Andrew Brown v. Kilolo Kijakazi

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedAugust 11, 2022
Docket8:20-cv-02383
StatusUnknown

This text of Andrew Brown v. Kilolo Kijakazi (Andrew Brown v. Kilolo Kijakazi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andrew Brown v. Kilolo Kijakazi, (C.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

Case 8:20-cv-02383-KES Document 31 Filed 08/11/22 Page 1 of 9 Page ID #:2600

2 O

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 ANDREW B., Case No. 8:20-cv-02383-KES

12 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 13 v. ORDER

14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16

17 I.

18 BACKGROUND

19 In March 2017, Plaintiff Andrew B. (“Plaintiff”) applied for disability

20 insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”), alleging a 21 disability onset date of December 1, 2008, at age 21, with a last date insured 22 (“LDI”) of March 31, 2015. AR 828-36. On October 17, 2019, an Administrative 23 Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted a hearing at which Plaintiff, who was represented 24 by counsel, testified along with a medical expert (“ME”) David Peterson, M.D., 25 and a vocational expert (“VE”). AR 537-65. 26 On January 9, 2020, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. AR 11-31. 27 The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe, medically determinable 28 impairments (“MDIs”) of “bipolar disorder and substance disorder present and 1 Case 8:20-cv-02383-KES Document 31 Filed 08/11/22 Page 2of9 Page ID #:2601

1 | material.” AR 17. The ALJ found that with substance abuse, Plaintiff's mental 2 | MDIs satisfied Listing 12.04. AR 17-18. Without substance abuse, however, 3 | Plaintiff would have the residual functional capacity (““RFC’”’) to work at all 4 | exertional levels with a restriction to “simple repetitive tasks with only occasional 5 || interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public.” AR 20. 6 Based on this RFC and other evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could 7 | work as a day worker, store labeler, or floor waxer. AR 25. The ALJ concluded, 8 || “Because the substance use disorder is a contributing factor material to the 9 | determination of disability, [Plaintiff] has not been disabled within the meaning of 10 | the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date through the date of 11 | this decision.” AR 25. 12 II. 13 ISSUE PRESENTED 14 This appeal presents the sole issue of whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the 15 | work-preclusive opinions of Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Binna Chahal, M.D. 16 IL. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Rules Governing the ALJ’s Evaluation of Medical Opinions. 19 An ALJ must consider all medical opinions of record. 20 C.F.R. 20 | §§ 404.1527(b), 416.927(b). For applications filed before March 27, 2019, like 21 | Plaintiff's, the regulations “distinguish among the opinions of three types of 22 | physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who 23 || examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who 24 | neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. 25 | Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). “Generally, 26 | a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining physician’s, 27 | and an examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a reviewing 28 | physician’s.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001).

Case 8:20-cv-02383-KES Document 31 Filed 08/11/22 Page 3 of 9 Page ID #:2602

1 The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is given “controlling 2 weight” so long as it “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 3 laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial 4 evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 5 416.927(c)(2). “When a treating doctor’s opinion is not controlling, it is weighted 6 according to factors such as the length of the treatment relationship and the 7 frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, 8 supportability, and consistency with the record.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 9 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). 10 “If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another 11 doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate 12 reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 13 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a 14 detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 15 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 16 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017). 17 The Social Security Act provides that a claimant “shall not be considered 18 disabled … if alcoholism or drug addiction would … be a contributing factor 19 material to the … determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. 20 § 423(d)(2)(C). To determine whether a claimant’s drug addiction and alcoholism 21 is material, the test is whether the claimant would still be found disabled if he 22 stopped using drugs or alcohol. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b), 416.935(b). The ALJ 23 must “evaluate which of [the claimant’s] current physical and mental limitations … 24 would remain if [the claimant] stopped using drugs or alcohol and then determine 25 whether any or all of [the claimant’s] remaining limitations would be disabling.” 26 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b)(2), 416.935(b)(2). The claimant bears the burden of 27 proving that substance use is not a material contributing factor to his disability. 28 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2007).

3 Case 8:20-cv-02383-KES Document 31 Filed 08/11/22 Page 4of9 Page ID #:2603

1 B. Summary of the Medical Opinion Evidence. 2 In January 2018, State agency consultant Phaedra Caruso-Radin, Psy.D., 3 | reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and observed that they were “marked by 4 | continued meth use. However, when not using is cog[natively] intact. Overall, 5 | without DA&A [drug abuse and alcoholism] the [Plaintiff] can complete srts 6 | [simple repetitive tasks] at least.” AR 608. 7 In October 2018, Plaintiff underwent a psychological consultative 8 || examination (“CE”) with Charlene K. Krieg, Ph.D. AR 1723-30. Plaintiff 9 | reported a history of using cannabis, methamphetamine, and mushrooms, but he 10 | had not used drugs for ten months. AR 1724. Dr. Krieg administered a variety of 11 | tests and concluded that Plaintiff displayed average intellectual functioning, scored 12 | in the “normal to mild deficit range” on tasks involving attention/concentration, 13 | and did not have any mental impairments that would limit his ability to perform 14 | simple, repetitive work tasks or complete a normal work schedule. AR 1727. 15 On September 25, 2019, treating psychiatrist Dr. Chahal authored a Medical 16 | Source Statement Concerning the Nature and Severity of an Individual’s Mental 17 | Impairment (“MSS”). Dr. Chahal diagnosed Plaintiff with Bipolar I disorder only. 18 | AR 2339. Dr.

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Andrew Brown v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrew-brown-v-kilolo-kijakazi-cacd-2022.