Andreucci v. City of New Haven

117 F. Supp. 2d 123, 1999 WL 33213055
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedMarch 29, 1999
Docket3:94CV02179(PCD), 3:96CV201(PCD)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 117 F. Supp. 2d 123 (Andreucci v. City of New Haven) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andreucci v. City of New Haven, 117 F. Supp. 2d 123, 1999 WL 33213055 (D. Conn. 1999).

Opinion

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DORSEY, District Judge.

Defendants move for summary judgment in these consolidated cases. Plaintiffs seek summary judgment in the lead action.

I. BACKGROUND

Familiarity with the facts underlying this dispute is presumed. Generally, *124 plaintiffs are white New Haven firefighters who allege that their constitutional rights were violated when their promotions were vacated as a result of a state lawsuit invalidating the promotional procedures because they violated the city charter and civil service regulations. The trial court’s ruling was sustained by the Appeal Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court. New Haven Firebird Society et al vs. The Board of Fire Commissioners of New Haven, et al, 32 Conn.App. 585, 630 A.2d 131, cert. den., 228 Conn. 902, 634 A.2d 295 (1993). Plaintiffs claim that the invalidation of their promotions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII because it was based on them race and skin color. Plaintiff Goodale also claims deprivation of a property right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Since filing this action, all plaintiffs have either been promoted or have retired. Thus, money damages are the only remaining relief sought. In a related action, Andreucci v. City of New Haven, Civ. No. 3:94CV2178, judgment was granted for defendants pursuant to a summary judgment motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment shall be granted when “the pleadings, depositions,... and admissions on file,... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Movant must make this showing. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A factual issue is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law....” Id. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

First, defendants argue that res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude plaintiffs from claiming they were demoted, which is a necessary predicate to their Title VII claims. Indeed, a fundamental underpinning to plaintiffs’ claim for relief, that they were lawfully promoted and thus were harmed when the_ promotions were vacated, has been decided against them. “The state court decisions made clear that plaintiffs never had any legitimate claim of entitlement to their former positions under state law, as their promotions were held to be unlawful from the start. See Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, Andreucci v. New Haven, Civ. No. 3:94CV2178, at 3. This court cannot redecide an issue already decided by the state court and this court in a related action. See Ruling on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, id. at 3; see also In re Juvenile Appeal, 190 Conn. 310, 316, 460 A.2d 1277 (1983)(“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim.”) (internal citations omitted). For this reason, summary judgment is granted to defendants on plaintiff Goodale’s Section 1983 claim based on deprivation of a property right. See Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, Andreucci v. New Haven, Civ. No. 3:94CV2178.

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

To prove their disparate impact claim, plaintiffs must show that the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly discriminatory impact. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47, 102 S.Ct. *125 2525, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (1982). Defendant must then rebut by showing that “any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question.” Id. Plaintiff responds by demonstrating that the employer was using the practice as a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. Title VII specifically excludes employment practices that are “pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(h).

Plaintiffs argue that they did nothing “illegal” and were “innocent victims of a racially motivated squabble.” Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support, at 3. Plaintiffs argue that it is undeniable that defendants’ actions underlying this complaint are racially motivated and that all rationally motivated actions are suspect. Plaintiffs essentially argue that if it were not for the illegal promotion practices that defendants utilized in the first place, plaintiffs would never have been injured. Plaintiff generally invokes the proposition that courts have broad authority under Title VII to remedy unlawful discrimination, including reinstatement and retroactive seniority. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 399-400, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir.1986) (white male denied director position based on race ordered reinstated by district court).

Plaintiffs present no evidence or legal authority to show how an illegal employment practice that adversely affected minority New Haven firefighters and was found unconstitutional under state law and defendants’ compliance with a court order to undo the discriminatory effects of this practice by vacating the promotions, entitles them to relief under Title VII or Section 1981. A proper motion for summary judgment having been made, plaintiffs’ must respond by pointing to evidence, not just the allegations of pleadings, demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact as to the viability of their claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

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117 F. Supp. 2d 123, 1999 WL 33213055, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andreucci-v-city-of-new-haven-ctd-1999.