Andrew Amavisca v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedOctober 24, 2024
DocketSF-315H-20-0500-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Andrew Amavisca v. Department of the Air Force (Andrew Amavisca v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andrew Amavisca v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANDREW P. AMAVISCA, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-315H-20-0500-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: October 24, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Andrew P. Amavisca , La Mirada, California, pro se.

Kathryn Price , Los Angeles Air Force Base, El Segundo, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND Effective August 20, 2018, the agency appointed the appellant to a GS-11 Contract Specialist position in the competitive service, subject to a 2-year probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 22-25. On May 7, 2020, while the appellant was still serving his probationary period, the agency notified him that he would be terminated from his position, effective May 9, 2020, due to his failure to demonstrate an acceptable level of performance. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 9, Tab 8 at 20-21. The appellant subsequently requested to resign and was allowed to do so effective May 12, 2020. IAF, Tab 8 at 15-19. The appellant filed an appeal with the Board challenging the termination. IAF, Tab 1 at 1-5. He requested a hearing. Id. at 2. The administrative judge issued orders informing the appellant of his burden to establish Board jurisdiction over his alleged involuntary termination and ordered him to file evidence and argument nonfrivolously alleging that his appeal was within the Board’s jurisdiction. IAF, Tabs 3, 9. The agency moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 8, Subtab 1 at 6-11. The appellant responded to the 3

administrative judge’s orders and the agency’s submissions, disputing that he had poor performance. IAF, Tab 6 at 4-5, Tab 10 at 4-7. He further argued that the agency did not follow its own policies when it issued the termination and that his resignation was coerced. IAF, Tab 10 at 7-10. In an initial decision, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal without holding the requested hearing, finding that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-7. The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, and the agency has responded. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The appellant has the burden of proof on the issue of jurisdiction, and if he makes a nonfrivolous allegation that the Board has jurisdiction over an appeal, he is entitled to a hearing on the jurisdictional question. Yiying v. Department of Agriculture, 106 M.S.P.R. 178, ¶ 8 (2007); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction over the instant appeal. At the time relevant to this appeal, individuals appointed to a permanent competitive-service position at the Department of Defense, including the Department of the Air Force, were subject to a 2-year probationary period and only qualified as an “employee” with chapter 75 appeal rights if they completed 2 years of current continuous service. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2018); 10 U.S.C. § 1599e(a), (b)(1)(A), (d) (repealed 2022); Bryant v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 8 & n.2. 2 Here, it is undisputed that the appellant was

2 At the time of the appellant’s appointment to his competitive-service position in August 2018, an individual appointed to a permanent competitive-service position at the Department of Defense (DOD) was subject to a 2-year probationary period and only 4

terminated before completing 2 years of service. IAF, Tabs 1, 6, 8, 10, 12. The administrative judge found that the appellant had less than 2 years of Federal civilian service. ID at 5-6. The appellant does not dispute this finding on review, and we discern no basis to disturb it. Prior military service cannot be tacked onto a period of Federal civilian service in order to meet the 2-year current continuous service requirement. See Wilder v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 675 F.3d 1319, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reaching the same conclusion when the applicable service requirement was 1 year under 5 U.S.C. 711(a)(1)(A)(ii), relying on 5 C.F.R. § 752.402 (defining current continuous employment as “a period of employment or service immediately preceding an adverse action without a break in Federal civilian employment of a workday”)); 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b) (reflecting that”[p]rior civilian service . . . counts toward completion of probation” in the competitive service). While the appellant had over 3 years of prior military service, the administrative judge properly found that the appellant’s prior military service could not be tacked on under 5 C.F.R.

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Related

Celia A. Wren v. Merit Systems Protection Board
681 F.2d 867 (D.C. Circuit, 1982)
Wilder v. Merit Systems Protection Board
675 F.3d 1319 (Federal Circuit, 2012)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Tahuana Bryant v. Department of the Army
2022 MSPB 1 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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Andrew Amavisca v. Department of the Air Force, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrew-amavisca-v-department-of-the-air-force-mspb-2024.