 party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 1 essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 2 Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 3 initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 4 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 5 376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The non-moving party must “show more than 6 the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 7 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). However, the non-moving party is not required to establish a material 8 issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to 9 require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. 10 Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 11 The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 12 party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 13 appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 14 “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 15 determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 16 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 17 nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 18 Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 19 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 B. Administrative Exhaustion 21 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought 22 with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a 23 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 24 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This statutory exhaustion 25 requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life,” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 26 (2002), regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or the relief offered by the process, Booth v. 27 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Unexhausted claims require dismissal. See Jones v. Bock, 28 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). 1 A prison’s own grievance process, not the PLRA, determines how detailed a grievance 2 must be to satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Id. at 218. When a prison’s grievance 3 procedures do not specify the requisite level of detail, “a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison 4 to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 5 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The grievance ‘need not include legal 6 terminology or legal theories,’ because ‘[t]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison 7 to a problem and facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.’” Reyes v. Smith, 8 810 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120). 9 The PLRA recognizes no exception to the exhaustion requirement, and the court may not 10 recognize a new exception, even in “special circumstances.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1862 11 (2016). The one significant qualifier is that “the remedies must indeed be ‘available’ to the 12 prisoner.” Id. at 1856. The Supreme Court has explained when an administrative procedure is 13 unavailable: 14 [A]n administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple 15 dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates . . . . Next, an administrative scheme might 16 be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use . . . . And finally, the same is true when prison administrators thwart 17 inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through 18 machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation . . . . [S]uch interference with an inmate’s pursuit of relief renders the administrative 19 process unavailable. And then, once again, § 1997e(a) poses no bar. 20 Id. at 1859-60 (citations omitted); see also Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 21 2017) (“When prison officials improperly fail to process a prisoner’s grievance, the prisoner is 22 deemed to have exhausted available administrative remedies.”). 23 If the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to exhaust available remedies, the proper 24 remedy is dismissal without prejudice of the portions of the complaint barred by § 1997e(a). See 25 Jones, 549 U.S. at 223-24; Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2005). 26 Background 27 Defendants contend that between the date of plaintiff’s arrival at High Desert State Prison 28 (“HDSP”), where the actions giving rise to this action allegedly occurred, and the filing of the 1 initial complaint, plaintiff filed twenty-two health care grievances, four of which relate to the 2 claims in this suit. ECF No. 65-1 at 3. 3 Grievance log number HDSP HC 20000283 requested the return of durable medical 4 equipment, but did not identify any named defendant or the specific medical equipment at issue. 5 ECF No. 65-3 at 21. 6 Grievance log number HDSP HC 20000326 challenged a reasonable accommodation 7 decision that was issued after HDSP HC 20000283. ECF No. 65-3 at 27. The grievance did not 8 mention defendants Kibler or Spearman, and the response thereto mentioned that a speaker 9 pillow, wheelchair bag, and TENS unit were discontinued because they were not medically 10 necessary. Id. at 30. The CPAP machine was listed in the response, but as one item of durable 11 medical equipment that plaintiff was still allowed to possess. Id. 12 Grievance log number HDSP HC 20001143 challenged the discontinuation of pain 13 medication, including Robaxin. Id. at 48. It also challenged the discontinuation of plaintiff’s 14 TENS unit and mentioned defendant Miranda. Id. at 47-48. It made no mention of defendants 15 Kibler or Spearman, however. 16 Grievance log number HDSP HC 22000530 alleged that the headphones in the law library 17 were unsuitable for use with his hearing aids. Id. at 59, 63. It also challenged the confiscation of 18 plaintiff’s speaker pillow. Id. at 63. Plaintiff alleged that his speaker pillow was confiscated on 19 order of the warden of High Desert State Prison, though he did not identify that individual by 20 name. Id. 21 Analysis 22 I agree with defendants that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to 23 defendants Kibler and Spearman and, as to his claims regarding the CPAP machine, the medical 24 consults, and the surgeries.1 I disagree, however, with their contention that he failed to exhaust 25 his claims regarding Robaxin. 26
27 1 I note that there is no dispute about the availability of the administrative exhaustion process. Indeed, such an argument would be difficult to make given the total number of 28 grievances plaintiff has filed. 1 A. Claims Against Kibler and Spearman 2 It is evident that plaintiff failed, as he was required to do under CDCR rules, to name 3 either defendant Kibler or Spearman in an exhausted grievance. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 4 § 3999.227(g). At a fundamental level, none of the relevant grievances, save one, even alludes to 5 any wrongdoing on behalf of either warden. In grievance HDSP HC 22000530, plaintiff does 6 allege in passing that, in April 2020, his adaptive hearing device (speaker pillow) was confiscated 7 on the order of an unnamed HDSP warden. ECF No. 65-3 at 63. It is unclear from the complaint 8 whether the warden at this time was Spearman or Kibler, both of whom are alleged to have acted 9 as warden for a time in 2020. ECF No. 56 at 2. Regardless, the grievance in question was not a 10 challenge to that initial confiscation and officials gave no indication that they weighed any 11 wrongdoing stemming from actions taken in 2020. Instead, this grievance, filed in November 12 2022, challenged a decision by a Reasonable Accommodation Panel that plaintiff felt was 13 insufficient to manage his hearing difficulties. ECF No. 65-3 at 59. And it is evident that this 14 was the matter prison officials considered because, in their grievance response, they identify the 15 issue as “[y]ou disagree with the Reasonable Accommodation Panel (RAP) response, 1824 Log 16 Number HDSP-D-22-00264.” Id. at 57. Plaintiff’s reference to the initial (and long past) 17 confiscation as background did not provide prison officials with notice or a meaningful 18 opportunity to address this alleged wrongdoing. 19 Plaintiff responds by arguing that the involvement of the wardens in any wrongdoing is 20 “inferred and obvious” because they had ultimate policymaking authority. ECF No. 68 at 7, 18. 21 But it is the prison’s procedures that govern the sufficiency of a grievance, and those procedures 22 mandated the identification of any staff accused of wrongdoing. And common sense cautions 23 against the approach advocated by plaintiff, whereby any claim could be deemed exhausted 24 against any supervisory defendant simply because policy flows downward from the top of the 25 chain of command. 26 Plaintiff also argues that, in determining exhaustion, I should consider his Reasonable 27 Accommodation Requests—section 1824 forms. Id. at 18. But, as defendants note in their reply, 28 plaintiff did not identify either warden in those forms, either. See Id. at 92-94, 99-104, 118-20, 1 150-52, 207-10. 2 Accordingly, I find that the claims against defendants Kibler and Spearman should be 3 dismissed as unexhausted. 4 B. Claims Regarding CPAP Machine, Neurological Consult, Denial of Surgeries 5 As defendants correctly contend, none of plaintiff’s relevant grievances (or section 1824 6 forms)2 explicitly raises either the confiscation of his CPAP machine, the denial of a neurological 7 consult, or the denial of any surgeries. Those claims will also be dismissed. 8 C. Pain Medication 9 By contrast, I find that plaintiff exhausted his claims regarding the denial of the pain 10 medication Robaxin against defendant Miranda were exhausted. In grievance number HDSP HC 11 20001143 plaintiff identified Robaxin by name and stated that Miranda was “incompetent,” 12 plainly intimating that he was at fault. ECF No. 65-3 at 47-48. And in responding to the 13 grievance, prison officials noted that the discontinuation of Robaxin and plaintiff’s overall pain 14 treatment were issues being considered. Id. at 43. Given that Miranda was identified in 15 connection with plaintiff’s pain treatment, prison officials had notice to consider his conduct. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 And, even if any section 1824 form could be construed to raise these claims, those forms 25 required plaintiff to file a 602 grievance form to dispute any decision with which he disagreed. See ECF No. 68 at 93. Thus, administrative remedies would remain available and exhaustion 26 would not be complete. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to 27 prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 28 facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). 1 Conclusion 2 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 3 1. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 65, is GRANTED in part. 4 2. Plaintiffs claims against defendants Kibler and Spearman, and his claims regarding his 5 || CPAP machine, neurological consult, and denied surgeries are DISMISSED for failure to exhaust 6 | administrative remedies. 7 3. The motion is DENIED in all other respects. 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ December 3, 2025 Q_——. 11 JEREMY D. PETERSON 0 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28