NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4040-16T2
ANDREW H. KASTEL, JR.,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW and COLLATERAL RECOVERY, INC.,
Respondents. ________________________________
Submitted October 3, 2018 – Decided October 12, 2018
Before Judges Reisner and Mawla.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 098,785.
Andrew H. Kastel, Jr., appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Aaron J. Creuz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Respondent Elite Collateral Recovery, Inc., has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Andrew H. Kastel, Jr. appeals from an April 3, 2017 final decision of the
Board of Review (Board), which found he was disqualified from receiving
unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), because
he left his job voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. We
affirm.
The following facts are taken from the record. Kastel worked for Elite
Collateral Recovery, Inc. (Elite) as a general manager from November 2014
through January 20, 2016. He left his job due to a non-work-related medical
condition, which caused him to seek disability benefits on January 22, 2016.
His original return to work date was March 20, 2016, but was extended to June
17, 2016, pursuant to his doctor's orders. However, Kastel informed Elite on
June 2, 2016, he could no longer perform his employment duties and never
returned to work. He did not provide any medical documentation to Elite and
filed a claim for unemployment benefits as of July 17, 2016.
The Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance (Division)
disqualified Kastel for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he left
work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. Kastel appealed
and the Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) conducted a telephonic hearing, during
A-4040-16T2 2 which Kastel testified he did not return to work because he felt he had not healed
sufficiently from a medical procedure. He testified he had attempted to contact
Elite and left a phone message indicating he was no longer capable of
performing the activities associated with his employment. Kastel testified he
did not provide Elite with any documentation related to his inability to perform
his employment duties at the time.
The Tribunal disqualified Kastel from unemployment benefits for the
same reason as the Division. The Tribunal stated to avoid disqualification under
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), an individual seeking unemployment after having
voluntarily left work for medical reasons must show the reason was related to
the work.
Kastel appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board, which remanded the
matter to the Tribunal to develop the record regarding whether Kastel's medical
condition was caused or aggravated by his work at Elite. At the subsequent
telephonic hearing on January 11, 2017, Kastel and his counsel appeared along
with Iraide Pineiro, president of Elite. Kastel provided an October 20, 2016 note
from a doctor stating Kastel could not return to his job because it was physically
demanding and would aggravate his medical condition, which prevents him from
standing and maintaining balance. Kastel also provided a December 30, 2016
A-4040-16T2 3 note from a nurse practitioner, stating he was cleared to work as of July 2016,
but could no longer perform his employment duties because his medical
condition would be aggravated by substantial walking. Kastel testified the
conditions of his employment required substantial walking, standing, and
maneuvering of heavy objects. He also testified these activities could cause
blisters, which unhealed, could turn into ulcers.
The Tribunal found Kastel did not make a reasonable effort to
communicate his medical condition and workplace restrictions with Elite before
filing for unemployment benefits and again disqualified him. The Tribunal
rejected Kastel's medical evidence as "self-serving" and "afterthought[s]." It
also concluded Elite's owner was not aware of Kastel's condition until a
conversation on October 16, 2016, which was after the denial of benefits. The
Tribunal also accepted Pineiro's testimony Elite did not have positions available
to accommodate Kastel's medical conditions.
Kastel appealed and the Board affirmed. The Board found Kastel was
disqualified because he could not perform his job duties due to non -work
connected medical conditions. This appeal followed.
The scope of our review of an administrative agency's final determination
is strictly limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). The
A-4040-16T2 4 agency's decision may not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable or inconsistent with the applicable law. Ibid.; In re Warren, 117
N.J. 295, 296 (1989). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient
credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd.
of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). Thus, "[i]n reviewing the factual findings
made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an
appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination
was its to make, but rather whether the fact finder could reasonably so conclude
upon the proofs." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of
Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).
On appeal, Kastel argues he met the requirements of N.J.A.C. 12:17-
9.3(b) for the medical good cause exception and should have qualified for
unemployment compensation. He contends the Board relied upon case law
which predated the amendment of N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b), and thus applied the
wrong legal standard. He argues the Tribunal erred by rejecting his medical
evidence because it had not been provided to the employer and was obtained
after his separation from employment. Kastel disputes N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3
requires an employee to request alternative work or provide the employer with
medical records.
A-4040-16T2 5 An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden to prove he or
she did so with good cause attributable to the work, and thus has the right to
unemployment compensation. Brady, 152 N.J. at 213, 218. An individual is
disqualified from receiving benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has
left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each
week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks
in employment." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
Generally, good cause has been defined as "cause sufficient to justify an
employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks
of the unemployed." Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287
(App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174
(App. Div. 1978)).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4040-16T2
ANDREW H. KASTEL, JR.,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW and COLLATERAL RECOVERY, INC.,
Respondents. ________________________________
Submitted October 3, 2018 – Decided October 12, 2018
Before Judges Reisner and Mawla.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 098,785.
Andrew H. Kastel, Jr., appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Aaron J. Creuz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Respondent Elite Collateral Recovery, Inc., has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Andrew H. Kastel, Jr. appeals from an April 3, 2017 final decision of the
Board of Review (Board), which found he was disqualified from receiving
unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), because
he left his job voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. We
affirm.
The following facts are taken from the record. Kastel worked for Elite
Collateral Recovery, Inc. (Elite) as a general manager from November 2014
through January 20, 2016. He left his job due to a non-work-related medical
condition, which caused him to seek disability benefits on January 22, 2016.
His original return to work date was March 20, 2016, but was extended to June
17, 2016, pursuant to his doctor's orders. However, Kastel informed Elite on
June 2, 2016, he could no longer perform his employment duties and never
returned to work. He did not provide any medical documentation to Elite and
filed a claim for unemployment benefits as of July 17, 2016.
The Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance (Division)
disqualified Kastel for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he left
work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. Kastel appealed
and the Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) conducted a telephonic hearing, during
A-4040-16T2 2 which Kastel testified he did not return to work because he felt he had not healed
sufficiently from a medical procedure. He testified he had attempted to contact
Elite and left a phone message indicating he was no longer capable of
performing the activities associated with his employment. Kastel testified he
did not provide Elite with any documentation related to his inability to perform
his employment duties at the time.
The Tribunal disqualified Kastel from unemployment benefits for the
same reason as the Division. The Tribunal stated to avoid disqualification under
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), an individual seeking unemployment after having
voluntarily left work for medical reasons must show the reason was related to
the work.
Kastel appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board, which remanded the
matter to the Tribunal to develop the record regarding whether Kastel's medical
condition was caused or aggravated by his work at Elite. At the subsequent
telephonic hearing on January 11, 2017, Kastel and his counsel appeared along
with Iraide Pineiro, president of Elite. Kastel provided an October 20, 2016 note
from a doctor stating Kastel could not return to his job because it was physically
demanding and would aggravate his medical condition, which prevents him from
standing and maintaining balance. Kastel also provided a December 30, 2016
A-4040-16T2 3 note from a nurse practitioner, stating he was cleared to work as of July 2016,
but could no longer perform his employment duties because his medical
condition would be aggravated by substantial walking. Kastel testified the
conditions of his employment required substantial walking, standing, and
maneuvering of heavy objects. He also testified these activities could cause
blisters, which unhealed, could turn into ulcers.
The Tribunal found Kastel did not make a reasonable effort to
communicate his medical condition and workplace restrictions with Elite before
filing for unemployment benefits and again disqualified him. The Tribunal
rejected Kastel's medical evidence as "self-serving" and "afterthought[s]." It
also concluded Elite's owner was not aware of Kastel's condition until a
conversation on October 16, 2016, which was after the denial of benefits. The
Tribunal also accepted Pineiro's testimony Elite did not have positions available
to accommodate Kastel's medical conditions.
Kastel appealed and the Board affirmed. The Board found Kastel was
disqualified because he could not perform his job duties due to non -work
connected medical conditions. This appeal followed.
The scope of our review of an administrative agency's final determination
is strictly limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). The
A-4040-16T2 4 agency's decision may not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable or inconsistent with the applicable law. Ibid.; In re Warren, 117
N.J. 295, 296 (1989). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient
credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd.
of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). Thus, "[i]n reviewing the factual findings
made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an
appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination
was its to make, but rather whether the fact finder could reasonably so conclude
upon the proofs." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of
Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).
On appeal, Kastel argues he met the requirements of N.J.A.C. 12:17-
9.3(b) for the medical good cause exception and should have qualified for
unemployment compensation. He contends the Board relied upon case law
which predated the amendment of N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b), and thus applied the
wrong legal standard. He argues the Tribunal erred by rejecting his medical
evidence because it had not been provided to the employer and was obtained
after his separation from employment. Kastel disputes N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3
requires an employee to request alternative work or provide the employer with
medical records.
A-4040-16T2 5 An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden to prove he or
she did so with good cause attributable to the work, and thus has the right to
unemployment compensation. Brady, 152 N.J. at 213, 218. An individual is
disqualified from receiving benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has
left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each
week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks
in employment." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
Generally, good cause has been defined as "cause sufficient to justify an
employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks
of the unemployed." Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287
(App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174
(App. Div. 1978)). However, individuals, who leave work for a good, but
personal reason, do not qualify for unemployment compensation under N.J.S.A.
43:21-5(a). See Brady, 152 N.J. at 213 (stating N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) was
amended in 1961 "to disqualify claimants who left work for purely personal
reasons."). Such reasons include voluntarily terminating employment because
the requirements of the work are harmful to an existing physical condit ion with
a non-work-related origin. Stauhs v. Bd. of Review, 93 N.J. Super. 451, 457
(App. Div. 1967). Nonetheless, "[t]he Unemployment Compensation Law
A-4040-16T2 6 'protects not only workers who are involuntarily unemployed – those who are
laid-off or terminated from their jobs by their employers – but also those who
voluntarily quit their jobs for good cause attributable to their work.'" Ardan v.
Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 602 (2018) (quoting Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194
N.J. 534, 543-44 (2008)).
N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) states:
[a]n individual who leaves a job due to a physical and/or mental condition or state of health which does not have a work-connected origin but is aggravated by working conditions will not be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work without good cause "attributable to such work," provided there was no other suitable work available which the individual could have performed within the limits of the disability. When a non-work connected physical and/or mental condition makes it necessary for an individual to leave work due to an inability to perform the job, the individual shall be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work.
The burden rests on the claimant to prove his medical condition was aggravated
by his employment duties in order to qualify for the statutory medical good
cause exception. Brady, 152 N.J. at 213.
Kastel argues he qualifies for unemployment benefits under the exception.
However, because Kastel failed to establish his medical condition was in fact
aggravated by his employment at Elite, the Board did not err in affirming the
A-4040-16T2 7 Tribunal's denial of unemployment benefits. Indeed, where an applicant for
benefits demonstrates "through uncontroverted medical evidence, that [his]
disease has been and will be aggravated by the [work] environment . . . [t]his
constitutes 'good cause.'" Israel v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 283 N.J. Super. 1, 5
(App Div. 1995) (citations omitted). Therefore, Kastel had to demonstrate "the
environment at [his] job aggravated [his] illness." Ibid. To meet this burden,
he had to supply a "medical certification . . . to support a finding of good cause
attributable to the work." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d).
Kastel's proofs fell short. He testified his initial leave from work was
caused by a diabetic blister becoming an ulcer as a result of the amount of
walking his employment required. However, he failed to provide the Division
with medical proofs showing performance of his employment responsibilities
had aggravated his medical condition.
Indeed, the October 20, 2016 medical record states only that "Patient is
unable to return to his previous position of employment with Elite[.] The job is
to [sic] phsically [sic] demanding and would aggravate [his] present medical
condition that prevents patient from standing and keeping balance for extended
amounts of time." The second record dated December 20, 2016, only states
Kastel "was advised that his medical condition would be aggravated by
A-4040-16T2 8 substantial walking, such as is present in his work at Elite . . . , and that such
activity should be avoided to protect his health as of the time he was released to
work [in] July of 2016." A record dated January 23, 2017, which was not
presented to the Tribunal, but was presented to the Board, recounts Kastel's
treatment history and states he was treated for a "chronic ulcer of [the] toe that
progressed from a non healing blister he had acquired on [July 2,] 2015."
However, there was no medical proof that the blister or the ulcer were caused
by the work or aggravated by the work.
None of the medical records provided by Kastel predate his
disqualification for benefits let alone explain how his employment aggravated
his non-work-related condition. The Board did not err in finding Kastel failed
to meet his burden of proof. The Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable, and is supported by the evidence in the record.
Affirmed.
A-4040-16T2 9