Andrew Gray v. Marion Feather

Ninth Circuit

Andrew Gray v. Marion Feather

540 F. App'x 665

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 26, 2013

Docket12-35197

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 540 F. App'x 665 (Andrew Gray v. Marion Feather) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Andrew Gray v. Marion Feather, 540 F. App'x 665 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Andrew Steven Gray appeals from the district court’s judgment *666 denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a section 2241 habeas petition, Bowen v. Hood, 202 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm.

Gray challenges a Bureau of Prisons rule categorically excluding inmates convicted of offenses involving “the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm” from eligibility for early release following completion of a Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii) (2009). Gray’s claim is foreclosed by our decision in Peck v. Thomas, in which we upheld the challenged rule as procedurally valid under Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 697 F.3d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir.2012), ce rt. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1289, 185 L.Ed.2d 220 (2013). Contrary to Gray’s contention, Peck does not conflict with our earlier decisions in Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir.2008), and Crickon v. Thomas, 579 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.2009).

Gray’s motion to file the supplemental brief submitted on March 5, 2013, is granted. The arguments raised in the supplemental brief do not change our analysis.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid *666 ed by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Andrew Steven Gray appeals from the district court’s judgment *666 denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a section 2241 habeas petition, Bowen v. Hood, 202 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm.

Gray challenges a Bureau of Prisons rule categorically excluding inmates convicted of offenses involving “the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm” from eligibility for early release following completion of a Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii) (2009). Gray’s claim is foreclosed by our decision in Peck v. Thomas, in which we upheld the challenged rule as procedurally valid under Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 697 F.3d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir.2012), ce rt. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1289, 185 L.Ed.2d 220 (2013). Contrary to Gray’s contention, Peck does not conflict with our earlier decisions in Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir.2008), and Crickon v. Thomas, 579 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.2009).

Gray’s motion to file the supplemental brief submitted on March 5, 2013, is granted. The arguments raised in the supplemental brief do not change our analysis.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid *666 ed by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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