Andrew Bell v. Department of Transportation

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided August 5, 2024·No. AT-0353-14-0525-C-3·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANDREW BELL, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0353-14-0525-C-3

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DATE: August 5, 2024 TRANSPORTATION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Andrew Bell , Atlanta, Georgia, pro se.

Daniel P. Kohlmeyer , Esquire, Jamaica, New York, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the compliance initial decision, denying his third petition for enforcement. For the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g). 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

BACKGROUND The administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision on September 4, 2019, finding the agency in compliance with the parties’ August 21, 2014 settlement agreement. Compliance File (CF), Tab 6, Compliance Initial Decision (CID). The compliance initial decision advised the appellant that the deadline to file a petition for review was October 9, 2019, and provided information as to how to file a petition for review. CID at 5-9. The compliance initial decision was sent to the appellant’s address of record, via U.S. Mail, on September 4, 2019. CF, Tab 7. On November 19, 2019, the appellant hand-delivered a petition for review to the regional office, arguing, among other things, that the agency had not corrected his service computation date, and asserting that the agency engaged in bad acts, both before and after the signing of the settlement agreement, including interfering with his claim for Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs benefits. Compliance Petition for Review (CPFR) File, Tab 1 at 1-3. That filing was forwarded to Board headquarters. CPFR File, Tab 2. The Acting Clerk of the Board issued a letter to the appellant asking him to clarify the purpose of his filing, id., and the appellant stated that his filing should be considered a petition for review of the compliance initial decision in MSPB Docket No. AT-0353-14- 0525-C-3, as well as the initial decision issued in the joined appeals of MSPB Docket Nos. AT-0343-14-0525-B-1, AT-0353-14-0524-B-1, and AT-3443-14- 0184-B-2. 2 CPFR File, Tab 4 at 4. The Acting Clerk of the Board then issued the appellant an acknowledgment letter, advising him that his petition for review of the compliance initial decision was filed after the October 9, 2019 deadline, and that he should file a motion with the Board to accept the filing as timely, or to waive the time limit for good cause. CPFR File, Tab 5 at 2. The appellant filed a 2 The Board has issued a separate decision addressing the appellant’s petition for review in MSPB Docket Nos. AT-0343-14-0525-B-1, AT-0353-14-0524-B-1, and AT -3443-14- 0184-B-2. 3

motion to accept his petition for review as timely filed, or to waive the time limit for good cause, explaining that he was out of town and unaware of the compliance initial decision until “on or after September 25, 2019.” CPFR File, Tab 7 at 5. He also stated that he had reaggravated a wrist injury and that he filed the petition for review once his wrist healed and he could retrieve documents from his post office box. 3 Id. The agency responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review. CPFR File, Tab 8.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW A petition for review generally must be filed within 35 days after the date of the issuance of the initial decision or, if the appellant shows that the initial decision was received more than 5 days after the initial decision was issued, within 30 days after the date the appellant received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). It is the appellant’s burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the timeliness of his petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(B); McPherson v. Department of the Treasury, 104 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 4 (2007) (stating that the appellant bears the burden of proof with regards to timeliness, which he must establish by preponderant evidence). A petition for review of the compliance initial decision was due no later than October 9, 2019. CID at 5. The appellant did not file his petition for review until November 19, 2019, i.e., approximately 6 weeks later. CPFR File, Tab 1. The certificate of service confirms that the compliance initial decision was sent to the appellant’s post office box, via U.S. Mail. CF, Tab 7. The appellant has not claimed that the address was incorrect, or that he did not receive the compliance initial decision. In fact, the appellant confirms that he received the initial

3 The appellant filed a second motion regarding the existence of good cause for his untimely filing on January 15, 2020, which repeated some of the arguments raised in his earlier filing. CPFR File, Tab 9 at 4-5. Although filed after the deadline set in the Acting Clerk’s acknowledgment order, we have considered the appellant’s pleading. 4

decision as of September 25, 2019. CPFR File, Tab 7 at 5. Therefore, the appellant has not established that his appeal was timely filed. 4 As the appellant filed his petition for review late, the issue is whether he established good cause to waive the time limit. The Board will waive a petition for review time limit only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). To establish good cause for the untimely filing of a petition, a party must show that he exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Rivera v. Social Security Administration, 111 M.S.P.R. 581, ¶ 4 (2009) (citing Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980)). To determine whether an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of his excuse and his showing of due diligence, whether he is proceeding pro se, and whether he has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune which similarly shows a causal relationship to his inability to timely file his petition. Rivera, 111 M.S.P.R. 581, ¶ 4 (citing Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table)). The appellant has not established good cause for his delay in filing. Although we recognize that the appellant is acting in a pro se capacity, a near 6-week filing delay is significant. See, e.g., Dow v. Department of Homeland Security, 109 M.S.P.R. 633, ¶ 8 (2008) (finding that a filing delay of more than 1 month was significant, despite an appellant’s pro se status); Crook v. U.S.

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