Andrew Gordon v. Department of the Navy
Opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
ANDREW SCOTT GORDON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-315H-19-0480-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: May 29, 2024 Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Andrew Scott Gordon , Fleming Island, Florida, pro se.
Jennifer Ann Misciagna , Jacksonville, Florida, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed. On July 23, 2018, the agency appointed the appellant to the competitive service position of GS-05 Production Controller, subject to a 2-year initial probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 44. Effective April 15, 2019, the agency terminated the appellant for post-appointment attendance reasons. Id. at 26-30.
The appellant filed a Board appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. He contested the merits of the termination, alleging that the agency failed to train him properly, mishandled some leave-related matters, and targeted him for termination in violation of an unspecified prohibited personnel practice. Id. at 4, 6. The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order, notifying the appellant of how to establish jurisdiction over a probationary termination appeal under 5 C.F.R. part 315, subpart H and a removal appeal under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. IAF, Tab 3 at 2-4. She ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument on the issue. Id. at 4-5. The appellant did not respond, and the agency moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 5.
The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID). She found that
the appellant was serving an initial 2-year probationary period under 10 U.S.C. § 1599e, the agency terminated him during that period for post-appointment reasons, the appellant was not an employee with chapter 75 appeal rights, and the appellant did not allege that his termination was based on marital status or partisan political reasons. ID at 2-4.
The appellant has filed a petition for review, stating that he did not receive the jurisdictional order until after the initial decision was issued. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-5. He alleges that, prior to his appointment to the competitive service, he worked as a contractor at the same location doing essentially the same job. Id. at 6. He also contests the merits of his termination and explains that the agency failed to afford him the Disabled Veteran Leave to which he was entitled. Id. The appellant has attached documentation to support his allegations. Id. at 8-28. The agency has filed a response in opposition to the petition for review. 2 PFR File, Tab 3.
ANALYSIS
To establish Board jurisdiction under chapter 75, an individual covered under 10 U.S.C. § 1599e must show that he is not serving the 2-year initial probationary period prescribed under that section or that he has completed 2 years of current continuous service. Bryant v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶¶ 8-9; see 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). 3 Prior Federal civilian service can be 2 The appellant was granted two extensions of time to reply to the agency’s response, but he ultimately declined to file a reply. PFR File, Tabs 4-7. 3 Section 1599e provided, inter alia, that an individual appointed to a permanent competitive-service position at the Department of Defense (DOD) was subject to a 2-year probationary period and only qualified as an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2016) if he completed 2 years of current continuous service. On December 27, 2021, President Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (2022 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541. The 2022 NDAA repealed the 2-year probationary period for DOD appointments made on or after December 31, 2022. Pub. L. No. 117-81, § 1106, 135 Stat. 1541, 1950. The 2022 NDAA is not applicable here because, as set forth above, the appellant’s competitive service appointment was made on July 23, 2018. IAF, Tab 5 at 44.
credited towards completion of a later probationary or trial period in a competitive service position if the employee shows that: (1) the prior service was performed in the same agency; (2) it was performed in the same line of work; and (3) it was completed with no more than one break in service of less than 30 days. McCrary v. Department of the Army, 103 M.S.P.R. 266, ¶ 10 (2006); 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b)
On review, the appellant appears to argue that his previous employment as a contractor in a similar line of work could be tacked onto his service as a Production Controller in order to satisfy the 2-year probationary period. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. However, we find that employment as a Government contractor is not “Federal civilian service” that may be credited toward the completion of a probationary period. 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b); see generally 5 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (defining “civil service” as “all appointive positions in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the Government of the United States, except positions in the uniformed services”). There is nothing in the record to indicate that the appellant ever held a civil service position prior to his most recent appointment, much less a position in which his service could be counted toward the completion of his probationary period or toward 2 years of current continuous service. We therefore affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant lacks Board appeal rights under chapter 75. ID at 3-4; see Bryant, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 9.
For individuals terminated for post-appointment reasons, there is a regulatory right of appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806, but this is limited to cases in which the appellant alleges that the termination resulted from discrimination based on marital status or partisan political reasons. See Mastriano v. Federal Aviation Administration, 714 F.2d 1152, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Cunningham v. Department of the Army, 119 M.S.P.R. 147, ¶ 8 (2013). The appellant in this case has not raised any such allegation, and we therefore agree with the administrative judge that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806.
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