Andres Martinez v. Donna Independent School District

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 19, 2004
• Docket: 13-03-00300-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

v03300.cp1

NUMBER 13-03-300-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

ANDRES MARTINEZ,                                                                  Appellant,

v.

DONNA INDEPENDENT

SCHOOL DISTRICT,                                                                   Appellee.

On appeal from the 275th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez

          By three issues, appellant, Andres Martinez, challenges the trial court’s orders denying his plea to the jurisdiction and granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Donna Independent School District (“the District”). We reverse the trial court’s order denying appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

          In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his plea to the jurisdiction. Specifically, appellant argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit because: (1) the District failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; and (2) the Commissioner of Education has primary jurisdiction over the issues of fact and law at issue in this controversy.

          Because jurisdiction is a question of law, we review the trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). We apply the de novo standard to both the granting of a plea to the jurisdiction and to the denial of such a plea. Godley Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woods, 21 S.W.3d 656, 658 (Tex. App.–Waco 2000, pet. denied, (citing City of Houston v. Morua, 982 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.)).

          A plea to the jurisdiction may be an appropriate vehicle for raising a failure-to-exhaust-administrative-remedies challenge to a plaintiff’s suit. Id. (citing Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. 1986)). Generally, under Texas law, an aggrieved party, whose claim relates to the administration of school laws and involves disputed fact issues, must exhaust his administrative remedies with the Commissioner of Education before turning to the courts for relief. Jones v. Clarksville Indep. Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Caramanian v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 829 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); see Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057 (Vernon Supp. 2004). However, there are four exceptions to this general rule. Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 121 S.W.3d 88, 91-92 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2003, no pet.).

          First, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the aggrieved party will suffer irreparable harm. Houston Federation of Teachers v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1987). Second, an exception to the requirement of pursuing administrative relief is found where the claims are for a violation of constitutional or federal statutory rights. Tex. Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d 88, 90-91 (Tex. 1992); Nueces County v. Nueces County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 909 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.). Third, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the cause of action involves pure questions of law and the facts are undisputed. Janik v. Lamar Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 961 S.W.2d 322, 323-24 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); Ball v. Kerrville Indep. Sch. Dist., 504 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.–San Antonio 1973, pet. ref'd n.r.e.). Fourth, an aggrieved party is not required to exhaust administrative remedies where the Commissioner of Education lacks jurisdiction. Tex. Educ. Agency, 830 S.W.2d at 90-91.

          The District argues that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in the instant case because the Commissioner of Education has no jurisdiction. Specifically, the District argues that in this case, it seeks a declaratory judgment that a judgment in cause number CL-37,290-D, styled Rudy Salinas v. Donna Independent School District, in County Court-at-Law No. 4, Hidalgo County, Texas (“Salinas”), is a valid order voiding the District’s contract with Martinez and that the judgment in Salinas is binding upon Martinez. The District argues that in Salinas, the county court-at-law properly determined the District’s contract with Martinez void on grounds that the District failed to comply with provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act and the Texas Open Records Act. Thus, the District argues, the Commissioner of Education has no jurisdiction when a court has determined that no contract exists.

          We also interpret the District’s argument that the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction because no contract exists as contending that the third exception to the requirement of pursuing administrative relief applies. The District contends, essentially, that the issues of whether violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act and Texas Open Records Act occurred are pure questions of law, which were properly determined in Salinas.

          The District cites Gibson v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 971 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. App.–Waco 1998), vacated on other grounds, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000), in support of its argument that administrative remedies need not be exhausted when violation of a statute is involved. In Gibson, the plaintiffs challenged the school board’s adoption of a new promotion policy on various grounds, including claims that the policy violated the education code, the Open Records Act, and that it was adopted in violation of the Open Meetings Act. See id. at 200. The Gibson court found that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required because the plaintiffs: (1) pled irreparable harm and the Commissioner of Education lacked authority to grant injunctive relief; (2) presented pure questions of law regarding whether the challenged policy violated the statutes; and (3) asserted constitutional challenges to the policy. See id. at 203-04.

          We find the District’s reliance on Gibson to be misplaced. The Gibson court found that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required because three of the four exceptions to the doctrine were applicable. See id. Moreover, we find the District’s argument that its contract with Martinez is void to be without merit. We hold that the District failed to establish the applicability of any of the exceptions to the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement because it failed to establish that any violation of a statute occurred.

          Accordingly, we hold that the Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to section 7.057 of the education code. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057 (Vernon Supp. 2004). We hold that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction. We REVERSE the trial court’s orders denying appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction and granting summary judgment to appellee, and DISMISS this cause for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

                                                               LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ

                                                                           Justice

Memorandum opinion delivered

and filed this the 19^th day of August, 2004.