Andres Mencia v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 25-11033
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-11033 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 1 of 3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11033 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

ANDRES MENCIA, Petitioner-Appellant, versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:24-cv-62261-WPD ____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 25-11033 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 25-11033

Andres Mencia, a former physician, appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for conspiracy to dispense con- trolled substances without a legitimate medical purpose, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We granted a certificate of appeal- ability to address whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address Mencia’s argument that his motion was timely based on an inter- vening change in law. Because his timeliness argument fails as a matter of law, we affirm. After we affirmed Mencia’s conviction on remand from the Supreme Court, our mandate issued on February 1, 2023. In No- vember 2024—more than one year later—Mencia filed a motion to vacate that conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argued that the motion was timely because Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450 (2022), and United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239 (11th Cir. 2023), constituted intervening changes in law. The district court denied the motion as untimely and, alternatively, on the merits, without addressing the Ruan and Duldulao argument. A district court must resolve all constitutional claims raised in a motion to vacate to ensure a full record for appellate review. Clisby, 960 F.2d at 935–938; see also Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Clisby in a section 2255 pro- ceeding). Although a failure to do so ordinarily requires us to va- cate the judgment and remand for further consideration, see Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1298–1299 (11th Cir. 2013), a remand is USCA11 Case: 25-11033 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2026 Page: 3 of 3

25-11033 Opinion of the Court 3

unnecessary here because Mencia’s timeliness argument fails as a matter of law. A motion to vacate must generally be filed within one year of “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). That limitations period may restart under section 2255(f)(3) when the Supreme Court recognizes a new right and makes it retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. See id. § 2255(f)(3). Mencia argues that he benefits from that alter- native limitations period, but we disagree. Neither Ruan nor Duldulao triggers this alternative limita- tions period. The Supreme Court decided Ruan in 2022, before Men- cia’s conviction became final in 2023. A Supreme Court decision issued before a conviction becomes final cannot serve as a change in law to restart the limitations period. See id. And Duldulao is a de- cision from this Court, not the Supreme Court. Under the plain text of section 2255(f)(3), only Supreme Court decisions can restart the limitations period. See id. We AFFIRM the denial of Mencia’s motion to vacate.