NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1708 ___________
ANDRES FEDERICO MACIAS-CHAMAIDAN, Petitioner
v.
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL ____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A208-058-485) Immigration Judge: Laura N. Pierro ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 2, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 12, 2026) ___________
OPINION* ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Andres Federico Macias-Chamaidan, a citizen of Ecuador, petitions for review of
a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). For the
reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.
I.
Macias-Chamaidan entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. In 2015, the
Government charged him with removability for being present in this country without
having been admitted or paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Through counsel,
Macias-Chamaidan conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal,
asserting that his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
to his U.S. citizen children. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Macias-Chamaidan also filed a
“Motion to Terminate Proceedings Under Pereira v. Sessions, [585 U.S. 198] (2018),”1
arguing that defects in the notice to appear (“NTA”) required dismissal of the
proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.
An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Macias-Chamaidan’s application for
cancellation of removal, concluding that he failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship to
his children, then ages 13 and 16. The IJ also orally denied the motion to terminate
proceedings. Macias-Chamaidan filed a pro se appeal with the BIA. The BIA dismissed
the appeal, agreeing with the IJ that the hardship requirement was not met. Like the IJ,
1 Pereira held that where a notice to appear does not include the time and place of the hearing, it does not “trigger the stop-time rule,” and the time period of continuous physical presence required for cancellation of removal continues to accrue. 585 U.S at 208-09. 2 the BIA also rejected Macias-Chamaidan’s argument that the proceedings against him
should be terminated because of defects in the NTA. Macias-Chamaidan filed a timely
pro se petition for review of the BIA’s decision.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a). We review the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions together, as the BIA both relied on the
IJ’s conclusions and provided its own analysis. See Thayalan v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d
132, 137 (3d Cir. 2021). Our review of the Agency’s hardship determination in a
cancellation-of-removal proceeding is governed by the substantial evidence standard.
See Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen., 131 F.4th 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2025). Under that standard, an
agency determination is conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). We review the Agency’s legal rulings de novo.
See Manuel-Soto v. Att’y Gen., 121 F.4th 468, 472 (3d Cir. 2024).
III.
In support of his hardship claim, Macias-Chamaidan asserted that his children
would suffer financially and emotionally if he were removed to Ecuador. In addition to
the testimony of Macias-Chamaidan and letters from the children, Macias-Chamaidan
submitted a three-page report from a licensed psychologist. See A.R. at 22-24. The
report, which was made almost two years prior to the IJ hearing, indicated that the
children lived with their mother, but were with Macias-Chamaidan every Saturday, and
that he paid child support. The psychologist interviewed the children, who “stated that
3 they are afraid that their father may be deported,” and “that they are very close to him and
he helps them a lot.” A.R. at 22. The children also indicated that they would be
“depressed” and “very sad” without their father. A.R. at 22. The report concluded,
without further elaboration, that “the separation of the children … from their father …
will cause the U.S. citizen children significant severe, continuous, and enduring
hardship,” and that the children would “also be affected financially because [Macias-
Chamaidan] pays child support to help support them.” A.R. at 24.
The Agency’s determination that Macias-Chamaidan failed to establish the
requisite hardship to warrant cancellation of removal is supported by substantial
evidence. Macias-Chamaidan argues that the Agency disregarded evidence that his
children would suffer, including the report from the psychologist. See 3d Cir. ECF No.
13 at 3. However, both the IJ and the BIA specifically referenced the report in their
decisions. The IJ acknowledged the report’s conclusion that the children’s separation
from their father would result in “significant, severe, continuous and enduring hardship,”
but also noted concerns with the report, including its failure to include a curriculum vitae
describing the psychologist’s qualifications, and the lack of any follow up with the
children in the nearly two years after the report was issued. The BIA also specifically
acknowledged the report and its conclusions, but determined that it could not “conclude
from this report, or other record evidence, that the hardship to the [Petitioner’s] children,
who have not been diagnosed with any mental health issues or psychiatric problems,
would be greater than typical in such circumstances.” A.R. at 2 (citing In re Monreal, 23
4 I&N Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001); see also Wilkinson, 131 F.4th at 143-44 (stating that
“feeling sad” cannot be characterized as “extremely unusual” hardship).
Further, the IJ considered Macias-Chamaidan’s concerns about providing for his
family if removed and determined that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that the
children “would be placed in such a situation whereby they would be at risk in the future
of abject poverty.” A.R. at 68-69. In reaching this conclusion, the IJ acknowledged
Macias-Chamaidan’s regular payments of child support, but noted as well that the
children do not live with him and that he does not provide their medical insurance. As
the BIA noted, “reduced economic and educational opportunities, without more, do not
rise to the level of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual’ hardship.” A.R. at 2-3 (citing In
re Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2002)). Considering the record before the Agency
as a whole, we agree that there was “not sufficient evidence in the record to establish that
the hardship to the [Petitioner’s] United States citizen children … resulting from his
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-1708 ___________
ANDRES FEDERICO MACIAS-CHAMAIDAN, Petitioner
v.
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL ____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A208-058-485) Immigration Judge: Laura N. Pierro ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 2, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 12, 2026) ___________
OPINION* ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Andres Federico Macias-Chamaidan, a citizen of Ecuador, petitions for review of
a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). For the
reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.
I.
Macias-Chamaidan entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. In 2015, the
Government charged him with removability for being present in this country without
having been admitted or paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Through counsel,
Macias-Chamaidan conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal,
asserting that his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
to his U.S. citizen children. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Macias-Chamaidan also filed a
“Motion to Terminate Proceedings Under Pereira v. Sessions, [585 U.S. 198] (2018),”1
arguing that defects in the notice to appear (“NTA”) required dismissal of the
proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.
An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Macias-Chamaidan’s application for
cancellation of removal, concluding that he failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship to
his children, then ages 13 and 16. The IJ also orally denied the motion to terminate
proceedings. Macias-Chamaidan filed a pro se appeal with the BIA. The BIA dismissed
the appeal, agreeing with the IJ that the hardship requirement was not met. Like the IJ,
1 Pereira held that where a notice to appear does not include the time and place of the hearing, it does not “trigger the stop-time rule,” and the time period of continuous physical presence required for cancellation of removal continues to accrue. 585 U.S at 208-09. 2 the BIA also rejected Macias-Chamaidan’s argument that the proceedings against him
should be terminated because of defects in the NTA. Macias-Chamaidan filed a timely
pro se petition for review of the BIA’s decision.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a). We review the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions together, as the BIA both relied on the
IJ’s conclusions and provided its own analysis. See Thayalan v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d
132, 137 (3d Cir. 2021). Our review of the Agency’s hardship determination in a
cancellation-of-removal proceeding is governed by the substantial evidence standard.
See Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen., 131 F.4th 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2025). Under that standard, an
agency determination is conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). We review the Agency’s legal rulings de novo.
See Manuel-Soto v. Att’y Gen., 121 F.4th 468, 472 (3d Cir. 2024).
III.
In support of his hardship claim, Macias-Chamaidan asserted that his children
would suffer financially and emotionally if he were removed to Ecuador. In addition to
the testimony of Macias-Chamaidan and letters from the children, Macias-Chamaidan
submitted a three-page report from a licensed psychologist. See A.R. at 22-24. The
report, which was made almost two years prior to the IJ hearing, indicated that the
children lived with their mother, but were with Macias-Chamaidan every Saturday, and
that he paid child support. The psychologist interviewed the children, who “stated that
3 they are afraid that their father may be deported,” and “that they are very close to him and
he helps them a lot.” A.R. at 22. The children also indicated that they would be
“depressed” and “very sad” without their father. A.R. at 22. The report concluded,
without further elaboration, that “the separation of the children … from their father …
will cause the U.S. citizen children significant severe, continuous, and enduring
hardship,” and that the children would “also be affected financially because [Macias-
Chamaidan] pays child support to help support them.” A.R. at 24.
The Agency’s determination that Macias-Chamaidan failed to establish the
requisite hardship to warrant cancellation of removal is supported by substantial
evidence. Macias-Chamaidan argues that the Agency disregarded evidence that his
children would suffer, including the report from the psychologist. See 3d Cir. ECF No.
13 at 3. However, both the IJ and the BIA specifically referenced the report in their
decisions. The IJ acknowledged the report’s conclusion that the children’s separation
from their father would result in “significant, severe, continuous and enduring hardship,”
but also noted concerns with the report, including its failure to include a curriculum vitae
describing the psychologist’s qualifications, and the lack of any follow up with the
children in the nearly two years after the report was issued. The BIA also specifically
acknowledged the report and its conclusions, but determined that it could not “conclude
from this report, or other record evidence, that the hardship to the [Petitioner’s] children,
who have not been diagnosed with any mental health issues or psychiatric problems,
would be greater than typical in such circumstances.” A.R. at 2 (citing In re Monreal, 23
4 I&N Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001); see also Wilkinson, 131 F.4th at 143-44 (stating that
“feeling sad” cannot be characterized as “extremely unusual” hardship).
Further, the IJ considered Macias-Chamaidan’s concerns about providing for his
family if removed and determined that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that the
children “would be placed in such a situation whereby they would be at risk in the future
of abject poverty.” A.R. at 68-69. In reaching this conclusion, the IJ acknowledged
Macias-Chamaidan’s regular payments of child support, but noted as well that the
children do not live with him and that he does not provide their medical insurance. As
the BIA noted, “reduced economic and educational opportunities, without more, do not
rise to the level of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual’ hardship.” A.R. at 2-3 (citing In
re Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2002)). Considering the record before the Agency
as a whole, we agree that there was “not sufficient evidence in the record to establish that
the hardship to the [Petitioner’s] United States citizen children … resulting from his
removal would rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual.” A.R. at 2; see
also Wilkinson, 131 F.4th at 142 (noting that “‘exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship’ … has long been understood to require a showing ‘substantially beyond the
ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this
country.’”) (citations omitted).2
2 To the extent Macias-Chamaidan challenges the Agency’s factual findings and weighing of the evidence, “factual findings remain strictly unreviewable.” Wilkinson, 131 F.4th at 139; see also Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 224-25 (“For instance, an IJ’s factfinding on credibility, the seriousness of a family member’s medical condition, or the level of financial support a noncitizen currently provides remain unreviewable.”).
5 We likewise discern no error in the denial of Macias-Chamaidan’s motion to
terminate the proceedings, which argued that the IJ lacked jurisdiction over his
proceedings because the NTA did not specify the time and date of his initial hearing.
“[W]hile § 1229(a) sets forth the type of notice that must be given to a noncitizen and
requires an NTA to include a date and time to appear, the absence of that information
does not impact the IJ’s authority to act.” Chavez-Chilel v. Att’y Gen., 20 F.4th 138, 142-
43 (3d Cir. 2021); see also Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 2019)
(rejecting jurisdictional argument).
As substantial evidence supports the Agency’s hardship determination, and as it
properly denied Macias-Chamaidan’s motion to terminate proceedings, we will deny the
petition for review.3
3 To the extent that Macias-Chamaidan argues that he merits cancellation of removal as an exercise of discretion, that issue is not properly before this Court, as neither the IJ nor the BIA considered the issue. 6