Andrew C. Wiesner v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedDecember 15, 2014
StatusUnpublished

This text of Andrew C. Wiesner v. Department of the Navy (Andrew C. Wiesner v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andrew C. Wiesner v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2014).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANDREW C. WIESNER, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-13-0434-I-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: December 15, 2014 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Marshall J. Tinkle, Esquire, Portland, Maine, for the appellant.

Barbara A. Badger and Scott W. Flood, Esquire, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s indefinite suspension based on a finding of harmful procedural error. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The following facts are not in dispute. The appellant held the position of Pipefitter at a naval shipyard, which required him to be able to obtain and maintain a security clearance with access to classified information. MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-13-0434-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 35, 57-59. On April 26, 2013, the agency suspended the appellant’s access to classified information. Id. at 40. As a result, the agency indefinitely suspended the appellant, effective June 3, 2013, based upon his failure to maintain a condition of employment. Id. at 36-37. ¶3 Meanwhile, on June 7, 2013, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoDCAF) informed the appellant of its final determination to revoke his eligibility for a security clearance and assignment to a sensitive position. MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-13-0434-I-2, IAF, Tab 3, Initial Decision (ID) at 3. The appellant appealed DoDCAF’s final revocation by submitting a written appeal to the Personnel Security Appeals Board (PSAB), and the PSAB upheld the revocation in a decision dated August 22, 2013. ID at 3. 3

¶4 The appellant timely appealed his indefinite suspension to the Board. IAF, Tab 1 at 4. After holding the requested hearing, id. at 2, the administrative judge issued an initial decision reversing the indefinite suspension action, ID at 4-5. 2 The administrative judge found that the agency committed harmful procedural error when it indefinitely suspended the appellant prior to his receipt of a written decision from the PSAB concerning his security clearance in violation of Department of Defense (DoD) regulation 5200.2-R. ID at 5. ¶5 The agency has filed a petition for review. 3 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 3, 6. On review, the agency claims that the Board’s recent decision in Flores v. Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 287 (2014), necessitates reversal of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 3 at 4-6. The appellant has filed a response in opposition. PFR File, Tab 5. In his response, the appellant requests the dismissal of the agency’s petition for review based upon its failure to provide interim relief. Id. at 4.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶6 The agency’s reliance on Flores is misplaced. In Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 287, ¶¶ 1, 4, the Board sustained an agency removal action based upon the appellant’s loss of eligibility to occupy a sensitive position. In sustaining the action, the Board held that it lacked the authority to review the merits of the agency’s decision to deny the appellant’s eligibility to occupy a sensitive position. Id., ¶¶ 7-8 (citing Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1158-60 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Northover v. Archuleta, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014)). Here, it appears that the agency is arguing that, because the Board lacks the authority to

2 The administrative judge also addressed the appellant’s appeal of his removal in the initial decision. ID at 6-9. We have addressed the appellant’s petition for review concerning the removal, which is docketed as MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-14-0342-I-1, in a separate order. 3 The petition for review is labeled as a cross-petition for review given the former status of the appeals as joined. PFR File, Tab 3. 4

review the merits of the agency’s decision regarding the loss of eligibility to occupy a sensitive position, it similarly lacks the authority to review whether the agency complied with its own procedures when taking an adverse action based on that loss or, as here, the revocation of a security clearance. PFR File, Tab 3 at 4-6. As described below, the agency’s argument is unavailing. ¶7 Generally, in an appeal of an adverse action based on the revocation of a security clearance, the Board is limited to reviewing whether: (1) the appellant’s position required a security clearance; (2) the clearance was denied, revoked, or suspended; and (3) the appellant was provided with the procedural protections specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Ulep v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 579, ¶ 4 (2014). Section 7513 is not the only source of procedural protections for employees subject to adverse actions, however; agencies must also comply with the procedures set forth in their own regulations. Schnedar v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 516, ¶ 8 (2014). Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A), the Board may not sustain an adverse action decision if the employee can show “harmful error in the application of the agency’s procedures in arriving at such decision.” The Board has held that it may review whether the agency complied with its own procedures for taking an adverse action based on the revocation of a security clearance. See Schnedar, 120 M.S.P.R. 516, ¶ 8.

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Related

John H. Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts
726 F.2d 730 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Kaplan v. Conyers
733 F.3d 1148 (Federal Circuit, 2013)
Northover v. Archuleta
134 S. Ct. 1759 (Supreme Court, 2014)

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Andrew C. Wiesner v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrew-c-wiesner-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2014.